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Abstract	  
This	   thesis	   offers	   a	   revisionist	   interpretation	   of	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   that	  
justified	   US	   interference	   in	   Latin	   America	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   social	   democratic	  
leaders	  between	  1933	  and	  1965.	  It	  posits	  that	  the	  Latin	  American	  social	  democratic	  
ideology	   of	   ‘nationalism,	   socialism	   and	   anti-­‐imperialism’,	   adopted	   in	   Mexico,	  
Venezuela,	   Peru,	   Cuba,	   Colombia,	   Guatemala	   and	   Costa	   Rica,	   posed	   a	   systematic	  
threat	   to	   the	   established	   Latin	   American	   oligarchies	   and	   their	   North	   American	  
supporters.	  This	   ideology	  sought	  to	  transform	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  structures	  
of	  those	  individual	  Latin	  American	  nations	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  for	  
the	   majority	   of	   the	   population.	   Yet	   the	   social	   democrats	   emerged	   during	   the	  
transition	  between	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  when	  progressive	  politics	  were	  
viewed	   with	   caution.	   This	   placed	   their	   nationalist	   movements	   within	   the	   broader	  
context	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.	  While	  the	  Latin	  American	  social	  democrats	  distanced	  
themselves	   from	   the	   small	   Latin	   American	   communist	   movement,	   Washington	  
characterised	   their	   economic	   policies	   as	   within	   ‘the	   communist	   line’.	   Despite	   their	  
lack	   of	   evidence,	   US	   policy	   makers	   directly	   contributed	   to	   the	   downfall	   of	   several	  
social	   democratic	   governments	   between	   1948	   and	   1965	   under	   the	   pretext	   of	   anti-­‐
communism.	  This	  pretext	  effectively	  ended	  the	  movement	   for	  Latin	  American	  social	  
democracy.	  Significant	   ‘blowback’	  then	  occurred	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  radicalisation	  of	  
the	   democratic	   left,	   the	   implantation	   of	   a	   communist	   regime	   in	   Cuba	   and	   the	  
destabilisation	   of	   the	   region	   in	   its	   aftermath.	   By	   revising	   the	   contextual	   and	  
ideological	   origins	   of	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   as	   a	  mechanism	   to	   thwart	   social	  
democracy	  in	  Latin	  America,	  this	  thesis	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  
political,	  military	  and	  economic	  machinations	  of	  the	  US	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  
Cold	  War.	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Introduction:	  A	  Pretext	  for	  Power	  
This	   thesis	   explains	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   that	   was	   utilised	  
against	   a	   generation	   of	   Latin	   American	   ‘social	   democratic’	   and	   ‘populist’	   leaders	  
between	   1933	   and	   1965.	   It	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   United	   States’	   (US)	   ‘Cold	   War’	  
policies	   in	  Latin	  America	  were	  not	  motivated	  by	  communism	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
(USSR).	  Rather,	  these	  policies	  were	  motivated	  by	  Imperial	  expansion	  against	  those	  
countries	  that	  expressed	  nationalist	  economic	  policies.	  This	  assertion	  is	  supported,	  
for	   instance,	   by	   the	   case	   of	   Guatemala	   in	   1954.1	  When	   historians	   examined	   the	  
early	  Cold	  War	  case	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Guatemala	  they	  revealed	  the	  disparity	  
between	  the	  Americans’	  rhetoric	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  and	  their	  actions,	  in	  deposing	  
a	  democratically	  elected	  reformer.	  Several	  historians	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  
reform	   regime	   of	   Jacobo	   Árbenz	   was	   not	   communist	   (Schlesinger	   and	   Kinzer,	  
1982,	   p.	   138). 2 	  Rather,	   the	   Árbenz	   regime	   threatened	   US	   private	   corporate	  
interests,	   which	   provided	   sufficient	   motivation	   for	   a	   US-­‐led	   coup.	   Despite	   the	  
widespread	   acceptance	   of	   this	   view	   of	   events	   in	   Guatemala,	   best	   articulated	   by	  
Greg	  Grandin	  (2004)	  and	  Piero	  Gleijes	  (1990),	  no	  scholar	  has	  sought	  to	  extend	  this	  
conclusion	   into	   a	   regional	   examination	   of	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   utilised	  
elsewhere.	  Guatemala	  was	  not	  unique,	  but	  an	  extreme	  example	  of	  a	  regional	  policy	  
of	  anti-­‐communism	  that	   targeted	  a	  generation	  of	   reform-­‐minded	   leaders	   in	  Latin	  
America.	  The	  US-­‐initiated	  coup	  in	  Guatemala	  had	  a	  similar	  outcome	  to	  the	  dozens	  
of	   domestic	   military	   coups	   that	   occurred	   between	   1948	   and	   1965	   under	   the	  
pretext	   of	   anti-­‐communism.3	  	   As	   this	   thesis	   has	   evolved,	   its	   focus	   has	   shifted	   to	  
defining	   those	   reformist	   governments	   and	   individuals	   targeted	   by	   American-­‐led	  
anti-­‐communism,	   in	   order	   to	   comprehend	   the	   threat	   that	   they	   posed	   to	   US	  
interests.	  Hence	  the	  project	  diverges	  into	  two	  key	  arguments:	  that	  the	  US	  formed	  
an	   alliance	   with	   conservative	   Latin	   American	   elements	   to	   prevent	   economic	  
reform	   under	   the	   pretext	   of	   anti-­‐communism;	   and	   that	   Latin	   American	  
progressives	   followed	   a	   pragmatic	   path	   of	   social	   democracy	   to	   reposition	   their	  
nations’	  places	  within	  the	  international	  capitalist	  economy.	  This	  introduction	  will	  
briefly	  explain	  those	  two	  points.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  Chapter	  Six	  for	  a	  thorough	  analysis	  of	  Guatemala.	  
2	  See	  also:	  Gleijes,	  1990;	  Grow,	  2008;	  Grandin,	  2004;	  Immerman,	  1982;	  Aybar	  de	  Soto,	  1978.	  
3	  For	  information	  on	  Latin	  American	  authoritarianism,	  see	  Schmitz,	  1999.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  
anti-­‐communism	  and	  military	  coups	  see	  Chapters	  Five,	  Six	  and	  Ten.	  
	   7	  
Anti-­‐communism	  was	  utilised	  in	  Latin	  America	  by	  local	  oligarchies	  and	  the	  
US	   State	   Department	   considerably	   earlier	   than	   traditional	   notions	   of	   the	   Latin	  
American	  Cold	  War,	  emerging	  in	  1947-­‐48,	  would	  suggest.	  Anti-­‐communist	  rhetoric	  
was	  utilised	  against	  progressive	  governments	  that	  challenged	  US	  interests	  as	  early	  
as	  the	  1920s.	  In	  1927,	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Frank	  Kellogg	  warned	  of	  the	  Bolshevist	  
threat	   in	  Mexico	   and	   its	   influence	  upon	  Augusto	   Sandino’s	   guerrilla	   campaign	   in	  
Nicaragua	   (as	   cited	   in,	   Wood,	   1961,	   p.	   20).	   The	   US	   Ambassador	   to	   Peru,	   Fred	  
Dearing,	  described	   the	  Aprista	  movement	  as	   “the	   reddest	  of	   the	   red”	   and	   “under	  
the	  influence	  of	  Moscow”	  during	  the	  1931	  presidential	  election	  (as	  cited	  in,	  Stein,	  
1980,	  p.	  172).	  In	  1933-­‐34	  the	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  Cuba,	  Sumner	  Welles,	  accused	  the	  
short-­‐lived	   Grau	   administration	   of	   supporting	   communist	   land	   seizures	   in	   rural	  
areas,	  leading	  to	  the	  overthrow	  of	  his	  government	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  9).	  As	  the	  
international	  Cold	  War	  descended,	  in	  1948,	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Marshall	  
accused	  rioters	  responding	  to	  the	  assassination	  of	  Jorge	  Eliécer	  Gaitán	  in	  Bogotá	  of	  
having	  communist	  motivations	  (as	  cited	  in,	  Randall,	  1992,	  p.	  189).	  Later,	  in	  1954,	  
US	   Secretary	   of	   State	   John	   Foster	   Dulles	   accused	   Guatemala	   of	   communist	  
infiltration	  to	  justify	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Árbenz	  regime	  (Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  
1982,	   p.	   145).	   Then	   US	   Vice-­‐President	   Richard	   Nixon	   (1978)	   labelled	   rioters	   in	  
Lima	   and	   Caracas	   communist	   during	   his	   1958	   trip	   (p.	   190).	   The	   threat	   of	  
communism	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   eventually	   took	   the	   US	   army	   to	   the	   Dominican	  
Republic	  in	  1965,	  as	  it	  was	  by	  then	  an	  institutionalised	  pretext	  for	  interference	  and	  
intervention	  (Crandle,	  2006,	  p.	  66).	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	   (NSC)	  referred	  
to	   its	   actual	   enemies	   	   as	   “impractical	   idealists”	   who	   “promised	   change”	   (NSC,	  
1953).	   Thus,	   anti-­‐communism	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   pervasive	   political	   strategy	   that	  
demonised	  all	  opponents	  of	  Washington’s	  vision	  for	  Latin	  America.	  This	  thesis	  will	  
demonstrate	   that	   these	   accusations	   of	   communism	   were	   exaggerations	   and	  
falsifications	   levied	   for	   political	   expediency	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   US	   imperial	  
interests.	  Of	   equal	   significance	   to	   these	  American	  accusations	  were	   the	  domestic	  
military	  coups	  between	  1948	  and	  1965,	  also	  under	  pretexts	  of	  anti-­‐communism.	  	  
Scholarly	   discussion	   on	   the	   forms	   of	   Latin	   American	   democracy	   is	   well	  
established.4	  It	   has	   gained	   additional	   attention	   during	   the	   past	   decade	   with	   the	  
emergence	   of	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   socially	   minded,	   often	   populist,	   democratic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  literature	  on	  Latin	  American	  democracy	  will	  be	  reviewed	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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leaders.5 	  The	   Venezuelan	   Hugo	   Chávez	   led	   these	   ‘Bolívarians’	   to	   continental	  
relevancy	  from	  his	  1999	  presidential	  inauguration	  until	  his	  death	  in	  2013.	  Daniel	  
Hellinger	  (2011)	  has	  concluded	  that:	  	  
During	  the	  Chávez	  years,	  political	  polarisation	  and	  conflict	  have	  themselves	  
pushed	   scholars	   studying	   Venezuela	   toward	   abstract,	   normative	   portraits	  
that	  replace	  empirical	  research	  with	  praise	  or	  condemnation	  (p.	  21).	  
Hence,	   most	   interpretations	   of	   Chávez’s	   government	   are	   heavily	   reliant	   on	  
polarised	   interpretations	   of	   Chávez	   himself.	   This	   is	   a	   poignant	   feature	   of	   Latin	  
American	  political	  history.	  Critique	  and	  analysis	  often	  centre	  upon	  the	  leader,	  over	  
their	   policies	   or	   achievements.	   Conservative	   academic	   and	   media	   sources	   often	  
claimed	  that	  Chávez	  was	  a	   ‘dictator’,	  a	   ‘socialist’	  or	  a	   ‘communist’,	  and	  argue	  that	  
the	   oppressed	   majority	   would	   have	   removed	   his	   government	   given	   the	  
opportunity.6	  Progressive	   and	   liberal	   academic	   and	   media	   sources	   claimed	   that	  
Chávez’s	   revolution	  was	   the	   last,	   and	  best,	   hope	  of	  Venezuela	   and	  broader	   Latin	  
America	  to	  reinvigorate	  the	  middle-­‐class	  and	  to	  reduce	  dependency	  upon	  the	  US-­‐
led	   capitalist	   world	   economy.7	  This	   thesis	   is	   not	   about	   Hugo	   Chávez,	   because	  
Chávez	  is	  not	  unique	  in	  Latin	  American	  history.	  While	  his	  success	  may	  be	  unique	  
due	   to	   large	   Venezuelan	   oil	   revenues,	   Chávez’s	   policies	   generally	   fell	   within	   the	  
Latin	  American	  social	  democratic	  and	  populist	  traditions.	  Rather,	  the	  focus	  here	  is	  
upon	   the	   initial	   emergence	   of	   socially	   progressive	   movements	   in	   Mexico,	  
Guatemala,	   Costa	   Rica,	   Cuba,	   the	   Dominican	   Republic,	   Colombia,	   Venezuela,	  
Bolivia,	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   between	   1933	   and	   1965.	   Each	   movement	   was	  
uniquely	   based	   on	   political	   and	   economic	   realities	   in	   their	   individual	   nations.	  
However,	   the	   transnational	   influence	   of	   intellectual	   and	   political	   thought	  
demonstrates	  a	  series	  of	  correlations	  within	  these	  movements.	  As	  such	  there	  is	  a	  
need	   to	   provide	   a	   detailed	   theoretical	   analysis	   of	   those	   efforts	   towards	   social	  
progress	   in	   Latin	   America	   during	   the	   mid-­‐twentieth	   century.	   The	   ideological	  
orientation	  of	  this	  generation	  of	  Latin	  American	  leaders	  is	  explored	  in	  this	  work.	  It	  
will	  also	  explain	  the	  conflict	  that	  this	  ideological	  orientation	  caused	  between	  these	  
leaders	  and	  the	  United	  States	  and	  domestic	  oligarchies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  information	  on	  the	  Bolívarian	  movement,	  see:	  Gott,	  2005;	  Cannon,	  2009;	  Ponniah	  and	  
Eastwood,	  2011.	  
6	  For	  the	  pro-­‐Chávez	  side,	  see:	  Webber	  and	  Carr,	  2013;	  Burbach,	  Fox	  and	  Fuentes,	  2013.	  
7	  For	  the	  anti-­‐Chávez	  side,	  see:	  Clark,	  2009;	  Brewer,	  2010.	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This	   thesis	  will	   argue	   that	   there	  was,	   in	   fact,	   a	   ‘Cold	  War’	  waged	   in	   Latin	  
America	   between	   1933	   and	   1965.	   The	   choice	   of	   time-­‐period	   is	   intentional.	   It	  
covers	   the	  period	  when	   this	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  emerged	   to	  when	   it	  became	  
an	   institutionalised	   part	   of	   regional	   politics.	   Accordingly,	   it	   chooses	   to	   end	   at	   a	  
time	  when	  the	  traditionally	  defined	  Cold	  War	   is	   just	  beginning.	  This	   thesis	   is	  not	  
about	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Cold	   War’	   between	   the	   USSR	   and	   the	   US.	   Hence,	   it	   is	   not	  
defined	   by	   the	   traditional	   historical	   parameters.	   While	   the	   conclusions	   of	   this	  
thesis	   have	   obvious	   implications	   for	   the	   overthrow	   of	   Salvador	  Allende	   in	   Chile,	  
the	  Sandinista	  war	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  broader	  Cold	  War	  struggles	  between	  1965	  
and	  1990,	  the	  cause	  of	  that	  conflict	  is	  the	  direct	  interest	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Accordingly,	  
recounting	   those	   events	   and	   demonstrating	   directly	   how	   the	   earlier	   conclusions	  
led	  to	  those	  outcomes	  is	  not	  a	  priority	  here.	  Rather,	  the	  thesis	  studies	  the	  Cold	  War	  
between	   conflicting	   visions	   of	   Latin	   America’s	   place	   in	   the	   capitalist	   world	  
economy,	   between	   the	   region’s	   social	   democrats	   and	   the	   oligarchic	   position	  
supported	  by	  the	  US,	  which	  occurred	  between	  1933	  and	  1965.	  	  
	  
Contribution	  to	  the	  field	  
The	  study	  will	  address	  a	  problem	  that	  has	  not	  been	  approached	  in	  over	  fifty	  
years:	  how	  one	  defines	  this	  generation	  of	  politically	  progressive	  leaders	  and	  why	  
they	  were	   persecuted	   during	   the	   Latin	  American	   ‘Cold	  War’.	   The	   ex-­‐Guatemalan	  
President,	  Arévalo,	   last	  confronted	  this	   issue	   in	  1963.	  Arévalo	  (1963)	  claims	  that	  
‘anti-­‐Kommunism’	  is	  “more	  than	  a	  doctrine,	  more	  than	  a	  political	  theory,	  it	  wears	  
the	   garb	   of	   a	   practical	   tool:	   a	   wall	   to	   block	   off	   the	   wide	   avenue	   of	   popular	  
revindications;	  a	  barricade	  to	  hold	  back	  social	  progress,	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  humble,	  a	  
just	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  and	  the	  winning	  of	  national	  control	  by	  the	  people”	  (p.	  
36).	   He	   believed	   that	   the	   US,	   the	   Latin	   American	   militaries,	   the	   media	   and	   the	  
Catholic	   Church	   had	   created	   anti-­‐communism	   to	   maintain	   a	   status-­‐quo	   of	  
inequality	   in	  Guatemala,	  and	  Latin	  America	  more	  broadly	  (Arévalo,	  1963,	  pp.	  22-­‐
25,	   73-­‐75,	   106,	   166).	   However	   this,	   largely,	   philosophical	   argument	   was	   not	  
supported	   by	   an	   extensive	   study	   to	   correlate	   his	   logical	   argument.	  Hence,	   it	   has	  
been	  relegated	  to	  a	  peripheral	  analysis	  of	  Latin	  American	  political	  discourse.	  This	  
thesis	   will	   explore	   the	   claims	   of	   Arévalo.	   It	   will	   critically	   test	   his	   argument.	   To	  
perform	  this	  task,	  this	  thesis	  is	  situated	  between	  several	  academic	  fields.	  It	  draws	  
in	  scholars	  from	  fields	  including	  political	  science,	  political	  history,	  Latin	  American	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history,	  international	  relations,	  propaganda	  studies	  and	  political	  economy.	  This	  is	  
necessary	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  thesis	  as	  it	  has	  evolved	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  project.	  
It	  will	  not	  be	  possible	   to	  review	  all	  of	   the	  relevant	   literature	  required	  within	   the	  
following	   section.	   Accordingly,	   this	   thesis	   will	   continually	   engage	   with	   the	  
academic	   literature	   when	   approaching	   topics	   of	   substantial	   intellectual	   debate,	  
and	  will	   inform	   the	   discussions	   that	   follow.	   It	  will	   now	  demonstrate	   its	   position	  
within	  the	  scholarly	  discourse.	  
Many	   authors	   have	   approached	   similar	   concerns	   about	   Latin	   American	  
politics	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   ways.	   This	   macro-­‐historical	   method	   of	   studying	   political	  
science	  is	  not	  unique	  in	  the	  field.	  Charles	  Ameringer	  (1974;	  1978;	  2000;	  2009)	  has	  
written	  extensively	  on	  the	  “democratic	  left”	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Ameringer,	  1974,	  p.	  
5).	   He	   concludes,	   “the	   impulse	   to	   create	   a	   socialist	   form	   of	   government	   was	  
common	   among	   the	   countries	   of	   Latin	   America	   during	   the	   twentieth	   century”	  
(Ameringer,	   2009,	   p.	   1).	   However,	   this	   analysis	   somewhat	   oversimplifies	   the	  
disparities	   between	   these	   movements.	   It	   also	   overlooks	   the	   external	   political	  
factors	   motivating	   this	   push	   towards	   socialism.	   Robert	   Alexander	   (1964;	   1979;	  
1982;	   1988;	   1991;	   2009)	   has	   written	   several	   books	   on	   the	   social	   democratic	  
governments	  of	  Latin	  America.	  His	  personal	  insight	  into	  the	  philosophies	  of	  these	  
governments	   is	   informed	   by	   personal	   relationships	   formed	   with	   many	   regional	  
leaders.	  While	   this	  may	   compromise	   objectivity,	   it	   offers	   an	   unparalleled	   insight	  
into	   the	   ideology	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	   governments.	   Stephen	   Rabe	   (1988;	  
1999)	   examines	   the	   anti-­‐communism	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	   and	   Kennedy	  
administrations.	  He	   identifies	   the	   “virulent	   anti-­‐communism”	   of	   Eisenhower	   and	  
Kennedy’s	  view	  of	  Latin	  America	  as	  a	  “Cold	  War	  battleground”	  (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  177;	  
Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  196).	  The	  revisionism	  of	  Rabe	  is	  an	  irreplaceable	  contribution	  to	  the	  
discourse	   of	   American	   Cold	   War	   diplomacy	   between	   1953	   and	   1963.	   Grandin	  
(2004;	  2010)	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  machinations	  of	  US	  imperial	  policy	  in	  Latin	  
America.	   Using	   Guatemala	   as	   a	   starting	   point,	   Grandin	   (2004)	   identifies	   the	  
motivations	   for	   the	   Latin	   American	   revolutions	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   Russian	  
Revolution	  (p.	  175).	  Moreover,	  this	  thesis	  fits	   into	  the	  revisionist	  field	  of	  political	  
science	   in	   Latin	   America.	   These	   scholars	   have	   enriched	   the	   field	   through	   their	  
theoretical	   analysis	   and	   insight	   into	   the	   Cold	  War	   in	   Latin	   America.	   This	   thesis	  
approaches	  a	  different	  question.	  However,	  it	  relies	  upon	  the	  examples	  of	  these,	  and	  
other,	  political	  analyses.	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There	   is	   a	   clear	   gap	   in	   the	   literature.	   This	   notion	   of	   an	   anti-­‐communist	  
pretext	   against	   the	   region’s	   social	   democrats	   has	   not	   been	   conclusively	  
demonstrated	  elsewhere.	  Many	  scholars,	  including	  Rabe	  (1988;	  1999)	  and	  Grandin	  
(2006),	   have	   indicated	   that	   American	   foreign	   policy	   was	   dominated	   by	   anti-­‐
communism	   at	   specific	   intervals.	   However,	   no	   text	   has	   traced	   the	   ideological	  
origins	   of	   this	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext.	   It	   is	   a	   general	   assumption	   that	   anti-­‐
communism	   in	   Latin	   America	   emerged	   during	   the	   1950s	   in	   response	   to	   leftist	  
deviation	  in	  Guatemala	  and	  Cuba.	  This	  thesis	  will	  prove	  that	  anti-­‐communism	  was	  
a	   regional	   policy	   that	   originated	   in	   the	   1930s,	   and	   was	   institutionalised	   in	   the	  
1940s.	   It	  will	   also	  demonstrate	   that	   anti-­‐communism	   scarcely	   targeted	  doctrinal	  
communists.	   Anti-­‐communism	   focussed	   upon	   the	   region’s	   social	   democrats	   and	  
populists.	   This	   raises	   a	   series	   of	   other	   questions,	   including:	  who	  were	   the	   social	  
democrats?;	  why	  was	  the	  US	  opposed	  to	  social	  democracy	  in	  Latin	  America?;	  how	  
was	  anti-­‐communist	  propaganda	  utilised?;	  and	  what	  were	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  anti-­‐
communist	   pretext	   in	   Latin	   America?	   Hence,	   a	   study	   into	   the	   anti-­‐communist	  
pretext	  is	  a	  legitimate	  task	  that	  will	  provide	  insight	  into	  inter-­‐American	  diplomacy	  
between	  1933	  and	  1965.	  While	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  confront	  a	  heterogeneous	  field	  
of	   literature,	   its	   interdisciplinary	   approach	   will	   offer	   a	   valuable	   analysis	   of	  
manifestations	   of	   Latin	   American	   social	   democracy.	   It	   is	   also	   necessary	   because	  
different	   intellectual	   questions	   require	   separate	   methodological	   approaches.	  
Similarly,	  while	   this	   thesis	   is	  not	  wholly	  dependent	  on	  primary	   research,	   certain	  
areas	  demand	  new	  perspectives.	  Hence,	  this	  thesis	  will	  engage	  in	  primary	  research	  
in	   cases	   where	   the	   scholarly	   community	   has	   underestimated	   the	   political	  
significance	  of	  historical	  events.	  This	  will	  make	  the	  thesis	  a	  more	  effective	  analysis	  
than	  a	  simple	  historical	  study.	  It	  will	  also	  make	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  narrative.	  	  
	  
Structure	  and	  Overview	  
This	   thesis	   is	  written	  as	  an	  historical	  narrative.	  This	  will	  demonstrate	   the	  
chronological	   correlations	   between	   what	   some	   consider	   to	   be	   disparate	  
manifestations	   in	   individual	   Latin	   American	   nations.	   This	   thesis	   will	   attempt	   to	  
look	  for	  patterns	  and	  similarities	  across	  movements	  for	  social	  democracy	  and,	  to	  a	  
lesser	   extent,	   populism,	   in	   Latin	   American	   history.	   It	   will	   argue	   that	   these	  
movements	  posed	  a	  common	  vision	   for	  Latin	  America’s	  altered	  role	   in	  the	  global	  
economy	   and	   their	   domestic	   political	   systems.	   It	   will	   also	   argue	   that	   these	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movements	   were	   the	   primary	   targets	   of	   anti-­‐communist	   policy	   within	   Latin	  
America,	  and	  from	  the	  US.	  The	  thesis	  will	  begin	  with	  a	  formal	  literature	  review	  and	  
theoretic	   framework.	  This	  section	  will	   inform	  the	  historical	  narrative	   throughout	  
by	   providing	   clear	   working	   definitions.	   The	   historical	   study	   is	   divided	   into	   two	  
distinct	   historical	   periods	   separated	  by	   the	  1952	  US	  presidential	   election.	   In	   the	  
section	   ‘The	  causes	  of	  anti-­‐communism’	   the	   thesis	  will	   argue	   that	   the	   ideological	  
Cold	  War	   between	   the	   two	   distinct	   visions	   for	   Latin	   America’s	   future	   economic	  
direction,	  between	  1933	  and	  1952.	  It	  will	  compare	  the	  views	  and	  perspectives	  of	  
both	  sides,	  concluding	   that	  US	   interests	  created	  a	  continental	  Cold	  War	  against	  a	  
rhetorical	   ‘communist’	   threat,	   which	   undermined	   the	   region’s	   social	   democrats.	  
The	  subsequent	  section,	   ‘The	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐communism’	  will	  examine	  the	   lasting	  
consequences	   of	   this	   accusation.	   It	  will	   argue	   that	   beyond	   the	   obvious	   effects	   of	  
forced	  authoritarianism	  and	  humanitarian	  concerns,	  this	  ideological	  battle	  defined	  
regional	  politics	  between	  1953	  and	  1965.	  The	  key	  evidence	   for	   this	   includes	   the	  
radicalisation	   the	   segments	   within	   democratic	   left,	   the	   arrival	   of	   a	   communist	  
regime	   in	   Cuba,	   the	   demand	   for	   economic	   assistance,	   and	   the	   moderation	   and	  
eventual	   defeat	   of	   the	   remaining	   social	   democrats.	  Moreover,	   the	   effects	   of	   anti-­‐
communism	  were	  the	  creation	  of	  a	   legitimate	  Cold	  War	  theatre	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
pragmatic	   reform	   in	   Latin	  America.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   ravages	   of	   the	   late-­‐Cold	  War	  
period	   from	  1965	   until	   1991.	   By	   following	   a	   historical	   narrative,	   this	   thesis	  will	  
demonstrate	  a	  consistent	  ideological	  conflict	  in	  Latin	  American	  history.	  
The	   first	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   contextualise	   the	   arguments	   of	   the	   thesis.	   This	  
firstly	  involves	  the	  comparative	  development	  of	  the	  ‘Anglo’	  and	  ‘Latin’	  Americas.	  It	  
will	   explain	   the	   divergence	   of	   the	   two	   geographic	   regions	   through	   sociological,	  
political	  and	  economic	  analysis,	  contextualising	  the	  political	  climates	  of	  both	  North	  
and	  South	  America.	  It	  will	  also	  explain	  why,	  and	  how,	  North	  America	  was	  able	  to	  
assert	  territorial,	  political	  and	  economic	  influence	  over	  parts	  of	  Latin	  America	  as	  a	  
nascent	   form	   of	   imperialism.	   The	   chapter	   will	   further	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
expansion	   of	  US	   influence	   occurred	   concurrently	   to	   independent	   political	   events	  
within	   Latin	   America.	   The	   emergence	   of	   progressive	   political	   thought	   coincided	  
with	   large-­‐scale	  migration	   from	  Europe	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   and	   early	  
twentieth	   century.8	  Europeans	   brought	   political	   theories	   including	   anarchism,	  
syndicalism,	  socialism	  and	  communism.	  These	  European	  communities	   influenced	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Specifically	  to	  the	  southeastern	  parts	  of	  the	  continent.	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labour	   activity	   throughout	   Latin	   America.	   They	   also	   inspired	   politicians	   in	  
Argentina,	   Uruguay	   and	   Chile	   to	   begin	   including	   the	  masses	   within	   the	   political	  
process.	   This	   evolution	   influenced	   activists	   in	  more	   conservative	   and	   repressive	  
states.	   While	   certainly	   influential,	   European	   intellectuals	   did	   not	   determine	   the	  
first	  manifestation	   of	   social	   democratic	   principals	   in	   Latin	  America.	   Rather,	   they	  
emerged	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   multiclass	   alliances	   present	   within	   the	   Mexican	  
Revolution.	   The	   alliance	   formed	   between	   peasants,	   workers,	   and	   middle-­‐class	  
revolutionaries	   were	   solidified	   through	   the	   Mexican	   Constitution	   of	   1917.	  
Considered	  one	  of	  the	  most	  radical	  of	  its	  time,	  it	  laid	  out	  a	  program	  for	  reformers	  
within	   the	  continent,	  which	   focused	  on	  economic	  sovereignty,	   labour	  reform	  and	  
social	  security.	  US	  secretary	  of	  State	  Frank	  Kellogg	   incorrectly	  accused	  Mexico	  of	  
‘Bolshevism’	  in	  1927	  (as	  cited	  in	  Wood,	  1961,	  p.	  20).	  The	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  US	  
officials	   accusing	   reformers	   of	   an	   alliance	  with	   Russia	   began	   in	   this	   period.	   The	  
chapter	  finishes	  by	  setting	  the	  scene	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  limitations	  of	  
the	  US	  position	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
The	   second	   chapter	   examines	   two	   distinct	   visions	   for	   Latin	   America	   that	  
emerged	   during	   1933.	   It	   argues	   that	   these	   two	   visions	   defined	   the	   conflict	  
witnessed	   throughout	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Accordingly,	   the	   emergence	   of	   social	  
democratic	   parties	   and	   ideology	   is	   detailed.	  This	   section	   explains	   the	   theoretical	  
perspective	   of:	   the	  Mexican	   Revolution	   led	   by	   President	   Cárdenas;	   the	   Peruvian	  
Apristas	  under	  political	  candidate	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre;	  the	  Venezuelan	  AD	  led	  by	  the	  
exiled	   intellectual	   Betancourt;	   the	   Colombian	   left	   liberal	   Gaitán	   and	   the	   Cuban	  
Auténticos	   led	  by	  the	  brief	  presidency	  of	  Grau	  San	  Martín.	  It	  will	  argue	  that	  these	  
organisations	   set	   the	   foundations	   for	   ideologically	   similar	   manifestations	   in	  
Bolivia,	  Chile,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Guatemala	  and	   the	  Dominican	  Republic.	  While	  political	  
outcomes	  were	  extremely	  modest	  between	  1933	  and	  1941,	  the	  ideology	  of	  social	  
democracy	   was	   developed	   into	   a	   regional	   philosophy	   during	   this	   period.	   The	  
chapter	   will	   also	   survey	   regional	   communism	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   it	   was	   a	  
movement	  separate	  from,	  and	  inferior	  to	  social	  democracy.	  Whilst	  in	  unique	  cases	  
collaboration	   was	   achieved,	   the	   two	   concepts	   and	   party	   organisations	   were	  
distinct.	   The	   other	   vision	   for	   the	   region’s	   role	   within	   the	   global	   economy	   was	  
pursued	  by	   the	  Roosevelt	  administration	   in	  Washington.	  The	  advent	  of	   the	  Good	  
Neighbour	  Policy	  (GNP)	  facilitated	  the	  Reciprocal	  Trade	  and	  Tariffs	  Act	  (RTTA)	  of	  
1934.	  In	  establishing	  contracts	  of	  reciprocal	  trade,	  the	  US	  supported	  conservative	  
	   14	  
dictatorships	   throughout	   Central	   America	   and	   the	   Caribbean.	   Its	   support	   for	   the	  
oligarchic	  political	  position	  was	  based	  on	  economic	  pragmatism	  and	  self-­‐interest.	  
However,	  this	  positioned	  the	  US	  against	  progressive	  political	  ideas.	  Whilst	  this	  did	  
not	   cause	   significant	  problems	  prior	   to	  World	  War	   II,	   its	   established	   support	   for	  
the	  oligarchic	  position	  would	  define	  its	  position	  within	  the	  ideological	  Cold	  War.	  
The	  third	  chapter	  examines	  the	  effects	  of	  World	  War	  II	  upon	  Latin	  America.	  
While	   the	   War	   did	   not	   physically	   expand	   to	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere,	   it	  
dramatically	  changed	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  climate	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  US	  did	  
not	  hold	  a	  dominant	  political	  or	  economic	  position	  in	  the	  large	  republics	  of	  South	  
America	   prior	   to	   WWII.	   It	   competed	   with	   Europeans	   for	   trade	   and	   investment	  
opportunities.	   It	   struggled	   to	   attain	   the	   political	   and	   military	   loyalties	   of	  
strategically	   significant	   nations.	   Moreover,	   the	   US	   was	   not	   a	   regional	   leader	   in	  
1939.	  The	  closing	  of	  markets	  in	  Europe	  and	  Asia,	  however,	  fostered	  co-­‐dependency	  
between	  the	  advanced	  US,	  and	  the	  export-­‐orientated	  Latin	  American	  economies.	  It	  
also	  provided	  a	  common	   ‘extra-­‐hemispheric’	  enemy.	  This	  elevated	  the	  concept	  of	  
the	   Monroe	   Doctrine	   to	   regional	   significance.	   Many	   Latin	   American	   leaders	  
believed	   that	   their	   alliance	   with	   the	   US	   would	   yield	   economic	   developmental	  
assistance.	  However,	  it	  was	  the	  ideological	  alliance	  that	  brought	  direct	  results	  for	  
the	  people	  of	  the	  region.	  Roosevelt’s	  war	  rhetoric	  led	  to	  a	  democratic	  revolution	  in	  
much	   of	   Latin	   America.	   Social	   democratic	   leaders	   in	   Peru,	   Venezuela,	   Cuba,	  
Guatemala	   and	   Costa	   Rica	   replaced	   longstanding	   dictatorships	   and	   oligarchic	  
control	  between	  1944	  and	  1948.	  They	  were,	   in	  part,	  motivated	  by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  
the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  and	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  ‘Four	  Freedoms’.	  They	  sought	  to	  remove	  
those	   types	   of	   totalitarianism,	   upon	  which	   the	   US	   had	  waged	  war	   in	   Europe,	   in	  
their	   own	   nations.	   Washington	   furthered	   this	   initiative	   by	   demanding	   that	   the	  
nationalist	  dictators	  of	  Brazil	  and	  Argentina	  hold	  democratic	  elections.	  Moreover,	  
progressive	  democracy	  was	  implanted	  upon	  the	  majority	  of	  Latin	  American	  people	  
between	  1944	  and	  1948.	  The	  era	  of	  the	  Four	  Freedoms	  was	  briefly	  realised	  in	  this	  
oppressed	   part	   of	   the	   world.	   Unfortunately	   for	   US	   leaders,	   many	   of	   these	  
progressive	  democracies	  limited	  the	  expected	  post-­‐war	  expansion	  of	  US	  trade	  and	  
investment	   in	  Latin	  America.	  Their	   frustration	  with	   those	   leaders	   led	   to	   a	  policy	  
reversal	  regarding	  regional	  democracy	  between	  1947	  and	  1950.	  
The	   fourth	  chapter	  argues	   that	   the	  Cold	  War	   in	  Latin	  America	  began	  after	  
April	   9,	   1948	  when	   Gaitán	  was	  murdered	   in	   Bogotá	   (Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   134).	   This	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chapter	   argues	   that	   Latin	  America	  was	   not	   part	   of	   the	   global	   Cold	  War	   between	  
communism	  and	  capitalism.	  However,	  it	  was	  in	  Washington’s	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  
As	  such,	  Washington	  began	  consolidating	  its	  leadership	  over	  the	  region.	  This	  was	  
achieved	   through	   the	   coordination	   of	  military	   alliances,	   arms	   sales	   and	   training.	  
The	  1947	  Rio	  Pact	   ensured	   collective	  defence	   against	   external	   threats.	  However,	  
the	  more	   significant	   Organisation	   of	   American	   States	   (OAS),	   established	   in	   April	  
1948,	   sought	   to	   exercise	   greater	   authority	  over	   the	  domestic	  politics	   of	  member	  
states.	   As	  Washington	   had	   largely	   achieved	   its	   dominant	   stance	   over	   the	   region	  
during	  WWII,	   it	  did	  not	  commit	  to	  large-­‐scale	  developmental	  assistance	  in	  return	  
for	  Latin	  American	  assistance	   in	   their	  Cold	  War.	   It	  was	  expected	  that	   the	  export-­‐
orientated	   economies	  of	   Latin	  America	  would	   continue	   to	   exclusively	   supply	   the	  
US	  with	  materials	   and	  would	   absorb	   their	   industrial	   exports.	   Additionally,	   their	  
moral	   support	   at	   the	   UN	   was	   of	   special	   significance.	   During	   April	   1948,	   the	   US	  
delegation	   led	   by	   George	   Marshall	   attempted	   to	   include	   Latin	   America	   in	   their	  
global	  Cold	  War.	  However,	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  in	  1948	  that	  communism	  posed	  
a	  threat	  to	  Latin	  America.	  This	  changed	  on	  April	  9,	  when	  Gaitán’s	  murder	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  ‘Bogotázo’	  was	  characterised	  as	  a	  communist	  insurrection	  by	  Marshall.	  
This	   led	   to	   a	   unanimous	   anti-­‐communist	   declaration	   by	   the	   Organisation	   of	  
American	  States,	  and	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  
The	   fifth	   chapter	   explains	   the	   effect	   of	   American	   anti-­‐communism	   upon	  
Latin	  American	  democracy.	  This	   requires	   a	  detailed	   evaluation	  of	   the	   shift	   in	  US	  
policy	   known	   as	   the	  Miller	  Doctrine.	   Policy	   documents	   by	  George	  Kennan,	   Louis	  
Halle,	  Francis	  Truslow	  and	  Edward	  G.	  Miller	  indicate	  a	  fundamental	  shift	  from	  the	  
pro-­‐democracy	   position	   of	   ‘Bradenism’	   to	   one	   of	   pragmatic	   support	   for	  military	  
regimes.	   In	   fact,	   Halle	   suggested	   that	   military	   governments	   could	   provide	  more	  
stability	   and	   could	   better	   repel	   ‘communists’.	   Stability	   had	   returned	   as	  
Washington’s	   policy	   in	   Latin	   America.	   This	   policy	   reversal	   was	   based	   on	  
Washington’s	  view	  of	  Latin	  America’s	  place	  within	   the	  global	   capitalist	  economy.	  
Social	  democratic	  and	  populist	  governments	  espoused	  economic	  nationalism.	  This	  
nationalism	  led	  several	  governments	  to	  pursue	  labour	  reform,	  market	  reform	  and	  
financial	   reform.	   All	   of	   these	   manoeuvres	   sought	   to	   moderate	   the	   effects	   of	  
international	  capitalism	  upon	  their	  populations.	  This	  was	  especially	  detrimental	  to	  
US	   firms	   operating	   in	   those	   republics.	   In	   their	   dealings	   with	   Mexico,	   the	   US	  
inadvertently	   revealed	   their	   conception	  of	   the	   ‘communist	   line’	   as	   any	   economic	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policy	   that	   diverted	   from	  US	   interests.	   This	   in	   turn	   led	   to	   a	   regional	  withdrawal	  
from	  democratic	  governance	  between	  1948	  and	  1955.	  While	  the	  US	  only	  directly	  
overthrew	  the	  Árbenz	  regime	  in	  Guatemala,	  the	  shift	  in	  US	  policy	  facilitated	  several	  
interconnected	   military	   coups	   during	   this	   period.	   As	   a	   result,	   military	   regimes	  
emerged	  in	  Peru	  in	  1948,	  Venezuela	  in	  1948,	  Haiti	  in	  1950,	  Cuba	  in	  1952,	  Colombia	  
in	   1953,	   Paraguay	   in	   1954,	   Guatemala	   in	   1954	   and	   Argentina	   in	   1955.	   Anti-­‐
communism	   motivated	   these	   coups.	   In	   both	   Peru	   and	   Venezuela	   the	   social	  
democratic	   leadership	   were	   characterised	   as	   communist	   to	   justify	   military	  
leadership.	   The	   US	   continued	   to	   work	   closely	   with	   Latin	   American	   military	  
regimes,	   providing	   increased	  military	   assistance	   and	   training.	  The	   climate	  of	   the	  
Cold	  War	  eradicated	  democratic	  rule	   in	  much	  of	  Latin	  America.	  Hence,	   the	  social	  
democratic	   community,	   and	   its	   collective	   ideology,	   was	   in	   exile	   for	  much	   of	   the	  
1950s.	  	  
The	   sixth	   chapter	   begins	   to	   explore	   the	   effects	   of	   international	   anti-­‐
communism.	   It	   will	   do	   so	   by	   examining	   the	   motivation	   for	   the	   removal	   of	  
governments	   in	   Argentina,	   Brazil	   and	   Guatemala.	   The	   Guatemalan	   coup	   of	   June	  
1954	   has	   been	   debated	   for	   decades.	   Most	   scholars	   have	   concluded	   that	   Jacobo	  
Árbenz	  was	   not	   a	   communist	   or	   under	   the	   direct	   influence	   of	   communists.	   This	  
thesis	   extends	   that	   view	   by	   placing	   Guatemala	   into	   a	   regional	   context.	   It	   can	   be	  
seen	   as	   the	   epitome	   of	   a	   policy	   of	   anti-­‐communism,	   rather	   than	   an	   aberration	  
caused	   by	   corrupting	   corporate	   influences	   upon	   the	   administration	   of	   Dwight	  
Eisenhower.	   This	   chapter	   explains	   Eisenhower’s	   South	   American	   problem.	   NSC	  
144/1	   defined	   those	   leaders	   antithetic	   to	   US	   interests	   in	   Latin	   America	   in	   1953	  
(NSC,	   1953).	   Unsurprisingly,	   many	   of	   the	   social	   democrats	   had	   been	   removed	  
indirectly	   through	   the	  policies	   of	   the	  Miller	  Doctrine.	   Yet	  Árbenz,	  Getúlio	  Vargas	  
and	   Juan	   Perón	   remained.	   The	   US	   Department	   of	   State	   and	   the	   CIA	   argued	   that	  
each	   of	   these	   leaders	   was	   under	   the	   control,	   or	   influence,	   of	   communists.	   This	  
forged	  a	  pretext	  for	  their	  removal.	   It	  was	  also	  revealing	  that	  the	   ‘South	  American	  
problem’	  was	   less	   influenced	   by	   governmental	   style	   than	   by	   economic	   ideology.	  
That	  is,	  idealistic	  leaders	  like	  Arévalo	  and	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre	  were	  linked	  to	  military	  
leaders	   such	   as	   Perón	   and	   Vargas.	   Nevertheless,	   from	   1953	   the	   process	   of	  
removing	  these	  three	  governments	  was	  underway.	  The	  CIA	  operation	  PBSUCCESS	  
overthrew	   Árbenz	   in	   1954.	   After	   Vargas	   lost	   the	   loyalty	   of	   the	   military	  
establishment	   in	   1954,	   he	   took	  his	   own	   life	   to	   preserve	   the	   democratic	   order	   in	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Brazil.	   Perón	   was	   overthrown	   by	   the	   military	   in	   1955.	   While	   the	   CIA	   was	   only	  
directly	  involved	  in	  one	  of	  these	  instances,	  US	  ambitions	  in	  Guatemala,	  Brazil	  and	  
Argentina	  were	   identical;	   to	  remove	  a	  progressive	   leader	  and	  help	   install	  a	  more	  
pliable	  government	  that	  could	  ensure	  fiscal	  and	  social	  stability.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1955	  
democracy	   remained	   in	   only	   five	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   all	   led	   by	   the	  
conservative	  wing	  of	  their	  movement.	  
The	   seventh	   chapter	   begins	   to	   examine	   the	   effect	   of	   imposed	  
authoritarianism	  upon	  the	  intellectual	  exiles.	  It	  starts	  by	  surveying	  the	  effect	  of	  US	  
policy	   upon	   the	   lives	   of	   Latin	   American	   people	   in	   1955.	   Many	   of	   the	   autocratic	  
rulers	  oversaw	  a	  significant	  decrease	  in	  living	  standards.	  The	  US	  policy	  at	  the	  1955	  
Rio	   economic	   conference	  maintained	   the	   economic	   status	   quo	   between	   the	   two	  
continents.	   However,	   this	   status	   quo	   could	   not	   continue	   indefinitely	   due	   to	   the	  
continuing	  presence	  of	  social	  democratic,	  and	  other	  more	  radical	  elements	  present	  
in	  virtually	  all	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  During	  the	  period	  from	  1956	  until	  1960	  
several	  of	  the	  authoritarian	  regimes	  fell	  to	  pro-­‐democratic	  elements.	  However,	  the	  
nature	   of	   the	   alliances	   against	   military	   rule	   threatened	   the	   leadership	   of	   many	  
social	   democrats.	   While	   they	   celebrated	   the	   removal	   of	   military	   regimes,	   the	  
radicalisation	   of	   former	   allies	   challenged	   their	   control	   over	   the	   masses.	   Latin	  
American	  anger	  at	  US	  policy	  boiled	  over	  in	  May	  1958	  when	  Vice	  President	  Richard	  
Nixon	   embarked	   on	   a	   goodwill	   tour.	   The	   people	   of	   Lima,	   Peru,	   and	   Caracas,	  
Venezuela,	  verbally	  and	  physically	  abused	  Nixon.	  The	  violence	   in	  Caracas	  was	  so	  
severe	   that	   Eisenhower	   sent	   warships	   to	   Venezuela’s	   Caribbean	   coast.	   The	   only	  
remaining	   member	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	   community	   not	   exiled	   by	   his	   own	  
government	   was	   Figueres.	   He	   was	   invited	   to	   address	   the	   US	   Congress’	   Inter-­‐
American	  Affairs	  committee	  on	  June	  9,	  1958.	  There,	  he	  deplored	  US	  policy	  towards	  
Latin	  America’s	  dictators,	  suggesting	  that	  other	  means	  of	  communication	  between	  
progressives	   and	   the	  US	  had	   failed,	   and	   “the	  only	   thing	   left	   to	  do	   [was]	   spitting”	  
upon	   Nixon	   and	   US	   policy	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   146).	   The	   Brazilian	   President	  
Juscelino	   Kubitschek	   provided	   the	   Eisenhower	   administration	   with	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   decrease	   tensions	   and	   to	   build	   an	   effective	   dialogue	   with	   Latin	  
America’s	   progressives	   through	   ‘Operation	   Pan-­‐America’	   (OPA).	   However,	  
Eisenhower	  refused.	  He	  continued	   to	  assume	  military	  strength	  would	  maintain	  a	  
status	  quo	  and	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  jeopardise	  that.	  Within	  six	  months	  it	  would	  be	  too	  
late,	  as	  the	  first	  declared	  communist	  regime	  was	  established	  in	  Cuba.	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The	   eighth	   chapter	   explains	   that	   the	  most	  direct	   consequence	  of	   imposed	  
authoritarianism	   was	   the	   radicalisation	   of	   democratic	   socialism	   in	   Cuba.	   In	  
analysing	  the	  radicalisation	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  this	  thesis	  asserts	  that	  Fidel	  
Castro	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  prior	  to	  the	  revolution.	  In	  fact	  Castro	  was	  a	  follower	  of	  
the	   anti-­‐communist	   politician	   Eduardo	   (Eddy)	   Chibás.	   Chibás’	   death	   in	   1951,	  
followed	  by	  the	  Batista	  coup	  in	  1952	  radicalised	  many	  in	  his	  Ortoxodo	  Party.	  The	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  anti-­‐dictatorial	  movements	  in	  
the	  1950s.	  Castro’s	   ‘revolutionary	  army’	  worked	  directly	  with	  the	  urban	  rebels	  of	  
Frank	  País	  and	  the	  old	  social	  democrats	  led	  by	  Grau	  San	  Martín,	  and	  even	  received	  
funding	   from	   regional	   allies	   including	   Figueres	   and	   Betancourt.	   The	   sole	   non-­‐
oligarchic	   group	   to	   avoid	   collaboration	   with	   the	   Revolution	   was	   the	   Cuban	  
Communist	  Party.	  When	   in	  power,	   the	  Cuban	  revolutionaries	  proposed	  a	  modest	  
reform	   agenda	   and	   elections	   and	   forfeited	   some	   power	   to	   more	   moderate	  
democratic	  elements.	  However,	  as	  US	  business	  interests	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  
opposed	  these	  fundamental	  economic	  reforms,	  control	  of	  the	  nation	  was	  handed	  to	  
radicals,	   led	   by	   Castro	   during	   1959.	   Castro	   asserted	   that	   pragmatism	  would	   fail	  
and	   that	   the	   reforms	   were	   necessary	   to	   maintain	   popular	   enthusiasm.	   Castro	  
continued	  to	  develop	  Cuba	  without	  US	  support,	  constantly	  fearing	  retaliation.	  His	  
position	  was	  confirmed	   in	  1961	  when	  the	  CIA	  sponsored	  the	   invasion	  of	  Cuba	  at	  
Playa	  Girón.	  From	  1961,	  Castro’s	  revolutionary	  regime	  became	  increasingly	  similar	  
to	   a	   communist	   dictatorship.	   This	   distanced	  Castro	   from	   the	   social	   democrats	   of	  
the	   region.	   This	   thesis	   will	   prove	   that	   the	   CIA	   used	   this	   conflict	   to	   coerce	   the	  
democratic	   left	   into	   its	   camp	   against	   Castro,	   significantly	   holding	   its	   major	  
conferences	  against	  Castro	  in	  Costa	  Rica,	  in	  1960,	  and	  Venezuela,	  in	  1961.	  The	  US	  
was	  committed	  to	  isolating	  Castro	  prior	  to	  the	  eventual	  destruction	  of	  his	  regime.	  
This	  campaign	  of	  intimidation	  backfired	  in	  1962	  when	  Castro,	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  
invasion,	   invited	   the	   USSR	   to	   station	   missiles	   in	   Cuba,	   increasing	   Cold	   War	  
tensions.	   The	   chapter	   concludes	   that	   US	   actions	   radicalised	   Castro’s	   Cuban	  
Revolution.	  	  
The	  ninth	  chapter	  exposes	  Washington’s	  attempts	  to	  isolate	  Cuba	  from	  their	  
former	  allies	  through	  the	  rhetorical	  Alliance	  for	  Progress.	  The	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  
was	   John	   F.	   Kennedy’s	   version	   of	   the	   Good	   Neighbour	   Policy.	   He	   acknowledged	  
that	  US	  policy	  had	  contributed	  to	  Castro’s	  revolution.	  The	  propaganda	  of	  the	  AFP	  
was	   masterful.	   Figueres	   wrote	   to	   Betancourt	   in	   1960,	   asserting	   that	   the	   Latin	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American	   democrats	  would	   be	   positioned	   as	   US	   allies	   against	   dictatorships.	   The	  
CIA	  assassination	  of	  Rafael	  Trujillo	  confirmed	  this	  view.	  The	  AFP	  Charter	  of	  1961	  
proposed	  to	  enact	  the	  social	  democratic	  revolution	  in	  Latin	  America.	  It	  committed	  
to	  land	  reform,	  labour	  reform,	  economic	  development,	  political	  freedoms	  and	  even	  
commodity	   price	   reform	   through	   ‘common	  markets’.	   This	   thesis	   asserts	   that	   not	  
only	  did	  the	  AFP	  fail,	  however;	  in	  fact	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  fail.	  The	  AFP	  did	  not	  set	  up	  
the	  mechanisms	   to	  make	   the	   structural	   reforms	  necessary	   to	  evolve	   the	  political	  
economies	   of	   underdeveloped	   states.	   It	   essentially	   placed	   the	  onus	  of	   enacting	   a	  
revolution	  upon	  the	  oligarchic	  politicians	  in	  whose	  interest	  it	  was	  to	  prevent	  one.	  
Therefore,	   Kennedy	   was	   not	   an	   impractical	   idealist	   –	   he	   was	   a	   masterful	  
propagandist.	   Kennedy	   has	   had	   the	   greatest	   impact	   upon	   the	   US	   image	   in	   Latin	  
America	   since	   Cordell	   Hull’s	   declaration	   of	   unwavering	   US	   commitment	   to	  
sovereignty	  in	  December	  1933.	  The	  US	  ideologically	  positioned	  itself	  as	  an	  ally	  of	  
Latin	   American	   social	   democracy.	   However,	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   aid	   provided	   to	  
Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1960s,	  serviced	  debts	  and	  devaluated	  currencies	  created	  
token	   development	   projects	   and	   increased	   the	   military	   capacity	   of	   dictatorial	  
governments.	  Hence,	  the	  AFP	  was	  designed	  to	  fail	  Latin	  America.	  However	  it	  was	  a	  
great	  policy	  success	  for	  the	  US	  as	  it	  further	  isolated	  Castro	  and	  justified	  increased	  
economic	  and	  military	  involvement	  throughout	  the	  continent.	  	  
The	   final	   chapter	   outlines	   the	   demise	   of	   social	   democracy	   due	   to	   the	  
expansion	   of	   Cold	   War	   anti-­‐communism.	   The	   death	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	  
philosophy	   was	   slow.	   The	   revolutionary	   impetus	   had	   passed	   on	   to	   Castro,	   and	  
Castroism-­‐communism	  would	   define	   the	   struggles	  with	   authoritarian	   regimes	   in	  
Colombia,	   Nicaragua,	   Peru,	   Guatemala	   and	   El	   Salvador.	   Moreover,	   social	  
democracy	  declined	  in	  significance	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext.	  The	  
deposed	   Dominican	   President	   Juan	   Bosch	   suggested	   in	   1963	   that	   the	   Americas	  
were	  “in	  the	  grip	  of	  psychosis”	  about	  reform	  and	  communism	  (Alexander,	  1995,	  p.	  
230).	  That	   is,	   the	  middle	  path	  that	  his	  allies	  had	  tracked	  for	  the	  past	   thirty	  years	  
had	   ceased	   to	   exist.	   This	   chapter	   explains	   the	   demise	   of	   social	   democratic	  
principles	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Firstly,	   the	   social	   democrats	   lost	   control	   of	   the	  
revolutionary	   leadership.	   The	   rise	   of	   insurgent	   movements	   in	   Bolivia,	   Colombia	  
and	   Venezuela,	   among	   others,	   gave	   the	   emphasis	   back	   to	   the	   Castroists.	   The	  
conflict	  became	  one	  between	  radical	  leftists	  and	  US-­‐supported	  regimes	  from	  1962	  
and	   1965.	   This	   condemned	   social	   democracy	   to	   virtual	   irrelevancy.	   To	   combat	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these	   new	   insurgent	   organisations,	   the	   US	   developed	   concepts	   of	   counter-­‐
insurgency.	   The	   vast	  majority	   of	   US	  military	   aid	   to	   Latin	   America	   following	   The	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  was	  designed	  for	  counter-­‐insurgency	  programs.	  This	  blurred	  the	  
distinction	   between	   the	   military	   and	   the	   police	   and	   increased	   the	   potential	   to	  
defeat	   insurgent	   organisations	   anywhere	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Expanded	   military	  
assistance	  propelled	  Washington	  to	  become	  a	  regional	  leader	  of	  not	  only	  external	  
defence	  but	  also	   internal	  defence	  against	  anti-­‐American	  forces.	  This	  position	  was	  
finally	  solidified	  through	  a	  series	  of	  military	  coups	  in	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  Honduras,	  
the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Peru	  and	  Bolivia.	  By	  1965	  the	  Cold	  War	  battle	  lines	  were	  
drawn	  and	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement	  was	  over.	  	  
This	  historical	  narrative	  confronts	  the	  standard	  definition	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  
as	  a	  conflict	  between	  the	  US	  and	  USSR.	  While	  the	  following	  section	  will	  outline	  the	  
thesis	  position	  on	  several	  academic	  discussions	   in	   thematic,	   the	   larger	   thesis	  can	  
only	  be	   told	  as	  a	  narrative.	   It	   follows	   the	  careers	  and	   ideological	  development	  of	  
several	  leaders	  and	  movements	  that	  are	  broadly	  considered	  disparate.	  This	  thesis	  
demonstrates	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  as	  these	  movements	  developed	  concurrently.	  
Leaders	   watched	   events	   unfold	   in	   their	   sister	   republics	   to	   gauge	   the	   different	  
attitudes	   of	   American	   leaders	   towards	   democracy	   and	   economic	   nationalism	   to	  
base	   their	   own	   national	   policies	   upon.	   This	   is	   a	   history	   of	   an	   entire	   continent	  
comprised	   of	   twenty	   individual	   independent	   republics.	   A	   nation-­‐by-­‐nation	   or	  
thematic	   approach	   would	   fail	   to	   grasp	   the	   enormous	   significance	   in	   regional	  
history	  or	  to	  underline	  the	  role	  played	  by	  external	  forces.	  
	  
	   21	  
Literature	  Review	  and	  Theoretical	  Framework	  
As	   the	   thesis	   is	   structured	   as	   a	   historical	   narrative,	   this	   section	   is	   designed	   to	  
overview	   the	   literature	   in	   the	  diverse	   fields	   covered,	  provide	   clear	  definitions	  of	  
terminology	  based	  on	  that	  literature,	  and	  explain	  the	  methodology	  that	  underpins	  
the	  thesis	  arguments.	  This	  allows	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  thesis	  to	  flow	  as	  a	  macro-­‐
historical	   narrative.	   This	   section	   will	   accordingly	   define	   its	   position	   on:	   the	  
evolution	  of	  Latin	  American	  political	  though;	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement;	  and	  
the	   expansion	   of	   US	   imperialism	   in	   the	   Americas.	   This	   will	   clarify	   the	   use	   of	  
potentially	   contentious	   terms	   throughout	   the	   thesis	   and	  demonstrate	  where	   this	  
thesis’	  position	  on	  several	  topics	  fits	  within	  the	  academic	  field.	  It	  will	  also	  provide	  
the	  assumptions	  that	  underpin	  the	  thesis	  arguments	  throughout.	  This	  chapter	  will	  
also	  explain	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  the	  thesis	  by	  overviewing	  the	  position	  of	  
the	   thesis	   within	   the	   fields	   of	   examination.	   This	   will	   explain	   the	   methodology	  
which	   underpins	   the	   arguments	   surrounding:	   anti-­‐communist	   accusations;	   the	  
motivation	  which	   underpins	   those	   accusations;	   the	   politics	   of	   social	   progress	   in	  
Latin	   America;	   and	   the	   forces	   of	   conservatism	   in	   Latin	   America.	   This	   chapter	   is	  
designed	  to	  provide	  some	  academic	  insight	  that	  underpins	  the	  historical	  narrative	  
of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
	  
The	  Evolution	  of	  Latin	  American	  Thought	  
Latin	   American	   political	   thought	   emerged	   within	   the	   system	   created	   by	   the	  
nationalist	  independence	  movements	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.9	  This	  system	  was	  
centred	  on	  a	  moneyed	  “oligarchy”.	  An	  oligarchy	  can	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  ownership	  of	  
a	   region	   or	   nation	   by	   a	   small,	   wealthy	   group.	   These	   oligarchic	   regimes	  
intentionally	  excluded	  the	  masses	  from	  politics	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  class,	  race,	  gender	  
and	   for	   personal	   economic	   interests.	   The	   concentration	   of	   power	   within	   the	  
oligarchies	  was	  determined	  by	  the	  size	  of	  the	  creole	  aristocracy	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  
respective	  revolutions.	  Fourteen	  families,	  for	  example,	  ruled	  El	  Salvador,	  for	  over	  a	  
century	  (Dunkerley,	  1979,	  p.7).	  While	  in	  larger	  states	  like	  Venezuela	  the	  oligarchy	  
was	  much	  larger	  and	  a	  bigger	  portion	  of	  the	  population.	  The	  size	  and	  the	  economic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  While	  chapter	  one	  will	  provide	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  those	  revolutions,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  begin	  by	  establishing	  definitions	  for	  the	  relevant	  terminology.	  It	  is	  
also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  broad	  definitions	  of	  political	  actors	  and	  
organisations	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  will	  not	  always	  fit	  the	  circumstance	  of	  
each	  nation.	  Hence,	  qualifications	  will	  be	  required	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	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interests	   of	   the	   oligarchs	   determined	   the	   form	   of	   government	   employed.	  Where	  
large	   oligarchies	  with	   competing	   interests	   existed,	   countries	   routinely	   operated,	  
what	   Smith	   (2012)	   has	   called,	   “oligarchic	   democracies”	   (p.	   26).	   	   An	   oligarchic	  
democracy	  is	  a	  very	  limited	  form	  of	  democracy	  where	  factors	  such	  as	  wealth,	  class,	  
race,	  gender,	  and	  land	  ownership	  determined	  whether	  a	  person	  could	  vote	  or	  hold	  
office,	   excluding	   all	   non-­‐oligarchic	   people.	   These	   competing	   interests	   between	  
“conservatives”	   and	   “liberals”,	   discussed	   below,	   often	   led	   to	   military	   conflict	  
necessitating	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  military	  “caudillo”.	  A	  caudillo	   is	   in	  essence	  a	  military	  
dictator	  (Di	  Tella,	  2004).	  In	  theory,	  however,	  the	  caudillo	  emerges	  from	  outside	  of	  
the	  oligarchy	  and	   serves	   the	  oligarchic	   interests	   in	   exchange	   for	  personal	  power	  
and	   wealth.	   Caudilloism	   also	   emerged	   to	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	   small-­‐unified	  
oligarchies	   from	   peasant	   and	   worker	   insurrections.	   Almond	   (1989)	   asserts	   that	  
there	  are	  several	  impediments	  to	  Latin	  American	  democracy	  including	  militarism	  
and	  oligarchic	  reaction	  (p.	  21).	  Hence,	  thoughts	  about	  Latin	  American	  democracy	  
emerged	  within	  this	  unstable	  and	  cyclical	  context.	  
	   The	   intellectual	   and	   political	   traditions	   of	   Latin	   American	   politics	   have	  
often	  been	  defined	  through	  the	  polarisation	  of	  Liberals	  and	  Conservative	  Parties.	  
While	   this	   thesis	  will	   assert	   that	   their	   coalition	   against	   progressive	   ideologies	   is	  
more	  significant	  than	  their	  opposition,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  define	  the	  two	  positions.	  
Woodward	  (1963)	  defines	  Latin	  American	  “conservatism”	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  radical	  
philosophies	   that	  emerged	   in	  nineteenth	  century	  Europe	   (pp.	  1-­‐9).	  Conservatism	  
was	   ideologically	   very	   close	   to	   the	   Catholic	   Church,	   which	   “upheld	   the	   existing	  
order”	   in	   the	  Catholic	   countries	  of	   the	  Americas	   (Woodward,	   1963,	   p.	   5).	  Hence,	  
the	  emergence	  of	  conservatism	  in	  Latin	  America	  was	  a	  response	  to	   the	  arrival	  of	  
liberalism	   during	   the	   national	   revolutions.	   Henderson	   (1988)	   asserts	   that	   the	  
emergence	  of	  Latin	  American	  conservatism	  “illustrate[s]	  both	  the	  unity	  of	  Western	  
history	  and	  the	  element	  of	   lag	   in	   the	  spread	  and	  acceptance	  of	  new	  ideas”	  (p.	  6).	  
This	   lag	   was	   both	   geographical	   and	   programmatic.	   As	   De	   Tella	   (2004)	  
demonstrates,	  conservative	  parties	  are	  a	  continuing	  part	  of	  the	  political	  landscape	  
in	   Latin	   America.	   Latin	   American	   liberalism	   originated	   from	   within	   European	  
thought.	   Fawcett	   (2014)	   defines	   “liberalism”	   as	   the	   belief,	   “that	   societies	   were	  
constantly	   evolving”	   with	   a	   specific	   emphasis	   “on	   people’s	   rights,	   toleration,	  
constitutional	   government,	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   and	   liberty”	   (pp.	   1-­‐9).	   All	   of	   the	  
nineteenth	  century	  philosophical	  traditions,	  including	  Marxism,	  defined	  liberty	  as	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a	  goal.	   Liberalism,	  however,	  diverges	   from	  Marxism	   through	   its	   emphasis	  on	   the	  
individual.	  	  
	   Liberals	   emphasise	  harnessing	   the	  power	  of	   people,	  who	  may	  be	  unequal	  
and	  even	  immoral	  (Fawcett,	  2014,	  p.	  11).	  This	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  classical	  liberal	  
works	  including	  Hobhouse	  (1964)	  and	  Weber	  (2008).	  It	  is,	  however,	  important	  to	  
make	   a	   distinction	   between	   economic	   and	   social	   components	   of	   liberalism.	  
Grampp	  (1965)	  defines	  “economic	   liberalism”	  as	  a	  “laissez-­‐faire”	  approach	  to	  the	  
economy	   that	   utilises	   human	   energy	   (p.	   167).	   Hence,	   economic	   liberals	   have	  
sought	   to	   unleash	   the	   powers	   of	   the	   free	   market	   to	   rapidly	   expand	   economic	  
output	   in	   their	   respective	  nations.	  Alternatively,	  Macer	   (2003)	  defines	   the	   social	  
liberal,	   or	   “progressive”	   agenda	   as	   “requiring	   an	   impressive	   host	   of	   reforms,”	  
including	   the	   improvement	  of	   the	   “conditions	  of	  workers”	   (p.	  79).	  Progressivism	  
began	   as	   an	   isolated	   strand	   of	   liberalism	   that	   sought	   to	   regenerate	   society	   by	  
utilising	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  According	  to	  Peeler	  (1998)	  “most	  Latin	  
American	   liberals	  were	   less	   deeply	   committed	   to	   the	   political	   side	   of	   liberalism,	  
with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   constitutionalism,	   limited	   government	   and	   freedom	   of	  
expression”	  as	  they	  were	  preoccupied	  by	  ‘economic	  liberalism,’	  which	  advantaged	  
the	  entrepreneurial	  oligarchic	  class	  (p.	  36).	  Hence,	  when	  it	  is	  said	  that	  the	  principle	  
conflict	   in	  Latin	  American	  politics	  was	  between	   liberalism	  and	  conservatism,	   the	  
statement	   concerns	   economic	   theories	   rather	   than	   progressive	   notions	   of	  
egalitarianism.	  
	   Hence,	   the	   first	   century	   of	   Latin	   American	   independence	  witnessed	   small	  
factions	  compete	  for	  control	  over	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  system.	  However,	  by	  
the	   late	   nineteenth	   and	   early	   twentieth	   century	   several	   competing	   ideologies	  
emerged.	  Smith	  (2012)	  defines	  democracy	  as	  “free	  completion	  or	  competition”	  and	  
“accountability”	   within	   a	   participatory	   system	   (p.23).	   He	   also	   defined	   “semi-­‐
democracies”,	  such	  as	  the	  Mexican	  PIR,	  as	  being	  able	  to	  work	  for	  the	  public	  good	  
(Smith,	  2012,	  p.	  25).	  However,	   Joseph	  (2008)	   identifies	   the	   “alternating	  cycles	  of	  
social	  reform	  and	  intense	  conservative	  reaction”	  as	  “an	  international	  Civil	  War”	  (p.	  
4).	  The	  vulnerability	  of	   these	  democratic	  experiments	  was	  due	  to	   the	  strength	  of	  
the	  oligarchic	  position,	  which	  in	  many	  cases	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  US	  prior	  to	  and	  
during	   the	  Cold	  War.	  Hence,	  Ames	  (1987)	   furthers	   this	  point	  by	  stating	   the	  need	  
for	   “survival	   coalitions”	   against	   this	   oligarchic	   position.	   There	   is	   no	   simple	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definition	   for	   Latin	   American	   democracy.	   Rather,	   one	  must	   look	   at	   the	   ideology	  
and	  class	  composition	  that	  underpins	  the	  motivation	  for	  democratic	  rule.	  	  
	   “Left-­‐liberalism”	  emerged	  in	  Britain	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  
is	  evident	  in	  parts	  of	  Latin	  America.	  Green	  (2003)	  emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  “general	  
will”	  within	  left-­‐liberalism	  (p.	  27).	  He	  identifies	  that	  in	  its	  simplest	  form	  liberalism	  
refers	  to	  “the	  natural	  rights	  of	  the	  individual”	  (Green,	  2003,	  p.	  27).	  Hence,	  the	  left-­‐
liberals	   of	   this	   era	   identified	   a	   contradiction	   in	   holding	   an	   ideology	   that	  
emphasised	   the	   economic	   freedoms	   of	   a	   small	   minority	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	  
political	   and	  economic	   freedoms	  of	   the	  great	  majority.	  This	  was	  a	  movement	   for	  
equality	   that	   came	   from	   above	   and	   underpinned	   the	   expansion	   of	   democracy	   in	  
Uruguay	   during	   the	   1910s	   and	   Colombia	   during	   the	   1930s.	   Both	   socialism	   and	  
communism	   were	   also	   emerging	   from	   above.	   Socialism	   refers	   to	   the	   radical	  
readjustment	   of	   the	   economic	   system	   to	   promote	   equality	   through	   taxation,	  
regulation	   and	   taxation.	   Because	   many	   socialists	   believed	   that	   their	   vision	   for	  
equality	  was	   compatible	  with	   the	  democratic	   system,	   Socialist	   parties	   competed,	  
often	   successfully,	   in	  Latin	  American	  elections.	  Like	   socialism	  and	   left-­‐liberalism,	  
communism	   was	   a	   movement	   from	   above	   within	   Latin	   America.	   The	   one	  
movement	  for	  democracy	  that	  emerged	  from	  below	  was	  unionism,	  which	  usually	  
relied	  upon	  “Anarchism	  and	  Syndicalism”.	  The	  collectivism	  of	  the	  union	  movement	  
was	   expanded	   into	   a	   political	  movement	   due	   to	   large	   union	  membership	   in	   the	  
early	   twentieth	  century.	  As	   the	  oligarchs	  were	  both	  “capital”	  and	  the	  “arbitrator”	  
the	  rise	  of	  democracy	  was	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  unionism,	  anarchism	  and	  
syndicalism.	   Hence,	   to	   refer	   to	   Latin	   American	   “democracy”	   is	   a	   difficult	   and	  
complicated	  task.	  One	  must	  also	  consider	  the	  ideology,	  class	  backing	  and	  national	  
interest	  of	  any	  democrat.	  
	   The	  fragility	  of	  Latin	  American	  democracy	  that	  Joseph	  (2008)	  identifies	  led	  
to	   another	   distinct	   characteristic	   within	   the	   regional	   political	   order.	   The	  
emergence	  of	   “populism”	   in	   the	  1930s	  was	  necessitated	  by	   the	   strong	  oligarchic	  
reaction	   to	   any	   level	   of	   democratisation	   in	   Latin	  America.	  While	   there	   had	   been	  
elements	  of	  “personalistic”	  within	  the	  oligarchy	  and	  caudilloism,	  the	  new	  coalition	  
between	  military	   leaders	   and	   the	  masses	   that	   emerged	   in	   the	   1930s	  was	   a	   new	  
phenomenon.	  Di	  Tella	  (2004)	  defines	  populism	  as	  “a	  political	  movement	  based	  on	  
a	  mobilised	  but	  not	  yet	  autonomously	  organized	  popular	  sector”	  led	  by	  an	  elite,	  or	  
elites	   (p.	   90).	   That	   is,	   a	   charismatic	   leader	   (often	   from	   the	   military)	   who	   can	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develop	  a	   “personalised	   link”	  with	   that	   “popular	  sector”	   through	  appeals	   to	   their	  
social	   welfare	   (Di	   Tella,	   2004,	   p.	   90).	   This	   was	   done	   in	   Argentina,	   Brazil	   and	  
Bolivia,	   as	   military	   leaders	   sought	   alliances	   with	   the	   lower	   classes	   against	   the	  
established	   oligarchic	   position.	   The	   populists	   used	   the	   forces	   of	   the	   masses	   in	  
order	   to	   reach	   their	   personal	   and	   nationalistic	   goals.10	  This	   forms	   the	   central	  
contrast	   between	   populism	   and	   democracy.	   In	   theory,	   democracy	   is	   about	  
autonomy	   of	   the	   people	   and	   accountability	   of	   their	   leaders.	   Whereas	   within	  
populism	  a	  free	  and	  independent	  press	  did	  not	  exist	  to	  ensure	  that	  those	  two	  goals	  
were	   achieved.	   Rather,	   populists	   used	   their	   platform	   to	   dictate	   goals	   that	   were	  
often	  advantageous	  to	  the	  masses,	  however,	  the	  goal	  was	  to	  advantage	  the	  leader.	  
Hence,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  the	  “military	  populists”	  and	  the	  region’s	  
“democrats”.	  
	  
The	  Social	  Democratic	  Movement	  
	   This	  thesis	  defines	  “social	  democracy”	  as	  a	  reformist	  ideology	  that	  sought	  to	  
enact	   a	   series	   of	   constitutional	   revolutions	   to	   overcome	   the	   endemic	   class	  
inequalities	  in	  their	  Latin	  American	  nations.	  While	  the	  Latin	  American	  parties	  were	  
quite	   different	   from	   their	   European	   counterparts,	   due	   to	   distinct	   political,	   social	  
and	  economic	  circumstances,	  it	  remains	  necessary	  to	  develop	  a	  clear	  definition	  of	  
“social	  democracy”	  through	  the	  literature	  concerning	  global	  movements	  for	  social	  
democracy.	   	   Padgett	   and	   Patterson	   (1991)	   view	   “social	   democracy	   as	   a	   hybrid	  
political	   tradition	   composed	   of	   socialism	   and	   liberalism”	   (p.	   1).	   Hinnfors	   (2006)	  
adds	   that,	   “efficiency,	   full	   employment	   and	   equality…	   Such	   would	   be	   a	   brief	  
definition	  of	   social	  democracy.	  A	  specific	  approach	   towards	   the	  market	  economy	  
takes	  central	   stage	  as	   the	  defining	   ideological	   characteristic	  of	   social	  democracy”	  
(p.	  21).	  Meyer	  (2007)	  asserts	  that	  social	  democracy	  diverged	  from	  other	  forms	  of	  
‘liberalism’	   over	   the	   concept	   of	   liberty	   itself	   (p.	   15).	   He	   argues	   that	   “a	   self-­‐
sustaining	   society”	   had	   to	   protect	   “labour	   from	   the	   vicissitudes	   of	   the	   market”	  
(Meyer,	   2007,	   p.	   16).	   Giddens	   (1998)	   highlights	   that	   “a	   strong	   government	  
presence	  in	  the	  economy”	  is	  desirable,	  “since	  public	  power,	  in	  a	  democratic	  society,	  
represents	  collective	  will”	  (p.	  9).	  	  While	  Przeworski	  (1985)	  concludes:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  While	  the	  distinction	  is	  important	  at	  this	  stage,	  as	  the	  thesis	  progresses	  it	  will	  become	  evident	  
that	  Washington	  viewed	  these	  two	  groups	  in	  a	  similar	  light	  as	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  US	  trade	  and	  
investment	  was	  consistent	  between	  the	  groups.	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The	   social	   revolution	   envisioned	   by	   social	   democrats	   was	   necessary	  
because	   capitalism	  was	   irrational	   and	  unjust….They	   could	  and	  did	  pursue	  
ad-­‐hoc	   measures	   designed	   to	   improve	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	   workers:	  
develop	   housing	   programs,	   introduce	   minimal	   wage	   laws,	   institute	   some	  
protection	   from	   unemployment,	   income	   and	   inheritance	   taxes,	   old	   age	  
pensions	  (pp.	  31-­‐35).	  
Moreover,	  social	  democracy	  has	  inherited	  traits	  of	  both	  liberalism	  and	  socialism	  in	  
order	  to	  regulate	  the	  capitalist	  system.	  It	  emerged	  during	  the	  Second	  International	  
of	   Workers	   in	   Europe	   (1889-­‐1916).	   European	   social	   democrats	   sought	   to	  
progressively	   bring	   socialism	   to	   their	   nations	   through	   evolutionary	   measures	  
consented	  to	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population.	  These	  changes	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  
what	  we	  now	   call	   the	   “welfare	   state”.	   Social	   democrats	   regulate	   the	   relationship	  
between	   capitalists	   and	   labour,	   which	   disadvantaged	   the	   oligarchic	   members	   of	  
society.	  They	  utilise	  the	  liberal	  conception	  of	  human	  ingenuity	  but	  regulate	  human	  
activity	   because,	   as	   Fawcett	   (2014)	   recognised,	   individuals	   can	   be	   unequal	   and	  
immoral	  (p.	  11).	  	  
	   The	  Latin	  American	  “social	  democrats”	  attempted	  to	  follow	  this	  ideological	  
framework.	   However,	   this	   philosophy	   was	   significantly	   “Latinised”,	   regionalised	  
and	   nationalised	   to	   fit	   individual	   priorities.	   The	   emergence	   of	   this	   new	   political	  
ideology	  in	  the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  in	  Latin	  America	  was	  designed	  to	  accommodate	  a	  
larger	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  population	   into	   the	  political	   system.	  This	   literature	   review	  
will	   briefly	   overview	   the	   works	   on	   the	   first	   two	   movements	   to	   espouse	   this	  
philosophy,	   in	   Mexico	   and	   Peru.	   González	   (2002)	   defines	   Cárdenas’	   political	  
strategy	  in	  terms	  “radical	  social	  policies,”	  “economic	  nationalism”	  and	  sovereignty	  
from	  foreign	  capital	   (p.	  222-­‐235).	  While	  Cardenas	  emerged	  from	  the	  military	  the	  
unique	   class	   alliances	   that	   resulted	   from	   the	  Mexican	   Revolution	  meant	   that	   he	  
inherited	   a	   government	   that	   relied	   upon	   the	   support	   of	   both	   labour	   and	   the	  
peasantry.	   Accordingly,	   his	   political	   manoeuvres	   between	   1934	   and	   1940	   were	  
targeted	  towards	  those	  groups.	  The	  largest	  land	  reform	  package	  in	  regional	  history	  
and	  the	  expropriation	  of	  productive	  industries,	  including	  American	  oil	  companies,	  
that	  defied	   the	   labour	   code	   laid	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	   economic	  philosophies	  of	  
the	   social	   democratic	   movement.	   Despite	   the	   limitations	   of	   democracy	   within	  
Mexico,	   the	   PIR	   were	   the	   first	   regional	   state	   to	   successful	   administer	   a	   social	  
democratic	  revolution.	  Stein	  (1980)	  identifies	  the	  central	  platform	  of	  the	  American	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APRA	   as	   “nationalism”,	   “anti-­‐Imperialism”,	   and	   “social	   security”	   (pp.	   162-­‐163).	  
Haya’s	   revolutionary	   philosophy	   was	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   his	   experience	   in	  
Mexico.	   He	   sought	   to	   develop	   a	   regional	   network	   of	   anti-­‐dictatorial	   and	   social	  
democratic	   governments.	   Haworth	   (1992)	   defines	   the	   democratic	   experience	   in	  
Peru	   as	   “herald[ing]	   an	   era	   of	   freedom	   for	   popular	   political	  
organisation…economic	  restructuring	  and	  social	  change”	  (p.	  170).	  These	  were	  the	  
two	  most	  significant	  movements	  for	  social	  democracy	  in	  the	  1930s	  that	   lead	  to	  a	  
regional	  revolution.	  
	   The	   ideology	   of	   social	   democracy	   resonated	   with	   an	   emerging	  
revolutionary	  class	   in	  Venezuela,	  Cuba,	  Guatemala,	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  the	  Dominican	  
Republic.	   These	   parties	   have	   been	   individually	   analysed	   as	   follows.	   The	  
preeminent	  source	  on	  the	  Venezuelan	  ‘trienio’,	  Robert	  Alexander	  (1982),	  identifies	  
the	   conversion	   of	   Betancourt’s	   1945	   coup	   “into	   a	   process	   of	   fundamentally	  
changing	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  structures	  of	  Venezuela”	  (p.	  224).	  After	  
17	   years	   of	   resisting	   totalitarianism	   in	   Venezuela,	   Betancourt	   and	   AD	   brought	   a	  
social	   democratic	   revolution	   that	   emphasised	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   welfare	   state	  
through	  making	   better	   use	   of	   oil	   income.	   Gleijes	   (1990)	   defines	   the	   Guatemalan	  
‘ten	  years	  of	   spring’	   as	   “an	  attempt	   to	  break	   the	  power	  of	   a	   foreign	  enclave	   that	  
threatened	  the	  country’s	  sovereignty”.	  The	  revolution	  of	  Arevalo	  and	  Arbenz’s	  PAR	  
used	  Mexico	  as	  a	  precedent	  in	  enacting	  meaningful	   labour	  and	  land	  reform.	  They	  
also	   attempted	   to	   nationalise	   significant	   parts	   of	   the	   economy	   to	   expand	   their	  
revolution.	  Ameringer	  (2000)	  defines	  the	  period	  of	  Auténtico	  rule	  under	  Grau	  as	  a	  
force	  for	  “nationalism,	  socialism,	  and	  anti-­‐Imperialism”	  (p.	  44).	  Grau	  focussed	  his	  
revolutionary	   efforts	   on	   creating	   legal	   and	   political	   equality	   between	   all	   classes	  
and	  used	  the	  little	  revenue	  available	  to	  expand	  the	  welfare	  state.	  Costa	  Rica,	  under	  
Jose	  Figueres,	  and	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  under	  Juan	  Bosch,	  also	  enacted	  limited	  
social	   democratic	   revolutions.	   Costa	   Rica	   was	   limited	   by	   their	   own	   pragmatism	  
following	   the	   1954	   coup	   against	   Guatemala,	  while	   the	  Dominican	  Republic	  were	  
limited	  by	  US	  involvement	  due	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  of	  1959.	  	  
	   The	  similarities	  in	  these	  movements	  demonstrate	  the	  significant	  point	  that	  
this	  ideology	  was	  multinational.	  In	  their	  edited	  collection,	  Bethell	  and	  Roxborough	  
(1992)	   assert,	   “despite	   differences	   in	   political	   regime…	   there	   [were]	   striking	  
similarities	   in	  the	  experience	  of	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  republics”	  between	  1944	  and	  
1948	  (p.	  1).	  Ameringer	  (1996)	  also	  states	  that	  “the	  democratising	  trends	  of	  World	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War	   II	   accelerated	   the	   pressure	   for	   change	   in	   the	   Caribbean”	   (p.	   1).	   Ameringer	  
(1996)	   goes	   on	   to	   assert	   that	   these	   changes	   “were	   more	   evolutionary	   than	  
revolutionary,”	  as	  the	  decentralisation	  of	  economic	  power	  during	  World	  War	  I	  led	  
to	   the	   gradual	   decentralisation	   of	   political	   power	   in	   the	   ensuing	   decades	   (p.	   1).	  
Finally,	   this	  movement	   for	   social	   democracy	  was	   evident	  within	   the	   following	  of	  
Jorge	   Eliecer	   Gaitan.	   Green	   (2003)	   defines	   the	   movement	   for	   Gaitánism	   in	  
Colombia	   as	   a	   “pronounced	   intellectual	   tradition”	   of	   the	   “home	   grown	   left”	   (p.	  
205).	  He	  notes	  that	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Bolívar,	  “all	  the	  campesinos	  have	  a	  portrait	  
of	   Gaitán	   in	   their	   homes,	   and	   daily	   tend	   it	   with	   a	   mystique	   that	   approaches	  
adoration”	   (Green,	   2003,	   p.	   203).	   Braun	   (1985)	   saw	   Gaitán’s	   downfall	   as	  
“inevitable”	  (p.	  134).	  He	  argues	  that	  “he	  was	  too	  dangerous	  and	  too	  feared	  by	  the	  
leaders	  of	  both	  parties”	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  134).	  More	  significant	  than	  his	  cult	  status,	  
however,	  was	   the	  movement	   that	  he	  spawned.	  Green	  (2003)	  asserts,	   “by	  1944	   it	  
was	   clear	   that	   Gaitánismo	   represented	   a	   pronounced	   intellectual	   tradition	   in	  
Colombia	  that	  may	  be	  referred	  as	  a	  home	  grown	  left”	  (p.	  205).	  And	  while	  there	  are	  
programmatic	  differences	  between	  Gaitanism	  and	  social	  democracy,	  the	  ideology,	  
class	  composition,	  and	  response	  to	  his	  movement	   fits	  within	  the	  movement.	  Like	  
his	   regional	   colleagues,	   Gaitán	   advocated	   social	   upheaval	   through	   government	  
regulation	  in	  the	  economy.	  Hence,	  they	  were	  ‘democratic	  socialists’.	  They	  sought	  to	  
change	  their	  society	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  their	  population.	  The	  central	  task	  was	  the	  
removal	   of	   the	   dictatorships	   through	   civil	   protest.	   Once	   in	   government	   they	  
advocated	  a	  very	  moderate	  version	  of	  socialism	  that	  emphasised	  the	  regulation	  of	  
the	   capitalist	   economy.	   They	  were	   not	   communists.	   They	  were	   not	   allied	   to	   the	  
USSR.	  However,	  their	  vision	  differentiated	  them	  from	  the	  US-­‐led	  capitalist	  system.	  
Divergences	  in	  the	  social	  democratic	  ideological	  tradition	  have	  also	  been	  studied	  in	  
depth.	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement	  to	  overcome	  the	  obstacles	  of	  
US	  intervention	  and	  oligarchic	  resistance	  led	  many	  within	  the	  movement	  towards	  
more	  radical	  ideologies,	  including	  Communism.	  	  
	   Castro,	  and	  those	  regional	  insurgents	  who	  followed	  his	  doctrine,	  promoted	  
a	  political	  and	  economic	  philosophy	  in	  line	  with	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement.	  
However,	  they	  aggressively	  fought	  for	  those	  programs	  that	  previous	  constitutional	  
governments	   had	   failed	   to	   deliver.	   Aguilar	   (1988)	   presents	   the	   most	   useful	  
analysis:	   Cuban	   Marxism	   “is	   merely	   a	   repertoire	   of	   slogans	   serving	   to	   organise	  
various	   interests,	   most	   of	   them	   completely	   remote	   from	   those	   which	   Marxism	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originally	   identified	   itself”	   (p.	   140).	   Moreover,	   Castroism	   pragmatically	   utilised	  
Marxist	   rhetoric	   in	   applying	   reforms	   that	   were	   not	   initially	   ‘revolutionary’,	   but	  
were	   demanded	   by	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   population.	   This	   afforded	   his	   regime	   the	  
support	   of	   the	   USSR,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   inevitable	   aggression	   from	   the	   US.	   Sánchez	  
(1967)	   offers	   the	   most	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   Castroism.	   He	   summarised	   its	  
characteristics	   as:	   “exceptional	   powers	   and	   qualities”	   of	   the	   leader;	   economic	  
dependence	  on	  an	  external	  source;	  and	  a	  commitment	  to	  “revolutionary	  duties”	  in	  
the	   hemisphere	   (pp.	   214-­‐215).	   He	   asserts	   that	   “Castroism”	   was	   unique	   from	  
communism.	   Thomas	   Whickham-­‐Crowley	   (1991,	   1992)	   argues	   that	   the	   “leftist	  
insurgent”	  movements	  were	  formed	  within	  the	  hemisphere.	  That	  is,	  they	  were	  not	  
imported	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Through	  substantial	  research,	  Wickham-­‐Crowley	  
(1992)	   concludes	   “guerrilla	  movements	   do	   not	   begin	   among	   the	   peasants	   in	   the	  
countryside	  but	  among	  urban-­‐based	  intellectuals,	  especially	  in	  the	  twin	  milieus	  of	  
universities	   and	   political	   parties”	   (p.	   30).	   He	   goes	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   Cuban	  
example	   was	   utilised	   by	   other	   leftist	   groups	   that	   existed	   within	   the	   standing	  
political	   system.	   This	   demonstrates	   the	   class	   origins	   of	   the	   region’s	   leading	  
insurgents.	   They	   were	   not	   peasants	   or	   communist	   agents,	   but	   disenfranchised	  
reformers	   from	   the	   now	   redundant	   social	   democratic	   movement.	   Radu	   (1988)	  
confirms	  this	  view,	  although	  from	  a	  different	  perspective	  (pp.	  1-­‐15).	  He	  argues	  that	  
guerrilla	   movements	   were	   an	   “elite	   phenomenon”	   made	   by	   those	   “unwilling	   to	  
accept…the	  prevailing	  social	  conventions	  of	  his	  class	  or	  group”	  (Radu,	  1988,	  p.	  3).	  
This	   thesis	   adheres	   to	   the	   view	   that	   university-­‐educated	   politicians	   alienated	   by	  
the	   perceived	   failure	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	   parties	   created	   the	   guerrilla	  
movements	  of	  1961-­‐1965.	  The	  machinations	  of	  anti-­‐Communism	  viewed	  all	  of	  the	  
above	  as	  within	  the	  “Communist	  Line”	  (Niblo	  ,2006,	  p.	  231).	  This	  thesis	  utilises	  the	  
extensive	   research	   conducted	   in	   this	   time	  period	   to	   break	   down	   that	   stereotype	  
and	  develop	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between:	  oligarchic	  democracy;	  liberal	  democracy,	  
social	  democracy,	  populism,	  Castroism,	  leftist	  insurgency	  and	  communism.	  
	  
US	  Imperialism	  in	  Latin	  America	  
	   This	  thesis	  views	  “American	  Imperialism”	  in	  Latin	  America	  as	  the	  policies	  of	  
successive	  administrations	  designed	  to	  advantage	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  Latin	  American	  sovereignty,	  prosperity	  and	  development.	  This	  is	  both	  
consistent	  with	  traditional	  notions,	   that	  highlight	  political,	  economic	  and	  military	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control,	  and	  Leninist	  views,	   that	  highlight	  economic	  exploitation	  of	  the	  periphery	  
by	  the	  metropole	  (Harvey,	  2005,	  p.	  26;	  Lenin,	  1916).	   Inasmuch,	   this	  thesis	  traces	  
the	   literature	   on	   American	   “Imperialism”	   from	   Franklin	   Roosevelt’s	   ‘Good	  
Neighbour	   Policy’	   to	   John	   Kennedy’s	   ‘Alliance	   for	   Progress’.	   Within	   this	  
examination	   a	   clear	   pattern	   of	   imperialist	   behaviour	   towards	   Latin	   America	  
becomes	  clear.	  It	  suggests	  that	  different	  strategies	  have	  the	  same	  aim.	  Hence,	  the	  
invasion	  of	  Guatemala	  and	  the	  pressure	  placed	  on	  the	  Bolivian	  MNR	  to	  reopen	  oil	  
reserves	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  same	  American	  imperialism.	  This	  thesis	  
predominately	   focuses	  on	  the	  “Imperialism”	   implicit	  within	  the	  GNP	  and	  the	  AFP	  
because	   it	   sees	   those	   acts	   of	   ‘good-­‐will’	   as	   the	   most	   pervasive	   form	   of	   regional	  
imperialism.	  Black	  (1988)	  asserts,	  “the	  main	  impact	  of	  the	  good	  neighbour	  policy	  
seemed	  to	  be	  the	  reaffirmation	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  faith	  in	  its	  own	  virtues”	  (p.	  61).	  
This	   was	   occurring	   simultaneous	   to	   the	   US	   condemnation	   of	   half	   a	   dozen	  
Caribbean	  nations	  to	  autocracy	  and	  leveraged	  others	  into	  damaging	  RTAs.	  Gellman	  
(1979)	   argues	   that	   the	   Good	   Neighbour	   was	   an	   accidental	   label	   given	   to	  
Roosevelt’s	   foreign	   policy	   (p.	   1).	   And	   that	   the	   GNP	   could	   be	   “separated	   into	   its	  
components”:	  of	  diplomacy,	  economic	  expansion	  and	  collective	  security	  measures	  
(Gellman,	   1979,	   p.	   1).	   Steward	   (1975)	   describes	   it	   as	   “the	   reversal	   of	   the	   trend	  
toward	   economic	   nationalism”,	  which	  was	   the	   principal	   point	   of	   the	   GNP	   (p.	   7).	  
Cordell	  Hull	  had	  advocated	  this	  action	  since	  1916,	  as	  he	  foresaw	  “a	  stable	  world-­‐
order	  of	  liberal-­‐capitalist	  internationalism”	  (Steward,	  1975,	  p.	  7).	  Steward	  (1975)	  
continues	  by	  describing	  the	  RTTA	  as	  “the	   internationally	  coordinated	  restoration	  
of	  commerce,	  shipping,	  and	   industry	  through	   liberalised	  trade	  measures”	  (p.	  11).	  
As	   Bauer	   (1963)	   argues,	   “the	   philosophy	   of	   the	   RTA	   became	   the	   bipartisan	  
cornerstone	  of	  American	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  during	  and	  after	  WWII”	  (p.	  26).	  
Grandin	  (2010)	  extends	  this	  argument	  to	  state	  that	  “this	  economic	  expansion	  into	  
Latin	   America”	   became	   “the	   keystones	   of	   the	   New	   Deal	   state	   for	   the	   next	   three	  
decades:	   liberalism	  at	  home	  and	   internationalism	  abroad”	  (p.	  36).	  This	  economic	  
imperialism	  drew	  much	  of	  the	  region	  into	  America’s	  sphere	  of	  influence	  during	  the	  
Roosevelt	  presidency.	  
	   As	  Hull	  had	  suggested,	  once	  the	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  coerced	  into	  his	  
economic	  line-­‐up,	  the	  political	  line-­‐up	  would	  follow.	  This	  political	  line-­‐up	  was	  both	  
diplomatic	   and	   militaristic.	   Pach	   (1991)	   argues	   that	   WWII	   Lend-­‐Lease	   was	   a	  
mechanism	   the	   JCS	   used	   to	   achieve	   “the	   standardisation	   of	   hemispheric	  military	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establishments…thus	  ensuring	  the	  orientation	  of	  Latin	  America	  towards	  the	  United	  
States”	   (p.	  41).	  This	   also	  applied	   to	  personnel	   training.	  Gill	   (2004)	   indicates	   that	  
the	  estrangement	  of	  military	  relations	  between	  Latin	  America	  and	  Europe	  during	  
WWII	   allowed	   for	   the	   effective	   US	   monopolisation	   of	   leadership	   (p.	   62).	   This	  
leadership	  was	   institutionalised	   in	  1946	  (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  62).	  Child	  (1980)	  sees	   the	  
“early	   Cold	   War	   period	   [as]	   one	   of	   consolidation	   of	   codification”	   of	   the	   inter-­‐
American	   military	   system	   (p.	   72).	   Given	   that	   there	   was	   no	   credible	   threat	   to	  
hemispheric	   security	   in	   1947,	   the	   increase	   of	   a	   US	   military	   presence	   on	   the	  
continent	   through	   the	   Military	   Assistance	   Program	   (MAP)	   was	   perplexing.	   The	  
signing	  of	  the	  1947	  “Rio-­‐Pact”	  and	  the	  consolidation	  regionalism	  through	  the	  1948	  
OAS	  agreement	  created	  Latin	  American	  states	  as	  appendages	  of	  US	  interests.	  The	  
increased	  emphasis	  on	  domestic	  intelligence	  indicated	  the	  true	  motivation	  of	  these	  
alliances:	   to	   create	   a	   political	   line-­‐up	   that	   served	   US	   interests	   above	   regional	  
actors.	   This	   was	   clear	   at	   the	   May	   1954	   meeting	   of	   the	   OAS	   where	   the	   Latin	  
American	  states	  condemned	  the	  Arbenz	  regime	  to	  its	  eventual	  downfall.	  It	  was	  also	  
evident	   at	   the	   1961	  meeting	   is	   Punta	   del	   Este	  where	   the	   Latin	   Americans	   sided	  
with	   Kennedy	   in	   its	   ostracism	   of	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution.	   Despite	   the	   lack	   of	   a	  
credible	  regional	  security	  threat	  the	  American	  military	  presence	  in	  Latin	  America	  
became	  virtually	  hegemonic	  between	  1933	  and	  1965,	  to	  the	  point	  that	  they	  could	  
choose	   foreign	   leaders	   and	   even	   invade	   nations	   on	   behalf	   of	   ‘regional	   security’.	  
This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  Imperialism	  that	  exceeds	  classical	  definitions,	  although	  fits	  within	  
the	  concepts	  of	  both	  Harvey	  (2005)	  and	  Lenin	  (1916).	  	  
	   The	  US	  was	  also	  able	  to	  change	  the	  concept	  of	  regional	  security	  through	  its	  
Imperial	   leadership	  of	   the	  continent.	  The	  propaganda	  around	  the	  proliferation	  of	  
regional	   communism	   exemplifies	   this	   point.	   Arévalo	   (1963)	   claims	   that	   anti-­‐
communism	   is	   “more	   than	   a	   doctrine,	  more	   than	   a	   political	   theory,	   it	  wears	   the	  
garb	  of	  a	  practical	  tool…a	  barricade	  to	  hold	  back	  social	  progress…”	  (p.	  36).	  While	  
communism	   existed	   in	   Latin	   America	   between	   1919	   and	   1965	   its	   size	   and	  
influence	   was	   limited.	   The	   studies	   conducted	   during	   the	   1960s	   by	   Alexander	  
(1963)	  and	  Aguilar	  (1968)	  provide	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  and	  direct	  analysis	  of	  
the	   Communist	   movement.	   The	   peak	   membership	   of	   400,000	   during	   1947	  
represented	  around	  0.22	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  hemispheric	  population.	  At	  all	  other	  times	  
during	  the	  focus	  period	  the	  proportion	  was	  much	  lower.	  Steinberg	  (1984)	  argues	  
that	   the	  purge	  of	   the	  US	  State	  Department	   created	   “a	  mental	   straightjacket”	   that	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dictated	  all	  facets	  of	  foreign	  policy	  (p.	  59).	  He	  continues	  that	  the	  “unfolding	  of	  the	  
loyalty	  program…served	  to	  maintain	  the	  generalised	  atmosphere	  of	  fear”	  in	  the	  US	  
State	   Department	   (Steinberg,	   1984,	   p.	   59).	   Boyle	   (2005)	   asserts	   that	   “the	   deep	  
fears	  and	  anxieties	  of	  America	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  created	  the	  irrationality	  of	  the	  Red	  
Scare”	  (p.	  21).	  Moreover,	  the	  anti-­‐Communist	  paranoia,	  which	  would	  eventually	  be	  
characterised	   as	   a	   psychosis,	   was	   not	   simply	   aimed	   at	   the	   small	   and	   weak	  
Communist	   parties.	   To	   build	   upon	   Arevalo’s	   claim	   that	   it	   held	   “back	   social	  
progress”,	   Niblo	   (2006)	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   US	   were	   concerned	   by	   a	  
hypothetical	   “communist	   line”,	   which	   is	   “any	   radical	   ideas	   they	   disapproved	   of”	  
(p.284).	   That	   is,	   anti-­‐communist	   accusations	  were	  utilised	   against	   any	   leader,	   or	  
movement,	  that	  threatened	  US	  imperial	  interests.	  We	  see	  this	  clearly	  with	  Gaitan,	  
Peron	  and	  Vargas.	  All	  of	  these	  leaders	  were	  accused	  of	  sympathising	  with	  the	  Nazis	  
during	  WWII.	  However,	  when	  it	  was	  expedient,	  anti-­‐communist	  accusations	  were	  
drawn,	   demonstrating	   that	   anti-­‐communism	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   tool	   to	   discredit	  
communists.	  
	   Social	   democratic	   leaders	   fell	   into	   the	   so-­‐called	   “communist	   line”	   due	   to	  
their	   “radical	   ideas”	   (as	   cited	   in	   Niblo,	   2006,	   p.284).	   This	   thesis	   outlines	   the	  
historical	   origins,	   application	   and	   demise	   of	   social	   democracy	   in	   Latin	   America.	  
The	  emergence	  of	  this	  pragmatic	  reform	  philosophy	  during	  the	  1930s	  represented	  
the	   future	   empowerment	  of	  many	  oppressed	  people	   in	  Latin	  America.	   Its	   failure	  
was	  due	  to	  its	  philosophical	  incompatibility	  with	  the	  US-­‐led	  modern	  world	  system.	  
The	   first	   tenet	   of	   Latin	   American	   social	   democracy	  was	   anti-­‐imperialism.	   In	   the	  
context	  of	  1930s	  Latin	  America,	  this	  meant	  anti-­‐American.	  While	  the	  isolated	  and	  
short-­‐lived	  concept	  of	  regional	  solidarity	  with	  people	  oppressed	  by	  US	  actions	  can	  
be	  considered	  as	  noble,	  its	  proponents	  did	  not	  realise	  or	  acknowledge	  the	  role	  that	  
Washington	  would	  play	  in	  their	  political	  future.	  Hence,	  Washington’s	  opposition	  to	  
social	  democratic	   leaders	  made	  the	  application	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  policies	  
extremely	   difficult.	   The	   second	   tenet	   of	   Latin	   American	   social	   democracy	   was	  
nationalism.	   Economic	   nationalism	   opposed	   unregulated	   trade	   and	   investment.	  
However,	  the	  world	  economy	  following	  WWII	  was	  increasingly	  globalised.	  Hence,	  
these	  leaders	  were	  seen	  as	  radical	  for	  opposing	  further	  US	  integration	  within	  their	  
economies.	  The	  third	  and	  final	  tenet	  of	  social	  democracy	  was	  socialism.	  The	  Latin	  
Americans	  promoted	  a	  form	  of	  socialism	  that	  followed	  the	  US	  New	  Deal	  and	  post-­‐
WWII	  Western	  European	  social	  democracy;	  the	  US	  became	  increasingly	  concerned	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about	   communist	   infiltration.	   Latin	   American	   socialism	   was	   compatible	   with	  
capitalism.	   However,	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   global	   Cold	   War	   drew	   very	   rigid	  
definitions.	   The	   US	   opposed	   any	   government	   who	   followed	   the	   hypothetical	  
‘communist	   line’	  on	  economic	  development,	   condemning	  many	  social	  democratic	  
leaders.	   The	   failure	   of	   social	   democracy	   caused	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   radicals	   to	  
oppose	  US	  imperialism	  through	  physical	  force.	  While	  some	  success	  was	  evident	  in	  
Cuba	   and	   Nicaragua,	   the	   result	   of	   this	   new	   strategy	   of	   insurgency	   had	   drastic	  
consequences	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Latin	  America.	  	  
	  
Theoretical	  Framework	  
This	  thesis	  is	  not	  a	  traditional	  historical	  analysis.	  It	  does	  not	  claim	  access	  to	  
a	   large	   collection	   of	   documents	   capable	   of	   proving	   that	   anti-­‐communism	   was	   a	  
product	  of	  propaganda.	  No	  unified	  collection	  could	  exist.	  This	  is	  a	  theoretical	  study	  
into	  the	  concepts	  of	  social	  democracy,	  populism	  and	  anti-­‐communism.	  It	  requires	  a	  
large	  amount	  of	  secondary	  source	  analysis.	  Primary	  sources	  are	  used	  sparingly	  in	  
cases	   where	   diplomats	   have	   exposed	   their	   prejudices	   and	   a	   tendency	   to	   create	  
propaganda	  against	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement.	  This	  study	  could	  not	  exist	  as	  
a	   classical	   historical	   analysis.	   It	   seeks	   to	   write	   a	   multi-­‐national	   narrative	   with	  
specific	  emphasis	  on	  political	  development,	  foreign	  relations,	  economic	  policy	  and	  
military	   coups.	  Moreover,	   there	   are	  weaknesses	   in	  macro-­‐historical	   studies	   that	  
are	   heavily	   reliant	   on	   documentary	   analysis.	   They	   rely	   heavily	   upon	   generalised	  
assumptions	   regarding	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Hal	   Brand’s	   (2010)	   ‘Latin	   America’s	   Cold	  
War’	  exemplifies	  this	  point.	  It	  is	  capable	  of	  providing	  valuable	  historical	  knowledge	  
to	   the	   debate.	   However,	   the	   focus	   is	   reliant	   upon	   the	   generalised	   ‘events’	   of	   the	  
Cold	  War.	   Hence	   its	   bias	   is	   towards	   Guatemala	   in	   1954,	   Cuba	   in	   1959,	   Brazil	   in	  
1964,	  Chile	  in	  1973,	  Nicaragua	  from	  1979,	  the	  operations	  of	  Condor	  and	  the	  Civil	  
Wars	   in	  Central	  America.	  This	  adds	  to	   the	  archive	  of	   information,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  
attempt	   to	   draw	   thematic	   links.	   Stephen	   Kinzer	   (2007)	   and	   Eric	   Grow	   (2008)	  
follow	  a	  similar	  narrative.	  They	  focus	  on	  the	  aggressive	  components	  of	  American	  
foreign	  policy	  as	  exemplified	  within	  the	  same	  case	  studies.	  Again,	  this	  is	  a	  natural	  
conclusion	  to	  draw	  from	  the	  archival	  evidence.	  Yet	   it	  overlooks	  the	  transnational	  
narrative.	  Traditional	  notions	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  highlight	   the	  struggle	  between	  the	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communists 11 	  and	   the	   Latin	   American	   militaries	   supported	   by	   the	   US.	   This	  
relegates	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  to	  virtual	  irrelevancy,	  outside	  of	  
Washington’s	  Guatemalan	  mishap.	  The	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America	  originated	  in	  the	  
ideological	   battles	   that	   preceded	   Castro’s	   triumph.	   Hence,	   this	   work	   has	  
concurrent	  value	  to	  those	  who	  archive	  historical	  events.	  	  
	   The	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  defined	  by	  its	  position	  on	  several	  
topics	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   project.	   Hence,	   this	   chapter	   will	   conclude	   with	   an	  
examination	  of:	  the	  potential	  of	  Communism	  in	  Latin	  America;	  its	  place	  within	  the	  
broader	   context	   of	   Latin	   American	   politics;	   an	   examination	   into	   the	   potential	   of	  
economic	  nationalism;	  and	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle.	  Communism	  can	  
be	  defined	  as	  a	  radical	  ideology	  that	  demanded	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  
political	   system	   to	   create	   a	  more	   just	   society.	  Hence,	   Communism	   cannot	   evolve	  
out	   of	   a	   standing	   system.	   It	   must	   replace	   the	   system	   with	   something	   new,	   as	  
occurred	   in	   Russia.	   According	   to	   Femia	   (1993)	   “Marx	   denounces	   bourgeois	   civil	  
society,	  based	  on	  unrestricted	   individualism,	  as	  a	  violation	  of	  man’s	  social	  being”	  
(p.	  70).	  	  Marx	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  rampant	  individualism	  could	  bring	  about	  social	  
betterment.	   He	   stated	   that	   “[t]rue	   democracy	   would	   abolish	   the	   alienation	  
between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  political	  community	  by	  resolving	  the	  split	  between	  
egoistic	  interests	  of	  individuals	  in	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  social	  character	  of	  political	  
life”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Femia,	  1993,	  p.	  70).	  Hence	  “[in]n	  Marx’s	  opinion,	  then,	  the	  classic	  
representative	  principle,	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  liberal	  tradition,	  fails	  to	  achieve	  its	  two	  
main	   goals:	   (i)	   accountability,	   and	   (ii)	   protection	   of	   the	   public	   interest”	   (Femia,	  
1993,	   p.	   73).	   It	   should	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   Latin	   American	   society	   was	   not	  
conducive	  to	  classical	  Marxism.	  With	  the	  exceptions	  of	  the	  metropolitan	  centres	  of	  
the	   ‘Southern	   Cone’,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	   population	   worked	   in	   agriculture.	  
Hence,	  the	  ‘proletarian’	  class	  were	  disjointed	  and	  not	  prepared	  to	  stage	  a	  Leninist	  
revolution.	   Literacy	   was	   low	   in	   peasant	   communities	   and	   they	   were	   far	   more	  
concerned	  with	  pragmatic	  reform	  around	  labour	  and	  land	  reform	  to	  liberate	  them	  
from	  indentured	  labour.	  While	  these	  Communist	  Parties	  existed,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  
a	   clear	  distinction	  between,	  Communism,	  Castroism,	   and	   leftist	   insurgency.	  Even	  
the	  Cold	  Warrior,	  George	  Kennan	  made	  this	  distinction.	  	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11The	  better	  analyses	  define	  between	  ‘insurgencies’	  and	  the	  Moscow-­‐orientated	  communist	  parties.	  
See	  Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1992;	  Ratliff,	  1976.	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Communism	  posed	   little	   threat	   to	   Latin	  America.	   The	   Soviet	  Union	  was	   not	   in	   a	  
position	   to	   challenge	   the	   US	   militarily	   in	   the	   hemisphere	   and	   the	   Communist	  
parties	   were	   small	   and	   ill	   equipped	   to	   challenge	   the	   civil	   order.	   Ironically,	   the	  
Communists	  of	  Latin	  America	  emerged	  in	  the	  upper	  echelons	  of	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   This	  thesis	  will	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  domestic	  political	  economies	  
of	   individual	   Latin	   American	   states	   and	   battle	   over	   ‘economic	   nationalism’.	  
However,	   it	  will	   do	   so	  within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   competing	   interpretations	   Latin	  
America’s	   place	   within	   the	   global	   capitalist	   economy.	   These	   two	   visions	   can	  
broadly	   be	   defined	   as	   the	   “dependency	   theory,”	   advocated	   by	   the	   ECLA,	   Raúl	  
Prebisch,	   Hans	   Singer	   and	   Andre	   Frank,	   and	   the	   “modernisation	   theory,”	  
advocated	   by	   American	   foreign	   policy	   and	   Walt	   Rostow	   adopted	   by	   US	   policy	  
makers.	   Palma	   (1981)	   demonstrates,	   “the	   development	   of	   the	   core	   necessarily	  
requires	   the	   underdevelopment	   of	   the	   periphery”	   (pp.	   44-­‐45).	   The	   Economic	  
Commission	   for	   Latin	   America	   (ECLA),	   led	   by	   Prebisch,	   developed	   the	   economic	  
theory	   that	   underpinned	   dependency	   theory.	   The	   Prebisch-­‐Singer	   Thesis	   (PST)	  
argued	  that	  continued	  free	  trade	  between	  the	  global	  North	  and	  South	  would	  lead	  
to	  a	  “divergence”	  of	  wealth	  between	  the	  two	  regions.	  Andre	  Gunder	  Frank’s	  (1967;	  
1970)	  research	  proves	  this	  point.	  His	  analysis	  of	  terms	  of	  trade	  demonstrated	  the	  
structural	  underdevelopment	  of	  Latin	  America,	  and	  unresolvable	  position	  of	  debt	  
it	   was	   taking	   on	   (Frank,	   1970,	   p.	   186).	   Proponents	   of	   dependency	   theory	  
advocated	   economic	   nationalistic	  measures	   to	   combat	   underdevelopment.	   These	  
measures	  were	  adopted	  in	  many	  nations.	  Rostow	  (1971)	  argues	  that	  all	  nations	  go	  
through	   the	   same	   pattern	   of	   economic	   development	   irrespective	   of	   national	  
circumstances	  (pp.	  4-­‐12).	  He	  argues	  that	  desire,	  education,	  government,	  available	  
capital,	  technology	  and	  raw	  materials	  determine	  the	  “take-­‐off”	  into	  capitalism	  (pp.	  
6-­‐7).	   In	   this	   respect,	   all	   states	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   become	   advanced	   capitalist	  
economies.	  This	  thesis	  was	  advocated	  by	  the	  US	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	   It	  was	  
the	   central	   tenet	   of	   the	   Alliance	   for	   Progress	   (AFP)	   (Latham,	   2000,	   p.	   71).	   It	  
required	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  the	  invisible	  hand	  of	  the	  market	  (Latham,	  
2000,	  p.	  89).	  While	   this	   is	  an	   intellectual	  battle,	   there	  were	  practical	  applications	  
for	   the	   continent.	   As	   this	   thesis	   will	   demonstrate,	   the	   conflict	   between	   the	   two	  
theories	  dominated	  economic	  discourse	  between	  Anglo	  and	  Latin	  America.	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Then	  the	  question	  becomes:	  did	  the	  US	  overestimate	  the	  communist	  threat	  in	  Latin	  
America?;	   Or	   was	   this	   an	   intentional	   falsification?	   After	   extensive	   analysis,	   this	  
thesis	   is	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   anti-­‐communism	   was	   an	   intentional	   falsification,	   a	  
ready	  expedient,	  a	  convenient	  pretext	  to	  further	  their	  interests	  and	  to	  combat	  the	  
trend	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  nationalism	  in	  the	  hemisphere.	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The	  Causes	  of	  Anti-­‐communism	  
Divergent	  Continents:	  The	  Origins	  of	  ‘Anglo’	  and	  ‘Latin’	  
America,	  1898-­‐1933	  
This	  thesis	  attempts	  to	  redefine	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
It	  argues	  that	  the	  Latin	  American	  Cold	  War	  was	  an	  ideological	  battle	  distinct	  from	  
the	  generational	  conflict	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR.	  Rather,	  the	  Latin	  American	  
Cold	  War	  was	  waged	  between	  distinct	  visions	  over	  the	  future	  involvement	  of	  each	  
individual	  Latin	  American	  nation	  within	  the	  world	  capitalist	  system.	  On	  one	  side,	  
the	   US	   regarded	  most	   Latin	   American	   nations	   for	   their	   raw	  materials	   and	   their	  
markets	   for	   industrial	   goods.	   All	   discussion	   on	   political	   and	   social	   development,	  
within	   the	   hemisphere,	   was	   relegated	   by	   this	   simple	   fact.	   On	   the	   opposing	   side	  
were	  Latin	  America’s	  social	  democrats	  and	  military	  populists	  who	  sought	  to	  utilise	  
the	  desires	  of	  the	  masses	  to	  transform	  many	  aspects	  of	  Latin	  American	  society	  to	  
resemble	   those	   of	   Europe	   and	   North	   America.	   This	   thesis	   will	   argue	   that	   this	  
struggle	  began	  during	  1933.	  No	  struggle	  emerges	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  however;	  extensive	  
contextualisation	   is	   required.	   This	   chapter	   will	   provide	   context	   to:	   the	  
development	  of	  Latin	  American	  society,	  culture,	  politics	  and	  political	  economy;	  US	  
visions	  of	  expansionism	   in	   the	   late-­‐nineteenth	  and	  early-­‐twentieth	  centuries;	   the	  
origins	   of	   Latin	   American	   democracy,	   liberalism,	   anarchism,	   unionism,	   socialism	  
and	   communism	   at	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century;	   the	   significance	   of	   a	  
multiclass	  revolution	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  Mexico,	  1910-­‐1920;	  the	  beginning	  of	  US	  
regional	   leadership	   during	   the	   1920s;	   the	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   US	   trade	   and	  
investment	  during	  the	  1920s;	  the	  fomenting	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism	  as	  a	  response	  to	  
both	  formal	  and	  informal	  imperialist	  actions	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  US;	  and	  the	  regional	  
views	  of	   the	  1929	  economic	  crisis.	   In	  doing	  so	   this	   chapter	  will	  demonstrate	   the	  
unequal	   development	   of	   the	   ‘Anglo’	   and	   ‘Latin’	   Americas.	   It	   does	   not	   seek	   to	  
rewrite	   the	   historiography	   of	   events	   that	   precede	   its	   focus	   area,	   however	   it	   is	  
necessary	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  several	  historical	  events	  set	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  
emergent	   Cold	   War	   that	   this	   thesis	   will	   examine.	   Moreover,	   this	   chapter	   will	  
provide	   a	   narrative	   that	   will	   explain	   how,	   and	  why,	   the	   two	   distinct	   visions	   for	  
Latin	  America	  emerged	  in	  several	  Latin	  American	  states	  from	  1933	  onwards.	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A	  New	  World	  in	  the	  Service	  of	  the	  Old	  
Europeans	   discovered	   the	   New	   World	   by	   chance.	   In	   the	   quest	   for	   Asian	  
commodities,	  the	  Venetian	  explorer	  Christopher	  Columbus	  navigated	  the	  islands	  of	  
the	   Caribbean	   in	   1492,	   prior	   to	   opening	   up	   a	   ‘New	   World’	   to	   Europeans	   in	  
subsequent	   voyages	   (Maltby,	   2009,	   pp.	   19-­‐24).	   The	   Spanish	   Crown	   claimed	  
ownership	  of	  the	  Americas	  without	  any	  prior	  knowledge	  of	  the	  peoples	  they	  were	  
colonising	  (Thomas,	  2010,	  pp.	  3-­‐15,	  212-­‐	  240).	  The	  Americas	  were	  home	  to	  great	  
empires	  prior	  to	  Columbus’	  voyage.	  The	  Mayans	  had	  constructed	  a	  civilisation	  that	  
rivalled	  Europe	  at	   its	  peak	   (Maltby,	  2009,	  p.	   45).	  The	  Aztecs	   ruled	  over	  much	  of	  
Mexico	   and	   the	   Southwest	   of	   the	  US	   (Thomas,	   2010,	   p.	   3).	   The	   Incas	   dominated	  
Northwest	   South	  America	   from	   their	   Peruvian	   capital	   (Maltby,	   2009,	   p.	   57).	   The	  
Indian	   tribes	   of	   North	   America	   also	   posed	   an	   obstacle	   to	   European	   colonisation	  
(Van	  Deusen,	  1959,	  p.	  171).	  However,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  ‘Colombian	  Exchange’	  	  –	  of	  
goods,	  ideas	  and	  pathogens	  –	  crippled	  these	  pre-­‐Colombian	  civilisations,	  allowing	  
for	  European	  ascendancy	  (Thomas,	  2010,	  pp.	  1-­‐15).	  After	  establishing	  bases	  in	  the	  
Caribbean,	   the	   Spanish	   began	   the	   invasion	   of	  Mexico	   in	   the	   1520s	   and	   of	   South	  
America	   in	   the	   1530s	   (Thomas,	   2010,	   pp.	   3-­‐15,	   212-­‐240).	   Their	  motivation	  was	  
gold,	  silver	  and	  power.	  Europeans	  targeted	  the	  unexploited	  gold	  and	  silver	  mines	  
of	  the	  New	  World,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  indentured	  native	  labour.	  This	  brought	  Europe	  
to	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  global	  capitalist	  system	  for	  the	  first	  time	  (Wallerstein,	  2011,	  pp.	  
169-­‐175).	   Britain,	   Portugal,	   France	   and	   Holland	   emulated	   Spain’s	   rapid	  
exploitation	  of	  American	  resources	  (Frank,	  1978,	  pp.	  25-­‐31;	  Ferguson,	  2003,	  pp.	  1-­‐
15).	  Spain	  imposed	  coercive	  rule	  upon	  its	  portion	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  became	  the	  
dominant	  regional	  power.	  The	  natives	  were	  subjected	  to	  slavery	  in	  the	  mines,	  and	  
to	   indentured	   labour	   on	   agricultural	   plantations	   (Maltby,	   2009,	   p.	   65;	   Thomas,	  
2010	  pp.	  12-­‐21).	  When	  native	  labour	  declined	  due	  to	  disease	  and,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  
genocide,	  Europeans	  initiated	  the	  largest	  forced	  migration	  of	  a	  human	  population	  
in	   history	   (Mintz,	   1984,	   pp.	   1-­‐8).	   The	   African	   slave	   trade	   saw	   twenty	   million	  
individuals	  captured	  and	  condemned	  to	  a	  life	  of	  suffering	  (Mintz,	  1984,	  pp.	  1-­‐8).	  By	  
the	  onset	  of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  of	  1776,	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  New	  World	  had	  
been	  colonised	  by	  Europeans.	  	  
Latin	   America’s	   political	   system	   has	   been	   defined	   by	   its	   Iberian	   history	  
(Henderson,	  2009,	  pp.	  11-­‐27).	  Europeans	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  New	  World	  to	  operate	  
the	   Spanish	   Empire	   through	   force,	   coercion	   and	   ‘conversion’.	   The	   Spaniards	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believed	   in	   converting	   the	   American	  masses	   to	   Catholicism	   in	   order	   to	   promote	  
cooperation	   and	   eventual	   assimilation	   (Maltby,	   2009,	   pp.	   73-­‐77).	   The	   Spanish	  
‘compradors’	   ensured	  a	   steady	   flow	  of	   capital	   to	   Spain	   throughout	   the	   sixteenth,	  
seventeenth	  and	  eighteenth	  centuries	  (Hopkins,	  2013,	  p.	  54).	  The	  ruling	  class	  was	  
Spanish,	  with	  an	  allegiance	  to	  the	  Crown.	  However,	  global	  circumstances	  changed	  
in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century.	  Spain	  was	  defeated	  and	  occupied	  in	  the	  Napoleonic	  
Wars,	   rendering	   Joseph	   Bonaparte	   control	   of	   the	   vast	   Spanish	   Empire	   in	   the	  
Americas	   (May,	   1975,	   p.	   94;	  Henderson,	   2009,	   p.	   33).	   The	   French	   and	  American	  
Revolutions	  also	  challenged	  the	  established	  notions	  of	  colonialism	  (May,	  1975,	  p.	  
209).	  The	  declaration	  of	  Haitian	   independence	   from	  France	  also	  motivated	  Latin	  
American	   ‘revolutionaries’	   to	   reconsider	   their	   dependence	   on	   Spain	   (Aristide,	  
2008,	  pp.	  3-­‐7).	  However,	  the	  principal	  motivation	  for	  the	  Latin	  American	  oligarchs	  
was	   financial.	   By	   severing	   ties	   with	   the	   Spanish	   Empire,	   Latin	   America’s	   ruling	  
class	   could	   enrich	   themselves	   through	   foreign	   trade,	   primarily	   with	   Britain	  
(Henderson,	  2009,	  pp.	  54-­‐59;	  Di	  Tella,	  2004	  pp.	  1-­‐19).	  Spanish	  America’s	   Iberian	  
oligarchy	   was	   not	   encouraged	   by	   idealistic	   sentiments	   of	   equality	   and	   no	   state	  
sought	  to	  extend	  suffrage	  to	  all	  its	  citizens	  (Rivera,	  1978,	  p.	  121).	  Rather,	  the	  ruling	  
groups	   operated	   quasi-­‐democratic	   governments	   that	   excluded	   all	   indigenous,	  
‘Mestizo’	   and	   dissenting	   voices.	   Descendants	   of	   Europeans,	   known	   as	   ‘Creole’,	  
owned	  the	  majority	  of	  land	  (Frank,	  1953,	  p.	  79).	  Moreover,	  the	  monopolisation	  of	  
land	   led	   to	   the	   monopolisation	   of	   labour.	   When	   peasants	   resisted,	   they	   were	  
suppressed.	   The	   extension	   of	   international	   trade	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	  
further	   burdened	   the	   indigenous	   population	   (Henderson,	   2009,	   pp.	   161-­‐167;	  
Frank,	   1978,	   pp.	   250-­‐270).12	  The	   advent	   of	   rail	   transportation	   rapidly	   increased	  
the	  amount	  of	  arable	   land	   in	  Latin	  America	  available	   for	  agricultural	  exploitation	  
(Woodward,	  1985,	  pp.	  171-­‐174).	  This	  last	  great	  land	  grab	  cemented	  the	  power	  of	  
oligarchic	  rule.	  	  
Latin	  America’s	  political	   economy	   is	  defined	  by	   its	   export	   economies.	  The	  
failure	  to	  sufficiently	  develop	  internal	  demand	  for	  domestically	  produced	  goods,	  as	  
occurred	  in	  the	  US,	  meant	  that	  the	  oligarchy	  became	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  capital,	  
industrial	   goods	   and,	  most	   significantly,	  markets	   (Bertola	   and	  Williamson,	   2006,	  
pp.	   11-­‐20).	   British,	   German,	   and	   later	   North	   American	   trade	   and	   investment	  
replaced	  the	  formal	  relationship	  of	  the	  Spanish,	  French	  and	  Portuguese	  colonies	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The	  example	  of	  Guatemala	  in	  the	  1880s	  highlights	  this	  pattern	  (McCrary,	  1983,	  pp.	  45-­‐60).	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Latin	   America	   through	   ‘free’	   trading	   competition.	   The	   Uruguayan	   historian	   and	  
activist	  Eduardo	  Galliano	  (1997)	  said	  of	  Latin	  America,	  it	  “continues	  to	  exist	  at	  the	  
service	  of	  others’	  needs”	  (p.	  1).	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  the	  material	  wealth	  of	  the	  region	  
that	  condemned	  it	   to	  export	  economics.	  During	  the	  colonial	  period,	   the	  continent	  
was	   looted	  of	   its	  gold	  and	  silver	  at	  huge	  mines	  such	  as	  Zacatecas,	   in	  Mexico,	  and	  
Potosi,	   in	   Peru	   (Thomas,	   2010,	   p.	   41).	   To	   service	   these	   large	   endeavours,	   the	  
Spanish	   also	   established	   agricultural	   plantations,	   called	   haciendas,	   and	  
rudimentary	  factories,	  called	  obrajes	  (Bertola	  and	  Williamson,	  2006,	  pp.	  22-­‐23).	  As	  
the	  scope	  of	  mining	  operations	  reduced	   in	   the	  early	  Republican	  period,	  hacienda	  
farming	   grew	   in	   significance	   (Bertola	   and	   Williamson,	   2006,	   pp.	   22-­‐25).	   The	  
hacienda	   structure	   resembled	   feudalism	   in	   Europe	   (Barraclough	   and	   Domike,	  
1970,	   p.	   50;	   Gilhodes,	   1970,	   p.	   411).	   A	   single	   owner	   controlled	   vast	   amounts	   of	  
land	  designated	  towards	  the	  production	  of	  a	  single	  commodity	  (Stone,	  1990,	  p.	  19).	  
In	  much	  of	   ‘tropical’	  Latin	  America	   the	  commodity	  was	  coffee	  (Safford,	  1995,	  pp.	  
121-­‐133;	   Gudmundson,	   1995,	   p.	   167).	   The	   indigenous	   and	   Mestizo	   workforce	  
belonged	   to	   the	   land,	   and	   their	   labour	  was	   exchanged	   for	   small	   tracts	   of	   land	   to	  
produce	   subsistence	   foodstuffs	   (Bertola	   and	   Williamson,	   2006,	   pp.	   22-­‐25).	   Any	  
actual	  wage	  was	  extremely	  low	  and	  usually	  returned	  to	  the	  landowner	  to	  pay	  for	  
minimal	  commodities	  through	  the	  system	  of	  debt	  peonage.	  The	  exceptions	  to	  this	  
economic	  pattern	  were	   the	  European	   settler	   societies	  of	  Argentina,	  Uruguay	  and	  
Southern	   Brazil.13	  Within	   those	   political	   economies,	   high	   numbers	   of	   European	  
immigrants	   replaced	   the	   indigenous	   population	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	  
(Laforcade,	   2010,	   p.	   327).	   Accordingly,	   urbanisation	   and	   industrialisation	  
paralleled	  North	  American	  development	  patterns.	  Nevertheless,	  by	  1900	  the	  vast	  
majority	   of	   Latin	   America’s	   population	   was	   engaged	   in	   commodity	   production,	  
either	  farming	  or	  mining,	  for	  European	  and	  North	  American	  consumption.	  
	  
A	  Rising	  Star	  in	  the	  North	  
The	   British	   established	   a	   settler	   society	   along	   the	   Eastern	   coast	   of	   North	  
America	  during	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  (Ferguson,	  2003,	  pp.	  58-­‐73).	  This	  settler	  
society	  was	  fundamentally	  different	  to	  the	  Iberian	  colonies	  established	  during	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  	  Ceslo	  Furtando	  has	  defined	  three	  categories	  of	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  Latin	  American	  
economies:	  temperate	  agricultural	  production	  of	  valuable	  commodities;	  tropical	  agricultural	  
production	  of	  cheap	  commodities	  through	  cheap,	  and	  often	  unpaid	  labour;	  and	  mineral	  production	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Bertola	  and	  Williamson,	  2006,	  p.	  20).	  The	  temperate	  economies	  of	  the	  Southern	  Cone	  
were	  unique	  due	  to	  their	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  development	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	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previous	   century.	   Europeans	   virtually	   replaced	   the	   indigenous	   population	   of	  
British	  North	  America.	  Meanwhile,	  each	  class	  of	  European	  society	  was	  transported	  
to	  form	  a	  neo-­‐Europe	  in	  the	  New	  World	  (Henretta	  and	  Nobles,	  1987,	  p.	  221).	  The	  
American	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   was	   different	   to	   Latin	   American	  
independence	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways.	   Its	   most	   significant	   characteristics	   were	   its	  
notions	   of	   nationalism	   and	   individualism.	  While	   a	   moneyed	   oligarchy	   remained	  
dominant	  over	  the	  political	  system,	  the	  European	  citizens	  of	  the	  US	  supported	  the	  
general	  manoeuvres	  of	   the	  Federal	  Government	   that	   they	  had	  elected	   (Armitage,	  
2008,	   pp.	   53-­‐57;	   Ferling,	   2007,	   pp.	   555-­‐560).14 	  North	   American	   society	   was	  
composed	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   social	   classes,	   from	   ‘robber	   baron’	   to	   slave.	   While	  
peripheral	  members	  of	  society,	  such	  as	  Native	  Americans	  and	  African	  slaves,	  were	  
excluded	   through	   forced	   unpaid	   labour	   and	   persecution,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	  
European	   citizens	   were	   free	   to	   undertake	   independent	   economic	   and	   social	  
activities	  (Henretta	  and	  Nobles,	  1987,	  pp.	  221-­‐236;	  Horsman,	  1981,	  p.	  100).	  This	  
forms	   the	   central	   contrast	   to	   Latin	   American	   societies	   of	   the	   late	   eighteenth	  
century.	   The	   Latin	   American	   oligarchy	   was	   visible	   and	   directly	   controlled	   the	  
majority	   of	   the	  population.	   There	  was	  no	   attempt	   to	   have	   lower-­‐class	   individual	  
economic	   activity	   contribute	   to	   the	   central	   development	   of	   a	   vibrant	   economy.	  
Moreover,	   the	   United	   States	   began	   its	   path	   to	   regional	   economic	   leadership	  
through	   its	   implementation	   of	   a	   rapidly	   expanding	   capitalist	   economy	   that	  
encouraged	  a	  variety	  of	  productive	  activities.	  	  
The	  thirteen	  colonies	  sought	  to	  geographically	  expand	  at	  the	  conclusion	  of	  
the	  Revolutionary	  War	  in	  1788	  (Plesur,	  1971,	  pp.	  4-­‐11).	  The	  continuing	  threat	  of	  
British	   aggression	   to	   the	   North	   directed	   the	   US	   both	   southward	   and	   westward.	  
This	   brought	   it	   into	   conflict	  with	   the	   ‘Latin’15	  American	  world	   for	   the	   first	   time.	  
Following	   the	   peaceful	   acquisitions	   of	   the	   regions	   of	   French	   Louisiana,	   in	   1803,	  
and	   Spanish	   Florida	   in	   1819,	   the	   US	   engaged	   in	   the	   eradication	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   throughout	   their	   westward	   expansion	   (Horsman,	   1981,	   pp.	   81-­‐90;	  
Philbrink,	  2010,	  pp.	  190-­‐195).	  Foreseeing	  this	  great	  expansion	  into	  ‘Latin’	  America,	  
US	  President	   James	  Monroe	  declared	  that	  European	  colonisation	  of	   the	  Americas	  
would	   amount	   to	   a	   declaration	   of	   war	   against	   the	   US.	   The	   ‘Monroe	   Doctrine’	   of	  
1823	  necessitated	  a	  westward	  expansion	  that	  would	  bring	  the	  US	  to	  the	  border	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Full	  male	  suffrage	  was	  ensured	  after	  1822	  (Henretta	  and	  Nobles,	  1987,	  p.	  228)	  
15	  Latin	  America	  encompasses	  the	  French,	  Portuguese	  and	  Spanish	  speaking	  
regions.	  This	  definition	  means	  that	  it	  geographically	  shifts	  over	  time.	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the	   newly	   independent	   Mexican	   Empire	   during	   the	   1820s	   (Horsman,	   1981,	   pp.	  
101-­‐109).	   While	   the	   US	   lacked	   the	   military	   capacity	   to	   prevent	   European	  
colonisation,	  an	  implicit	  alliance	  was	  formed	  with	  Britain	  (May,	  1975,	  p.	  197).	  Both	  
nations	   sought	   to	   prevent	   further	   economic	   competition	   in	   the	   Americas.	   They	  
sought	  to	  freely	  compete	  for	  resources	  and	  markets.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  US	  continued	  
its	   continental	   expansion.	  The	  Texan	   region	  of	   the	  Mexican	  Empire	  was	   sparsely	  
populated.	   The	   US	   government	   commissioned	   the	   settlements	   led	   by	   Moses	  
Houston	  into	  East	  Texas	  from	  the	  late	  1820s	  (Martínez,	  1975,	  p.	  20).	  US	  Nationals	  
withdrew	   Texas	   from	   Mexican	   authority	   in	   1836	   (Van	   Deusen,	   1959,	   p.	   171).	  
Against	  the	  calls	  of	  expansionists,	  US	  president	  Martin	  Van	  Buren	  decided	  against	  
the	   annexation	  of	  Texas	   in	  1836	   to	  prevent	   a	   continental	  war,	   as	   the	  US	  did	  not	  
then	   have	   the	  military	   power,	   or	   the	  will,	   to	   do	   so	   (Martínez,	   1975,	   p.	   32).	   The	  
following	  decade	  saw	  a	  resurgence	  of	  nationalism	  under	  the	  doctrine	  of	  “manifest	  
destiny”	   (Schroeder,	   1973,	   p.	   6).	   Many	   nationalists	   argued	   that	   it	   was	   the	   US’	  
mission	  to	  spread	  itself	  across	  the	  continent.	  James	  Polk	  revisited	  the	  issue	  in	  1846	  
(Nevins,	  1952,	  p.	  6).	  Polk’s	  dominance	  in	  the	  Mexican-­‐American	  War	  of	  1846-­‐1848	  
gained	   the	   US	   2.5	   million	   square	   kilometres,	   over	   half	   of	   Mexican	   territory	  
(Martínez,	  1975,	  p.	  147).	  More	  significantly,	   it	  provided	  the	  US	  with	  access	  to	  the	  
Pacific	   Ocean	   and	   the	   impetus	   to	   become	   a	   global	   power.	   In	   1848	   the	   US	  
announced	  itself	  to	  the	  region.	  	  
Despite	   its	  continental	  geographic	  ascendancy,	  the	  US	  suffered	  deep	  social	  
and	   economic	   divisions	   (Reid,	   1999,	   pp.	   62-­‐65;	   Richardson,	   2007,	   pp.	   1-­‐3).	   The	  
nation	  was	   polarised	   over	   the	   issue	   of	   slavery,	   descending	   into	   the	   Civil	  War	   of	  
1861-­‐1865	   (Henretta	   and	  Nobles,	   1987,	   p.	   236;	   Richardson,	   2007,	   pp.	   3-­‐7).	   The	  
reconstruction	  of	  national	   identity	  was	  a	  difficult	   task,	   especially	   in	   the	  defeated	  
South.	   The	   influx	   of	   non-­‐British	   migrants	   in	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   also	  
created	   urban	   sub-­‐cultures,	   which	   challenged	   social	   cohesion.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
post-­‐Civil	   War	   era	   saw	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   plantation	   farming,	   and	   towards	   an	  
advanced	  industrial	  economy	  (Richardson,	  2007,	  pp.	  7-­‐11).	  In	  many	  respects	  this	  
shift	  did	  not	  reflect	  the	  reality	  of	  its	  position	  within	  the	  global	  capitalist	  economy	  
(Davis	   and	   Cull,	   1994,	   p.	   79).	   Europe	   was,	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   the	  
principal	  market	  for	  US	  exports	  and	  the	  principal	  source	  of	  foreign	  capital	  (Davis	  
and	  Cull,	  1994,	  p.	  79;	  Henretta	  and	  Nobles,	  1987,	  p.	  225).	  The	  US	  was	  positioning	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itself	  against	   the	  most	  powerful	  nautical	  and	   industrial	  global	  power,	  Britain.16	  It	  
sought	  to	  utilise	  its	  geographic	  position	  to	  replace	  Britain	  as	  the	  leading	  industrial	  
exporter	   to	   the	   New	   World	   and	   Asia.	   The	   depression	   of	   the	   1890s	   further	  
demonstrated	  to	  US	  policy	  makers,	  such	  as	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  and	  Alfred	  Thayer	  
Mahan,	   that	   the	   US	   required	   significant	   markets	   beyond	   Europe	   for	   its	   export	  
commodities	  (Hunt,	  1992,	  pp.	  16-­‐28;	  Williams,	  1972,	  pp.	  48-­‐53).	  The	  “open-­‐door	  
notes”	  urged	  the	  US	  to	   initiate	  an	  expansionist	  trade	  policy	   in	  both	  East	  Asia	  and	  
Latin	   America.	   American	   politicians	   urged	   that	   US	   expansionism	   would	   be	  
different	   to	   European	   colonialism	   (Williams,	   1972,	   pp.	   48-­‐53).	   The	  US	   sought	   to	  
achieve	   its	   economic	   goals	   in	   both	   Asia	   and	   Latin	   America	   through	   competition	  
with	  the	  Europeans,	  and	  the	  geographic	  proximity	  to	  those	  regions	  gave	  the	  US	  a	  
natural	  advantage.	  Accordingly,	  the	  US	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  trade	  liberalism	  in	  Asia.	  
During	   the	   1890s	   the	   US	   transformed	   its	   economic	   position	   from	   raw	   material	  
exporter	   to	   industrial	  and	  material	  exporter	  (Pletcher,	  1998,	  pp.	  21-­‐30;	  Henretta	  
and	   Nobles,	   1987,	   p.	   225).	   Competition	   for	   necessary	   primary	   resources	   and	  
foreign	  markets	   became	   a	   central	   goal	   of	   US	   foreign	   policy	   thereafter	   (Williams,	  
1973,	  pp.	  48-­‐53).	  This,	  in	  turn,	  motivated	  US	  imperial	  expansion	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  
century	  (Secunda	  and	  Moran,	  2007,	  pp.	  11-­‐13).	  
	  
The	  Imperial	  Moment	  
The	  onset	  of	  an	  American	  Imperial	  presence	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  was	  sudden.	  
Between	  1890	  and	  1933,	  US	  Presidents	  utilised	  the	  armed	  forces	  forty-­‐three	  times	  
without	   Congressional	   approval	   (Crawley,	   2007,	   pp.	   8-­‐9).	   Thirty-­‐two	   of	   these	  
actions	   occurred	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   Basin,	   demonstrating	   its	   significance	   to	  
American	   expansion	   (Crawley,	   2007,	   pp.	   8-­‐9).	   The	   US	   did	   not	   hold	   a	   dominant	  
position	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  prior	  to	  1898.	  Spain	  held	  onto	  its	  remaining	  colonies	  in	  
Cuba	   and	   Puerto	   Rico	   (Secunda	   and	   Moran,	   2007,	   p.	   14);	   Britain	   dominated	  
regional	   trade	   and	   investment,	  while	   Germany,	   France	   and	   the	  Netherlands	   also	  
provided	   competition.	   The	   only	   nation	   that	   the	   US	   held	   the	   majority	   of	   Direct	  
Foreign	   Investment	   (DFI)	   in	   was	   Mexico,	   with	   approximately	   US$200	   million	  
(Davis	  and	  Cull,	   1994,	  p.	  81).	  This	  was	  approximately	  one	   third	  of	   all	  US	   foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  In	  1895	  Richard	  Olny,	  influenced	  by	  Theodore	  Roosevelt	  and	  Alfred	  Mahan,	  asserted	  to	  Britain	  
that	  “the	  US	  is	  practically	  sovereign	  on	  this	  continent	  and	  its	  fiat	  is	  law	  upon	  the	  subjects	  to	  which	  it	  
confines	  its	  interposition.”	  (Perkins,	  1964,	  p.	  161.)	  While	  Britain	  did	  not	  appreciate	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  
memorandum	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine,	  it	  was	  a	  clear	  message	  of	  US	  intentions	  to	  
challenge	  British	  naval	  and	  mercantile	  hegemony	  in	  the	  Americas.	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capital	  in	  1897.	  Mexico	  became	  the	  precedent	  for	  informal	  colonisation	  in	  the	  late	  
nineteenth	  century.	  The	  pro-­‐US	  dictator,	  Porfirio	  Díaz,	  ruled	  Mexico	  both	  formally	  
and	   informally	   from	  1876,	   after	  US	   rail	  magnate	   James	   Stillman	   funded	   the	  Díaz	  
military	  coup,	  until	  1910	  (O’Brien,	  2009,	  p.	  201).	  The	  US	  sought	  similar	  influence	  
throughout	   the	   Caribbean	   Basin,	   attempting	   to	   eliminate	   the	   formal	   colonial	  
control	  that	  hindered	  the	  open	  door	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  own	  presence	  
in	  the	  region.	  While	  there	  were	  certainly	  political	  and	  security	  motivations,	  US	  DFI	  
in	  Latin	  America	  increased	  from	  US$308	  million	  in	  1898	  to	  US$753	  million	  in	  1908	  
(Davis	   and	   Cull,	   1994,	   p.	   81).	   This	   section	   demonstrates	   how	   the	   US	   first	  
established	   a	   dominant	   stance	   in	   Latin	   America,	   beginning	   in	   Mexico,	   Central	  
America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  
The	  Cuban	  rebels	  resisted	  Spanish	   tyranny	   for	  decades,	  and	  welcomed	  US	  
assistance	  (Tone,	  2006,	  p.	  58).	  The	  Cuban	  exile,	  José	  Martí,	  foresaw	  the	  conditions	  
of	  Cuba’s	  informal	  imperial	  subjugation	  to	  the	  US	  during	  his	  time	  in	  Díaz’s	  Mexico	  
(Turton,	   1986,	   p.	   65).	   He	   correctly	   warned	   that	   the	   US	   would	   interfere	   in	   the	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  against	  Spain.	  The	  sinking	  of	   the	  USS	  Maine	   in	  Havana	  Harbor,	  
on	  February	  15	  1898,	  provided	  US	  President	  William	  McKinley	  with	  the	  pretext	  to	  
attack	   Spain	   (Secunda	   and	   Moran,	   2007,	   p.	   15).	   Ninety	   per	   cent	   of	   Americans	  
supported	   the	   war	   effort	   under	   the	   slogan	   “Remember	   the	   Maine:	   to	   hell	   with	  
Spain”	   (Morgan,	  2003,	  p.	  277).	  Members	  of	   the	   “yellow	  press,”	   including	  William	  
Hearst,	   advocated	   war	   with	   Spain	   from	   1897	   (Hillstrom	   and	   Hillstrom-­‐Collier,	  
2012,	  p.	  42).	  This	  led	  to	  public	  support	  for	  the	  intervention.	  The	  Spanish-­‐American	  
War	  also	  solidified	  nationalism	  in	  the	  US,	  which	  had	  been	  deficient	  since	  the	  Civil	  
War	  (Secunda	  and	  Moran,	  2007,	  p.	  22).	  The	  revolutionary	  leader	  Laureano	  Gómez	  
declared,	  “the	  enemy	  has	  departed,”	  prior	  to	  the	  US	  invasion	  in	  June	  (Pérez,	  1992	  
p.	  154).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  US	  initiated	  an	  economic	  and	  political	  protectorate	  upon	  
Cuba,	   under	   the	   Platt	   Amendment	   of	   1903,	   in	   addition	   to	   seizing	   Puerto	   Rico,	  
Guam	  and	  the	  Philippines.	  The	  “benefits	  of	  North	  American	  rule”	  from	  1899	  until	  
1903	   “were	  North	   American”	   (Pérez,	   1992,	   p.	   167).	   US	   companies	   including	   the	  
United	   Fruit	   Company	   (UFCo),	   the	   Cuba	   Company,	   the	   American	   Sugar	   Refining	  
Company	   and	   Pennsylvania	   Steel	   hurriedly	   purchased	   every	   productive	   Cuban	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industry	   (Pérez,	   1992,	   pp.	   167-­‐170).	   The	  US	  began	   its	   imperial	   expansion	   at	   the	  
expense	  of	  a	  nationalist	  movement	  modelled	  on	  its	  own	  revolutionary	  ideology.17	  
With	   the	   ‘Pearl	   of	   the	   Antilles’	   under	   US	   control,	   its	   expansion	   into	   the	  
Caribbean	   continued	   through	   the	   monopolisation	   of	   trans-­‐continental	   trade	  
through	   the	   construction	  of	   an	   isthmian	   canal.	   In	  1900,	   the	  French	  owner	  of	   the	  
New	   Panama	   Canal	   Company	   (NPCC),	   Philippe	   Bunau-­‐Varilla,	   possessed	   the	  
exclusive	   rights	   to	   the	   Central	   American	   isthmus’	   narrowest	   point,	   Panama	  
(Yarbrough,	  2012,	  p.	  181).	  Ferdinand	  de	  Lesseps,	  the	  French	  designer	  of	  the	  Suez	  
Canal,	   had	   abandoned	   construction	   in	  1889	  after	   eleven	  years	   and	   the	  deaths	  of	  
20,000	   labourers.	   Bunau-­‐Varilla	   sought	   to	   recoup	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   company’s	  
investment	  by	  selling	   its	   rights	   to	   the	  US	  government	   in	  1900	  (LaFeber,	  1989,	  p.	  
17).	   However,	   the	   US	   government	   favoured	   construction	   in	   Nicaragua.	   Bunau-­‐
Varilla	   then	   hired	   influential	   Wall	   Street	   lawyer	   William	   Cromwell,	   for	   a	   fee	   of	  
US$500,000,	   to	   lobby	   Congress	   to	   move	   the	   canal	   project	   to	   Panama	   (Mowry,	  
1958,	  p.	  152).	  Cromwell	  paid	  Senator	  Mark	  Hannah	  US$60,000	  to	  spread	  the	  fear	  
of	   Nicaraguan	   volcanic	   activity,	   thereby	   ensuring	   the	   success	   of	   the	   Panama	  
solution.	   The	   Roosevelt	   government	   offered	   the	   NPCC	   US$40	   million	   for	   their	  
contracts	  and	  the	  Colombian	  government	  US$10	  million	  and	  US$250,000	  annually	  
to	   own	   and	   operate	   the	   “Canal	   Zone”	   in	   Panama	   (Mowry,	   1958,	   p.	   152).	   The	  
Colombian	  President	  Rafael	  Reyes,	  however,	  demanded	  greater	  remuneration	  for	  
the	   Canal	   Zone.	   In	   response,	   Roosevelt	   urged	   the	   Panamanians	   to	   secede	   from	  
Colombia.	   When	   revolt	   ensued	   in	   1903,	   Roosevelt	   sent	   the	   USS	   Nashville	   to	  
blockade	   the	   region,	   which	   was	   only	   accessible	   by	   sea,	   from	   Colombian	  
reinforcements	  (Yarbrough,	  2012,	  p.	  185).	  The	  independent	  Panamanian	  state	  was	  
then	  free	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  US	  over	  the	  canal.	  However,	  it	  never	  did;	  “the	  treaty	  
that	  no	  Panamanian	  signed”	  was	  written	  solely	  between	  Bunau-­‐Varilla	  of	  the	  NPCC	  
and	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  (Lafeber,	  1989,	  p.	  32).	  It	  ensured	  US	  sovereignty	  over	  
the	   Canal	   Zone	   for	   the	   original	   fee	   offered	   to	   Colombia.	   In	   addition,	   the	  
Panamanian	  government	  was	  reduced	  to	  the	  status	  of	  unofficial	  protectorate,	  with	  
no	  army	  of	  its	  own.	  By	  1903	  the	  US	  had	  a	  possession	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  to	  defend;	  its	  
policy	  needed	  to	  reflect	  this	  reality.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  Cuban	  revolutionary	  and	  scholar,	  José	  Martí,	  predicted	  this	  point.	  Martí’s	  critique	  of	  US	  
imperialism	  became	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  all	  revolutionary	  thought	  in	  Cuba	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  
century	  (Turton,	  1986,	  p.	  63).	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The	   expansion	   of	   US	   trade	   and	   investment	   throughout	   the	   Caribbean	  
necessitated	   a	  more	   assertive	   foreign	   policy.	   The	   onset	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	  
oversaw	  the	  most	  dramatic	  shift	   in	  US	  foreign	  policy	   in	   its	  short	  history.	   In	  1900	  
McKinley	  received	  US$115	  million	  from	  Congress	  to	  construct	  military	  bases	  and	  
an	   industrialised	   navy	   (Ginger,	   1965,	   p.	   250).	   The	   combination	   of	   military	  
expansion,	   the	  transoceanic	  canal	  and	   increasing	  US	  trade	  and	   investment	  meant	  
the	   Caribbean	   had	   the	   potential	   to	   become	   an	   ‘American	   Lake’.	   However,	  
continuing	  European	  trade,	  investment	  and	  naval	  presence	  temporarily	  obstructed	  
Washington’s	  advance.	  In	  the	  1904	  State	  of	  the	  Union	  Address,	  Roosevelt	  offered	  a	  
far-­‐reaching	  corollary	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine.	  Whereas	  Monroe’s	  primary	  concern	  
had	  been	  the	  avoidance	  of	  re-­‐colonisation	  of	  European	  empires,	  Roosevelt	  sought	  
to	  bring	  all	  the	  nations	  of	  the	  Caribbean	  into	  the	  American	  economic	  and	  political	  
sphere.	   Roosevelt	   (1904)	   sought	   the	   expansion	   of	   US	   political	   and	   economic	  
control	   in	   “every	  country	  washed	  by	   the	  Caribbean	  Sea.”	  He	   saw	   the	   interests	  of	  
the	  regions	  as	  “identical”	  as	  they	  possessed	  “great	  natural	  riches”	  that	  would	  bring	  
“prosperity”	   to	   the	   region	   (Roosevelt,	   1904).	   However,	   those	   nations	   that	  
continued	   to	   defy	   the	   Monroe	   Doctrine	   by	   maintaining	   their	   relationships	   with	  
European	   trade	   and	   investment,	   through	   their	   “impotence”	   would	   be	   subject	   to	  
“international	   police	   powers”	   (Roosevelt,	   1904).	   These	   police	   powers	   took	   a	  
variety	   of	   forms	   as	   they	  were	   both	   directed	   at	   European	   gunships,	   in	  Venezuela	  
and	   the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  and,	  under	  President	  William	  Howard	  Taft,	  at	  Latin	  
American	   leaders	  who	  did	  not	   submit	   to	  US	  demands	   (McBeth,	   2001,	   pp.	   85-­‐88;	  
Kinzer,	   2007,	   pp.	   56-­‐77).	   The	   expansion	   of	   informal	   trade	   protectionism	   and	  
formal	   military	   occupations,	   as	   well	   as	   private	   capitalist	   interference,	   firmly	  
established	   the	   Caribbean	   as	   an	  American	   lake	   under	   the	  Roosevelt	   Corollary	   to	  
the	  Monroe	  Doctrine.	  	  
The	   Roosevelt	   Corollary	   had	   a	   practical	   application	   upon	   the	   relatively	  
weak	   nations	   of	   the	   Caribbean.	  Many	  were	   dependent	   on	   the	   export	   of	   primary	  
products	   such	   as	   indigo,	   coffee,	   sugar	   and	   bananas	   to	   generate	   tariff	   revenue.	  
However,	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   export	   economy	   demanded	   capital	   investment,	  
specifically	   in	   rail,	   which	   required	   external	   funding	   through	   loans	   (Woodward,	  
1985,	   p.	   178).	   The	   conditions	   of	   these	   debts	   left	   many	   states	   in	   an	   irresolvable	  
economic	   position.	   In	   1906	   Honduras	   accrued	   a	   debt	   of	   US$124	   million	   to	  
European	  financiers,	  with	  meagre	  annual	  tariff	  revenue	  of	  US$1.6	  million	  (LaFeber,	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1984,	   p.	   32).	   European	   gunships	   were	   active	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   in	   the	   early	  
twentieth	  century,	   seeking	   to	   reclaim	   the	  capital	   they	  had	   lent	   (McBeth,	  2001,	  p.	  
85).	   The	   US	   sought	   to	   end	   European	   loans	   to	   these	   weak	   Latin	   American	  
governments.	  On	  the	  surface	   this	  was	   to	  prevent	  European	  military	   intervention,	  
however	   it	   also	   secured	   for	  US	   capitalists	   a	   controlling	   stake	   in	   the	   treasuries	  of	  
Latin	   America.	   The	   first	   case	   of	   economic	   protectionism	   followed	   the	   European	  
bombardment	   of	   Caracas	   in	   1902	   (McBeth,	   2001,	   p.	   85).18 	  Civil	   conflict	   had	  
burdened	  Venezuela	  with	  significant	  European	  debt,	  yet	  Cipriano	  Castro	  refused	  to	  
repay	   the	   debt	   of	   his	   predecessors,	   which	   motivated	   European	   intervention	  
(McBeth,	  2001,	  p.	  88).	  To	  offset	  European	  aggression,	  Roosevelt	  established	  a	  US	  
protectionist	   plan	   in	   1903.	   US	   administrators	  were	   employed	   to	   recover	   30	   per	  
cent	   of	   customs	   revenue	   to	   service	   debts,	   while	   US	   financiers	   refinanced	   the	  
Venezuelan	  government	  (Mowry,	  1958,	  p.	  157).	  A	  similar	  situation	  occurred	  in	  the	  
Dominican	  Republic,	  where	  the	  1903	  Customhouse	  Agreement	  ensured	  that	  45	  per	  
cent	  of	   revenue	  would	  be	  committed	   to	  service	   its	  national	  debt	   (Curry,	  1979,	  p.	  
12).	   The	   American	   Kuhn	   Loeb	   and	   Company	   bought	   the	   national	   debt	   in	   1905	  
(Curry,	  1979,	  p.	  15).	  By	  installing	  US	  private	  citizens	  in	  the	  customhouses	  of	  both	  
Venezuela	  and	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  the	  US	  was	  able	  to	  commit	  these	  nations	  to	  
‘reciprocal’	   trade,	  which	   advantaged	  US	   businesses.	   Furthermore,	   US	   investment	  
also	  focussed	  upon	  resource	  extraction.19	  The	  US	  also	  re-­‐occupied	  Cuba	  from	  1906	  
until	  1909	  to	  protect	  US	   investment	  (Millet,	  1968,	  pp.	  72-­‐97).	   Informal	  economic	  
protectionism	  served	  to	  extend	  the	  reach	  of	  Washington’s	  financial	  conquistadors	  
in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  
The	  Latin	  American,	  specifically	  Central	  American,	  nations	  that	  opposed	  US	  
capitalist	   monopolisation	   faced	   a	   new	   threat.	   Roosevelt’s	   warning	   that	   the	   US	  
would	   exercise	   “international	   police	   powers”	   was	   realised	   under	   the	   ‘gunboat	  
diplomacy’	  of	  his	  successor,	  Howard	  Taft	  (T	  Roosevelt,	  1904;	  Scholes	  and	  Scholes,	  
1970,	   pp.	   40-­‐42).	   While	   Roosevelt	   had	   targeted	   irresponsible	   regimes	   that	  
incurred	  European	  intervention	  in	  the	  Caribbean,	  Taft	  targeted	  those	  governments	  
whose	  policies	  ran	  counter	  to	  US	  business	  interests	  (Scholes	  and	  Scholes,	  1970,	  pp.	  
49-­‐59).	   This	   stance	   led	   the	   US	   to	   overthrow	   the	   sovereign	   governments	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  bombardment	  and	  blockade	  of	  Caracas	  was	  led	  by	  the	  navies	  of	  Germany,	  
Britain	  and	  Italy	  (McBeth,	  2001,	  p.	  85).	  
19	  In	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  infrastructure	  was	  constructed	  to	  increase	  sugar	  exports	  (Curry,	  
1979,	  p.	  24).	  In	  Venezuela,	  oil	  exploration	  became	  increasingly	  important	  (Bucheli	  and	  Aguiler.	  
2010,	  p.	  364).	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Nicaragua	   and	   Honduras	   during	   1911.	   The	   Honduran	   President	   Miguel	   Davila	  
inherited	  an	  onerous	  economic	  position.	  The	  US	  government	  proposed	  a	  ‘recovery	  
plan’	   in	   1907.	   The	   plan	   required	   the	   sale	   of	   fertile	   Honduran	   land	   to	   US	   fruit	  
companies,	   primarily	   Sam	   Zemmurray’s	   Cuyamel	   Fruit,	   to	   pay	   off	   the	   country’s	  
debt	   (Kinzer,	   2007,	   p.	   58;	   MacCameron,	   1983,	   p.	   3).	   The	   plan	   would	   effectively	  
make	  Honduras	  a	  plantation	  state	  and	  its	  people	  indentured	  subjects	  of	  a	  foreign	  
power.	   Davila	   and	   the	   Honduran	   Congress	   refused	   and	   in	   response,	   Taft	   urged	  
Zemmuray	  to	  initiate	  a	  coup,	  installing	  the	  former	  dictator	  Manuel	  Bonilla	  (Scholes	  
and	  Scholes,	  1970,	  p.	  65).	  Zemmuray	  hired	  Soldier	  of	  Fortune	  Lee	  Christmas	  and	  
other	   US	   mercenaries	   to	   stage	   the	   coup	   (Kinzer,	   2007,	   p.	   60).	   The	   US	   navy	  
provided	   safe	   passage	   for	   the	   conspirators	   to	   overthrow	   the	   meagre	   Honduran	  
military.	  Bonilla	   accepted	   the	   reorganisation	  of	   national	   debt	  with	  US	   financiers,	  
and	   sold	   off	   Honduran	   land	   to	   meet	   the	   payments	   (Karnes,	   1978,	   p.	   44).	   In	  
Nicaragua,	   the	   President	   José	   Santos	   Zelaya	   had	   run	   a	   responsible	   government	  
since	   1895.	   Large	   investment	   from	   German	   and	   Italian	   coffee	   planters	   gave	  
Nicaragua	   a	   rising	   level	   of	   national	   prosperity	   (Bermann,	   1986,	   p.	   153).	   The	   US	  
timber	  magnate,	  George	  Emery,	  was	  given	  the	  contracts	  to	  extract	  lumber	  from	  the	  
rich	  mahogany	  region	  of	   the	  Mosquito	  Coast.	  Zelaya	  demanded	  that	   two	  trees	  be	  
planted	   for	   each	   taken	   and	   a	   serviceable	   railway	   constructed	   in	   the	   region	  
(Bermann,	  1986,	  p.	  155).	  Emery’s	  contracts	  were	  terminated	  when	  neither	  of	  these	  
conditions	   was	   met.	   The	   US	   citizens	   in	   the	   Bluefields	   region	   protested	   Zelaya’s	  
actions.	  The	  US	  invaded	  Nicaragua	  to	  replace	  Zelaya	  with	  a	  more	  compliant	  leader	  
in	  1911;	  this	  was	  followed	  by	  nine	  separate	  US	  military	  interventions	  in	  Nicaragua	  
(Crawley,	   2007,	   p.	   9).	   US	   imperialism	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	  
century	  was	  demonstrated	  by	  its	  actions	  in	  Nicaragua	  and	  Honduras.20	  
	  
The	  Imperial	  Dilemma	  	  
The	  US	  approached	  Latin	  America	  as	  if	   it	  was	  a	  stagnant	  region	  that	  could	  
be	  easily	  manipulated	  and	  controlled.	  However,	  Latin	  American	  society	  included	  a	  
variety	   of	   organised	   segments	   that	   would	   impede	   US	   imperial	   ambitions.	   These	  
included	  peasants,	  urban	   industrial	  unions	  and	   the	  burgeoning	  social	  democratic	  
movement.	   This	   led	   to	   an	   evolution	   in	   the	   national	   life	   of	  many	   Latin	   American	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Ironically,	  many	  of	  Taft’s	  policies	  were	  institutionalized	  and	  extended	  by	  his	  ‘liberal’	  successor,	  
Woodrow	  Wilson.	  Wilson	  expanded	  military	  intervention	  to	  Haiti	  and	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  in	  
1915-­‐1916	  (Notter,	  1965,	  pp.	  284-­‐291).	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republics.	  The	  first	  group	  to	  consider	  are	  the	  Latin	  American	  peasants.	  Private	  US	  
businesses	   were	   evolving	   several	   Caribbean	   nations	   into	   plantation	   states.	   The	  
expansion	  of	  corporate	  and	  foreign	  sugar,	  coffee	  and	  banana	  production	  in	  the	  first	  
decade	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  conflicted	  with	  the	  traditional	  way	  of	  life	  of	  many	  
Mayan	  peasants	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Central	  America	  (Baraclogh	  and	  Domike,	  1970,	  pp.	  
50-­‐55).	   While	   indigenous	   peasants	   had	   continually	   revolted	   against	   Spanish	  
colonial	   rule,	   their	  movements	   remained	   largely	   unorganised	   and	   localised,	   and	  
lacking	   ideological	   foundations.	   The	   expansion	   of	   export	   agriculture	   further	  
impeded	  traditional	  life.	  The	  implementation	  of	  rail	  technology,	  by	  British	  and	  US	  
companies,	  opened	  up	  more	  of	   the	  region	  to	  extractive	  production	  (Carrol,	  1970,	  
pp.	   107-­‐115). 21 	  This	   brought	   the	   region’s	   peasants	   into	   conflict	   with	   the	  
centralised	  state.	  Additionally,	   it	  brought	  geographically	   isolated	  people	   together	  
on	  plantations	  as	  tribal	  lands	  were	  annexed	  to	  create	  large	  haciendas.	  
While	  land	  was	  desired,	  the	  labour	  of	  indigenous	  peasants	  was	  the	  greater	  
goal.	   Monoculture	   production	   was	   only	   profitable	   through	   cheap	   pliable	  
Indigenous	  labour.	  The	  region’s	  caudillos	  began	  determining	  this	  relationship	  from	  
the	   late	   nineteenth	   century	   (Barraclogh	   and	   Domike,	   1970,	   p.	   50).22	  Since	   this	  
expansion,	   the	   peasants	   of	   Latin	   America	   have	   had	   one	   central	   concern	   –	   land	  
reform.23	  The	  first	  large,	  organised	  movement	  for	  land	  reform	  occurred	  in	  Morales,	  
Southern	   Mexico	   (Huizer,	   1970,	   pp.	   375-­‐378).	   The	   peasant	   armies	   of	   Emiliano	  
Zapata	   came	   into	   conflict	  with	   both	   the	   local	  haciendos	   and	   the	   dictator	   Porfirio	  
Díaz	  over	  land	  tenure	  and	  labour	  conditions	  on	  their	  haciendas	  (Rolls,	  2011,	  p.	  14;	  
Huizer,	   1970,	   p.	   378);	   following	   a	   decade	   of	   oligarchic	   land	   seizure	   from	  
agricultural	   communities.	   The	   conflict	   predated	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   in	   the	  
Southern	  Mexico,	   with	   incidences	   of	   violence	   recorded	   between	   1904	   and	   1910	  
(Rolls,	   2011,	   pp.	   16-­‐28).	   Zapata	   was	   an	   indigenous	   Mexican	   who	   wanted	   the	  
occupied	   land	   of	   the	   haciendas	   returned	   to	   the	   ‘Indians’	   for	   communal	   farming	  
(Huizer,	  1970,	  p.	  376).	  While	  his	  direct	  political	  influence	  was	  against	  the	  Morales	  
oligarchy,	   his	   wider	   influence	   would	   determine	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   Mexican	  
Revolution	  (Gilly,	  1983,	  pp.	  162-­‐170).	  Zapata	  gave	  his	  support	  to	  liberal	  politicians	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  expansion	  of	  British	  coffee	  plantations	  in	  Guatemala	  during	  the	  1890s	  exemplifies	  this	  point	  
(McCrary,	  1983,	  p.	  18).	  
22	  This	  expanded	  during	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  1934	  Vagrancy	  Law	  in	  
Guatemala	  made	  it	  illegal	  for	  an	  indigenous	  peasant	  to	  avoid	  plantation	  work	  (Greib,	  1979,	  p.	  34).	  
23	  Land	  reform	  has	  been	  the	  central	  issue	  for	  peasant	  movements	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  
century.	  Social	  democrats	  also	  adopted	  this	  platform	  to	  gain	  the	  support	  of	  peasants	  throughout	  the	  
period.	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in	   local	  and	  national	  elections,	   in	   return	   for	   commitments	  on	   land	  reform	  (Rolls,	  
2011,	   p.	   31).	   This	   was	   the	   basis	   of	   his	   alliance	   with	   Francisco	  Madero	   in	   1910.	  
Zapata	  continued	  to	  struggle	  for	  the	  Morales	  peasantry	  throughout	  the	  protracted	  
Mexican	   Revolution.	   Moreover,	   the	   struggles	   of	   indigenous	   peasants	   challenged	  
the	  expansion	  of	  capitalist	  development	  in	  rural	  Latin	  America,	  in	  which	  they	  were	  
in	  danger	  of	  losing	  their	  land	  and	  their	  subsequent	  way	  of	  life.	  	  
A	   similar	   threat	   was	   emerging	   in	   Latin	   America’s	   urban	   landscape.	   The	  
expansion	   of	   organised	   trade	   unions	   in	   the	   first	   two	   decades	   of	   the	   twentieth	  
century	  changed	  the	  relationship	  between	  labour	  and	  capital.	  Unionism	  grew	  more	  
slowly	   in	   Latin	   America	   than	   in	   North	   America	   because	   of	   its	   relative	   isolation	  
from	   European	   ideologies	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   pp.	   1-­‐5).	   Nevertheless,	   in	   the	   last	  
decades	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   skilled	   workers	   in	   several	   Latin	   American	  
nations	  established	  mutual	   aid	   societies	  and	   ‘guilds’	   (Alexander,	  2009,	  pp.	  1-­‐10).	  
Mass	   immigration,	   especially	   to	   Argentina,	   witnessed	   the	   slow	   introduction	   of	  
European	   ideologies	   of	   labour	   agitation,	   including	   unionism,	   anarchism	   and	  
syndicalism	  (Shaffer,	  2010,	  p.	  273).24	  In	  Argentina,	  European	  anarchists	  dominated	  
the	  urban	  labour	  movement.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  “port	  of	  entry	  for	  radical	  ideologies	  
from	  Europe	  due	  to	  high	  levels	  of	  immigration”	  (Laforcade,	  2010,	  p.	  327).	  This	  led	  
to	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Argentine	  radical	  movement	  (Horowitz,	  1999,	  p.	  25).	   In	  Chile,	  a	  
broader	   class	   organisation	   emerged.	   The	   Great	   Chilean	   Worker’s	   Federation	  
(FOCH)	   was	   established	   in	   1909	   (Loveman,	   1987,	   p.	   130).	   The	   largest	   Latin	  
American	   union	   at	   the	   time,	   FOCH	   recruited	   40,000,	   primarily	   bureaucratic,	  
members	   in	   fifteen	  cities	   (Loveman,	  1987,	  p.	  131).	  Much	  of	   the	  FOCH	   leadership	  
identified	   with	   socialism	   after	   the	   1920s.25	  An	   anarcho-­‐syndicalist	   ideology	   was	  
instituted	  in	  Peru	  during	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  (Hirsch,	  2010,	  pp.	  228-­‐233).	  
Peru	   staged	   the	   first	   Latin	   American	   ‘General	   Strike’	   in	   Lima	   in	   January	   1919	  
(Hirsch,	  2010,	  p.	  233).	  Urban	  workers	  sought	   to	  reform	   labour	   laws	   instituting	  a	  
minimum	  wage	  and	  six	  day	  week.	  During	  the	  1920s,	  the	  leadership	  of	  labour	  was	  
divided	   between	   socialists	   and	   ‘Apristas’	   both	   of	   whom	   had	   broader	   agendas	  
(Bollinger,	  1987,	  p.	   308;	   Stein,	  1980,	  p.	   129).	   Finally,	   in	  Mexico	  anarchist	  unions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Anarchist	  groups	  were	  less	  concerned	  by	  national	  boundaries	  than	  other	  progressive	  
nationalists,	  and	  so	  connections	  between	  anarchist	  groups	  across	  different	  states	  were	  more	  
evident.	  For	  example,	  the	  Americans	  of	  the	  International	  Workers	  of	  the	  World	  (IWW)	  assisted	  
anarchist	  groups	  in	  Mexico	  (Shaffer,	  2010,	  p.	  273).	  
25	  This	  was	  due	  to	  popular	  outrage	  over	  declining	  living	  standards	  in	  Chile	  throughout	  the	  1920s	  
(Loveman,	  1987,	  p.	  131).	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were	  extremely	  active	  during	  the	  Porfirian	  era.	  They	  staged	  125	  strikes	  from	  1905	  
until	   1910,	   primarily	   over	   labour	   conditions	   (Anderson,	   1987,	   p.	   517).	   Mexico’s	  
unions,	   through	   their	  alliance	  with	  Venustiano	  Carranza	   in	  1914,	  won	  significant	  
concessions	   after	   the	   revolution	   (Gilly,	   1983,	   pp.	   161-­‐167). 26 	  The	   fight	   for	  
minimum	   conditions	   challenged	   the	   profitability	   of	   domestic	   and	   foreign	  
manufacturing	   firms	   in	   Latin	   America.	   It	   also	   threatened	   the	   control	   of	   the	  
oligarchy	  over	  Latin	  American	  politics.	  
Although	  much	  of	  Latin	  America	  had	  been	  dominated	  by	  a	  landed	  oligarchy	  
since	   its	   independence,	   a	   series	   of	   intellectual	   Euro-­‐American	   ideals	   took	   root	  
within	  the	  region.	  The	  European	  Enlightenment	  directly	  influenced	  the	  new	  ideas	  
of	   liberalism,	   justice	   and	   democracy.	   Such	   notions,	   for	   instance,	   appeared	   in	  
Uruguay	   at	   the	   start	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   However,	   unlike	   most	   reform	   in	  
Latin	  America,	  change	  came	  from	  above.	  The	  Presidency	  of	   José	  Batlle	  y	  Ordóñez	  
brought	  significant	  changes	  to	  Uruguay	  during	  his	  second	  presidential	   term	  from	  
1911	  until	  1915	  (Ameringer,	  2009,	  pp.	  27-­‐38).	  Voting	  rights	  were	  extended	  to	  all	  
literate	   citizens,	   while	   social	   programs	   such	   as	   education,	   health	   and	   minimum	  
labour	   conditions	   were	   legislated	   (Roade,	   1987,	   p.	   707;	   Di	   Tella,	   2004,	   pp.	   38-­‐
43).27	  Batlle	   y	   Ordóñez’s	   legacy	   was	   the	   most	   stable	   democracy	   in	   the	   region	  
throughout	  this	  period.	  It	  also	  demonstrated	  the	  potential	  for	  democratic	  reform	  in	  
the	  region.	  In	  Argentina,	  from	  1911,	  all	  literate	  males	  over	  the	  age	  of	  eighteen	  were	  	  
invited	   to	   vote	   (Rock,	   1986,	   p.	   189).	   This	   gave	   rise	   to	   new	   directions	   in	  
Argentinean	   politics.	   The	   former	   Radical	   Civic	   Union	   (UCR)	   leader	   Hipólito	  
Yrigoyen	  was	  elected	  President	   in	  1916	  (Di	  Tella,	  2004,	  pp.	  44-­‐47).	  This	  was	   the	  
first	   example	   of	   a	   non-­‐oligarchic	   politician	   leading	   a	   Latin	   American	   nation.	  
Yrigoyen’s	   interaction	   with	   capital,	   labour	   and	   foreign	   business	   interests	   were	  
fundamentally	  different	  to	  the	  methods	  of	  previous	  governments	  (Di	  Tella,	  2004,	  p.	  
47).	   In	   Peru,	   the	   student	   leader	   Víctor	   Raúl	   Haya	   de	   la	   Torre	   campaigned	   for	  
democratic	   action.	   The	   general	   strike	   of	   1919	   led	   to	   an	   alliance	   between	   Lima’s	  
workers	  and	  the	  student	  union	  (Graham,	  1992,	  pp.	  22-­‐24).	   In	  1922	  Haya	  opened	  
the	  “Popular	  University”	  to	  educate	  factory	  and	  mine	  labourers	  in	  reading,	  writing,	  
general	  mathematics	  and	  health	  (Stein,	  1980,	  p.	  140).	  The	  dictator	  Augusto	  Leguía	  
feared	  Haya’s	   ‘leftist’	  movement	  and	  exiled	  the	  future	  Aprista	   leader	  to	  Mexico	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Specifically	  through	  the	  1917	  Mexican	  Constitution.	  
27	  Uruguay	  was	  also	  the	  first	  Latin	  American	  state	  to	  grant	  female	  suffrage	  in	  1927	  (Roade,	  1987,	  p.	  
714).	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1924	   (Nazal,	   1988,	   p.	   22;	   Graham,	   1992,	   p.	   27).	   Despite	   the	   move	   towards	  
democracy	   in	   Latin	   America,	   its	   outcomes	   were	   modest.	   Moreover,	   full	  
representative	  democracy	  was	  not	  achieved	  in	  this	  era.28	  
All	   of	   these	   social	   movements	   culminated	   in	   the	   ‘multiclass’	   Mexican	  
Revolution	  of	  1910-­‐1920.	  Since	  its	  emphatic	  defeat	  in	  the	  Mexican-­‐American	  War,	  
Mexico	  had	  experienced	   increasing	  US	   influence.	  By	  1911	  the	  US	  owned	  223,000	  
mines,	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  Mexican	  agricultural	  land	  and	  had	  over	  US$1.2	  billion	  of	  DFI	  
(Bernstein,	  1965,	  p.	  75;	  Cohen,	  1987,	  p.	  64;	  Calvert,	  1968,	  p.	  19).	  Its	  leader,	  Porfirio	  
Díaz,	  had	  been	  in	  power	  since	  1876.	  Díaz	  and	  the	  Mexican	  oligarchy	  embraced	  US	  
technical	  investment,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Mexico’s	  peasants,	  unions,	  republicans	  and	  
democratic	  proponents	  (Hart,	  1987,	  p.	  110).	  Popular	  pressure	  led	  to	  the	  election	  of	  	  
1910.	  It	  was	  apparent,	  however,	  that	  the	  liberal	  oligarch	  Francisco	  Madero	  was	  set	  
to	  win	   over	   Díaz.	   Accordingly,	   Díaz	   cancelled	   the	   elections	   (Hart,	   1987,	   p.	   240).	  
This	   decision	   was	   rejected	   by	   many	   sectors	   of	   Mexican	   society.	   Madero	   sought	  
alliances	  with	  the	  Constitutionalists	  of	   the	  North,	   the	  Zapatista	  peasant	  armies	  of	  
the	  South,	  the	  anarchist	  industrial	  unions	  and	  the	  revolutionaries	  in	  the	  north,	  led	  
by	  Pancho	  Villa	  (Gilly,	  1983,	  p.	  153).	  Together,	  they	  removed	  Díaz	  in	  1911.	  Madero	  
soon	  lost	  the	  support	  of	  many	  revolutionary	  factions	  with	  his	  reluctance	  to	  support	  
land	   reform	   led	   to	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   Zapata	   and	   Villa	   from	   his	   alliance	   (Rolls,	  
2011,	  p.	  38).	  Madero	  also	  alienated	  the	  industrial	  unions.	  With	  chaos	  ensuing,	  the	  
Porfirian	   general	   Victoriano	   Huerta	   overthrew	   Madero	   in	   February	   1913	  
(Tannenbaum,	   1967,	   p.	   163).	   Huerta	   also	   sought	   to	   eliminate	   the	   resistance	   of	  
Zapata	  and	  Villa.	  However,	   the	  peasant	  armies	  drove	  the	  military	  back	  to	  Mexico	  
City	   during	   1914	   (Rolls,	   2011,	   p.	   110).	   Villa,	   Zapata	   and	   thousands	   of	   rebel	  
peasants	   controlled	  Mexico	   City	   during	   the	  winter	   of	   1914-­‐1915	   (Gilly,	   1983,	   p.	  
162).	   The	   final	   struggles	   of	   the	   revolution	   were	   between	   previous	   allies.	   The	  
Constitutionalist	   Army	   of	   Carranza	   and	   Álvaro	   Obregón,	   hereafter,	   sought	   to	  
control	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   revolution.	   While	   an	   alliance	   was	   formed	   between	  
Zapata	  and	  Carranza	  was	  achieved	  during	  1915-­‐1916,	  Villa	  was	  not	  included	  in	  the	  
arrangement	   (Gilly,	   1983,	   p.	   184).	   Despite	   its	   obvious	   complexities,	   the	  Mexican	  
Revolution	  permanently	  changed	  Mexico’s	  social	  structure.	  Power	  shifted	  from	  the	  
oligarchy	   to	   a	   broad	   multiclass	   coalition	   of	   bourgeoisie,	   union	   and	   peasant	  
interests	  that	  dominated	  Mexican	  politics	  for	  over	  fifty	  years.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  With	  the	  sole	  exception	  of	  Uruguay.	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While	   the	   US	   feared	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution,	   most	  
American	   leaders	   failed	   to	   grasp	   its	   motivations.	   President	   Taft’s	   appointed	  
ambassador,	   Henry	   Lane	  Wilson,	   supported	  Huerta’s	   assassination	   of	  Madero	   in	  
order	  to	  halt	  the	  revolution	  (Schoultz,	  1998,	  p.	  214).	  However,	  the	  new	  Democratic	  
President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  rejected	  this	  stance.	  He	  dismissed	  the	  ambassador	  and	  
was	   antagonistic	   towards	  Huerta	   (Hart,	   1987,	   p.	   253).	  This	   led	   to	   the	  misguided	  
1914	   invasion	   of	   Veracruz,	   which	   inadvertently	   reinvigorated	   the	   revolution	  
(Tannenbaum,	   1968,	   p.	   165).	   The	   US	   again	   invaded	   Mexico	   in	   March	   1916,	   to	  
assassinate	  Villa	  in	  retaliation	  for	  the	  deaths	  of	  17	  US	  citizens	  killed	  during	  a	  train	  
heist	   (Gilly,	   1983,	  p.	   223).	  The	   forces	  of	  Mexico,	  which	  had	  not	   approved	   the	  US	  
mission,	  drove	   its	   troops	  back	  north	  of	   the	  Rio	  Grande	  by	   January	  2,	  1917	  (Gilly,	  
1983,	  p.	  223).	  	  
The	  US	  was	  correct	  to	  fear	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution.	  It	  was	  antithetic	  to	  US	  
interests	   in	  Mexico	  in	  every	  way,	  as	   it	  challenged	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	   in	  the	  
country	   (González,	   2002,	   p.	   110).	   The	  Mexican	   Constitution	   of	   January	   31,	   1917	  
ensured	   basic	   civil,	   judicial,	   and	   democratic	   rights	   to	   all	   Mexican	   citizens	  
regardless	  of	   race.	  Yet	   its	   two	  most	   significant	   articles	  were	  direct	   results	  of	   the	  
‘multiclass’	  alliance	  of	  the	  revolution.	  Article	  27	  (1917),	  written	  to	  secure	  Zapata’s	  
support,	  was	  a	  radical	  land	  reform	  law	  that	  policed	  foreign-­‐owned	  land	  and	  subsoil	  
rights.	  It	  asserted	  that	  the	  government	  could	  expropriate	  all	  Mexican	  land	  held	  by	  
foreign	  corporations	  (Mexican	  Constitution,	  1917).	  This	  included	  the	  land	  of	  large	  
oil	   and	  mineral	   companies.	   Its	  purpose	  was	   to	  break	  up	   the	   foreign	  haciendas	   to	  
improve	   the	   lives	   of	   Mexico’s	   agrarian	   population.	   Article	   123	   (1917)	   was	   the	  
labour	   code	   promised	   to	   the	   industrial	   unions.	   It	   established	  minimum	  working	  
standards.	   Together,	   these	   reforms	   targeted	   foreigners	   who	   had	   monopolised	  
Mexican	  industry,	  mining	  and	  agriculture	  in	  the	  decades	  preceding	  the	  revolution.	  
As	  a	  result,	  these	  reforms	  primarily	  targeted	  North	  Americans.	  
	  
In	  Defence	  of	  Life	  and	  Property	  
The	  US	  possessed	  significant	  capital	  investment	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  the	  
Caribbean	   by	   1920.	   US	   foreign	   policy	   under	   the	   Republican	   administrations	   of	  
Harding,	  Coolidge	  and	  Hoover	  focused	  on	  returning	  the	  US	  to	  “normalcy”	  (Schales,	  
2013,	   p.	   196).	   They	   also	   committed	   their	   governments	   to	   the	   “protect	  American	  
life	   and	   property”	   abroad	   (Bermann,	   1986,	   p.	   163).	   Simply	   put,	   the	   Republicans	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would	  protect	  and	  promote	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  abroad.	  This	  meant	  returning	  
the	   US	   to	   pro-­‐capitalist	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   policy	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   WWI	  
However,	   this	   stance	   faced	   many	   obstacles.	   The	   1917	   Bolshevik	   Revolution	  
bolstered	  the	  credibility	  of	  communism	  as	  a	  movement	  (Leffler,	  1994,	  p.	  3).	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  the	  short-­‐lived	  1919	  Hungarian	  Soviet	  Republic	  further	  exacerbated	  a	  
fear	   of	   communist	   expansion	   (Leffler,	   1994,	   p.	   7).	   As	   an	   economic	   doctrine,	  
communism	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  US	  global	  economic	  expansion,	  as	  it	  would	  seize	  the	  
productive	   forces	   of	   capital.	   President	   Wilson	   declared	   that	   “Bolshevism	  
represented	   the	   antithesis	   of	   everything”	   he	   believed	   in	   (Leffler,	   1994,	   p.	   12).	  
Despite	   no	   detailed	   knowledge	   of	   the	   doctrine,	   or	   of	   events	   in	   Russia,	   American	  
politicians	   “would	   brand	   their	   enemies	   as	   communists”	   from	   this	   period	   on	  
(Leffler,	   1994,	   p.	   15).	   The	   origins	   of	   anti-­‐communism	   as	   a	   pretext	   preceded	   the	  
international	   Cold	  War	   that	   followed	  WWII.	   These	   accusations	   date	   back	   to	   the	  
Red	   Scare	   of	   1919-­‐1922	   (Weiner,	   2012,	   pp.	   27-­‐33).	   Labour	   strikes	   and	   cases	   of	  
political	  violence	  within	   the	  US	  exacerbated	   the	   fear	  of	  communism	  during	  1919	  
(Ceplair,	  2011,	  pp.	  19-­‐25).	  Similar	  fears	  were	  felt	  across	  Latin	  America.	  	  
From	   1919	   to	   1921	   communist	   parties	   were	   established	   in	   Argentina,	  
Brazil,	  Uruguay,	  Mexico	   and	  Chile	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   pp.	   93,	   136,	   154,	   177,	   319).	  
Their	  membership	  evolved	  out	  of	  anarchist	  groups,	  organised	  labour	  and	  socialist	  
organisations	   (Aguilar,	   1968,	   pp.	   8-­‐11).	   However,	   Latin	   American	   communism	  
developed	   slowly.	   Its	   place	   at	   the	   Communist	   International,	   prior	   to	   1928,	   was	  
within	  the	  “Latin”	  bureau	  along	  with	  France,	  Spain	  and	  Portugal	  (Cabellero,	  1986,	  
p.	  27).	  Membership	  remained	  very	  low	  during	  the	  1920s.29	  Ceplair	  (2011)	  reasons,	  
“the	  communist	  threat	  on	  which	  anti-­‐communism	  was	  based	  [in	  the	  US]	  could	  not	  
be	   measured	   or,	   in	   cases,	   even	   substantiated”	   (p.	   19).	   Events	   that	   were	   not	  
directed	   by	   communists	   could	   evoke	   anti-­‐communist	   fear,	   even	   without	   any	  
factual	  evidence.	  For	  example,	   significant	  union	  activity	  during	  1919-­‐1920	  was	  a	  
far	  greater	  threat	  (Alexander,	  2009,	  pp.	  41-­‐47).	  The	  unions	  rallied	  for	  better	  urban	  
working	   conditions	   with	   often	   disastrous	   consequences.	   The	   1919	   strikes	   in	  
Argentina,	   for	   example,	   are	   remembered	   for	   the	   “tragic	   week”	   in	   which	   conflict	  
between	   the	  military	   and	  workers	   cost	   approximately	   one	   hundred	   lives	   (Haas,	  
1987,	  p.	  19).	   In	  Colombia,	  unionism	  also	  spread	   to	  campesino	   labourers	  on	  UFCo	  
plantations	  (Toman,	  1987,	  p.	  182).	  These	  conflicts	  were	  the	  first	  indication	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  By	  1928,	  Brazil	  had	  2,000	  members,	  	  Argentina	  had	  1,200	  and	  Mexico	  had	  1,000	  (Aguilar,	  1968,	  
p.	  11).	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approaching	  civil	  war	  between	  the	  impoverished	  people	  and	  the	  oligarchic	  classes	  
in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  threat	  to	  oligarchic	  control	  inevitably	  imperilled	  US	  interests	  
in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1920s.	  
From	  1919	  to	  1929	  the	  US	  experienced	  a	  70	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  industrial	  
output	   (Cohen,	   1987,	   p.	   18).	   The	   rapid	   industrialisation	   of	   export	   commodity	  
industries,	   such	   as	   those	   producing	   automobiles,	   electronics	   and	   light	   consumer	  
goods,	   was	   fuelled	   by	   global	   demand	   (Wilson,	   1971,	   p.	   8).	   The	   US’	   economic	  
relationship	  with	   Latin	  America	  was	   vital	   to	   this	   expansion.	  US	   influence,	   led	   by	  
private	   investment,	   was	   pivotal	   in	   creating	   new	  markets	   within	   South	   America.	  
However,	   the	   economic	   relationship	   between	   the	   US	   and	   Latin	   America,	  
established	   between	   1898	   and	   1920,	   was	   threatened	   by	   events	   in	   Mexico.	   The	  
1917	  constitution	  held	   the	  power	  to	  regulate	  all	  US	  business	   interests	   in	  Mexico.	  
This	  challenged	  US	  access	  the	  Mexican	  resources,	   including	  oil.	   It	  also	  challenged	  
their	  access	  to	  Mexico’s	  markets.	  This	  ‘revolution’	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  undermine	  
the	  American	  empire	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  if	  replicated	  across	  the	  region;	  accordingly,	  
Washington	  sought	  to	  contain	  its	  influence	  (Adler,	  1965,	  p.	  96).	  When	  Obregón	  and	  
Warren	   Harding	   assumed	   their	   respective	   presidencies,	   in	   1920	   and	   1921,	   this	  
bilateral	  relationship	  was	  at	  an	  impasse.	  For	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Charles	  Hughes,	  
the	  priority	  was	  “the	  safeguarding	  of	  property	  rights	  against	  confiscation”	  (Blasier,	  
1976,	  p.	  116).	  The	  US	  argued	  that	  the	  ‘retroactivity	  clause’	  in	  the	  constitution	  was	  
illegal	   (Blasier,	   1976,	   pp.	   116-­‐119).	   While	   it	   still	   had	   revolutionary	   aims,	   the	  
Mexican	  Civil	  War	  left	  the	  government	  in	  need	  of	  revenue.	  To	  appease	  Washington,	  
Obregón	  imposed	  a	  25	  per	  cent	  tax	  on	  the	  export	  profits	  of	  US	  companies	  over	  the	  
full	   and	   immediate	   expropriation	   of	   oil	   reserves	   (Blasier,	   1976,	   p.	   117).	   Hughes	  
accepted	   this	   agreement	   and	   the	   tensions	   were	   temporarily	   eased.	   The	   1924	  
election	   of	   Elías	   Calles	   to	   the	   Mexican	   Presidency,	   however,	   rejuvenated	   the	  
revolutionary	   attitude	   (Blasier,	   1976,	   p.	   120).	   While	   there	   was	   no	   cooperation	  
between	  Mexico	   and	   the	   USSR,30	  conservative	   leaders	   in	   the	   US	   dubbed	   this	   the	  
beginning	  of	  a	  “Soviet	  Mexico”	  (Blasier,	  1976,	  p.	  120).	  There	  were	  loud	  calls	  for	  a	  
US	  invasion	  to	  establish	  a	  Díaz-­‐style	  regime.	  Instead,	  the	  new	  US	  president,	  Calvin	  
Coolidge,	  established	  an	  economic	  treaty	  to	  avert	  war	  (Schlaes,	  2013,	  p.	  392).	  US	  
companies	   were	   granted	   further	   access	   to	   Mexican	   resources	   in	   exchange	   for	  
increased	   revenues	   to	   the	   Mexican	   government	   (Blasier,	   1976;	   Adler,	   1965,	   p.	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  They	  did,	  however,	  establish	  diplomatic	  ties	  in	  1927.	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105).	  Moreover,	   US	   policy	   successfully	   contained	   the	  Mexican	  Revolution	   during	  
the	  1920s.	  
In	   addition	   to	   defending	   trade	   and	   investment	   abroad,	   the	   US	   advocated	  
their	  rapid	  expansion.	  During	  the	  1920s	  US	  businesses	  expanded	  their	  influence	  in	  
agriculture,	   resource	   extraction,	   infrastructure	   and	   material	   exports.	   The	   main	  
agricultural	  products	  imported	  into	  the	  US	  from	  Latin	  America	  were	  sugar,	  coffee	  
and	   bananas	   (Safford,	   1995,	   pp.	   121-­‐125;	   Chapman,	   2007,	   p.	   52).	   These	   three	  
commodities	   defined	   the	   political	   economies	   of	   a	   dozen	  Latin	  American	   states.31	  
The	  largest	  landowner	  in	  Latin	  America	  was	  the	  UFCo	  (Chapman,	  2007,	  pp.	  55-­‐60).	  
The	  UFCo	  monopolised	  production,	  transport	  and	  infrastructure	  in	  Honduras	  and	  
Guatemala	   (Chapman,	   2007,	   p.	   56).	   It	  made	   federal	   governments	   subservient	   to	  
their	  demands.	  The	  mineral	  wealth	  of	  Latin	  America’s	   resources	  was	  also	  sought	  
by	   a	   variety	   of	   foreign	   companies.	   By	   1918	   the	  US	   accounted	   for	   87	   per	   cent	   of	  
Chilean	   copper	   exports	   (O’Brien,	   2009,	   p.	   205).	   The	   Guggenheims’	   American	  
Smelting	   and	   Refining	   Company	   (ASARCo)	   also	   initiated	   large-­‐scale	   mineral	  
extraction	   in	  Colombia,	   Peru	   and	  Bolivia	   (O’Brien,	   2009,	   pp.	   197-­‐205).	  The	  most	  
significant	   regional	   commodity	   in	   the	   1920s,	   however,	   was	   oil.	   As	   demand	  
expanded	  during	  the	  decade,	  US	  oil	  companies,	  such	  as	  Standard	  Oil	  of	  New	  Jersey	  
(SONJ),	  sought	  new	  unexploited	  reserves	  (Bucheli	  and	  Aguilar,	  2010,	  p.	  361).	  The	  
setback	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Constitution	  of	  1917	  sent	  SONJ	  further	  south.	  Significant	  oil	  
deposits	   were	   discovered	   in	   Colombia,	   Bolivia	   and	   Venezuela	   during	   the	   1920s	  
(Bucheli	  and	  Aguilera,	  2010,	  pp.	  362-­‐	  370).	  By	  1930,	  SONJ	  had	  become	  one	  of	  the	  
leading	  oil	  exporters	  in	  South	  America.	  The	  sale	  of	  infrastructure	  to	  Latin	  America	  
was	   also	   very	   profitable,	   and	   ensured	   further	   American	   influence.	   In	   the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  US	  companies	  focused	  on	  rail.	  Pioneers,	  such	  as	  Minor	  Cooper	  
Keith	  and	  James	  Stillman,	  sought	  to	  sell	  the	  technology	  to	  every	  Caribbean	  nation	  
(Woodward,	  1985,	  pp.	  177-­‐182;	  O’Brien,	  2009,	  p.	  201).	  However,	   these	  men	  also	  
built	   successful	   enterprises	   through	   their	   actions.	   This	   in	   turn	   motivated	   an	  
increased	   desire	   for	   communications,	   roads	   for	   cars	   and	   trucks,	   electricity,	  
irrigation	   and	   aviation.	   The	   expansion	   of	   the	   International	   Telegraph	   and	  
Telephone	   Company	   (ITT),	   Ford	   Motors,	   General	   Electric	   and	   Pan	   American	  
Airlines	  to	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1920s	  increased	  commercial	  contact	  between	  
the	  two	  continents	  (Fejes,	  1986,	  p.	  23;	  Newton,	  1978,	  p.	  141).	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  Specifically	  those	  nations	  of	  Central	  America,	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  northern	  South	  America.	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The	  US	  also	  promoted	   the	  export	  of	   their	   industrial	  goods	   in	  a	  number	  of	  
ways	  during	   the	  1920s.	  This	   included	   the	  development	  of	  military	  protectorates,	  
economic	  protectorates,	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  and	  marketing.	  The	  US	  occupied	  
Cuba,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Haiti,	  Honduras,	  Nicaragua	  and	  Panama	  for	  varying	  
periods	  between	  1898	  and	  1935	  (Crawley,	  2007,	  pp.	  8-­‐9).	  These	  occupations	  aided	  
US	   trade	   through	   reciprocal	   agreements	   with	   the	   interim	   governments	   creating	  
long	  term	  dependency	  (Cohen,	  1987,	  pp.	  4-­‐17).	  US	  financiers	  were	  granted	  control	  
of	  the	  customs	  houses	  of	  the	  Dominican	  Republic	  and	  Venezuela	  and	  US	  economic	  
advisors	   could	   promote	   bilateral	   trading	   agreements.	   The	   Edge	   Act	   of	   1919	  
allowed	  US	  banks	  to	  operate	  in	  foreign	  nations	  (Cohen,	  1987,	  pp.	  4-­‐17);	  this	  meant	  
that	  US	  financiers	  could	  now	  compete	  with	  Europeans	  operating	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
These	  banks	  extended	  loans	  to	  Latin	  American	  countries	  that	  were	  purchasing	  US-­‐
manufactured	   goods.	   This	   enterprise	  was	   so	   successful	   that	   it	  was	   incorporated	  
into	   national	   policy	   in	   the	   1930s	   through	   the	   Export-­‐Import	   (EXIM)	   Bank	  
(Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  161).	  Finally,	  the	  expansion	  of	  US	  media	  and	  popular	  culture	  to	  
Latin	   America	   further	   promoted	   US	   products	   abroad.	   By	   1930,	   the	   Associated	  
Press	  (AP)	  and	  United	  Press	  (UP)	  owned	  twenty-­‐five	  Latin	  American	  newspapers,	  
which	  assisted	  in	  the	  marketing	  of	  US	  goods	  (Fejes,	  1986,	  p.	  18).	  The	  expansion	  of	  
radio	   broadcasting	   and	   Hollywood	   movies	   amongst	   the	   region’s	   wealthy	  
inhabitants	   further	   bolstered	   this	   strategy.	   US	   exports	   dominated	   within	   the	  
Caribbean	   region.	   The	   US’	   geographic	   proximity	   to	   markets,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  
industrial	  efficiency	  of	  its	  companies,	  gave	  the	  US	  a	  prime	  position	  to	  market	  their	  
goods	  to	  Latin	  America.	  Prior	  to	  the	  1930s,	  however,	  the	  US	  had	  not	  gained	  market	  
dominance	  in	  the	  more	  significant	  economies	  of	  South	  America	  (Steward,	  1975,	  pp.	  
1-­‐15).	   Nevertheless,	   these	   US	   corporations	  were	   creating	   an	   informal	   empire	   in	  
parts	   of	   Latin	   America,	   which	   further	   fuelled	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   US	   industrial	  
economy.	  
The	  1920s	  witnessed	  an	  expansion	  of	  US	  economic	  and	  political	  influence	  in	  
the	  Caribbean.	  The	  Mexican	  Revolution	  had	  been	  contained,	  the	  US	  military	  was	  in	  
control	  of	   the	  Panama	  Canal,	   an	   increasing	  number	  of	   states	  were	  dependent	  on	  
monocultural	  exports	  to	  the	  US	  and	  European	  investment	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  
the	   Caribbean	   was	   limited	   to	   coffee	   and	   sugar	   plantations.	   However	   anti-­‐US	  
sentiment	   was	   rising	   in	   one	   of	   Washington’s	   informal	   colonies.	   Nicaragua	   had	  
suffered	  under	  US	  military	  protection	  since	  Zelaya	  was	  deposed	  in	  1911	  (Bermann,	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1986,	  p.	  157).	  In	  July	  1927	  Augusto	  César	  Sandino	  declared	  war	  on	  the	  occupying	  
US	  marine	  force	  (McPherson,	  2003,	  p.	  16).	  According	  to	  Sandino,	  the	  conservative	  
president	  Adolfo	  Díaz	  was	  illegitimate	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  US	  (Bermann,	  1986,	  p.	  
192).	  While	   other	   liberal	   generals,	   such	   as	   José	  Moncada,	   rallied	   to	   declare	   Juan	  
Sacasa	  as	  the	  constitutional	  president,	  Sandino	  sought	  to	  end	  the	  US	  occupation	  by	  
force.	  Sandino’s	  peasant	  army	  operated	  in	  the	  hills	  near	  the	  Honduran	  border.	  His	  
forces	  utilised	  traditional	  strategies	  used	  by	   local	  bandits	  against	   the	  US	  marines	  
(Bermann,	  1986,	  p.	  201).	  As	  Sandino	  lacked	  external	  sources	  of	  ammunition,	   this	  
allowed	   the	   struggle	   to	   be	   prolonged.	   Despite	   US	   accusations,	   Sandino	   was	   not	  
aligned	  to	  communists	  or	  reliant	  on	  the	  Comintern.	  	  Interventionists	  within	  the	  US	  
demanded	  that	  Sandino	  be	  stopped	  and	  Nicaragua	  returned	  to	  its	  correct	  place	  in	  
the	  region.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Frank	  Kellogg	  argued	  that	  Sandino	  represented	  the	  
struggle	   against	   “American	   Imperialism”	   in	   its	   attempt	   towards	   “the	   successful	  
development	   of	   the	   international	   revolutionary	   movement	   in	   the	   new	   world”	  
(Wood,	   1961,	   p.	   20).	   Moreover,	   Sandino	   was	   seen	   as	   the	   greatest	   threat	   to	   US	  
imperial	   expansion	   in	   the	   Caribbean.	   The	   potential	   of	   Sandino’s	   movement	   was	  
limited	  to	  a	  small	  peasant	  army,	  and	  represented	  the	  only	  physical	  challenge	  to	  US	  
‘life	  and	  property’	   in	  the	  Caribbean.	  However,	  several	  factors	  called	  into	  question	  
the	   stability	   of	   America’s	   imperial	   presence	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   at	   the	   close	   of	   the	  
1920s.	  
	  
An	  Unsustainable	  Empire	  
Despite	  the	  advance	  of	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  from	  1898	  until	  1930,	  the	  
US	   was	   not	   dominant	   throughout	   Latin	   America.	   In	   South	   America,	   US	  
corporations	   were	   forced	   to	   compete	   with	   Europeans	   for	   trade	   and	   investment	  
opportunities.	  For	   instance,	  while	  Venezuela	  possesses	   the	   largest	  oil	   reserves	   in	  
the	  Western	   Hemisphere,	   SONJ	  was	   forced	   to	   share	   its	   ownership	   of	   them	  with	  
Royal	   Dutch	   Shell	   (Bucheli	   and	   Aguilar,	   2010,	   p.	   365).32	  This	   was	   also	   true	   of	  
Mexico’s	   oil	   reserves	   (Bucheli	   and	   Aguilar,	   2010,	   p.	   357).	   Britain	   too	   invested	  
heavily	   in	   infrastructure.	   Despite	   attempts	   by	   Americans,	   such	   as	   William	  
Wheelwright	   to	  build	  US	  owned	   infrastructure,	  British	   firms	  had	  constructed	   the	  
majority	  of	  Argentine	   rail	   (Fifer,	   1991,	  p.	   77).	   Furthermore,	  Britain	  monopolised	  
the	  telegraph	  and	  telephone	  services	  of	  Eastern	  South	  America	  (Fejes,	  1986,	  p.	  23).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Predominately	  British	  owned	  by	  the	  1920s.	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European	  financiers	  were	  also	  dominant	  in	  South	  America.	  British,	  German,	  French	  
and	  Italian	  banks	  operated	  in	  the	  commercial	  centres	  of	  São	  Paulo,	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro,	  
Buenos	  Aires	   and	   Santiago,	  while	  US	   institutions	   lagged	  behind	   (Cohen,	   1987,	   p.	  
23).	  Germany	  was	  also	  the	  largest	  ammunitions	  exporter	  to	  South	  America	  in	  the	  
1920s	  and	  early	  1930s	  (Green,	  1971,	  p.	  22).	  German	  ammunitions	  were	  viewed	  as	  
superior	  to	  Anglo-­‐American	  ones,	  and	  the	  armies	  of	  Argentina	  and	  Chile	  brought	  in	  
German	  advisors	  to	  train	  their	  troops	  (Green,	  1971,	  p.	  37).	  This	  posed	  a	  significant	  
threat	  to	  regional	  solidarity.	  However,	  by	  far	  the	  biggest	  obstacle	  to	  US	  dominance	  
in	  Latin	  America	  was	  trade.	  Corporations	  in	  the	  US	  were	  importing	  unprecedented	  
amounts	  of	   raw	  materials.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   independent	  South	  American	  states	  
were	  not	   importing	   sufficient	   capital	  or	   consumer	  goods	   from	   the	  US	   to	   fund	  US	  
imports.	   By	   the	   late	   1920s,	   the	   US	   had	   a	   balance	   of	   payments	   crisis	  with	   South	  
America	  (Wilson,	  1971,	  p.	  169)	  It	  therefore	  required	  increased	  trade	  with	  the	  large	  
South	   American	   economies.	   However	   its	   actions	   in	   the	   Caribbean	   inhibited	   its	  
relationship	  with	  those	  significant	  markets.	  	  
Anti-­‐American	   sentiments	   also	   limited	   US	   trade	   and	   investment	   in	   Latin	  
America.	  The	  future	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Cordell	  Hull	  (1948a)	  asserted,	  “the	  United	  
States	   has	   pursued	   policies	   towards	   some	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   nations”	  which	  
has	  led	  to	  “prejudice	  and	  feeling	  throughout	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  against	  our	  
country…”	  (p.	  308).33	  The	   immediate	  threat	  of	  US	   invasion	  from	  regional	  military	  
outposts 34 	  dominated	   inter-­‐American	   diplomacy	   as	   the	   Great	   Depression	  
approached.	   Anti-­‐Americanism	  was	   also	   directly	   influenced	   by	   the	   actions	   of	   US	  
businesses	   operating	   in	   Latin	   America.	  Washington’s	   aggressive	   actions	   towards	  
Latin	  American	  governments,	   communities	  and	   labour	   forces	  came	   to	  be	  seen	  as	  
characteristic	  of	   their	  motivations	   in	   the	  region.	  Yet	  Washington	  never	  exercised	  
control	   over	   the	   actions	   of	   Asarco,	   SONJ	   or	   the	   UFCo	   prior	   to	   1930;	   these	  
businesses	   actually	   extended	   their	   influence	  within	   Latin	   America	   under	   private	  
capitalist	   interest.	  This	  often	  damaged	  US	   relations	  with	  Latin	  America,	  which	   in	  
turn	  damaged	  broader	  US	  trade	  and	  investment.	  In	  1928	  the	  consequence	  of	  these	  
actions	  became	  apparent	  in	  both	  Colombia	  and	  the	  US.	  The	  massacre	  of	  workers	  by	  
government	   forces	   in	   Magdalena	   of	   1928	   galvanised	   anti-­‐American	   opinions	   in	  
Colombia	  (Bucheli,	  2005,	  p.	  132).	  Since	   the	  early	   twentieth	  century	  US	  trade	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Hull	  listed	  events	  in	  Mexico,	  Panama,	  Haiti,	  Nicaragua	  and	  Cuba	  as	  instances	  of	  US	  actions	  
harming	  US	  regional	  interests	  (Hull,	  1948a,	  p.	  308).	  
34	  Such	  as	  Guantanamo	  Bay	  and	  the	  Panama	  Canal	  Zone.	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investment	  had	  prospered	  in	  Colombia;	   its	  wealth	  of	  resources,	  agricultural	   land,	  
pliable	  government	  and	  cheap	  labour	  force	  made	  it	  the	  ideal	  location	  for	  American	  
investment.	  However,	  in	  the	  1920s	  the	  UFCo’s	  hold	  on	  the	  Atlantic	  Coast	  region	  of	  
Magdalena	  came	  under	  question.	  The	  banana	  workers	  began	  protesting	  for	  higher	  
wages,	   better	   conditions	   and,	   most	   significantly,	   permanent	   contracts	   (Bucheli,	  
2005,	   p.	   128.	   In	   1928	   the	   workers	   staged	   a	   regional	   strike	   in	   the	   Plaza	   Cenega	  
(Bucheli,	  2005,	  p.	  132).	  The	  conservative	  government	  of	  Miguel	  Mendez	  turned	  the	  
army	  on	   the	  protestors.	  Varying	  historical	  accounts	  have	  placed	   the	  death	   toll	   at	  
between	   47	   and	   several	   hundred	   (Bucheli,	   2005,	   p.	   132;	   Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   57).	  
Nevertheless,	   after	   the	   massacre,	   Colombians	   –	   including	   the	   young	   bourgeois	  
reformer	   Jorge	   Eliécer	   Gaitán	   –	   developed	   strong	   anti-­‐American	   opinions	   that	  
were	  to	  proliferate	  throughout	  the	  region	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  57).	  
By	  1933,	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  a	  ‘Cold	  War’	  in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  US	  sought	  
to	   extend	   its	   Caribbean	   experiments	   to	   greater	   Latin	   America.	   However,	   the	  
governments	   of	   Brazil,	   Argentina	   and	   Chile	   expressed	   great	   reservations	   about	  
that	   extension.	   Meanwhile,	   those	   governments,	   and	   individuals,	   under	   the	  
influence	  of	  Washington	   sought	   to	   reclaim	  economic	   and	  political	   independence.	  
The	   global	   stock	  market	   collapse	   of	   1929,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   Great	  Depression	  
presented	   both	   challenges	   and	   opportunities	   for	   the	   US	   in	   Latin	   America.	  While	  
many	   Latin	   Americans	   blamed	   the	   US	   for	   the	   Great	   Depression,	   it	   offered	   the	  
opportunity	  to	  revise	  policies	  without	  altering	  the	  basic	  objectives	  of	  US	  trade	  and	  
investment	  abroad	  (Gellman,	  1973,	  p.	  5).	  In	  1823	  Monroe	  had	  stated	  “we	  could	  not	  
view	   any	   interposition	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   oppressing	   [Latin	   America],	   or	  
controlling	  in	  any	  other	  manner	  their	  destiny,	  by	  any	  European	  power”	  (Monroe,	  
1823).	  However,	  by	  1930	  no	  European	  power	  sought	  such	  control.	  Moreover,	  the	  
mythical	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  had	  been	  undermined	  by	  several	  factors:	  the	  free	  choice	  
of	  sovereign	  states;	  free	  and	  liberal	  trade	  by	  Europeans;	  and	  the	  poor	  reputation	  of	  
“American	  Imperialism”	  (Kellogg,	  cited	  in	  Wood,	  1961,	  p.	  20).	  Now,	  the	  only	  state	  
attempting	  to	  “control”	  the	  “destiny”	  of	  Latin	  American	  states	  was	  the	  US.	  This	  led	  
to	   an	  unstable	   relationship	  with	  much	  of	   the	   region	   in	  which	   the	  US	   took	   on	   an	  
Imperial	   role.	   US	   foreign	   policy	   in	   Latin	   America	   required	   a	   fundamental	   shift	  
during	   the	   1930s	   in	   order	   to	   regain	   its	   influence	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   fulfil	   the	  
central	  tenet	  of	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine.	  Fortunately	  for	  the	  US,	  global	  economic	  and	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political	   conditions	  were	   to	  provide	  Washington	  with	   the	  opportunity	   to	  achieve	  
their	  goals.	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Conflicting	  Visions:	   Latin	  American	  Nationalism	  and	   the	   ‘Good	  
Neighbour	  Policy’	  
This	   chapter	  will	   redefine	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   ‘Cold	  War’	   in	   Latin	   America	   by	  
examining	   the	   belligerents	   in	   that	   struggle.	   Doing	   so	   will	   also	   necessitate	   a	  
redefinition	   of	   the	   time	   period	   under	   consideration.	   It	   is	   asserted	   that	   the	   ‘Cold	  
War’	  in	  Latin	  America	  originated	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression	  of	  the	  early	  1930s.	  It	  
contends	  that	   two	  conflicting	  visions	   for	  Latin	  America	  emerged	  during	  this	   time	  
period.	   The	   broad	   social	   democratic	   movement	   active	   throughout	   many	   Latin	  
American	  republics	  during	   the	  1930s	  proposed	   the	   first.	  They	  sought	   to	  emulate	  
the	   social	   democratic	   and	  multiclass	   policies	   of	   the	  Mexican	   Revolution	   and	   the	  
American	   New	  Deal	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   regulate	   capitalism	  within	   their	   individual	  
nations	  (González,	  2002,	  pp.	  222-­‐250;	  Biles,	  1991,	  p.	  11).	  This	  chapter	  will	  provide	  
a	   detailed	   explanation	   of	   the	   emergent	   social	   democratic	  movement.	   It	  will	   also	  
outline	  the	  peripheral	  role	  of,	  and	  limitations	  to,	  regional	  communism.	  In	  doing	  so,	  
it	   will	   provide	   a	   comparison	   of	   the	   size	   and	   scope	   of	   social	   democracy	   when	  
compared	  to	  communism.	  The	  second	  vision	  for	  Latin	  America	  was	  defined	  by	  the	  
US.	  Through	  its	  desire	  for	  Latin	  American	  resources	  and	  markets,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
the	   Great	   Depression,	   Franklin	   D.	   Roosevelt	   dramatically	   restructured	   American	  
foreign	   policy	   towards	   Latin	   America.	   Roosevelt	   distanced	   himself	   from	   his	  
predecessors’	   imperial	   actions.	   The	   Good	   Neighbour	   Policy	   facilitated	   the	  
expansion	  of	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  through	  “reciprocity”	  (Steward,	  1975,	  pp.	  1-­‐
8).	  Accordingly,	  it	  outlined	  both	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  aspects	  of	  Washington’s	  
vision	  for	  Latin	  America.	  This	  would	  define	  the	  US	  vision	  for	  Latin	  America	  within	  
its	   long-­‐term	   sphere	   of	   influence.	   Finally,	   this	   chapter	   will	   evaluate	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	   ‘Good	  Neighbourism’	   through	  an	  analysis	  of	  multilateralism	  from	  
1936	  until	  1941.	  It	  will	  assert	  that	  America’s	  political	  and	  economic	  expansion	  into	  
Latin	   America	   between	   1933	   and	   1941	  was	   successful.	   However,	   it	   came	   at	   the	  
expense	   of	   regional	   democratic	   movements;	   thereby	   initiating	   its	   ‘Cold	   War’	   in	  
Latin	  America.	  	  
	  
Social	  Democracy	  
Much	   of	   Latin	   America	   experienced	   widespread	   class	   conflict	   during	   the	  
1930s.	  This	  was	  caused	  by	  several	  factors,	  which	  included:	  the	  economic	  effects	  of	  
the	  Great	  Depression;	  the	  evolution	  of	  regional	  production	  methods;	  the	  failure	  of	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the	   oligarchs	   to	   incorporate	   the	  masses	   into	   democratic	   political	   processes;	   and	  
the	   proliferating	   ideals	   of	   social	   democracy.	   An	   examination	   of	   the	   social	  
democratic	  movement	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  is	  crucial	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
Cold	   War	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Many	   scholars	   have	   pointed	   out	   ideological	  
connections	   between	   the	   parties	   striving	   for	   social	   democracy.	   González	   (2002)	  
defines	  Cárdenas’	  political	  strategy	  in	  terms	  of	  “radical	  social	  policies,”	  “economic	  
nationalism”	   and	   sovereignty	   from	   foreign	   capital	   (pp.	   222-­‐235).	   Stein	   (1980)	  
identifies	   the	   Aprista	   platform	   through	   “nationalism,”	   “anti-­‐Imperialism”	   and	  
“social	   security”	   (pp.	   162-­‐163).	   Ameringer	   (2000)	   cites	   Eduardo	   Chibás	   in	  
identifying	  the	  Auténtico	  platform	  as	  “nationalism,	  socialism	  and	  anti-­‐Imperialism”	  
(p.	   44).	   Hellinger	   (1991)	   defines	   the	   AD	   philosophy	   as	   “nationalisation,”	   “social	  
reform”	   and	   unity	   against	   “imperialist	   finance”	   (p.	   51).	   These	   social	   democratic	  
parties	  did	  not	  base	  their	  platforms	  on	  a	  standing	  ideology.	  Rather,	  they	  advanced	  
policies	  necessary	  to	  procure	  the	  support	  of	  the	  masses.	  Braun	  (1985)	  argues	  that	  
Gaitán’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Colombian	  “social	  problem”	  fits	  into	  this	  analysis	  (p.	  
60).	  Like	  his	   regional	   colleagues,	  Gaitán	  advocated	  government	   intervention	   into	  
the	   Colombian	   market	   economy.	   This	   section	   will	   argue	   that	   these	   parties,	   and	  
leaders,	  were	  creating	  a	  movement	  which	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  standing	  oligarchic	  
position,	   supported	  by	   the	  US,	   in	  Latin	  America.	   It	  will	   explain	   the	  philosophy	  of	  
social	   democracy	   before	   explaining	   the	   effects	   of	   each	   movement	   on	   their	  
individual	  nations.	  
Social	  democracy	  was	  distinct	  from	  radical	  ideologies	  such	  as	  communism,	  
socialism	  or	  anarchism.	  It	  emphasised	  the	  basic	  rights	  of	  the	  individual	  through	  a	  
strong	  state	   infrastructure	  (Meyer,	  2007,	  pp.	  1-­‐7).	  Unlike	  communism,	   there	  was	  
no	   central	   body	   to	   dictate	   ‘social	   democratic’	   policies	   until	   the	   Socialist	  
International	   of	   the	   1950s	   (Vasconi	   and	  Martell,	   1993,	   p.	   100).	  While	   somewhat	  
disorganised,	   Latin	   American	   social	   democrats	   were	   clearly	   defined	   from	   the	  
liberal	  and	  conservative	   ‘democrats’	  within	  the	   ‘oligarchic’	  governments.	  The	  key	  
distinction	   revolved	   around	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘liberty’,	   or	   ‘freedom.’	   For	   liberal	  
democrats,	   ‘freedom’	  meant	  a	   small	  government	   that	  allowed	   the	  capitalist	   land-­‐
owning	  class	   to	  prosper	   (Vasconi	  and	  Martell,	  1993,	  p.	  110).	  Any	  action	  made	   to	  
regulate	  property	  ownership	  or	  its	  relationship	  to	  labour	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  affront	  to	  
‘freedom.’	  Inasmuch,	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  the	  state	  was	  to	  ensure	  freedom	  of	  action	  
within	   the	   economy.	   For	   social	   democrats,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   state,	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capital	  and	  the	  population	  was	  more	  complex.	  They	  saw	  “a	  self-­‐sustaining	  society”	  
as	  having	  to	  “protect	  labour	  from	  the	  vicissitudes	  of	  the	  market”	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	  
collective	  well	   being	   of	   all	   members	   of	   society	   (Meyer,	   2007,	   p.	   16).	   Hence,	   the	  
government	  was	   responsible	   for	   the	   freedoms	  of	   all	  members	   of	   their	   society.	  A	  
state	   with	   endemic	   inequality,	   in	   their	   opinion,	   was	   not	   truly	   democratic.	   The	  
conflict	   between	   liberal	   and	   social	   democracy	   was	   evident,	   through	   the	  
demonisation	   of	   the	   latter,	   throughout	   many	   Latin	   American	   states	   during	   the	  
1930s.	  
Latin	   American	   social	   democrats	   sought	   to	   limit	   the	   effects	   of	   monopoly	  
capitalism	   through	   taxation,	   regulation	   and	   social	   welfare,	   which	   included	  
education,	   healthcare	   and	   basic	   social	   security	   (Meyer,	   2007,	   pp.	   43-­‐47).	   These	  
policies	  were	  necessary	  to	  limit	  inequality	  within	  their	  societies	  and	  to	  safeguard	  
democracy	   from	   those	   forms	   of	   coercive	   rule	   that	   have	   been	   common	   in	   Latin	  
American	  history.	   	  This	  made	  the	  social	  democratic	  message	  widely	  appealing:	   in	  
states	   dominated	   by	   monopolistic	   industries,	   usually	   agrarian	   or	   resource	  
extraction;	   in	   societies	   with	   extreme	   income	   inequality;	   and	   in	   societies	   under	  
authoritarian	   rule.	   These	   broad	   appeals	   to	   the	  masses	   have	   drawn	   comparisons	  
between	   social	   democracy	   and	  populism.	  Di	  Tella	   (2004)	  defines	  populism	  as	   “a	  
political	   movement	   based	   on	   a	   mobilised	   but	   not	   yet	   autonomously	   organized	  
popular	  sector”	  led	  by	  an	  elite,	  or	  elites	  (p.	  90).	  That	  is,	  a	  charismatic	  leader	  (often	  
from	  the	  military)	  who	  can	  develop	  a	  “personalised	  link”	  with	  that	  “popular	  sector”	  
through	   appeals	   to	   their	   social	  welfare	   (Di	   Tella,	   2004,	   p.	   90).	   This	  was	   done	   in	  
Argentina,	  Brazil	   and	  Bolivia,	   as	  military	   leaders	   sought	   alliances	  with	   the	   lower	  
classes	  against	  the	  established	  oligarchic	  position.	  While	  the	  outcome	  and	  rhetoric	  
were	   similar,	   the	  motivations	   of	   military	   populists	   differed	   from	   those	   of	   social	  
democrats. 35 	  This	   chapter	   will	   explore	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	  
movement	  within	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  and	  its	  proliferation	  in	  Peru,	  Venezuela,	  
Cuba	  and	  Colombia	  during	   the	  1930s.	  While	   this	  movement	   grew	   in	   significance	  
during	   and	   after	  WWII,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   its	   origins	   and	   limitations	  
during	  this	  period.	  	  
The	   ‘multiclass’	   Mexican	   Revolution	   set	   the	   precedent	   for	   the	   social	  
democratic	  movement	  of	  the	  1930s.	  The	  Mexican	  constitution	  of	  1917	  established	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  While	  the	  distinction	  is	  important	  at	  this	  stage,	  as	  the	  thesis	  progresses	  it	  will	  become	  evident	  
that	  Washington	  viewed	  these	  two	  groups	  in	  a	  similar	  light	  as	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  US	  trade	  and	  
investment	  was	  consistent	  between	  the	  groups.	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the	  primary	   ideological	   framework	  of	   the	   ‘democratic	   left’	  during	   the	  early	  Latin	  
American	  Cold	  War.	  Its	  emphasis	  on	  suffrage,	  political	  and	  economic	  sovereignty,	  
labour	   reform,	   land	   reform	   and	   social	   services	   proliferated	   throughout	   many	  
nations	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  (Mexican	  Constitution,	  1917).	  However,	  one	  
theorist	  alone	  did	  not	  develop	  these	  ideas	  as	  it	  was	  contextually	  specific	  and	  could	  
not	   be	   easily	   translated	   to	   non-­‐Latin	   American	   environments.	   The	   Mexican	  
governments	   from	   1920	   to	   1934	   had	   only	   enacted	   limited	   pragmatic	   reform	   to	  
appease	   their	   revolutionary	   allies	   (Dwyer,	   1998,	   p.	   496).	   The	   influence,	   and	  
threats,	  of	  both	  the	  US	  and	  the	  old	  oligarchy	  prevented	  the	  full	  implementation	  of	  
economic	  and	  land	  reform	  (Dwyer,	  1998,	  p.	  497).	  Furthermore,	  the	  land	  that	  had	  
been	  expropriated	  was	  largely	  granted	  in	  regions	  of	  severe	  revolutionary	  violence	  
(González,	  2002,	  p.	  232)36	  When	  Lázaro	  Cárdenas	  was	  elected	  Mexican	  president	  
in	   1934;	   the	   revolution	  was	   at	   an	   impasse.	   Cárdenas	   reinvigorated	   it	   through	   a	  
focus	  on	  education,	  healthcare	  and,	  most	  significantly,	  land	  reform	  (Basurto,	  1999,	  
p.	   76).	   He	   sought	   to	   utilise	   communal	   farms,	   called	   ‘ejidos,’	   to	   alleviate	   rural	  
poverty	  and	  Mexico’s	  dependence	  on	  imported	  foodstuffs	  (González,	  2002,	  p.	  233).	  
He	  also	  established	  the	  National	  Bank	  of	  Ejido	  Credit	  to	  allow	  peasants	  capital	  to	  
develop	   their	   land	   (González,	   2002,	   p.	   235).	   This	   brought	   Cárdenas	   into	   conflict	  
with	   Mexican	   hacienda	   owners	   and	   US	   corporations	   such	   as	   the	   Standard	   Fruit	  
Company	  (SF)	  (Karnes,	  1978,	  p.	  160).37	  Cárdenas’	  revolutionary	  stance	  made	  him	  a	  
popular	   figure	   in	   Mexico.	   Revolutionary	   communities	   exiled	   from	   several	   Latin	  
American	  republics,	  and	  who	  had	  settled	  in	  Mexico,	  helped	  to	  further	  the	  influence	  
of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution.	  For	  example,	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre	  worked	  as	  a	  secretary	  for	  
Education	  Minister	   José	  Vasconcelos	  while	   in	  exile	   from	  Peru	  between	  1926	  and	  
1928	   (Stein,	  1980,	  p.	  148).	  Accordingly,	  Mexico	  was	   the	   centre	  of	   ‘revolutionary’	  
activity	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s.	  	  
The	  Mexican	  Revolution	  directly	  influenced	  the	  democratic	  parties	  in	  Peru,	  
Venezuela	  and	  Cuba	  (Di	  Tella,	  2004,	  p	  .22).	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre	  formed	  the	  Peruvian	  
Apristas	   as	   a	   revolutionary	   party	   prior	   to	   its	   formal	   establishment	   in	   1924.	   To	  
Haya’s	  long-­‐term	  detriment,	  he	  relied	  solely	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  activists	  
and	  workers	  that	  had	  been	  established	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  (Stein,	  1980,	  p.	  129).	  	  	  By	  
focusing	   on	   these	   he	   neglected	   other	   sectors	   of	   society,	   costing	   the	   Apristas	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Mexican	  state	  of	  Morales.	  
37	  However,	  he	  did	  not	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  Roosevelt	  administration.	  This	  point	  will	  be	  
explained	  below.	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electoral	   majority.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   Apristas	   were	   allowed	   to	   contest	   the	   1930	  
election	   in	  Peru	   (Graham,	   1992,	   p.	   35).	   Their	   ambitious	  program	  was	  put	   to	   the	  
people.	  The	  Apristas	  advocated:	  anti-­‐imperialism;	  unity	  with	  other	  Latin	  American	  
democrats;	   nationalisation	   of	   key	   industries;	   internationalisation	   of	   the	   Panama	  
Canal;	  and	  solidarity	  with	  all	  oppressed	  people	  of	  the	  world	  (Stein,	  1980,	  p.	  162).	  
As	   this	   “maximum	   program”	   did	   not	   however	   garner	   mass	   appeal,	   a	   more	  
pragmatic	  “minimum	  program”	  was	  developed	  (Stein,	  1980,	  p.	  163).	  This	  program	  
included:	   ending	   corruption;	   establishing	   a	   large	   state	   bureaucracy;	  
nationalisation	   of	   foreign	  mining	   and	   oil;	   separation	   of	   Church	   and	   state;	   and	   a	  
plethora	   of	   social	   programs	   (Stein,	   1980,	   pp.	   163-­‐164).	   The	   Aprista	   campaign	  
focussed	   on	   the	   Lima	   unions,	   while	   ignoring	   professionals,	   the	   indigenous	  
peasantry	  and	  mine	  workers	  (Nazal,	  1988,	  p.	  28).	  Haya	  de	   la	  Torre	   lost	  the	  1930	  
election.	  While	   he	   claimed	   electoral	   fraud,	   such	   accusations	  were	   never	   verified	  
(Graham,	  1992,	  p.	  35).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  roots	  of	  Peruvian	  social	  democracy	  were	  
laid	  in	  the	  early	  1930s.	  
Venezuela	  endured	  the	  tyranny	  of	  military	  rule	  for	  the	  first	  45	  years	  of	  the	  
twentieth	   century	   (Lombardi,	   1982,	   pp.	   190-­‐240).	   However,	   a	   movement	   for	  
democracy	  began	   in	  1928.	  Rómulo	  Betancourt	  was	  born	   into	   a	  wealthy	   agrarian	  
family.	  He	  studied	  in	  Caracas	  and	  joined	  the	  student	  union	  (Hellinger,	  1986,	  p.	  45).	  
The	  democratic	  strikes	  of	  1928	  brought	  Betancourt	  to	  national	  prominence	  as	  he	  
rose	   to	   the	   leadership	   circle	   after	   mass	   arrests	   of	   student	   activists	   (Alexander,	  
1982,	  p.	  39).	  In	  1929	  the	  student	  organisation	  joined	  young	  army	  officers,	  staging	  
an	  unsuccessful	  coup	  against	  Laureano	  Gómez.	  Betancourt	  later	  argued	  that	  1929	  
was	  “action	  for	  the	  point	  of	  action”	  (Hellinger,	  1986,	  p.	  49).	  While	  exiled	  in	  Costa	  
Rica,	  Betancourt	  was	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  Costa	  Rican	  Communist	  Party	  
and	  later	  during	  the	  early	  1930s	  edited	  their	  newspaper	  (Alexander,	  1982,	  p.	  69).	  
However	   he	   claimed	   “none	   of	   us	  who	   later	   founded	   the	  AD	  political	   party…ever	  
became	  active	  members	  of	  political	  groups	  subordinate	  to	  the	  Third	  International”	  
(Hellinger,	   1986,	   p.	   49).38	  In	   fact	   Betancourt,	   and	  AD,	   identified	  Roosevelt’s	  New	  
Deal	  as	  a	  source	  of	  inspiration.	  Betancourt	  stated,	  “the	  New	  Deal	  as	  a	  philosophy	  of	  
state	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  own	  plans	  for	  Venezuela”	  
(as	   cited	   in,	   Hellinger,	   1986,	   p.	   57).	   AD’s	   political	   program	   included:	   universal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Betancourt’s	  claim,	  repeated	  by	  Hellinger	  (1986,	  p.	  49),	  is	  evidenced	  by	  his	  pro-­‐capitalist	  policies	  
while	  in	  office	  from	  1945-­‐1948.	  However,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  peripheral	  members	  of	  AD	  worked	  
with	  communist	  groups	  during	  the	  1930s,	  as	  Betancourt	  had	  done	  in	  Costa	  Rica.	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suffrage;	   higher	   taxes	   on	   oil	   profits;	   anti-­‐fascism;	   import	   substitution	  
industrialisation;	  land	  reform;	  social	  services;	  and	  labour	  reform	  (Hellinger,	  1986,	  
p.	  54).	  AD	  was	  significantly	  more	  successful	  than	  the	  Peruvian	  Apristas	  throughout	  
its	   history,	   as	   Betancourt	   actively	   sought	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   rural	   working	  
class	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   p.	   241).	   By	   1936,	   AD	   and	   Betancourt	   actively	   worked	  
against	   communism,	   who	   were	   seen	   to	   be	   running	   a	   competing	   Venezuelan	  
underground	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   pp.	   129-­‐134).	   The	   AD	   underground	   was	  
domestically	  persecuted	  until	  its	  1945	  re-­‐emergence	  (Ellner,	  1987,	  p.	  727).	  	  
Cuba	   had	   been	   under	   the	   informal	   rule	   of	   the	   US	   since	   the	   1903	   Platt	  
Amendment.	   The	  US	   had	   the	   power	   to	   intervene	   in	   Cuban	   politics,	   and	   to	   grant	  
pro-­‐US	   leaders	   political	   legitimacy	   (Pérez,	   1992,	   p.	   165).	   However,	   the	   Great	  
Depression	   escalated	   Cuban	   discontent	   with	   its	   autocratic	   President	   Gerardo	  
Machado	   (Gellman,	   1973,	   p.	   2).	   Cuba’s	   economic	   situation	   was	   dire	   during	   the	  
Depression	  as	  the	  decrease	  in	  world	  sugar	  prices	  fell	  from	  2c	  per	  pound	  in	  1929	  to	  
0.57c	  per	  pound	   in	  1932,	   leading	   to	   an	  economic	   crisis	   (Steward,	  1975,	  p.	  91).39	  
Discontent	   was	   targeted	   at	   the	  Machado	   government	   as	   widespread	   violence	   in	  
Havana	   in	   August	   and	   September	   1933	   saw	  Machado	   lose	   the	   confidence	   of	   his	  
military	   generals.	   The	   university	   had	   been	   the	   centre	   of	   revolutionary	   thought	  
since	   the	   protests	   of	   1927	   (Aguilar,	   1972,	   p.	   107).	   The	   young	   military	   leader	  
Fulgencio	  Batista	  approached	  the	  university	  rebels	  to	  propose	  replacing	  Machado	  
with	   civilian	   officials	   (Aguilar,	   1972,	   p.	   115).	   The	   September	   10	   Revolution,	   of	  
1933,	  brought	  Dr	  Ramón	  Grau	  San	  Martín	  to	  the	  interim	  presidency	  (Farber,	  1976,	  
p.	   39).	   Like	  other	   social	   democrats,	  Grau	  had	  been	  persecuted	   and	   exiled	  by	   the	  
Machado	  regime	  and	  his	  popularity	  stemmed	  from	  his	  comprehension	  of	  the	  social	  
problems	  in	  Cuba	  (Farber,	  1976,	  pp.	  31-­‐34).	  The	  social	  platform	  of	  the	  university	  
movement,	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Auténtico	   Revolution’,	   included:	   the	   abrogation	   of	   the	  
Platt	   Amendment;	   universal	   suffrage;	   dismissal	   and	   prosecution	   of	   Machado	  
officials;	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  bureaucracy;	  and	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  
the	   Cuban	   economy	   through	   diversification	   (Farber,	   1976,	   p.	   41).	   Grau	   faced	  
criticism	   from	   virtually	   every	   sector	   (Aguilar,	   1972,	   p.	   176).	   The	   Marxist	   left	  
criticised	   his	   bourgeois	   reforms	   and	   took	   an	   independent	   line	   (Aguilar,	   1968,	   p.	  
25).	   The	   conservatives	   saw	  his	   decrees	   as	   too	   radical	   and	   potentially	   dangerous	  
(Farber,	   1976,	   p.	   40).	   The	   military	   were	   concerned	   by	   his	   popularity	   with	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  This	  was	  partly	  caused	  by	  US	  policy,	  as	  the	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Tariff	  Act	  of	  1930	  limited	  sugar	  cane	  
imports	  from	  several	  Caribbean	  states,	  favouring	  sugar-­‐beet	  production	  in	  the	  US.	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masses.	  The	  greatest	  opposition	  came	  from	  the	  US,	  however.	  While	  Sumner	  Welles	  
advocated	  US	   intervention	   to	   remove	  Grau	   in	   late	   1933,	   the	   pragmatism	   of	  Hull	  
proved	   more	   successful	   (Gellman,	   1973,	   p.	   5).	   By	   destroying	   confidence	   in	   his	  
government	  within	   the	  army	   the	  Grau	  government	  was	  condemned	   to	   failure.	   In	  
January	   1934	  Batista	   removed	  Grau	   and	   the	   brief	   period	   of	   social	   democracy	   in	  
Cuba	  was	  replaced	  by	  military	  rule	  (Farber,	  1976,	  p.	  45).	  	  
The	  example	  of	  Colombia	  demonstrates	  the	  challenge	  of	  reforming	  a	  system	  
from	   within.	   Colombia	   did	   not	   undergo	   a	   revolution	   in	   the	   1930s.	   Rather,	   the	  
increased	   prestige	   of	   the	   “left-­‐liberal”	   ideology	   reformed	   Colombian	   politics	  
(Green,	   2003,	   pp.	   29-­‐44).	   The	   emergence	   of	   Jorge	   Eliécer	   Gaitán	   challenged	   the	  
existing	   order.	   Colombia’s	   political	   history	   concerns	   two	   parties	   of	   similar	   class	  
origins,	   the	   Conservative	   and	   Liberal	   Parties	   as	   these	   factions	   fought	   a	   series	   of	  
wars	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  culminating	  in	  The	  War	  of	  One	  Thousand	  Days	  
ending	   in	  1902	   (Safford	   and	  Palacious,	   2002,	   p.	   250).	   From	  1902	  until	   1930	   the	  
Conservative	   Party	   were	   unopposed	   in	   power.	   After	   the	   dramatic	   events	   of	   the	  
Magdalena	   massacre	   of	   1928	   the	   Liberals	   saw	   the	   opportunity	   to	   take	   power	  
(Bucheli,	   2005,	   p.	   98;	   Colman,	   2008,	   p.	   6).	   Gaitán	   was	   another	   middle-­‐class	  
intellectual.	  He	  had	  studied	  law	  in	  Bogotá	  and	  won	  a	  state	  sponsored	  scholarship	  
to	  pursue	  his	  work	  in	  Philosophical	  Positivism	  in	  Rome	  from	  1925	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  
56).	  He	  had	  studied	  under,	  and	  was	  influenced	  by,	  Enrico	  Ferri,	  while	  developing	  a	  
detailed	  examination	  of	  the	  class	  problem	  within	  Colombia	  (Green,	  2003,	  p.	  48).	  He	  
asserted	   that	   the	   “social	  problem”	   in	  Colombia	  was	  not	   that	  of	  capital,	  but	  of	   the	  
“inequity”	  in	  capital’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  worker	  (Gaitán	  in	  Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  60).	  
If	  capital	  could	  be	  regulated	  to	  interact	  with	  labour	  equitably	  then	  there	  “would	  be	  
no	   social	   problem”	   (Gaitán	   in	   Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   60).	   Gaitán’s	   attacks	   on	   the	  
Conservative	  Party	  over	  Magdalena	  won	  him	  an	  invitation	  to	  join	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  
in	   1930.	   The	   future	   president,	   Alfonso	   López,	   commented	   that	   “Gaitán	   defended	  
the	   rights	   of	   the	  poor	  without	   first	   asking	   the	  permission	  of	   the	   rich”	   (in	  Braun,	  
1985,	  p.	  60).	  To	  Gaitán’s	   frustration,	  however,	   the	  Liberal	  Party,	   including	  López,	  
were	  ‘the	  rich’	  (Green,	  2003,	  pp.	  72-­‐76).	  Although	  Gaitán	  was	  a	  talented	  politician,	  
he	   failed	   to	   gain	   significant	   influence	   within	   the	   party.	   Gaitán	   asserted	   that	   the	  
Liberals	   had	   failed	   the	   Colombian	   people	   between	   1930	   and	   1934	   and,	   in	   1934,	  
also	   asserted	   that	   the	   two	   parties	   held	   the	   same	   policies	   (Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   64).	  
Gaitán	   sought	   to	   form	   an	   independent	  movement,	   known	   as	   the	  Unión	  Nacional	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Izquierdista	   Revolucionaria	   (UNIR)	   from	   1934	   until	   1936,	   without	   widespread	  
success	   (Green,	  2003,	  p.	  75).40	  López	   then	  brought	  Gaitán	  back	   to	   the	  Liberals	   in	  
1936	   as	   Bogotá’s	   Mayor	   (Randall,	   1992,	   p.	   166).	   From	   there,	   Gaitán	   would	  
continue	  his	  rise	  through	  Colombian	  politics.	  	  
Social	   democracy	  had	   threatened	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  US	   in	  Latin	  America	  
for	  several	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  it	  jeopardised	  foreign,	  including	  US,	  capital	  operating	  in	  
every	  Latin	  American	  republic.	  The	  expansion	  of	  US	  capital	   investment	  into	  Latin	  
America	   required	   minimal	   regulation	   of	   commodity,	   production	   and	   labour	  
markets.	   Each	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   social	   democratic	   movements	   sought	   to	  
regulate	   these	  markets.	  The	  most	  direct	   threat	   emanated	   from	  expropriations	  of	  
land	   and	   subsoil	   rights	   in	   Mexico	   (Mexican	   Constitution,	   1917).	  41	  However,	   the	  
mere	   possibility	   of	   regulation	   posed	   a	   direct	   threat.	   American	   trade	   and	  
investment	  had	  spread	  through	  the	  Caribbean	  Basin	  during	  times	  of	  weakness	  and	  
compliance	   (Cohen,	   1987,	   pp.	   1-­‐10).	   If	   Latin	  America	  were	   to	   be	   comprised	   of	   a	  
series	   of	   strong	   independent	   nations,	   the	   advance	   of	   American	   capital	  would	   be	  
slowed	   and	   modified.	   Additionally,	   US	   businesses	   in	   Latin	   America	   required	   a	  
steady	  supply	  of	  cheap	  pliable	  labour.	  The	  governments’	  support	  of	  the	  industrial	  
union	   and	   peasant	   movements	   posed	   a	   direct	   threat	   to	   US	   extractive,	   agrarian,	  
service	  and	  manufacturing	  businesses	  operating	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Di	  Tella,	  2004,	  
p.	  90).	  Secondly,	   the	  exercise	  of	  economic	  sovereignty	  made	  Latin	  America	  a	   less	  
attractive	   trading	   destination.	   Governments	   that	   were	   willing	   to	   protect	   local	  
industries	  through	  tariff	  policies	  stood	  in	  opposition	  to	  US	  expansion	  in	  the	  region.	  
Finally,	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  politically	  independent,	  yet	  cohesive,	  bloc	  of	  independent	  
Latin	   American	   states	   not	   subservient	   to	   US	   demands	   posed	   a	   threat	   to	   US	  
strategic	   interests	   in	   an	   evolving	   world.	   With	   World	   War	   II	   approaching,	   the	  
creation	  of	  a	  hemispheric	  alliance	  was	  an	  imperative	  for	  the	  US	  (Francis,	  1977,	  pp.	  
1-­‐4).	  Independent	  states	  would	  be	  less	  compliant	  in	  this	  endeavour.	  From	  1930	  the	  
US	  confronted	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  changing	  Latin	  America.	  This	  threat	  was	  not	  from	  
communism,	  but	  by	  the	  forces	  of	  social	  democracy	  against	  compliant	  oligarchs.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  The	  UNIR	  faced	  several	  handicaps	  from	  the	  onset.	  Most	  significant	  was	  the	  recruitment	  of	  literate	  
and	  politically	  active	  citizens	  who	  were	  not	  aligned	  to	  the	  two	  hegemonic	  parties.	  Gaitán	  failed	  in	  
this	  task	  during	  the	  1930s	  (Green,	  2003,	  p.	  77).	  
41	  The	  expropriation	  of	  Mexican	  oil	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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Communism	  in	  Latin	  America	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  popular	  support	  for	  social	  democracy,	  communism	  grew	  
slowly	  during	  the	  1930s	  (Poppino,	  1963,	  pp.	  82-­‐88).	  The	  cause	  of	  Latin	  American	  
communism’s	   relative	  weakness	   can	   be	   explored	   through	   a	   survey	   of	   its	   growth	  
from	   1930	   until	   1935.	   This	   requires	   several	   further	   considerations.	   Firstly,	   one	  
must	   identify	  the	  Latin	  American	  communist	  parties.	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  parties	  of	  
Argentina,	   Brazil,	   Chile,	   Mexico	   and	   Uruguay	   that	   existed	   in	   1921,	   parties	   were	  
formed	  in:	  Cuba	  in	  1924;	  El	  Salvador	  in	  1925;	  Ecuador	  in	  1929;	  Costa	  Rica	  in	  1929;	  
Peru	  in	  1929;	  Colombia	  in	  1930;	  Haiti	  in	  1930;	  and	  Venezuela	  in	  1935	  (Alexander,	  
1963,	  pp.	  270,	  366,	  384,	  223,	  237,	  246,	  254,	  296).	  Additionally,	  small	  communist	  
intellectual	   groups	   emerged	   in:	   Bolivia	   from	   1923;	   Panama	   from	   1925;	   and	  
Nicaragua	  from	  1927	  (Alexander,	  1963,	  pp.	  213,	  392,	  378).	  The	  minimal	  numbers	  
of	   communists	   in	   Paraguay,	   Honduras,	   Guatemala	   and	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	  
were	   neither	   organised	   nor	   officially	   recognised	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   pp.	   149,	   372,	  
253,	   299).	   Secondly,	   these	   groups	   were	   extremely	   small	   during	   the	   1920s	   and	  
1930s.	  The	  Comintern	  estimated	  that	  in	  1928	  the	  Argentine	  party	  was	  the	  largest	  
with	   2,000	   members	   (Aguilar,	   1968,	   p.	   11).	   In	   Brazil	   there	   were	   1,200	   party	  
members,	   and	   Mexico	   had	   1,000	   (Aguilar,	   1968,	   p.	   11).	   Every	   other	   party	   had	  
significantly	   less	  members	   than	   this	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   p.	   11).	   Thirdly,	  while	   the	  
size	   of	   the	   party	   does	   not	   automatically	   relegate	   Latin	   American	   communism	   to	  
irrelevancy,	  the	  success,	  or	  lack	  therein,	  of	  the	  communists’	  actions	  demonstrates	  
their	   primary	   obstacles.	   Latin	   America’s	   first	   significant	   mention	   by	   the	  
International	   Communist	   Congress	   concerned	   Sandino’s	   guerrilla	   war	   of	   1927-­‐
1933	  (Caballero,	  1986,	  p.	  84).	  However,	  Sandino	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  (Bermann,	  
1986,	   p.	   192).	   Communist	   insurrections	   had	   significantly	   less	   direction	   and	  
success.	  For	  example,	  the	  tragic	  insurrection	  of	  1932	  in	  El	  Salvador	  demonstrated	  
the	   willingness	   of	   the	   peasantry	   to	   attack	   the	   oligarchy	   to	   reclaim	   their	   land	  
(Lindo-­‐Fuentes,	  Chang	  and	  Martínez,	  2007,	  pp.	  22-­‐44).	  However,	  the	  communists	  
could	   not	   offer	   the	   peasantry	   direction,	   leadership	   or	   ammunition	   for	   their	  
struggle	   leading	   to	   the	  massacre	   of	   30,000	   indigenous	   peasants	   (Lindo-­‐Fuentes,	  
Chang	   and	  Martínez,	   2007,	   pp.	   22-­‐44).	   The	   ease	  with	  which	   Getúlio	   Vargas	   pre-­‐
emptively	   overcame	   the	   1935	   attempted	   insurrection	   of	   Luís	   Carlos	   Prestes	  
demonstrated	  the	  profound	  weakness	  of	  this	  regional	  communist	  movement	  in	  the	  
1930s	   (Dulles,	   1973,	   p.	   530).	   Prestes	   later	   lamented	   the	  mistake	  of	   “starting	   the	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insurrection	  when	  [his]	  strength	  in	  the	  working	  class	  was	  still	  weak	  and	  when	  the	  
labour	  peasant	  alliance	  was	  practically	  non-­‐existent”	   (as	   cited	   in	  Dulles,	  1973,	  p.	  
530).	  The	  preconditions	   for	  revolution	  were	  not	  evident	   in	  Latin	  America	  during	  
the	  1930s.	  
The	   fourth	   consideration	   is	   the	   adherence	   of	   Latin	   American	   communist	  
parties	   to	   the	   directives	   of	   the	   Comintern.	   The	   origins	   of	   Latin	   American	  
communism	   underwent	   three	   distinct	   phases	   that	   echoed	   the	   six	   stages	   of	  
international	   communism	   between	   1919	   and	   1943	   (Herman,	   1974,	   pp.	   1-­‐27).	  
Those	   six	   international	   phases	  were	   characterised	   by:	   Lenin’s	   vision	   of	   a	   global	  
proletarian	   revolution	   from	   1919-­‐1920;	   Trotsky’s	   proliferation	   of	   communist	  
discourse	   through	   the	   party	   apparatus	   from	   1921-­‐1927;	   Stalin’s	   purging	   of	   the	  
communist	  movement	  between	  1928	  and	  1935;	  the	  development	  of	  popular	  fronts	  
in	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  fascism	  in	  1935-­‐1939;	  the	  anti-­‐imperialism	  of	  the	  Nazi-­‐
Soviet	   pact	   of	   1939-­‐1941;	   and	   finally	   the	   WWII	   collaboration	   with	   the	   West	  
(Herman,	  1974,	  pp.	  3-­‐25).	  This	  pattern	  was	  simplified	  in	  Latin	  America.	  From	  1920	  
until	   1928	   orthodox	   Marxists	   sought	   to	   expand	   their	   influence	   in	   the	   region	  
(Caballero,	   1986,	   pp.	   26-­‐37).	   During	   this	   period,	   communists	   competed	   for	  
members	  with	   anarchists,	   socialists,	   and	   other	   progressive	   forces,	   such	   as	   social	  
democratic	   ones	   (Cabellero,	   1986,	   pp.	   26-­‐37).	   Accordingly,	   the	   Latin	   American	  
communist	   parties	   formed	   and	   were	   slowly	   admitted	   to	   the	   Communist	  
International.	   No	   Latin	  American	  was	   present	   at	   the	   First	   International	   in	   1919,	  
while	  only	  three	  representatives,	   from	  Mexico,	  attended	  the	  Second	  International	  
in	  1920	  (Herman,	  1974,	  p.	  61).	  When	  the	  anticipated	  revolution	  in	  Europe	  failed	  to	  
eventuate,	  the	  Comintern	  focused	  on	  developing	  parties	  globally	  (Herman,	  1974,	  p.	  
16).	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  Latin	  American	  communism	  emerged.	  Communism	  failed	  to	  
advance	   or	   apply	   Marxist	   theory	   or	   practice	   applicable	   to	   the	   Latin	   American	  
context,	  which	  was	  more	  rural	  than	  Europe.	  The	  communists’	  theoretical	  position	  
underestimated	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   national	   bourgeoisie’s	   and	   the	   social	  
democrats’	   quests	   for	   reform.	   From	   1928	   until	   1935	   the	   Latin	   American	  
communists	   adhered	   to	   the	   “hard-­‐line,”	   purging	   moderates,	   socialists	   and	  
anarchists	   from	  their	  organisations	   (Aguilar,	  1968,	  p.	  20).	  This	   “hard-­‐line”	  policy	  
represented	   a	   misunderstanding	   and	   miscalculation	   of	   regional	   politics.42	  They	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  And	  an	  obvious	  misinterpretation	  of	  Marxist	  theory	  on	  national	  revolution.	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saw	  socialists,	  anarchists	  and	  social	  democrats	  greater	  competitors	  than	  the	  ruling	  
dictators	   and	   oligarchies.	   Accordingly,	   the	   communists	   waged	   war	   against	   the	  
progressive	  forces	  for	  ascendancy	  in	  any	  potential	  revolution	  (Poppino,	  1963,	  pp.	  
15).	  They	  undermined	  and	  condemned	  democracy	  to	  promote	  their	  position,	  and	  
purged	  their	  membership	  to	  ensure	  ideological	  purity	  (Herman,	  1974,	  p.	  18).	  The	  
Seventh	   Congress	   of	   the	   Comintern	   in	   1935	   identified	   the	   threat	   of	   European	  
fascism	   and	   the	   need	   for	   collaboration	   with	   aligned	   democratic	   forces	   globally	  
(Aguilar,	  1968,	  p.	  28).	  Accordingly,	  from	  1935	  until	  the	  conclusion	  of	  World	  War	  II	  
the	   Latin	   American	   communists	   sought	   to	   generate	   popular	   front	   alliances	  
(Caballero,	   1986,	  pp.	   120-­‐123).	   From	  1935,	   the	   communists	   saw	  democracy	  and	  
progress	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  revolution.	  Yet	  their	  previous	  actions	  alienated	  them	  
from	  many	  potential	  alliances.	  Moreover,	   their	  adherence	   to	   the	  directives	  of	   the	  
Comintern	   rendered	   Latin	   American	   communism	   largely	   irrelevant	   during	   the	  
1930s.	  
The	   fifth	   consideration	   is	   the	   penetration	   of	   communism	   within	   the	  
respective	   Latin	   American	   labour	  movements.	   During	   the	   1920s	   and	   1930s,	   the	  
communists	   competed	   for	   control	   of	   the	   labour	   movement	   with	   the	   anarchists,	  
socialists,	   and	   progressive	   populist	   forces	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   pp.	   41-­‐56).43	  Their	  
participation	   in	   the	   union	   movement	   ebbed	   throughout	   the	   various	   Comintern	  
directives.	  The	   chief	   antagonist	   for	   the	   communists	  was	   the	  Red	   International	  of	  
Labour	   Unions,	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Profintern	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   p.	   44).	  While	   in	  
Europe	  the	  Profintern	  supported	  ‘red’	  unionism,	  in	  Latin	  America	  it	  was	  forced	  to	  
“bore	  from	  within”	  (Alexander,	  2009,	  p.	  42).44	  When	  communists	  began	  asserting	  
themselves	   in	   the	   early	   1920s,	   their	   hostility	   surprised	   the	   anarchists	   and	  
socialists,	  who	  had	  expected	   collaboration.	  After	   the	  Stalinist	   ‘hard-­‐line’	   of	  1928,	  
pro-­‐communist	   unions	   isolated	   themselves	   further	   from	   non-­‐communist	  
organisations	   (Caballero,	   1986,	   pp.	   44-­‐46).	   The	   small	   communist	   leadership	  
believed	   that	   workers	   would	   naturally	   be	   drawn	   to	   ‘communist’	   unions	   and	  
therefore	   began	   establishing	   their	   own	   ideologically	   pure	   unions.	   This	   prophecy	  
was	  never	  fulfilled.	  In	  1927,	  regional	  unionists	  commemorating	  the	  anniversary	  of	  
the	  revolution	   in	  Russia	  established	   the	  communist	  Confederación	  Sindical	  Latino	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Such	  as	  the	  Peruvian	  Apristas.	  
44	  Communist	  unions	  struggled	  to	  recruit	  due	  to	  the	  limited	  penetration	  of	  their	  doctrine	  in	  Latin	  
American	  societies.	  Accordingly,	  they	  sought	  to	  recruit	  from	  within	  legitimate,	  non-­‐communist	  
unions	  where	  possible.	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Americana	   (CSLA)	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   p.	   49).	   Small	   unions	   in	   Chile,	   Cuba	   and	  
Argentina	  joined	  the	  CSLA	  during	  its	  inception,	  with	  delegations	  from	  fifteen	  states	  
attending	   their	   first	   Congress	   in	   Montevideo,	   Uruguay	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   p.	   52).	  
Most	  unions	  represented	  were	  relatively	  small.	  After	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  Popular	  
Front	  in	  1935,	  the	  CSLA	  was	  free	  to	  act	  independently.	  Consequently,	  membership	  
could	  include	  other	  anti-­‐fascist	  entities.	  However,	  after	  1938	  the	  majority	  of	  Latin	  
American	  labour	  conformed	  to	  the	  non-­‐communist	  Confederación	  de	  Trabajadores	  
de	   América	   Latina	   (CTAL),	   run	   by	   the	   Mexican	   Vicente	   Lombardo	   Toledano	  
(Anderson,	  1987,	  p.	  520).	  CTAL	  called	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  communist	  unions	  into	  
more	  heterogeneous	  ones	  that	  would	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  workers	  (Anderson,	  
1987,	  p.	  520).	  Despite	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  communist	  unions	  during	  
World	  War	  II,	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  communist	  movement	  in	  the	  unions	  continued.	  	  
The	  sixth	  consideration	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  communists	  
in	   alliances	   with	   other	   progressive	   forces.	   Chile	   provides	   the	   only	   successful	  
example	   of	   a	   Popular	   Front	   government,	   which	   contained	   communists,	   in	   Latin	  
American	  history.	  The	  narrative	  of	  Chilean	  politics	  permanently	  changed	  between	  
June	  and	  October	  1932	  (Drake,	  1978,	  pp.	  71-­‐76).	  The	  coup	  to	  remove	  the	  dictator	  
Ibáñez	   instilled	   a	   socialist	   tradition	   into	   Chilean	   politics,	   removing	   the	   old	  
dichotomy	  of	   liberals	   versus	   conservatives	   that	   had	   characterised	  many	   of	   Latin	  
America’s	  political	  systems.	  Radical	  and	  Socialist	  Parties	  were	  founded	  to	  contest	  
the	   national	   elections	   (Loveman,	   2001,	   p.	   213).	   The	   so-­‐called	   ‘Socialist	  Republic’	  
was	  not	  truly	  Marxist	  as	  it	  relied	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  income	  rather	  than	  wealth	  
(Drake,	  1978,	  p.	  76).	  Moreover,	  it	  based	  itself	  on	  progressive	  ideals	  similar	  to	  those	  
of	  the	  American	  New	  Deal,	  preceding	  Cardenas	  in	  Mexico.	  The	  Moscow-­‐orientated	  
Communist	  Party	  opposed	  the	   ‘Socialist	  Republic’	  as	  reactionary	  (Drake,	  1978,	  p.	  
80).	  While	  the	  ‘Socialist	  Republic’	  failed	  after	  four	  months,	  however,	  it	  left	  a	  legacy	  
for	  reform	  in	  Chile.	  From	  1935	  the	  communists	  approached	  the	  Radical	  Party	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  form	  a	  Popular	  Front	  under	  a	  radical	  presidential	  candidate.	  Given	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  alliance	  the	  socialists,	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  relevant,	  were	  also	  forced	  to	  
join.	   They	   reasoned	   that	   their	   competition	   for	   leftist	   votes	   would	   continue	   to	  
ensure	  power	  to	  the	  oligarchic	  parties.	  It	  is	  crucial	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Popular	  Front	  
was	  a	  multi-­‐party	  alliance	  rather	  than	  a	  multi-­‐ideology	  party.	  The	  leadership	  of	  the	  
Popular	   Front	   remained	   with	   the	   middle-­‐class	   Radical	   Party	   throughout	   the	  
alliance	  (Loveman,	  2001,	  p.	  285).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Chilean	  Communist	  Party	  was	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the	   most	   successful	   in	   the	   region,	   as	   it	   was	   able	   to	   present	   its	   ideology	   as	   a	  
legitimate	   democratic	   force	   through	   its	   participation	   in	   the	   Popular	   Front	   from	  
1935.45	  
The	   final	   consideration	   is	   anti-­‐communism.	   The	   US	   had	   opposed	  
communism	   globally	   since	   1917	   (Leffler,	   1994,	   pp.	   6-­‐15).	   It	   was	   antithetical	   to	  
their	  foreign	  economic	  policy.	  However,	  many	  other	  factors	  were	  also	  antithetical	  
to	  their	   foreign	  trading	  policy.	  This	  made	  communism	  a	  ready	  expedient	  prior	  to	  
the	  Cold	  War.	  For	  example	  Kellogg	  claimed	  in	  1927	  that	  “the	  Bolshevist	  leaders	  [in	  
Mexico	  have]	  set	  up	  as	  one	  of	  their	  fundamental	  tasks	  the	  destruction	  of	  what	  they	  
term	   American	   imperialism	   as	   a	   necessary	   prerequisite	   to	   the	   successful	  
development	   of	   the	   international	   revolutionary	  movement	   in	   the	  new	  world”,	   to	  
motivate	   US	   intervention	   (Wood,	   1961,	   p.	   20).	   The	   Mexican	   government	   was	  
described	   as	   ‘Bolshevist’	   for	   granting	   support	   to	   Nicaraguan	   rebels.	   Neither	   the	  
Mexican	   government	   nor	   Augusto	   Sandino’s	   rebel	   army	   were	   ‘Bolshevik’	  
(Bermann,	  1986,	  p.	  188).	  However,	  it	  provided	  a	  rationale	  for	  immediate	  military	  
action	   in	   Nicaragua.	   In	   this	  mould	   a	   series	   of	   Latin	   American	   leaders	   used	   anti-­‐
communism	  to	  legitimize	  their	  alignments	  with	  the	  US.	  Grau	  was	  characterised	  as	  
a	   Marxist	   by	   both	   the	   Cuban	   military	   and	   Sumner	   Welles.	   This	   was	   used	   as	  
justification	  for	  the	  military	  coup	  of	  January	  1934	  (Aguilar,	  1972,	  p.	  132).	  Martínez	  
massacred	   30,000	   indigenous	   peasants	   in	   1932	   under	   the	   pretext	   of	   anti-­‐
communism	   (Lindo-­‐Fuentes,	   Chang	   and	   Martínez,	   2007,	   pp.	   22-­‐44).	   While	  
communist	  antagonism	  certainly	  led	  to	  the	  peasant	  revolt,	  it	  was	  neither	  the	  only	  
nor	  the	  most	  important	  factor.	  Nevertheless,	  Martínez	  did	  not	  incur	  international	  
condemnation	  for	  his	  actions.	  Both	  the	  Apristas	  of	  Peru	  and	  AD	  of	  Venezuela	  were	  
labelled	  as	  communists	  during	  the	  1930s	  to	  justify	  their	  continued	  repression	  and	  
persecution	  (Stein	  1980,	  p.	  1	  72).	  For	  example,	   the	  US	  ambassador	   to	  Peru,	  Fred	  
Dearing,	   referred	   to	   the	   Apristas	   as	   “the	   reddest	   of	   the	   red”	   and	   “under	   the	  
influence	  of	  Moscow”	  (Stein,	  1980,	  p.	  172).	  Moreover,	  the	  US	  and	  its	  conservative	  
Latin	   American	   allies	   initiated	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   prior	   to	   the	   official	  
onset	   of	   the	   European	   ‘Cold	   War’	   with	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Anti-­‐communism	   was	  
significant	  in	  justifying	  regional	  repression	  during	  the	  1930s.	  It	  was	  also	  less	  direct	  
than	  forms	  of	  ‘gun-­‐boat	  diplomacy.’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  While	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  Popular	  Front	  achieved	  little	  for	  the	  Chilean	  communists,	  their	  
increased	  exposure	  and	  legitimacy	  within	  national	  politics	  added	  to	  the	  prestige	  of	  regional	  
communism.	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Good	  Neighborism	  
Franklin	   Roosevelt’s	   Good	   Neighbor	   Policy	   (GNP)	   is	   regarded	   as	   a	  
significant	  departure	  from	  the	   ‘gunboat	  diplomacy’	  of	  his	  predecessors.	  However,	  
the	  motivations	   for	  this	  departure	  are	  often	  misunderstood.	  The	  GNP	  was	  not	  an	  
extension	  of	  the	  domestic	  liberalism	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  abroad.	  Black	  (1988)	  asserts,	  
“the	  main	   impact	  of	   the	  good	  neighbour	  policy	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  reaffirmation	  of	  
the	  United	  States’	  faith	  in	  its	  own	  virtues”	  (p.	  61).	  Gellman	  (1979)	  argues	  that	  the	  
Good	  Neighbour	  was	  an	  accidental	  label	  given	  to	  Roosevelt’s	  foreign	  policy	  (p.	  1).	  
Despite	   the	   lack	   of	   “a	   precise	   definition…	   it	   had	   enormous	   popular	   appeal	   and	  
recognition”	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  1).	  Therefore,	  the	  GNP	  could	  be	  “separated	  into	  its	  
components”:	  of	  diplomacy,	  economic	  expansion	  and	  collective	  security	  measures	  
(Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  1).	  However	  the	  economic	  aspects	  took	  on	  greater	  significance	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  Moreover,	  the	  GNP	  was	  the	  economic	  arm	  
of	   the	   domestic	   political	   New	   Deal.	   The	   recovery	   of	   the	   US	   domestic	   economy	  
required	   the	   expansion	   of	   American	   commerce	   throughout	   the	   region.	   Green	  
(1971)	   writes	   that	   “the	   [GNP]	   sprang	   directly	   from	   a	   realisation	   that	   simple	  
tinkering	   with	   the	   international	   economy	   would	   not	   get	   the	   country	   out	   of	  
depression”	   (p.	   19).	   A	   long-­‐term	   economic	   strategy	   was	   required.	   This	   in	   turn	  
required	  a	  diplomatic	  policy	  to	  counter	  the	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  To	  do	  so,	  
the	   United	   States	   adopted	   the	   role	   of	   moral	   leader	   of	   the	   hemisphere.	   Grandin	  
(2010)	  identifies	  “the	  Good	  Neighbour	  Policy	  [as]	  the	  model	  for	  the	  European	  and	  
Asian	  alliance	  system,	  providing	  a	  blueprint	  for	  America’s	  empire	  by	  invitation”	  (p.	  
4).	  Moreover,	   the	  political	  motivations	   for	   the	  GNP	  were	  economic;	   there	  was	  no	  
idealistic	   principal	   underpinning	   it.	   Hence,	   one	   can	   only	   judge	   the	   success,	   or	  
failure,	  of	  the	  GNP	  in	  economic	  terms.	  This	  section	  will	  detail	  the	  political	  actions	  
that	  allowed	  for	  this	  economic	  advance.	  
The	  1929	  market	  collapse	  and	  subsequent	  Great	  Depression	  had	  a	  profound	  
effect	  on	  the	  US	  economy.	  In	  the	  first	  four	  years	  of	  the	  Depression	  the	  real	  value	  of	  
US	  exports	  declined	  by	  78	  precent	  (Steward,	  1975,	  p.	  2).	  The	  global	  nature	  of	  the	  
crisis	  forced	  nations	  in	  Europe,	  Asia	  and	  South	  America	  to	  increase	  their	  barriers	  
to	  trade.	  The	  1930	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Tariff	  Act	  constructed	  further	  barriers	  (Gellman,	  
1979,	  p.	  7).	  Domestically,	  approximately	  5,000	  banks	  defaulted	  and	  over	  13	  million	  
unskilled	  American	  workers	   lost	   their	   jobs	   (Biles,	  1991,	  p.	  11).	  This	   represented	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unemployment	   for	   one	   in	   four	   American	   workers	   (Biles,	   1991,	   p.	   11).	   In	   1933,	  
Roosevelt	   inherited	   a	   US	   government	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   collapse.	   The	   Secretary	   of	  
State,	  Cordell	  Hull	   (1948a),	  argued	  that	   the	  developed	  nations	  must	  cooperate	  to	  
increase	   “freer	   trade”	   (p.	  174).	  Roosevelt’s	   evolved	  New	  Deal	   economic	  program	  
sought	  to	  drag	  the	  US	  out	  of	  depression	  (Biles,	  1991,	  p.	  96).	  Initial	  actions	  focused	  
on	  social	  welfare;	  however	  the	   increase	  of	  US	  export	  markets	  was	  also	  of	  central	  
importance	  to	  the	  program	  (Biles,	  1991,	  pp.	  99-­‐110).	  Given	  the	  division	  of	  world	  
economics	   into	   spheres	   of	   influence,	   Latin	   America	   became	   an	   ideal	   target	   for	  
increased	   American	   trade.46	  The	   1929	   Stock	   Market	   Crash	   also	   had	   a	   profound	  
effect	   on	   the	   way	   the	   US	   interacted	   with	   Latin	   America.	   Before	   Roosevelt’s	  
administration,	   the	  US	  had	  been	  autocratic	   in	   their	   relations	  with	  Latin	  America.	  
The	  military	  occupations	  imposed	  upon	  several	  Caribbean	  states	  evoked	  memories	  
of	   European	   colonialism	   in	   the	   larger	   nationalistic	   states	   of	   South	   America.	  
American	   involvement	   in	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   in	   the	   1920s	   was	   known	  
throughout	   South	   America	   (Cohen,	   1987,	   pp.	   64-­‐68).	   Significantly,	   its	   diplomacy	  
with	   Cuba,	   which	   suffered	   under	   the	   Platt	   Amendment,	   and	   to	   Panama,	   which	  
leased	   the	   ‘Canal	   Zone’	   to	   the	   US,	   was	   seen	   as	   autocratic	   and	   imperious	   (Pérez,	  
1992,	  p.	  167;	  Lafeber,	  1989,	  p.	  31).	  Washington’s	   support	   for	  US	  corporations	   in	  
Latin	   American	   provoked	   resentment	   (Bucheli,	   2005,	   p.	   84).	   As	   most	   Latin	  
American	   governments	   dealt	  with	   these	   large	  US	   corporations,	   this	  was	   a	  major	  
grievance	   in	   their	   collective	   relationship	   with	   the	   US.	   This	   deep-­‐seated,	   and	  
multifaceted	  anti-­‐Americanism	  prevented	  any	  realisation	  of	  the	  US’	  vision	  for	  Latin	  
America.	   To	   combat	   these	   challenges,	   FDR	   established	   a	   foreign	   policy	   based	   on	  
‘Good	  Neighbourism’	  to	  serve	  US	  objectives	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
The	   US	   sought	   to	   form	   a	   strong	   Pan-­‐American	   alliance	   through	   the	  
implementation	   of	   ‘Good	   Neighbourism’.	   In	   his	   inaugural	   address	   on	   March	   4	  
1933,	  Roosevelt	  alluded	  stated,	   “I	  would	  dedicate	   this	  nation	   to	   the	  policy	  of	   the	  
good	  neighbour”	  (FD	  Roosevelt,	  1933).	  He	  sought	  to	  fulfil	  US	  global	  commitments	  
while	   respecting	   “the	   rights”	   of	   other	   nations	   (FD	   Roosevelt,	   1933).	   Given	   the	  
severity	  of	   the	  domestic	   situation,	   it	   is	  unsurprising	   that	  only	   fleeting	   comments	  
were	   given	   regarding	   foreign	   policy	   in	   his	   inaugural	   address.	   However,	   his	  
acceptance	  that	  “we	  now	  realise…our	  interdependence	  on	  each	  other,”	  reflects	  the	  
global	  position	  of	  his	  administration	  (FD	  Roosevelt,	  1933).	  US	  policy	  toward	  Latin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Hull’s	  (1948a)	  failure	  to	  avoid	  regionalism	  at	  the	  London	  Economic	  Conference	  of	  1933,	  
motivated	  this	  renewed	  interest	  in	  Latin	  America	  (p.	  320).	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America	   had	   been	   extremely	   autocratic	   during	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century.	   In	  
addition	  to	  assembling	  a	  team	  of	  ‘New	  Dealers’	  at	  home,	  FDR	  sought	  to	  encourage	  
a	  reform	  of	  policy	  abroad.	  This	  reform	  was	  of	  imperative	  to	  the	  domestic	  economic	  
situation.	  For	  example,	   in	  1929	  Wall	   Street	   lawyer	  and	   future	  Secretary	  of	   State,	  
John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  commented	  that	  the	  US	  “must	  finance	  [its]	  exports	  by	  loaning”	  
capital	   to	   Latin	   America,	   otherwise	   US	   goods	   will	   be	   “rotting	   in	   [American]	  
warehouses	   as	   unusable	   surplus”	   (in	   Williams,	   1972,	   p.	   127).	   This	   theory	   was	  
cemented	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Export-­‐Import	   Bank	   (EXIM)	   under	   FDR	  
(Gellman,	   1979,	   p.	   161).	   To	   ensure	   growth	   in	   the	   US	   industrial	   economy,	   it	  
required	  exports	  to	  Latin	  America.	  To	  establish	  this	  new	  ‘Good	  Neighbour	  Policy,’	  
FDR	   appointed	   Cordell	   Hull,	   who	   stated	   that	   the	   “political	   line-­‐up”	   follows	   the	  
“economic	  line-­‐up”,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (in	  Williams,	  1972,	  p.	  240).	  Hull’s	  economic	  
background	  indicated	  the	  direction	  US	  policy	  would	  take	  in	  the	  region.	  
In	   December	   1933	   the	   United	   States	   unilaterally	   renounced	  
interventionism	   in	   the	   Uruguayan	   capital	   of	   Montevideo	   (Gellman,	   1979,	   p.	   29).	  
Hull	   pledged	   that	   a	   state	   had	   no	   “right	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   internal	   or	   external	  
affairs	  of	  another”	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  29;	  Inter-­‐American	  States,	  1933).	  After	  three	  
decades	  of	   ‘gunboat	  diplomacy,’	   the	  US	  committed	  to	  dismantling	   its	  semi-­‐formal	  
empire	  in	  Latin	  America.	  In	  1934	  the	  Platt	  Amendment	  was	  repealed,	  giving	  Cuba	  
its	  first	  political	  independence	  in	  four	  centuries	  (Wood,	  1961,	  p.	  120).47	  In	  1935	  US	  
marines	  were	  withdrawn	  from	  Haiti,	  ending	  three	  decades	  of	  permanent	  military	  
occupation	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  (Renda,	  2001,	  p.	  310).	  In	  1934	  the	  amendments	  in	  the	  
Panamanian	  constitution,	  which	  made	   it	  an	   informal	  protectorate,	  were	  removed	  
(LaFeber,	  1989,	  p.	  68).	  Additionally,	   the	  price	  paid	  by	   the	  US	   to	  Panama	   to	   lease	  
the	   Canal	   Zone	   increased	   from	   US$250,000	   to	   US$430,000	   annually	   (LaFeber,	  
1989,	  p.	  68).	  Roosevelt	  gave	  away	   the	   territorial	  gains	  of	  his	  predecessors,	  as	  he	  
asserted	  the	  significance	  of	  trade	  and	  investment	  over	  a	  territorial	  empire.	  During	  
the	  early	  1930s,	  trade	  and	  investment	  from	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  Britain	  increased,	  
especially	   in	   Argentina,	   Uruguay	   and	   Southern	   Brazil.	   Peterson	   (1964)	   asserted	  
that	  the	  German	  “drive	  for	  minds,	  markets	  and	  materials	  of	  Latin	  America	  [during	  
the	   1930s],	   raised	   the	   old	   spectre	   of	   European	   interventionism”	   (p.	   389).	  
Accordingly,	  under	  Roosevelt	  “the	  Monroe	  doctrine	  [was	  elevated]	  to	  the	  status	  of	  
a	   principle	   accepted	  by	   all	  American	   states,”	  which	   justified	   intervention	   against	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  However,	  by	  1934	  Cuba	  was	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  pro-­‐US	  dictator	  Fulgencio	  Batista.	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extra-­‐hemispheric	   threats,	   such	   as	   German	   and	   eventually	   Soviet	   Communism	  
(Peterson,	   1964,	   p.	   389).	   The	   US	   committed	   itself	   to	   winning	   the	   battle	   with	  
Germany	  for	  “minds,	  markets	  and	  materials”	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  1930s	  (in	  
Peterson,	   1964,	   p.	   389).	   Roosevelt’s	   Good	   Neighbourism	   was	   a	   pivotal	   strategy	  
towards	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  inter-­‐American	  community	  built	  upon	  US	  interests.	  
The	   majority	   of	   Latin	   American	   republics	   accepted	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   Good	  
Neighbourism.	  However,	   the	  US	   retained	   several	  ways	   to	   control	   the	   small	   Latin	  
American	   states.	   Firstly,	   the	   Latin	   American	   region	   owed	   US$1.5	   billion	   in	  
defaulted	  government	  bonds	  to	  American	  banks	  and	  financiers	  (Steward,	  1975,	  p.	  
7).	  A	  decrease	  in	  tariff	  earnings	  meant	  that	  these	  states	  could	  not	  repay	  this	  debt.	  
Tariff	  earnings	  declined	  between	  1929	  and	  1933	  due	  to	  a	  68	  per	  cent	  decrease	  in	  
exports	   to	   the	  US,	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   significant	   reduction	   in	   the	   real	   value	   of	   raw	  
materials	   (Steward,	   1975,	   p.	   8).	   The	   Latin	  American	   states	   that	   owed	   the	  US	   for	  
defaulted	  capital	  could	  have	  their	  economies	  controlled.	  Washington	  also	  used	  the	  
recognition	   of	   unconstitutional	   governments	   as	   leverage	   for	   reciprocal	   trade	  
agreements.	   Without	   international	   recognition,	   Latin	   American	   states	   could	   not	  
borrow	  from	  either	  American	  or	  international	  institutions,	  which	  left	  them	  unable	  
to	  run	  their	  governments.	  This	  strategy	  of	  non-­‐recognition	  was	  used	  twice	   in	  the	  
first	   year	   of	   FDR’s	   presidency.	   The	   effect	   on	   the	   Cuban	   Grau	   government	   has	  
already	   been	   demonstrated.	   Additionally,	   non-­‐recognition	   was	   used	   against	   the	  
Nicaraguan	  President,	  Juan	  Sacasa	  who	  had	  previously	  been	  allied	  to	  Sandino	  and	  
sought	   to	   confront	  US	   economic	  policy	   (Crawley,	   2007,	  p.	   30;	  Bermann,	  1986,	  p.	  
182).	  Military	  governments	  that	  received	  US	  recognition	  replaced	  both	  Sacasa	  and	  
Grau.	   The	   1923	   Washington	   Convention	   had	   outlawed	   unconstitutional	  
governments	   (Adler,	   1965,	   p.	   199).	   However,	   ‘non-­‐intervention’	   overrode	   that	  
convention.	   Swift	   diplomatic	   recognition	   by	   Washington	   was	   given	   to	  
unconstitutional	   governments	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   Honduras,	   Guatemala	   and	   the	  
Dominican	  Republic	  in	  the	  first	  years	  of	  the	  Good	  Neighbour	  Policy	  (Lafeber,	  1984,	  
pp.	  67-­‐79).	  Despite	  Washington’s	  decline	  in	  direct	  imperial	  policies,	  it	  still	  held	  the	  
power	   to	   control	   the	   direction	   of	   many	   Latin	   American	   governments	   to	   the	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Selfish	  Reciprocity	  
	   The	  Reciprocal	  Trade	  and	  Tariffs	  Act	  (RTTA)	  was	  a	  major	  step	  towards	  US	  
global	   economic	   leadership.	   Steward	   (1975)	   describes	   it	   as	   “the	   reversal	   of	   the	  
trend	  toward	  economic	  nationalism”	  (p.	  7).	  Cordell	  Hull	  had	  advocated	  this	  action	  
since	   1916,	   as	   he	   foresaw	   “a	   stable	   world-­‐order	   of	   liberal-­‐capitalist	  
internationalism”	   (Steward,	   1975,	   p.	   7).	   Steward	   (1975)	   continues	   by	   describing	  
the	  RTTA	  as	   “the	   internationally	   coordinated	   restoration	  of	   commerce,	   shipping,	  
and	  industry	  through	  liberalised	  trade	  measures”	  (p.	  11).	  The	  RTTA	  has	  not	  been	  
granted	  significant	  academic	  attention	  because	  of	  the	  accepted	  narrative	  of	  WWII	  
ending	   the	   Great	   Depression.	   However,	   the	   economic	   history	   of	   the	   US	   between	  
1934	  and	  1970	  was	  underpinned	  by	  Hull’s	  vision	   for	  a	  globalised	  economy.	  This	  
phase	  of	  RTA	  agreements	  focussed	  on	  Latin	  America.	  It	  attempted	  to	  increase	  the	  
role	  of	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  with	  complimentary	  economies	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  
Bauer	   (1963)	   argues,	   “the	   philosophy	   of	   the	   RTA	   became	   the	   bipartisan	  
cornerstone	  of	  American	  foreign	  economic	  policy	  during	  and	  after	  WWII”	  (p.	  26).	  
Grandin	  (2010)	  extends	  this	  argument	  to	  state	  that	  “this	  economic	  expansion	  into	  
Latin	   America”	   became	   “the	   keystones	   of	   the	   New	   Deal	   state	   for	   the	   next	   three	  
decades:	   liberalism	   at	   home	   and	   internationalism	   abroad”	   (p.	   36).	   Hull	   had	  
successfully	  initiated	  the	  Open	  Door	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America	  as	  a	  blueprint	  for	  the,	  
decolonised	  post-­‐World	  War	  II,	  world	  through	  the	  RTTA	  of	  the	  GNP.	  This	  section	  
will	  detail	  how	  this	  occurred.	  
Roosevelt’s	   ‘Good	  Neighbourism’	   facilitated	   the	  most	   fundamental	   shift	   in	  
the	   history	   of	   American	   foreign	   economic	   policy.	   The	   stock	   market	   collapse	   of	  
1929	   led	   to	  declining	  global	   trade.	  World	   trade	  contracted	   from	  US$68	  billion	   in	  
1929,	  to	  US$23	  billion	  in	  1934	  (Tasca,	  1938,	  p.	  4).	  Washington’s	  declining	  share	  of	  
world	  trade	  was	  even	  more	  significant,	  with	  a	  78	  per	  cent	  decline	  in	  the	  real	  value	  
of	  US	  exports	  over	  this	  period	  (Steward,	  1975,	  p.	  2).	  The	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  Tariff	  Act	  
of	  1930	  compounded	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  Bauer	  (1963)	  describes	  
the	   legislation	   as	   “a	   triumph	   of	   rampant	   protectionism”	   (p.	   23).	   This	   was	   a	  
constant	   theme	   in	   American	   economic	   history	   throughout	   the	   late	   nineteenth	  
century	  and	  early	   twentieth	   century.	  The	  US	   sought	   to	   limit	   imports	  of	  products	  
that	   could	   compete	  with	   domestic	   production	   (Davis	   and	   Cull,	   1994,	   pp.	   65-­‐90).	  
The	  debate	  between	  free	  trade	  and	  protectionism	  dated	  back	  to	  the	  1890s,	  when	  
the	   US	   was	   transitioning	   from	   an	   agricultural	   to	   industrial	   exporter	   (Davis	   and	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Cull,	  1994,	  pp.	  65-­‐90).	  However,	  several	  factors	  were	  different	  in	  the	  1890s	  to	  the	  
1930s.	  Firstly,	   the	   increase	   in	  competition	  for	   industrial	  markets	  had	  divided	  the	  
world	   into	   economic	   spheres	   of	   influence.	   Systems	   such	   as	   British	   “imperial	  
preference”	  meant	  that	  the	  US	  could	  not	  export	  industrial	  goods	  to	  the	  colonies	  of	  
European	   powers	   (Judd,	   1996,	   p.	   316).	   This	   closed	   off	  much	   of	   the	  world	   to	   US	  
exporters.	   Secondly,	   the	  nature	  of	  US	  production	  had	  changed.	  During	   the	  1920s	  
the	  industrial	  output	  of	  US	  factories	  increased	  by	  70	  per	  cent	  (Cohen,	  1987,	  p.	  18).	  
This	  made	  the	  industrial	  manufacturing	  sector	  more	  important	  to	  the	  US	  economy	  
than	  the	  agricultural	  sector,	  which	  sought	  to	  protect	  prices	  by	  limiting	  agricultural	  
imports.	   These	   two	   facts	   were	   not	   recognised	   by	   the	   Hoover	   administration	   in	  
1930.	   Accordingly,	   they	   increased	   the	   barriers	   to	   trade	   with	   disastrous	   effects	  
upon	  the	  domestic	  US	  economy.	  	  	  
Washington’s	   economic	   sphere	   of	   influence	   was	   very	   small	   in	   1930.	   It	  
included	  the	  Caribbean	  and	  Central	  American	  states	  that	  had	  either	  been	  directly	  
controlled	   by	   the	   US	   military	   or	   indirectly	   controlled	   by	   significant	   capital	  
investment	  in	  productive	  industries	  (Cohen,	  1987,	  pp.	  28-­‐50).	  However	  it	  did	  not	  
extend	  to	  the	  large	  economies	  of	  South	  America.	   	  The	  US	  did	  not	  control	  regional	  
trade	  and	   investment	   in	  1934.	   In	  1913	  the	  US	  held	  approximately	  30	  per	  cent	  of	  
Latin	  America	  trade,	  and	  one-­‐fifth	  of	   its	  exports	  travelled	  south	  (Gilderhus,	  1986,	  
p.	  5).	  While	  this	  increased	  to	  approximately	  40	  per	  cent	  in	  1930,	  the	  relationship	  
was	  hindered	  by	   two	   facts	   (Steward,	   1975,	   p.	   4).	   Firstly,	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	  US	  
trade	   was	   with	   the	   Caribbean,	   meaning	   figures	   in	   the	   major	   economies	   of	  
Argentina,	   Brazil	   and	   Chile	   were	   much	   lower.	   Within	   South	   America	   the	   major	  
European	  economic	  powers	  were	  Britain	  followed	  by	  Germany	  (Friedman,	  2003,	  p.	  
84;	   Kolko,	   1968,	   p.	   485).	   Germany	   sent	   trade	  missions	   to	  many	   Latin	   American	  
nations	  in	  1934,	  shortly	  after	  the	  rise	  of	  Hitler	  (Friedman,	  2003,	  p.	  84).	  Secondly,	  
while	  the	  US	  demanded	  tropical	  goods,	  it	  could	  not	  sell	  its	  industrial	  goods	  within	  
the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  Moreover,	   the	  US	  had	  an	  ongoing	  structural	  balance	  of	  
payments	   crisis	   with	   South	   America	   that	   had	   never	   been	   addressed	   (Steward,	  
1975,	  p.	  5).	  The	  US	   installed	  the	  RTTA	  in	   June	  1934	  to	  combat	   its	  weaknesses	   in	  
the	  region.	  The	  RTTA	  allowed	  the	  President,	  and	  his	  advisors,	  to	  directly	  decrease	  
tariffs	   on	   imports	   to	   the	   US	   where	   beneficial	   treaties	   of	   reciprocity	   could	   be	  
arranged.	   In	   the	   first	   seven	   years,	   Roosevelt	   signed	  1,000	  decrees	   hat	   facilitated	  
the	  resurgence	  of	  US	  exports	  (Bauer,	  1963,	  p.	  26).	  While	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  and	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their	   agricultural	   supporters,	   in	   1934	  described	   the	  RTTA	   as	   creeping	   socialism,	  
the	  concept	  of	  reciprocity	  became	  the	  bipartisan	  cornerstone	  of	  American	  foreign	  
economic	  policy	  after	  WWII	  (Bauer,	  1963,	  p.	  26).	  	  
Despite	   its	   perceived	   weakness	   in	   South	   America,	   the	   US	   had	   several	  
mechanisms	  to	  coerce	  states	  into	  reciprocity.	  These	  mechanisms	  included	  the	  new	  
institutional	   pan-­‐Americanism,	   leniency	   on	   defaulted	   bonds	   and	   recognition	   for	  
unconstitutional	  governments.	  To	  exemplify	  these	  points,	  this	  thesis	  will	  utilise	  the	  
example	   of	   Colombia.	   During	   the	   Great	   Depression	   85	   per	   cent	   of	   Latin	   bonds	  
defaulted	  (Wilson,	  1971,	  p.	  170).	  While	  the	  US	  did	  not	  hold	  the	  majority	  of	  bonds	  
throughout	   South	  America,	   in	   those	   nations	   in	  which	   it	   did	   it	   had	   an	   advantage.	  
The	   two	  primary	  examples	  were	  Chile,	  which	  defaulted	  on	  US$300	  million	   to	  US	  
citizens,	  and	  Colombia,	  which	  defaulted	  on	  US$130	  million	  to	  US	  citizens	  (Francis,	  
1977,	   p.	   11;	   Randall,	   1992,	   p.	   111).	   The	   Colombian	   example	   is	   particularly	  
revealing,	   as	   it	   demonstrates	   a	   direct	   correlation	   between	   the	   problems	   of	   both	  
investment	  and	  trade	  policy.	  It	  was	  also	  the	  first	  state	  to	  sign	  a	  RTTA	  with	  the	  US.	  
In	  1933	  Colombia	  exported	  US$47	  million	  worth	  of	  goods,	  primarily	  coffee,	  to	  the	  
US,	  yet	  they	  only	  imported	  US$14	  million	  worth	  (Steward,	  1975,	  p.	  68).	  Colombia	  
had	  restrictive	  trade	  policies,	  as	   they	  sought	  to	  develop	  basic	   industry	   in	  Bogotá.	  
Colombia	  also	   received	   significant	  DFI	   from	  Germany,	   specifically	   in	   the	  areas	  of	  
transport	  and	  aviation	  (Newton,	  1978,	  p.	  26).	  Also,	  the	  US	  had	  no	  tariff	  on	  coffee,	  
since	  it	  was	  not	  domestically	  produced.	  These	  factors	  accounted	  for	  the	  substantial	  
balance	  of	  payments	  deficit.	  The	  Colombians	  understandably	  opposed	  the	  signing	  
of	   the	   RTA.	   The	   importation	   of	   cheap	   US	   manufactured	   goods	   would	   threaten	  
thousands	  of	   industrial	   jobs	   in	  Bogotá	  (Randall,	  1992,	  p.	  150).	  Cordell	  Hull	  made	  
two	   threats	   to	   achieve	   the	   RTA	   with	   Colombia.	   While	   the	   limitation	   on	   foreign	  
capital	  for	  the	  Colombian	  government	  was	  significant,	  it	  was	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  excise	  
tariff	   on	   Colombian	   coffee	   that	   ensured	   the	   RTA	  was	   signed	   (Osterling,	   1989,	   p.	  
80).	   Hull	   ensured	   a	   RTA	   agreement	   that	   served	   US	   interests	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  
Colombian	  ones.	  
The	   other	   major	   mechanism	   used	   to	   coerce	   Latin	   American	   nations	   into	  
RTA	   agreements	   was	   the	   recognition	   of	   unconstitutional	   governments.	   US	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  Charles	  Hughes	  had	  repudiated	  unconstitutional	  governments	  in	  
the	  Americas	   during	   the	  Washington	   conferences	   of	   1923.	  He	   had	   argued	   that	   a	  
lack	  of	  “self-­‐determination	  which	  makes	  for	  wars	  and	  places	  obstacles	  in	  the	  way	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of	  all	  plans	  for	  keeping	  the	  peace”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Williams,	  1972,	  p.	  130).	  During	  the	  
1930s,	   however,	   constitutional	   governments	   posed	   a	   greater	   threat	   to	   the	  
implementation	   of	   RTAs.	   For	   Hull,	   the	   “economic	   line-­‐up”	   would	   follow	   the	  
“political	   line-­‐up”	   (as	   cited	   in	   Williams,	   1972,	   p.	   240).	   Pragmatic	   economic	  
agreements	  were	  more	   important	   than	   idealism.	   This	   is	   best	   evidenced	   through	  
the	  RTA	  signed	  with	  the	  Guatemalan	  government	  of	  Jorge	  Ubico.	  In	  1929,	  despite	  
three	  decades	  of	  capital	  investment	  by	  US	  corporations,	  the	  US	  still	  did	  not	  control	  
the	  majority	  of	  Guatemalan	  trade	  (Aybar	  de	  Soto,	  1978,	  p.	  77).	   Its	   largest	  market	  
for	  coffee	   in	  1929	  was	  Germany,	  which	  purchased	  40	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  Guatemalan	  
exports	  (Aybar	  de	  Soto,	  1978,	  p.	  77).	  US	  corporations	  had	  a	  significant	  presence	  in	  
Guatemala	  (Chapman,	  2007,	  pp.	  61-­‐71).	  They	  included:	  the	  United	  Fruit	  Company	  
(UFCo),	   which	   monopolised	   rail,	   land	   and	   trade	   throughout	   Guatemala;	   General	  
Electric;	  Grace	  Company;	  and	  Citibank	  (Grieb,	  1979,	  p.	  68).	  However	  their	  actions,	  
especially	   those	   of	   the	   UFCo,	   motivated	   anti-­‐Americanism,	   which	   increased	  
available	   trading	   opportunities	   for	   German,	   Italian	   and	   British	   firms.	   The	  
Guatemalan	  political	  situation	  was	  more	  significant	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  the	  RTA	  
than	  the	  power	  of	  the	  US	  economy.	  In	  1936	  Ubico	  sought	  to	  transform	  his	  ‘elected’	  
government	   into	   a	   permanent	   dictatorship	   (Grieb,	   1979,	   p.	   48).	   Washington	  
warned	   that	   it	   would	   only	   grant	   recognition	   to	   Ubico’s	   unconstitutional	  
government	   if	  a	  RTA	  were	   formed.	  The	  agreement	  was	  concluded	   in	  1936	  at	   the	  
expense	   of	   Guatemalan	   economic	   ties	   to	   Germany,	   whose	   share	   of	   Guatemala’s	  
exports	   decreased	   to	   11	   per	   cent	   by	   1939.	   By	   1944	   Guatemala	   was	   completely	  
dependent	  upon	  the	  US	  to	  absorb	  92	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  its	  exports	  (LaCharité,	  Kennedy	  
and	   Thienal,	   1964,	   p.	   17).	   The	   success	   in	   Guatemala	   contributed	   to	   RTAs	   and	  
recognition	   for	   unconstitutional	   governments	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   Honduras,	   the	  
Dominican	   Republic,	   Haiti	   and	   Cuba.	   Hence,	   majority	   of	   RTAs	   were	   with	  
dictatorships	  undermining	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  GNP.	  
Between	  1934	  and	  1940	  the	  US	  signed	  twelve	  RTAs	  in	  Latin	  America.	  This	  
was	   a	   definitive	   factor	   in	   the	   creation	   of	   hemispheric	   unity	   leading	   into	   WWII.	  
However,	  it	  also	  demonstrated	  the	  divergent	  interests	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  US	  
during	   the	   1930s.	   The	   reciprocal	   agreements	   did	   not	   benefit	   the	   US	   and	   Latin	  
American	  states	  equally.	  The	  RTA	  was	  a	  great	  success	  for	  the	  US.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
key	  mechanisms	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  revival	  of	  the	  US	  industrial	  economy.	  The	  
depression	  clearly	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  American	  economy	  was	  dependent	  upon	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foreign	  markets	   for	   its	   industrial	   goods.	   The	  division	  of	   the	   globe	   into	   economic	  
spheres	  of	   influence	  meant	  that	  South	  America	  became	  Washington’s	  only	  option	  
to	  expand	   its	  exports.	  While	   this	  was	  a	   slow	  process	   that	   required	   the	  closing	  of	  
European	  markets	   to	  raw	  materials	  during	  WWII,	   the	  US	  began	   its	  emergence	   to	  
regional	   economic	   leadership	   through	  RTAs	  with	   large	   economies	   such	   as	  Brazil	  
and	   Chile	   (Steward,	   1975,	   pp.	   261-­‐290).	   Yet	   RTAs	   placed	   limitations	   upon	   Latin	  
American	  states.	  Despite	  the	  political	   factors	  that	  condemned	  much	  of	   the	  region	  
to	   autocracy,	   the	  RTAs	  had	  economic	   implications	   for	   those	   countries.	  The	  RTAs	  
represented	   conditions	   opposite	   to	   those	   economic	   circumstances	   that	   had	  
allowed	  the	  US	  to	  transition	  from	  raw	  material	  production	  to	  industry	  during	  the	  
late	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  early	   twentieth	  century	  (Davis	  and	  Cull,	  1994,	  pp.	  5-­‐
11).	  Rather,	   the	  US	  was	   creating	  dependencies	   throughout	  Latin	  America.	   It	  was	  
also	  undercutting	  the	  ability	  of	  Latin	  American	  countries	  to	  receive	  a	  fair	  price	  for	  
their	  commodities	  through	  international	  competition.	  This	  was	  especially	  evident	  
in	  regard	  to	  Central	  American	  coffee.	  By	  alienating	  the	  small	   isthmian	  economies	  
from	   European	  markets,	   the	   US	   enjoyed	   greater	   autonomy	   over	   price	   levers	   for	  
raw	   commodities.	   It	   also	   increased	   its	   role	   in	   distribution.	   However,	   the	   most	  
significant	   impact	   of	   the	   RTAs	   was	   the	   effect	   on	   regional	   manufacturing.	   By	  
removing	   the	   economic	   lever	   of	   the	   tariff,	   South	  American	   governments	   lost	   the	  
ability	   to	  protect	  emerging	   industries	   from	  cheap	  US	  goods	   (Bauer,	  1963,	  p.	  21).	  
Hence,	  the	  US	  was	  not	  creating	  circumstances	  for	  the	  Latin	  American	  governments	  
to	   emulate	   their	   own	   economic	   success;	   rather,	   they	  were	   seeking	   to	   reproduce	  
previous	   formal	   and	   informal	   imperial	   bonds	   that	  were	   being	   phased	   out	   of	   the	  
region.	  
	  
Multilateralism	  and	  Monroe	  
The	   alignment	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   priorities	   between	   the	  
hemispheres,	   under	   President	   Roosevelt,	   brought	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   Latin	  
Americans	  into	  each	  of	  Hull’s	  “political”	  and	  “economic”	  line-­‐ups	  (Hull,	  as	  cited	  in	  
Williams,	  1972,	  p.	  240).	  This	  process	  accelerated	  as	  the	  war	  approached	  between	  
1933	   and	   1939.	   The	   Monroe	   Doctrine	   had	   become	   an	   alliance	   against	   extra-­‐
hemispheric	   aggression.	   Accordingly,	   it	   required	   a	   level	   of	   multilateralism	   that	  
exceeded	  anything	  that	  had	  been	  achieved	  in	  Latin	  America	  up	  to	  that	  point.	  Pan-­‐
Americanism	   was	   also	   promoted	   by	   increased	   US-­‐ownership	   of	   the	   short-­‐wave	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broadcasting	   industry	  (Fejes,	  1986,	  p.	  118).	  Support	   for	   the	  US	   in	  their	  battle	   for	  
“minds,	  materials	  and	  markets”	  against	  the	  Germans	  was	  ensured	  by	  a	  new,	  more	  
positive,	  perception	  of	  the	  US	  (as	  cited	  in	  Peterson,	  1964,	  p.	  389).	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  
create	   hemispheric	   solidarity,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   States	   convened	   in	   1936	   in	  
Buenos	   Aires,	   Argentina	   (Fejes,	   1986,	   p.	   67).	   This	   conference	   demonstrated	   a	  
renewed	   faith	   in	  American	   foreign	  policy.	  Roosevelt	  was	   revered	   throughout	   the	  
region	  for	  his	  domestic	  New	  Deal	  and	  foreign	  Good	  Neighbour	  Policy.	  Hull	  sought	  a	  
binding	   inter-­‐American	   alliance	   in	   1936	   to	   ensure	   hemispheric	   solidarity	   and	  
security	   against	   European	   aggression.	   Seventeen	   of	   the	   twenty	   republics	  
supported	   this	   resolution.	   Only	  Argentina,	   Chile	   and	  Mexico	   opposed.	  Hull	   again	  
sought	   to	   establish	   a	   “regional	   league	   of	   nations”	   during	   the	   1938	   conference	   in	  
Lima,	  Peru	  (Lamas,	  as	  cited	  in	  Wood,	  1961,	  p.	  17).	  Argentina	  was	  the	  only	  country	  
to	   vote	   against	   the	   binding	   security	   resolution,	   which	   would	   have	   seen	   the	  
hemisphere	  committed	  to	  war	  following	  the	  Pearl	  Harbor	  attack.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  
transition	  of	  Washington’s	  image	  in	  Latin	  America	  between	  1933	  and	  1938	  was	  an	  
astounding	   success.	   The	   one	  weakness	  was	   relations	  with	   Argentina	   during	   this	  
period.	  
Argentina	  was	   isolated	   from	  the	  economic	   line-­‐up	  during	   the	  1930s	  as	   its	  
economy	   competed	   with	   the	   US	   (Tulchin,	   1989,	   p.	   35).	   They	   produced	   similar	  
exports	   competing	   for	   the	   same	   markets	   in	   both	   Latin	   America	   and	   Europe.	  
Argentina	  was	  the	  nation	  most	  directly	  impacted	  by	  Smoot-­‐Hawley	  in	  1930,	  as	  its	  
exports	  to	  the	  US	  decreased	  from	  $US117	  million	  in	  1929	  to	  under	  $US16	  million	  
in	   1933	   (Steward,	   1975,	   p.	   177).	   This	   contributed	   to	   urban	   unemployment	  
(Horowitz,	  1999,	  p.	  27).	   It	  was	   the	  only	  nation	  to	  approach	  the	  US	   for	  an	  RTA	  to	  
which	   Hull	   refused	   (Steward,	   1975,	   p.	   177).	   As	   a	   result,	   Argentina	   reluctantly	  
signed	   itself	   into	   the	   British	   economic	   empire,	   under	   the	   Roca-­‐Runciman	  
Agreement	  in	  1933	  (Peterson,	  1964,	  p.	  381).	  Argentina’s	  disdain	  for	  Washington’s	  
political	   and	   economic	  policies	   in	   South	  America	  promoted	   rampant	  nationalism	  
during	   the	   1930s	   (Tulchin,	   1989,	   p.	   35).	   Many	   believed	   in	   Argentine	   regional	  
leadership	   and	   objected	   to	   American	   regional	   impositions.	   This	   was	   evident	   at	  
both	  the	  Buenos	  Aires	  and	  Lima	  conferences.	   In	  1936,	  Foreign	  Minister	  Saavedra	  
Lamas	  argued	  that	  increased	  regionalism	  challenged	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  that	  
the	   new	   American	   ‘Good	   Neighbourism’	   had	   a	   responsibility	   to	   national	  
sovereignty	   in	  every	   field	  (Peterson,	  1964,	  p.	  392).	  This	  argument	  was	  echoed	   in	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1938.	  Argentina	  downgraded	  the	  “Declaration	  of	  Lima”	   to	  a	  non-­‐binding	  security	  
pledge	   (Inter	   American	   States,	   1938).	   While	   many	   saw	   Argentina’s	   actions	   as	   a	  
result	  of	  their	  desire	  to	  see	  a	  Nazi	  victory,	  one	  must	  carefully	  consider	  Argentina’s	  
position	  (F.D.	  Roosevelt,	  as	  cited	  in	  Kimble,	  1989,	  p.	  23).	  Commitment	  to	  regional	  
security	   would	   have	   directly	   impacted	   Argentina	   in	   two	   ways.	   Firstly,	   it	   would	  
place	  Argentina	  in	  a	  precarious	  economic	  position.	  In	  1938	  the	  Argentine	  economy	  
was	  completely	  dependent	  upon	  agricultural	  exports	  to	  Britain,	  Germany	  and	  Italy	  
(Tulchin,	   1989,	   pp.	   48-­‐50).	   By	   committing	   to	   regionalism,	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   its	  
trading	  partners,	   the	  Argentines	  were	  vulnerable	   to	  economic	  collapse.	  Secondly,	  
the	  Argentines	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  US	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  protect	   it,	  or	  Chile,	  
from	  foreign	  attacks	  (Francis,	  1977,	  p.	  108).	  Their	  isolation	  from	  US	  vital	  interests	  
in	  the	  Caribbean	  would	  expose	  Argentina,	  should	  it	  be	  legally	  required	  to	  declare	  
war	   on	   Germany.	   Hence,	   Argentina’s	   decision	   was	   based	   on	   nationalism	   and	  
pragmatism,	  rather	  than	  any	  alliance	  with	  a	  foreign	  power.	  
Despite	   Argentina’s	   reservations,	   the	   inevitability	   of	   global	   war	   became	  
more	   evident	   during	   1938-­‐1939.	   Japan’s	   undeclared	   war	   upon	   China	   had	  
expanded	  from	  Manchuria	  into	  Chinese	  territory	  during	  1937	  (Smith,	  2007,	  p.	  61).	  
This	   closed	   export	   markets	   throughout	   much	   of	   northern	   Asia	   while	   regional	  
exports	   into	  Europe	  were	   also	  being	   threatened	  by	   fascist	   expansion	   (Friedman,	  
2003,	   p.	   87).	   Moreover,	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere	   was	   becoming	   increasingly	  
isolated	   from	   global	   trade	   between	   1936	   and	   1939.	   This	   made	   the	   continents	  
interdependent.	   This	   interdependence	   was	   recognised	   by	   Sumner	   Welles,	   who	  
declared	  the	  US	  would	  “assure	  [Latin	  America]	  that	  [it]	  was	  in	  a	  position	  to	  defend	  
[Latin	   America]	   from	   all	   aggression	   from	   whatever	   source	   it	   may	   arise,	   and	  
[wished	  that	  Latin	  America	  would	  be]	  prepared	  to	  join	  with	  fellow	  democracies	  of	  
the	   New	  World”	   to	   prevent	   any	   attack	   on	   the	   region	   (in	   Gellman,	   1979,	   p.	   74).	  
While	   threats	   to	   Latin	   American	   security	   were	   limited	   to	   sporadic	   attacks	   on	  
Brazilian	  shipping,	  the	  US’	  commitment	  to	  regional	  defence	  was	  significant	  (Child,	  
1980,	  p.	  11).	  The	  US	  sought	  to	  extend	  its	  security	  personnel	  to	  all	  of	  Latin	  America,	  
and	   to	   bolster	   Latin	   American	   forces	   to	   fight	   under	   US	   command.	   For	   Latin	  
America,	   assurance	   for	   the	   region	   depended	   on	   a	   Latin	   American	   declaration	   of	  
war	  should	  the	  US	  be	  attacked	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  18).	  Continental	  mobilisation	  would	  
have	  been	  required	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  Pearl	  Harbor	  attack	  in	  December	  1941.	  Latin	  
Americans,	   primarily	   Argentina	   and	   Chile,	   rejected	   the	  US’	   conditions.	   The	   1938	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Declaration	   of	   Lima	   was	   not	   a	   formal	   unilateral	   security	   alliance.	   Instead	   it	  
expressed	  a	  desire	  to	  “defend	  the	  peace	  of	   the	  continent”	  (Inter-­‐American	  States,	  
1938).	  The	  US	  could	  not	  dictate	  regional	  politics	  in	  1939;	  however,	  the	  experience	  
of	  WWII	  would	  again	  change	  inter-­‐American	  diplomacy.	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Taking	  Their	  Share:	  The	  Democratic	  Revolution	  in	  Latin	  America	  
Latin	   America’s	   progressive	   forces	   claimed	   a	   decisive	   victory	   in	   the	   ‘Cold	   War’	  
between	  1941	  and	  1948.	  Ten	  dictatorial	  governments	  fell	  to	  democratic	  advocates	  
during	   this	   period.	   This	   left	   only	   five	   military	   regimes	   out	   of	   the	   twenty	   Latin	  
American	   republics	   that	   existed	   in	   early	   1948.48	  While	   social	   gains	  were	   limited	  
and	  short-­‐lived	  in	  Haiti,	  El	  Salvador	  and	  Honduras,	  social	  democratic	  governments	  
were	  established	  in	  Guatemala,	  Cuba,	  Venezuela,	  Peru	  and	  Costa	  Rica	  (Ameringer,	  
2009,	   pp.	   130-­‐170).	   Additionally,	   elections	   in	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   consolidated	  
the	  populist	  opposition	   to	  US	  domination	  of	   the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  (Rapoport,	  
1992,	   p.	   117;	   Bethal,	   1992,	   p.	   45).	   A	   democratic	   revolution	   swept	   over	   Latin	  
America	  during	  this	  period.	  While	  these	  individual	  revolutions	  were	  disparate	  and	  
subject	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   political	   economic	   conditions,	   the	   chronological	   pattern	  
cannot	   be	   ignored.	   These	   revolutions	   challenged	  Washington’s	   leadership	   of	   the	  
hemisphere	   as	   independent	   political	   and	   economic	   policies	   throughout	   Latin	  
America	  threatened	  the	  dominant	  position	  the	  US	  had	  gained	  during	  the	  previous	  
decade.	  This	  chapter	  will	  establish	  the	  setting	  for	  the	  impending	  crisis	  of	  1948.	  Its	  
primary	   objective,	   however,	   is	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   cause	   of	   this	   democratic	  
revolution	   by;	   tracing	   the	   origins	   of	   an	   independent	   and	   democratic	   philosophy	  
developed	  in	  Mexico	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Lázaro	  Cárdenas;	  explaining	  the	  Latin	  
America’s	   contribution	   to	   the	  Allied	  victory	   in	  WWII	  will	  be	  explained;	   revealing	  
that	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  inspired	  democratic	  elements	  throughout	  
the	  hemisphere;	  exploring	  the	  disparate	  democratic	  revolutions;	  offering	  a	  critique	  
of	  US	  policy	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	   ‘Bradenism’;	  and	  finally,	  explaining	   	  why	  these	  
democratic	  revolutions	  negatively	  impacted	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America.	  In	  
doing	   so,	   this	   chapter	   will	   explain	   why	   a	   ‘Cold	   War’	   in	   Latin	   America	   became	  
central	  to	  US	  interests	  by	  1948.	  
	  
The	  Beginning	  of	  Mexico’s	  Independence	  
Economic	  nationalism	  was	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  social	  democratic	  revolutions	  
in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  underdevelopment	  of	  most	   regional	   republics	  necessitated	  
economic	  sovereignty	  to	  meet	  the	  goals	  of	  development	  and	  social	  reform.	  In	  1950,	  
Raúl	  Prebisch	  and	   the	  ECLA	  argued	   that	   “in	  an	  unregulated	   international	  market	  
system	   the	   gains	   from	   trade	   are	   biased	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   advanced	   industrial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  These	  regimes	  included	  Nicaragua,	  the	  Dominican	  Republic,	  Bolivia,	  Ecuador,	  and	  Paraguay.	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countries	   [and]	   inhibit	   industrial	   development	   at	   the	   periphery”	   (as	   cited	   in	  
Overbeek,	   1999,	   p.	   570).	   Mexico	   subsequently	   initiated	   a	   program	   of	   economic	  
nationalism.	   According	   to	   González	   (2002),	   Cárdenas	   initiated	   “an	   agenda”	   of	  
“agrarian	   reform,	   socialistic	   education	   and	   economic	   nationalism”	   (p.	   223).	   This	  
economic	   nationalism	   focussed	   on	   land	   and	   resource	   redistribution.	   The	   most	  
notorious	  example	  of	  Mexico’s	  program	  was	  the	  expropriation	  of	  the	  oil	  companies	  
in	  1938.	  Dwyer	  (1998)	  suggests	  that	  the	  expropriation	  of	  US$102	  million	  worth	  of	  
agricultural	   land	   had	   even	   more	   of	   an	   impact	   on	   US	   commerce	   than	   the	   oil	  
seizures.	   Cárdenas	   revitalised	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   through	   a	   course	   of	  
independent	   political	   and	   economic	   developments	   (Dwyer,	   1998,	   pp.	   495-­‐510).	  
The	  precedent	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  posed	  the	  most	  fundamental	  threat	  to	  US	  
interests	   in	   Latin	   America	   throughout	   the	   following	   decade.	   This	   pro-­‐capitalist,	  
nationalist	   economic	   philosophy	   laid	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	   social	   democratic	  
economic	   reforms	   following	   WWII.	   This	   section	   details	   the	   proliferation	   of	  
economic	  nationalism	  and	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  US	  interests	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
From	   1938	   Cárdenas	   turned	   his	   attention	   from	   land	   reform	   to	   resource	  
expropriation	  (González,	  2002,	  p.	  246).	  Cárdenas	  was	  more	  progressive	  than	  Elías	  
Calles,	   his	   predecessor.	   This	   divergence	   from	   the	   party	   line	   made	   Cárdenas	  
dependent	  upon	  popular	  support	  (Levy	  and	  Szekley,	  1974,	  p.	  37).	  Cárdenas	  sought	  
to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  the	  peasants	  and	  labourers,	  and	  was	  determined	  to	  fulfil	  the	  
promise	   of	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   on	   land	   reform.	   “State	   imposed	   agrarian	  
reform”	   expropriated	   large	   tracts	   of	   arable	   land	   from	  wealthy	   oligarchs	   and	   US	  
capitalists,	   such	  as	   the	  Standard	  Fruit	  Company	   (González,	   2002,	  p.	   233;	  Karnes,	  
1978,	  p.	  162).	  This	   land	  was	  redistributed	  to	  collective	  peasant	  groups	  known	  as	  
ejidas	   (González,	   2002,	  p.	   214).	   Cárdenas	  won	  popular	   support	   through	  granting	  
agrarian	  credits	   to	  self-­‐reliant	  peasant	  communities.	  Through	  his	  support	   for	   the	  
claims	   of	   oil	   workers,	   who	   demanded	   job	   security	   after	   substantial	   layoffs,	  
Cárdenas	   was	   supporting	   labour.	   When	   the	   oil	   companies	   refused	   to	   negotiate	  
with	   him,	   he	   threatened	   expropriation	   under	   Article	   27	   of	   the	   Mexican	  
Constitution	  (González,	  2002,	  p.	  246).	  As	   the	  oil	  companies	   to	  refused	  to	  yield	   to	  
union	  demands,	  Cárdenas	  in	  1938	  expropriated	  the	  holdings	  of	  Royal	  Dutch	  Shell	  
(RDS)	  and	  Standard	  Oil	  of	  New	  Jersey	  (SONJ).	  Cárdenas	  argued	  that	  “the	  petroleum	  
expropriation	  marks	  the	  beginning	  of	  our	  independence”	  (in	  Britton,	  2006,	  p.	  50).	  
The	   oil	   companies	   demanded	   US	   intervention,	   which	   was	   supported	   by	   Cordell	  
	   90	  
Hull.	   Roosevelt,	   however,	   saw	   this	   as	   the	   Good	   Neighbour’s	   greatest	   test,	   and	  
refused	  to	  sacrifice	  regional	  trade	  policy	  for	  the	  “oil	  men”	  (Pike,	  1995,	  p.	  193).	  
The	  challenge	  posed	  by	  Cárdenas	  was	  greater	  than	  the	  direct	  cost	  to	  the	  oil	  
companies.	  Cárdenas	  set	  the	  precedent	  for	  other	  Latin	  American	  nations.	  Foreign	  
ownership	   of	   resources	   had	   hindered	   development	   in	   Latin	   America	   since	   the	  
onset	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  While	  foreign	  ownership	  of	  mineral	  resources	  was	  
at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   debate	   in	   Latin	   America,	   foreign	   ownership	   of	   land	   was	  
equally	   important.	   During	   this	   period,	   nationalist	   oil	   policies	   were	   adopted	   by	  
Venezuela,	  Colombia	  and	  Bolivia.	  In	  1937	  the	  nationalist	  military	  regime	  of	  Bolivia	  
demanded	  compensation	   from	  SONJ	   for	   the	  war	   it	  had	   initiated	  against	  RDS	  and	  
Paraguay	   over	   disputed	   territory	   in	   the	   Amazonian	   Chaco	   region	   (Whitehead,	  
2003,	   p.	   122).	   When	   the	   company	   refused,	   Bolivia	   confiscated	   its	   property	  
(Whitehead,	   2003,	   p.	   123).49	  In	   Venezuela,	   the	   military	   government	   bowed	   to	  
constant	  nationalist	  pressure	  to	  obtain	  a	  larger	  percentage	  of	  oil	  revenue	  (Bucheli	  
and	  Aguilera,	  2010,	  p.	  365).	  The	  1943	  Hydrocarbons	  Act	  ensured	  that	  half	  of	  all	  oil	  
profits	  accrued	  went	  to	  the	  Venezuelan	  government.	  In	  Colombia	  the	  state	  opened	  
a	  national	  oil	   company	   to	   compete	  with	  SONJ	  as	  a	  move	   towards	  nationalisation	  
(Bucheli	   and	  Aguilera,	   2010,	  p.	   368).	  However,	   that	  nation’s	  history	   inhibited	   its	  
capacity	   to	   develop	   that	   industry. 50 	  Other	   resource-­‐rich	   nations	   also	   began	  
demanding	  fairer	  prices	  for	  their	  commodities.	  The	  Popular	  Front	  in	  Chile	  sought	  
to	   regulate	   copper	   prices	   to	   increase	   national	   revenues	   during	   and	   after	   WWII	  
(Barnard,	   1992,	   p.	   67).	   Land	   reform	   was	   enacted	   in	   Guatemala,	   Venezuela	   and	  
informally	   in	   Colombia.	   Moreover,	   the	   potential	   assault	   on	   US	   DFI	   was	  
implemented	  through	  the	  policies	  of	  Cárdenas	   in	  reviving	  aspects	  of	   the	  Mexican	  
Revolution.	  	  
While	   during	   the	   1930s	   most	   of	   Latin	   America	   looked	   towards	   Mexican	  
commodity	  control,	  Cárdenas	  also	  began	  developing	  Mexico’s	  industry	  (Schneider,	  
2004,	   p.	   63).	   Industrialisation	  was	   vital	   to	   the	   economic	   development	   of	  Mexico	  
and	  other	  Latin	  American	  economies.	  According	  to	  Schneider	  (2004),	  “the	  decade	  
of	   the	   1930s	   in	   Mexico	   was	   a	   pivotal	   period	   of	   economic	   crisis,	   political	  
reorganisation	   and	   changing	   development	   strategies”	   (p.	   63).	   Moreover,	   the	  
Cárdenas	  regime	  sought	  to	  use	  domestic	  corporatist	  elements	  to	  rebuild	  Mexican	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Bolivian	  oil	  was	  nationalized	  between	  1937	  and	  1956.	  However,	  the	  minimal	  production	  and	  
export	  of	  the	  commodity	  limited	  the	  economic	  gains	  to	  the	  Bolivian	  government.	  
50	  Particularly	  the	  decade-­‐long	  civil	  war,	  ‘La	  Violencia,’	  which	  began	  in	  1948.	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industry	   emphasising	   national	   interest.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Depression	   and	  
approaching	  war,	   this	  meant	   the	   reconstruction	   of	  Mexico’s	   capacity	   to	   produce	  
processed	   goods	   for	   the	   domestic	   market	   (Gereffi	   and	   Wyman,	   1990,	   p.	   307).	  
During	   the	   1950s	   this	   industrialisation	   process	   became	   known	   as	   Import	  
Substitution	  Industrialisation	  (ISI).	  Between	  1929	  and	  1950	  Mexico	  decreased	  its	  
portion	  of	   imports	   in	   consumer	   goods	   from	  35.2	  per	   cent	   to	  6.9	  per	   cent	   (Gerffi	  
and	   Wyman,	   1990,	   p.	   307).	   This	   decrease	   allowed	   for	   a	   greater	   investment	   in	  
heavy	   industry	   during	   this	   period.	   Mexico	   set	   the	   example	   of	   domestic	  
industrialisation	   between	   1936	   and	   1945	   (Schneider,	   2004,	   pp.	   63-­‐65).	   Several	  
nations	   emulated	   this	   successes	   by	   producing	   consumer	   goods	   such	   as	   textiles,	  
processed	  foods	  and	  alcohol,	  and	  retaining	  foreign	  currency	  domestically	  after	  the	  
war	   (Prebisch	   in	   Overbeek,	   1989,	   p.	   570).	   The	   foreign	   currency	   would	   then	   be	  
reserved	   for	   capital	   goods	   such	   as	   automobiles,	   agricultural	   machinery	   and	  
industrial	  equipment,	  to	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  economy.	  The	  growth	  of	  the	  
domestic	  market	  would	  increase	  the	  profitability	  of	  these	  industries,	  creating	  more	  
urban	   jobs	   and	   leading	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   cosmopolitan	   cities	   through	   internal	  
migration.	  However,	   ISI	  was	  only	  possible	   in	   certain	   economic	   conditions.	  As	   ISI	  
required	  large	  initial	  outlays,	  including	  investment	  and	  worker	  training,	  it	  was	  far	  
less	   efficient	   than	   foreign	   imports.	   ISI	   could	   thus	   only	   exist	   with	   substantial	  
government	   support	   through	   either	   subsidies	   or	   significant	   tariff	   barriers	   to	  
competitive	  foreign	  goods	  (Prebisch	  in	  Overbeek,	  1989,	  p.	  571).	  The	  mobilisation	  
of	   European	   and	  North	  American	   economies	   towards	   the	  war	   effort	   allowed	   for	  
the	  temporary	  establishment	  of	  ISI.	  	  
The	  Good	  Neighbour	  Policy	  allowed	  for	  this	  limited	  economic	  development	  
in	   the	   parts	   of	   Latin	   America	   deemed	   non-­‐essential	   to	   the	   war	   effort.	   This	   was	  
evident	   in	   Roosevelt’s	   handling	   of	   Mexico’s	   oil	   expropriation.	   Roosevelt	   had	  
appointed	   his	   liberal	   and	   advisor,	   Josephus	   Daniels	   as	   ambassador	   to	   Mexico	  
(Gerber,	   1983,	   p,	   274).	   Daniels	   was	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   Mexican	  
Revolution	   and	   sought	   to	   contain	   Hull’s	   aggressive	   response	   to	   the	   crisis	   by	  
working	  directly	  with	   the	  President	   (Pike,	   1995,	  p.	   193).	  Daniels	  withheld	  Hull’s	  
critique	   of	   Cárdenas	   on	   the	   President’s	   order	   (Pike,	   1995,	   p.	   193).	   The	   British	  
government	  demanded	   that	  Roosevelt	   “deal	  with	   those	  communists	  down	   there”	  
in	  Mexico,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  British	  investment	  (Pike,	  1995,	  p.	  193).	  According	  to	  
Cárdenas,	  the	  British	  Empire	  “was	  sick	  and	  with	  a	  weak	  soul”	  (as	  cited	  in	  González,	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2002,	  p.	  250).	  The	  oil	   companies	   launched	  a	  vicious	  anti-­‐communist	  propaganda	  
campaign	  against	  Mexico	  (Pike,	  1995,	  p.	  193).	  However,	  herein	  lies	  the	  strategy	  of	  
the	  GNP	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Roosevelt	  understood	  that	  US	  interests	  revolved	  around	  
access	  to	  raw	  materials,	  rather	  than	  ownership	  of	  a	  select	  few.	  51	  If	  the	  US	  imposed	  
economic	   sanctions	   upon	   Mexico,	   Mexico	   would	   increase	   trade	   with	   Japan	   and	  
Germany,	   especially	   in	   the	   oil	   industry.	   This	   would	   be	   detrimental	   to	   the	   US’	  
position	   in	   WWII.	   Roosevelt	   was	   pragmatic,	   rather	   than	   philanthropic,	   towards	  
Mexico.	  To	  appease	  business	  and	  guarantee	  wartime	  oil	  supplies,	  the	  US	  organised	  
contracts	  to	  buy	  Mexican	  oil	  at	  a	  favourable	  price	  and	  ensure	  limited	  compensation	  
to	   the	   companies	   involved	   (Pike,	   1995,	   p.	   196).	   Moreover,	   the	   GNP	   concerned	  
national	  interest,	  and	  such	  goodwill	  contributed	  to	  the	  national	  interest.	  President	  
Roosevelt	   stated,	   “that	   is	   a	  new	  approach	   that	   I	   am	   talking	  about	   to	   these	  South	  
American	   things…Give	   them	  a	  share.	  They	   think	   they	  are	   just	  as	  good	  as	  we	  are,	  
and	  many	  of	  them	  are”	  (as	  cited	   in	  Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  157).	  As	  WWII	  approached,	  
Latin	  Americans	  questioned	   just	  what	   this	   share	  would	   constitute.	  However,	   the	  
goodwill	   generated	   by	  Roosevelt	   had	   convinced	   the	  majority	   of	   Latin	  Americans	  
that	  the	  US	  would	  support	  the	  advances	  made	  by	  revolutionary	  Mexico.	  This	  also	  
convinced	  most	  Latin	  Americans	  to	  support	  the	  Allied	  war	  effort	  from	  1941.	  
	  
Fighting	  Fascism	  Abroad	  
By	   the	   end	   of	   1939	   both	   Europe	   and	   Asia	   were	   at	   war.	   As	   of	   that	   year,	  
isolationist	   policies	  prevented	  Washington’s	   entry	   into	   foreign	   conflicts	   (Jenkins,	  
2003,	   p.	   107).	   Roosevelt’s	   primary	   fear	   was	   an	   invasion	   of	   the	   Western	  
Hemisphere	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  19).52	  The	  US	  sought	  to	  convene	  the	  American	  states	  
in	  Panama	  City	   in	  1939	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  establish	  a	   large	  neutrality	  zone	  around	  
the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  27).	  This	  would	  allow	  the	  US	  Navy	  access	  
to	  Latin	  American	  ports	  and	  ensure	  the	  termination	  of	  Axis	  involvement	  and	  trade	  
in	   the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	   The	  war	   also	   impacted	   Latin	  America	   as	   the	   rise	   of	  
Germany	  alerted	  Roosevelt	   to	   the	  possibility	  of	  German	  seizure	  of	   the	  Caribbean	  
colonies	  of	  the	  Netherlands,	  France,	  and	  even	  Britain	  (Bratzel,	  2007,	  p.	  1).	  The	  US	  
sought	   permission	   to	   invade	   these	   territories	   should	   Germany	   defeat	   the	  
Europeans.	  The	  motions	  at	  Panama	  largely	  failed,	  however,	  as	  Argentina	  and	  other	  
states	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  Axis	  powers	  would	  invade	  Latin	  America	  (Francis,	  1977,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  In	  addition	  to	  trade	  and	  political	  influence.	  
52	  This	  thesis	  will	  only	  focus	  on	  those	  aspects	  of	  WWII	  that	  directly	  influenced	  Latin	  America.	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p.	  167).	  The	  Nazi	  advance	  into	  France	  caused	  the	  US	  to	  convene	  the	  inter-­‐American	  
states	   again	   in	   Havana	   in	   1940	   (Child,	   1980,	   p.	   19).	   Sumner	   Welles	   brought	  
monetary	   incentives	   to	   the	  Havana	   conference;	   the	   lending	   capacity	   of	   the	  EXIM	  
Bank	  more	   than	   tripled	   to	  US$700	  million	   (Gellman,	   1979,	   p.	   162).	   Priority	  was	  
given	   to	   military	   build-­‐up	   in	   the	   hemisphere.	   The	   war	   also	   distanced	   Latin	  
American	  countries	  from	  their	  traditional	  markets	  in	  Europe.	  Simply	  put,	  the	  onset	  
of	  WWII	  had	  a	  drastic	  effect	  on	  every	  Latin	  American	  state.	  While	  Argentina,	  Brazil	  
and	   Chile 53 	  boycotted	   the	   Havana	   resolution,	   a	   sufficient	   majority	   of	   states	  
supported	  US	   leadership	  at	   the	  onset	  of	  WWII.	  This	   loyalty	  was	  based	  on	  several	  
factors,	   including	   hemispheric	   defence,	   economic	   dislocation	   and	   perceived	  
ideological	  coherence.54	  	  
From	  1936	  until	  1945	  the	  US	  expressed	  their	  concerns	  about	  hemispheric	  
defence.	  This	  was	  a	  direct	  response	  to	   fascist	   infiltration	   in	  Brazil,	  Argentina	  and	  
Chile	  (Friedman,	  2003,	  pp.	  13-­‐46).	  The	  threat	  seemed	  especially	  real	  in	  Argentina,	  
which	   continued	   to	   trade	  with	   the	  Axis	  powers	   throughout	   the	  war	   –	   albeit	   at	   a	  
declining	   rate	   (Scheinin,	   2007,	   p.	   188).	   Despite	   the	   views	   of	   pro-­‐Axis	   leaders	   in	  
Argentina	   and	  Brazil,	   neither	   government	   chose	  Germany	  over	   the	  US	   (Scheinin,	  
2007,	   p.	   186;	   Smith,	   2007,	   p.	   144).	   History	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   much	   of	   the	  
anxiety	   regarding	   the	  Axis	   threat	  was	   falsified	   by	  British	   intelligence	   (Friedman,	  
2003,	   pp.	   58-­‐59).	   However,	   the	   viability	   of	   this	   Pan-­‐American	   alliance	   was	   not	  
assured	   in	   1941.	   The	  US	  moved	   to	   create	   a	  mechanism	   for	   hemispheric	   defence	  
against	  the	  threat	  of	  Axis	  aggression.	  Brazil	  was	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  inter-­‐American	  
alliance.	   It	   possessed	   the	   large	   under-­‐inhabited	   north-­‐eastern	   ‘bulge’	   of	   South	  
America,	  which	  was	  the	  closest	  point	  to	  Axis-­‐occupied	  Africa.	  Brazil	   leveraged	  its	  
cooperation	  for	  financial	  aid,	  which	  was	  directed	  towards	  foreign	  minister	  Osvaldo	  
Aranha’s	   aggressive	   economic	   agenda	   in	   Brazil	   (Smith,	   2007,	   p.	   153).	   This	   aid	  
cemented	  the	  alliance	  and	  allowed	  the	  US	  to	  patrol	  the	  hemisphere.	  Following	  the	  
attack	   on	   Pearl	   Harbor	   in	   1941,	   the	   US	   joined	   the	   war.	   Nine	   Latin	   American	  
republics	  declared	  war	  on	   the	  Axis	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor	   (Hull,	  1948b,	  1139).	  Their	  
motives	   for	   war	   were	   determined	   by	   “geography,	   internal	   politics,	   intra-­‐Latin	  
American	   relations,	   economic	   factors,	   history,	   and	   a	   host	   of	   other	   variables”	  
(Bratzel,	  2007,	  p.	  8).	   In	  early	  1942	   the	   inter-­‐American	  states	  convened	   in	  Rio	  de	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  In	  1940,	  these	  three	  states	  still	  held	  close	  ties	  with	  Germany.	  Additionally,	  they	  were	  sceptical	  of	  
Washington’s	  ability	  to	  defend	  the	  hemisphere	  in	  any	  international	  conflict.	  
54	  Ideological	  coherence	  was	  demonstrated	  through	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter.	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Janeiro	   to	   consult	   on	   wartime	   policies	   (Child,	   1980,	   p.	   28).	   In	   Rio,	   the	   US	  
demonstrated	   that	   there	  was	  a	  significant	   threat	   to	   the	  hemisphere.	  Accordingly,	  
18	  of	  the	  20	  sovereign	  Latin	  American	  states	  severed	  relations	  with	  the	  Axis.	  They	  
were	  also	  encouraged	  to	  monitor	  fascist	  activity	  at	  home.	  Only	  Brazil	  and	  Mexico	  
committed	  troops	  to	  WWII,	  aiding	   in	  the	   invasion	  of	   Italy	   in	  1943(Child,	  1980,	  p.	  
48).	  More	  significantly,	  during	  WWII	  hemispheric	  defences	  were	  bolstered.	  For	  the	  
US,	   Latin	   America’s	   role	   in	   WWII	   was	   to	   defend	   itself	   from	   foreign	   aggression,	  
thereby	  allowing	  US	  troops	  to	  fight	  in	  Europe.	  The	  limitation	  of	  Latin	  forces	  meant	  
that	   100,000	  US	   troops	  were	   stationed	   in	   the	   region	   throughout	   the	  war	   (Child,	  
1980,	  p.	  21).	  Jesse	  Jones	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  remarked,	  “we	  shall	  thus	  have	  for	  
the	  first	  time	  the	  ammunition	  to	  deal	  with	  South	  America”	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  162).	  	  
The	  two	  abstainers,	  Argentina	  and	  Chile,	  eventually	  succumbed	  to	  inter-­‐American	  
pressure	  after	  the	  Axis	  defeat	  became	  inevitable.	  
Its	   economic	   dislocation	   from	   Europe	   defined	   Latin	   America’s	   role	   in	   the	  
allied	  victory	  in	  WWII.	  The	  region	  experienced	  a	  structural	  readjustment	  to	  service	  
the	  US	  war	   economy	   (FEAC,	   1943,	   pp.	   3-­‐7).55	  The	  US	   prioritised	   this	   adjustment	  
because	  of	  the	  decrease	  of	  access	  to	  the	  economies	  of	  Eurasia	  (FEAC,	  1943,	  pp.	  8-­‐
11,	   94-­‐98).	   In	   November	   1939	   the	   US,	   represented	   by	   Welles,	   established	   the	  
Financial	   and	   Economic	   Advisory	   Committee	   (FEAC)	   (FEAC,	   1943,	   pp.	   3-­‐7).	   The	  
FEAC	   and	   the	   War	   Resources	   Board	   controlled	   the	   political	   economies	   of	   most	  
Latin	   American	   states	   throughout	   WWII.	   The	   FEAC’s	   stated	   intention	   was	   to	  
“provide	   long-­‐term	   solutions	   to	   increase	   inter-­‐American	   trade	   and	   seek	  ways	   to	  
stimulate	  Latin	  American	  growth”	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  157).	  However,	  “no	  long-­‐term	  
planning	  was	  given	  serious	  consideration”	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  167).	  The	  FEAC	  was	  
designed	  to	  absorb	  excess	  Latin	  exports	  formally	  destined	  for	  Europe.	  The	  US	  gave	  
special	   priority	   to	   essential	   war	  materials,	   to	   keep	   them	   out	   of	   Axis	   hands.	   The	  
other	  significant	  element	  was	  keeping	  Latin	  American	  states	  as	  primary	  exporters.	  
By	  committing	  to	  the	  purchase	  of	  goods,	  the	  US	  maintained	  the	  existing	  political-­‐
economic	   structure	   of	   the	   hemisphere.	   According	   to	   Henry	   Wallace, 56 	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55The	  data	  in	  this	  paragraph	  comes	  from	  the	  handbook	  of	  the	  Financial	  and	  Economic	  Advisory	  
Committee	  (FEAC)	  published	  by	  the	  US	  government	  in	  1943.	  This	  extensive	  handbook	  outlines	  
collaborative	  economic	  activities	  between	  the	  US	  and	  several	  Latin	  American	  states.	  Resolutions	  
concluded	  between	  1939	  and	  1943	  included	  price	  controls	  and	  quotas	  on	  primary	  goods,	  
organizational	  principals	  and	  transportation	  needs.	  Moreover,	  this	  highlights	  the	  economic	  
collaboration	  of	  the	  hemisphere	  and	  several	  sacrifices	  made	  by	  the	  smaller	  hemispheric	  republics.	  
56	  Wallace	  was	  the	  US	  Secretary	  for	  Agriculture.	  In	  that	  position,	  he	  sought	  to	  maintain	  markets	  for	  
US	  agricultural	  produce	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  
	   95	  
dependency	   should	   be	   further	   enhanced	   through	   the	   establishment	   of	   more	  
complimentary	   trade.	   In	  1939	  Latin	  America	  only	  provided	  US$16	  million	  of	   the	  
US$236	   million	   of	   “tropical	   imports”	   (Gellman,	   1979,	   p.	   157).	   The	   US	   Congress	  
committed	  US$500,000	  to	  research	  technologies	  to	  create	  goods,	  such	  as	  rubber,	  in	  
Latin	  America	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  158).	  	  
During	  WWII	  Latin	  America	  postponed	  its	  possible	  economic	  diversification	  
in	   order	   to	   assist	   the	   US	   war	   economy.	   The	   production	   of	   cash	   crops	   and	   the	  
extraction	  of	  minerals	   temporarily	   enriched	   the	   oligarchic	   classes.	   This	   situation	  
was	  temporary,	  however.	  Many	  Latin	  American	  states	  were	  committed	  to	  an	  Allied	  
victory	   in	   order	   to	   receive	   their	   share	   of	   development	   aid	   as	   a	   reward	   for	   their	  
economic	   contribution	   after	   the	  war	   (FEAC,	   1943,	   p.	   9).57	  The	   US	  was	   poised	   to	  
become	  the	  global	  hegemon,	  and	  the	  Latin	  Americans	  believed	  a	  close	  relationship	  
with	   the	   US	   would	   grant	   them	   a	   better	   position	   in	   the	   world	   order.	   The	   years	  
1945-­‐1948	  revealed	  this	  was	  not	  the	  US’	  intention.	  Wallace	  remarked:	  
It	  is	  a	  rather	  disturbing	  thought	  that	  we	  in	  the	  United	  States	  can	  maintain	  a	  
deep	  interest	  in	  Latin	  America	  only	  so	  long	  as	  we	  think	  we	  have	  something	  
to	  gain	  by	  it.	  I	  hope…during	  the	  next	  few	  years	  that	  Latin	  America	  will	  feel	  
that	  we	  are	  really	  her	  friend	  and	  not	  merely	  a	  friend	  for	  expedient	  purposes	  
in	  time	  of	  great	  need	  (in	  Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  198).	  
Wallace’s	   wish	   would	   not	   be	   fulfilled	   as	   WWII	   increased	   Latin	   American	  
dependency	   upon	   the	   US;	   it	   was	   never	   intended	   to	   drag	   Latin	   America	   out	   of	  
poverty	   in	   the	   process.	   The	   Latin	   Americans	   were	   forced	   to	   look	   elsewhere	   for	  
‘their	  share’.	  	  
Roosevelt	  and	  his	  chief	  advisor,	  Sumner	  Welles,	  had	  changed	  the	  dimension	  
of	  this	  ‘Cold	  War’	  for	  a	  brief	  moment	  in	  1941.	  Roosevelt	  argued	  that	  the	  visions	  of	  
US	   expansionists	   and	   Latin	  American	   social	   democrats	  were,	   at	   last,	   compatible.	  
However,	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  demonstrated	  that	  this	  was	  never	  the	  
case.	  It	  was	  designed	  to	  convince	  the	  occupied	  people	  of	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  that	  the	  
US-­‐led	   system	  would	   offer	   self-­‐determination	   (O’Sullivan,	   2008,	   p.	   47).	   Yet	   Latin	  
Americans	   were	   never	   the	   targets.	   The	   Atlantic	   Charter	   justified	   US	   global	  
leadership	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  a	  moral	  crusade	  (O’Sullivan,	  2008,	  p.	  51).	  The	  US	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Specifically,	  the	  US	  committed	  to	  design	  “a	  broader	  inter-­‐American	  system	  of	  inter-­‐American	  
cooperative	  organization	  in	  trade	  and	  industrial	  matters,	  and	  to	  propose	  credit	  measures	  and	  other	  
measures	  of	  assistance	  which	  may	  be	  immediately	  necessary	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  economics,	  finance,	  
money,	  and	  foreign	  exchange”	  (FEAC,	  1943,	  p.	  9).	  Moreover,	  the	  FEAC	  made	  future	  commitments	  to	  
economic	  leaders	  in	  Latin	  America.	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sought	   to	   attain	   global	   moral	   leadership	   through	   its	   professed	   commitment	   to	  
democracy,	   human	   rights	   and	   economic	   development.	   The	   US,	   through	   Welles,	  
claimed	   to	   be	   an	   unwilling	   participant	   in	   WWII,	   and	   had	   fought	   only	   for	   the	  
betterment	  of	  human	  kind	  (O’Sullivan,	  2008,	  p.	  51).	  This	  propaganda	  allowed	  the	  
US	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  global	  political	  and	  economic	  order	  following	  the	  war.	  It	  was	  
to	  be	  based	  on	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  and	  Roosevelt’s	  Four	  Freedoms	  speech,	  which	  
was	  a	  naked	  appeal	  to	  the	  oppressed	  peoples	  of	  the	  world.	  It	  laid	  out	  a	  society	  that	  
was	   beneficial	   to	   those	   peoples	   living	   under	   fascism,	   communism	   and	   European	  
imperialism.	   It	   promoted	   self-­‐determination	   and	   an	   end	   to	   exploitation	   between	  
nations.	   Roosevelt	   declared	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   Allies	   to	   be	   humanitarian.	   The	   first	  
“freedom”	   included	   the	   independence	   of	   speech	   and	   the	   press	   (FD	   Roosevelt,	  
1941).	   This	   would	   appeal	   to	   all	   oppressed	   people	   as	   it	   gave	   way	   to	   political	  
activism	   in	   the	   developing	   world.	   The	   second	   “freedom”	   was	   of	   religion	   (FD	  
Roosevelt,	   1941).	   The	   third	   “freedom”	   guaranteed	   against	   “want”	   (FD	  Roosevelt,	  
1941).	  The	  impoverished	  people	  of	  the	  colonial	  and	  semi-­‐colonial58	  world	  saw	  this	  
as	   a	   guarantee	   of	   economic	   development.	   The	   fourth,	   and	   most	   significant	  
“freedom”	   was	   from	   “fear”	   (FD	   Roosevelt,	   1941).	   The	   US	   committed	   to	   ending	  
dictatorial	   rule	   over	   the	   globe.	   While	   history	   has	   found	   these	   claims	   to	   be	  
propaganda,	   they	   were	   very	   powerful	   in	   convincing	   states	   to	   join	   a	   new	   world	  
order	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  and	  free-­‐trade	  economics.	  	  
The	   US	   government	   did	   not	   design	   this	   new	   world	   order.	   Rather,	   it	   was	  
outlined	   by	   the	   private	   organisation	   known	   as	   the	   Council	   for	   Foreign	  Relations	  
(CFR)	  (Parmar,	  2004,	  p.	  151).	  Preceding	  WWII,	  “the	  [CFR]	  saw	  the	  purpose	  of	  post-­‐
war	   planning	   as	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   international	   economic	   and	   political	   order	  
dominated	   by	   the	   United	   States”	   (Shoup	   and	   Minter,	   1977,	   p.	   141).	   The	   CFR’s	  
membership	   was	   intertwined	   with	   US	   State	   Department	   membership,	   which	  
included	  Sumner	  Welles,	  Hamilton	  Fish	  and	  Adolf	  Berle	  (Schulzinger,	  1984,	  pp.	  59-­‐
65).	  While	  not	  a	  CFR	  member,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Hull	  supported	  the	  expansion	  of	  
US	   global	   economic	   leadership	   (Parmar,	   2004,	   p.	   120).	   Its	   membership	   also	  
included	   influential	   economists,	   executives	   and	   intellectuals	   (Schulzinger,	   1984,	  
pp.	  31-­‐34).	  It	  sought	  to	  define	  the	  future	  of	  American	  imperialism	  by	  asserting	  that	  
the	  US	  economy	  was	  not	  self-­‐sufficient,	  and	  could	  not	  sustain	  a	  superior	  quality	  of	  
life	  for	  its	  citizens	  without	  global	  markets	  and	  resources.	  Given	  the	  dominance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  This	  term	  defines	  those	  nations	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  Euro-­‐American	  capitalism,	  outside	  of	  
formal	  political	  control.	  It	  might	  apply	  to	  many	  Latin	  American	  states	  (Aguilar,	  1968,	  p.	  18).	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the	   Germans	   in	   Europe,	   the	   CFR	   sought	   to	   integrate	   other	   areas	   of	   the	   world	  
economy	  into	  a	  US-­‐led	  political	  economic	  bloc.	  Resource-­‐rich	  Latin	  America	  was	  to	  
be	   the	   centre	   of	   this	   bloc.	   However,	   Latin	   America	   did	   not	   yet	   have	   sufficient	  
internal	   markets	   to	   support	   the	   US	   industrial	   economy.	   The	   CFR	   sought	   to	  
integrate	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  Asia	   into	  their	  “Grand	  Area”	  (Shoup	  and	  Minter,	  
1977,	  p.	  126).	  This	  meant	  war	  with	   Japan	  and	   in	  order	   to	  wage	  war,	  a	  degree	  of	  
idealism	   was	   necessary.	   CFR	   recommendations	   shaped	   the	   State	   Department’s	  
conception	  of	  war;	  the	  CFR	  was	  known	  to	  FDR	  as	  “my	  post-­‐war	  advisors”	  (Shoup	  
and	   Minter,	   1977,	   p.	   122).	   However,	   these	   post-­‐war	   advisors	   were	   primarily	  
concerned	  with	  propaganda.	  Their	  aims	  in	  1941-­‐42	  were	  to	  convince	  the	  American	  
people	   to	   fight	   WWII,	   and	   to	   leave	   the	   international	   community	   puzzled	   by	   its	  
actual	   reasons	   for	   war.	   The	   organisation	   asserted	   that	   the:	   “formulation	   of	   a	  
statement	  of	  war	  aims	  for	  propaganda	  purposes	  is	  very	  different	  from	  formulation	  
of	  one	  defining	   the	   true	  national	   interest”	   (Shoup	  and	  Minter,	  1977,	  p.	  162).	  The	  
Atlantic	  Charter	  and	  the	  Four	  Freedoms	  served	  this	  purpose.	  
	   The	   US	   claimed	   to	   fight	   the	   war	   for	   moral	   reasons.	   They	   declared	   that	  
Nazism	  and	  Japanese	  militarism	  were	  ‘evil’	  and	  that	  the	  US	  had	  a	  moral	  obligation	  
to	  end	  them.	  The	  reality	  was	  otherwise.	  While	  the	  American	  people,	  and	  soldiers,	  
were	  at	  war	  for	  those	  reasons,	  the	  aims	  of	  its	  leading	  diplomats	  did	  not	  fulfil	  this	  
rhetoric.	  The	  protracted	  decline	  of	  the	  British	  and	  French	  empires	  in	  the	  inter-­‐war	  
period	  posed	  created	  a	  void	  in	  global	  leadership	  (Kolko,	  1968,	  pp.	  484-­‐490).	  Three	  
modern	   forces	   sought	   to	   usurp	   the	   leadership	   of	   the	   declining	   imperial	   powers.	  
Along	  with	  modern	  US	   capitalism	  came	  German	  Nazism	  and	  Soviet	  Communism.	  
The	  US	  sought	  to	  compete	  with	  these	  ideologies	  to	  confirm	  its	  role	  as	  global	  leader.	  
The	  CFR’s	  vision	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  economic	  system	  is	  quite	  revealing	  of	  US	  foreign	  
policy	   in	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   war.	   The	   CFR	   divided	   the	   world	   into	  
economic	   regions.	   Within	   this	   division	   of	   regions	   came	   a	   vision	   of	   permanent	  
division	  of	  labour.	  The	  CFR	  argued	  that	  the	  tropical	  economies	  of	  the	  world	  were	  
to	  remain	  resource	  producers	  (Shoup	  and	  Minter,	  1977,	  p.	  167).	  Along	  with	  most	  
of	  Latin	  America,	  South	  and	  South-­‐East	  Asia,	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Africa	  were	  seen	  
as	   dependent	   economies	   to	   be	   controlled	   by	   Western	   powers.	   The	   industrial	  
regions	   of	   Europe	   and	   North-­‐East	   Asia	   were	   seen	   as	   industrial	   manufacturers.	  
These	   CFR	   plans	  were	   largely	   initiated	   after	  WWII;	   Europe	   and	  North-­‐East	   Asia	  
were	   given	   large	   development	   funds,	   while	   Latin	   America	   remained	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underdeveloped.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  and	  Four	  Freedoms	  Speech	  
was	   to	   conceal	   the	  economic	  aims	  of	  US	   foreign	  policy	  behind	   its	  moral	   crusade.	  
This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  utilisations	  of	  propaganda	  in	  US	  history.	  
	  
Fighting	  Fascism	  at	  Home	  
Latin	   America’s	   brief	   experiments	   in	   democracy	   have	   been	   cautiously	  
connected	   by	   experts	   of	   this	   period.	   In	   their	   edited	   collection,	   Bethell	   and	  
Roxborough	  (1992)	  assert,	   “despite	  differences	   in	  political	   regime…	  there	   [were]	  
striking	   similarities	   in	   the	   experience	   of	   the	  majority	   of	   the	   republics”	   between	  
1944	  and	  1948	  (p.	  1).	  Ameringer	  (1996)	  also	  states	  that	  “the	  democratising	  trends	  
of	   World	   War	   II	   accelerated	   the	   pressure	   for	   change	   in	   the	   Caribbean”	   (p.	   1).	  
Ameringer	   (1996)	  goes	  on	   to	  assert	   that	   these	  changes	   “were	  more	  evolutionary	  
than	  revolutionary,”	  as	  the	  decentralisation	  of	  economic	  power	  during	  World	  War	  
I	   led	  to	  the	  gradual	  decentralisation	  of	  political	  power	   in	  the	  ensuing	  decades	  (p.	  
1).	   The	   political	   and	   economic	   factors	   that	   motivated	   the	   anti-­‐authoritarian	  
movements	  were	   unique	   in	   each	   state.	   However,	   the	   leaders	   of	   several	   of	   those	  
movements	   held	   a	   common	   ideological	   convictions	   for	   social	   democracy.	   The	  
preeminent	  source	  on	  the	  Venezuelan	  ‘trienio’,	  Robert	  Alexander	  (1982),	  identifies	  
the	   conversion	   of	   Betancourt’s	   1945	   coup	   “into	   a	   process	   of	   fundamentally	  
changing	   the	   political,	   economic,	   and	   social	   structures	   of	   Venezuela”	   (p.	   224).	  
Gleijes	  (1990)	  defines	  the	  Guatemalan	  ‘ten	  years	  of	  spring’	  as	  “an	  attempt	  to	  break	  
the	   power	   of	   a	   foreign	   enclave	   that	   threatened	   the	   country’s	   sovereignty”.	  
Ameringer	   (2000)	   defines	  Auténtico	   rule	   under	  Grau	   as	   a	   force	   for	   “nationalism,	  
socialism,	   and	   anti-­‐Imperialism”	   (p.	   44).	  Haworth	   (1992)	  defines	   the	  democratic	  
experience	   in	   Peru	   as	   “herald[ing]	   an	   era	   of	   freedom	   for	   popular	   political	  
organisation…economic	   restructuring	   and	   social	   change”	   (p.	   170).	   Finally,	   Green	  
(2003)	   defines	   the	   movement	   for	   Gaitánism	   in	   Colombia	   as	   a	   “pronounced	  
intellectual	   tradition”	   of	   the	   “home	   grown	   left”	   (p.	   205).	   While	   each	   movement	  
faced	  different	  obstacles,	  their	  objective	  was	  the	  same:	  to	  transform	  their	  republics	  
into	  modern	  social	  democratic	   states	   that	   could	  effectively	  compete	   in	   the	  world	  
capitalist	   economy	  by	  utilising	   the	   full	   potential	   of	   their	  population.	  This	   section	  
will	  document	  the	  attempts	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  people	  to	  take	  their	  share	  of	  the	  
post-­‐WWII	   freedoms	   of	   “victorious	   democracy”	   (Morales,	   as	   cited	   in	   Ameringer,	  
1974,	  p.	  53).	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The	   reciprocal	   arrangements	   of	   the	   1930s	   had	   formed	   police	   states	   in	  
Central	   America	   and	   the	   Caribbean.	   The	   long-­‐term	   dictators	   included	   the	  
Guatemalan	   Jorge	   Ubico	   (1934-­‐1944),	   the	   El	   Salvadoran	   Maximiliano	   Martínez	  
(1931-­‐1944),	  the	  Honduran	  Carías	  Andino	  (1933-­‐1949),	  the	  Nicaraguan	  Anastasio	  
Somoza	   (1936-­‐1956),	   the	   Cuban	   Fulgencio	   Batista	   (1934-­‐1944),	   and	   the	  
Dominican	  Rafael	  Trujillo	  (1930-­‐1961)	  (Black,	  1988,	  p.	  61;	  Ameringer,	  2000,	  pp.	  9-­‐
22).	  Less	   formal	  military	  rule	  was	  also	  conducted	   in	  Panama	  and	  Haiti	   (LaFeber,	  
1989,	  pp.	  85-­‐100;	  Trouillot,	   1990,	  pp.	  102-­‐106).	  The	  only	   regional	  nation	  with	   a	  
somewhat	  democratic	  system	  was	  Costa	  Rica;	  however,	  with	  limited	  suffrage,	  the	  
political	   economy	   was	   tightly	   controlled	   by	   a	   landed	   oligarchy	   (Cruz,	   1992,	   pp.	  
280-­‐285).	   In	   1944	   conservative	   military	   leaders,	   many	   of	   whom	   resembled	  
European	   fascists,	  dominated	  Central	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean	  (Arévalo,	  1963,	  
p.	   35).	   The	   Guatemalan	   president,	   Juan	   José	   Arévalo	   (1963)	   asserted	   that	   the	  
“Nazism	  of	  Central	  and	  South	  America	  was	  intrinsic	  with	  [the]	  Police-­‐State	  rulers,	  
ideologically	   and	   in	   practice”	   (p.	   35).	   Citizens	   of	   the	   region	   enjoyed	   few	   of	   the	  
freedoms	  enunciated	  by	  President	  Roosevelt	  (Arévalo,	  1963,pp.	  30-­‐39).	  However,	  
Roosevelt’s	  promises	  in	  part	  motivated	  the	  regional	  change	  that	  came	  to	  threaten	  
US	   dominance.	   Betancourt	   stated	   the	   Roosevelt	   “gave	   hope	   to	   the	   oppressed	  
people	  of	  Latin	  America”	  (as	  cited	   in	  Ameringer,	  1974,	  p.	  52).	  The	  region’s	  social	  
democrats	  were	   in	   exile	   (Ameringer,	   1974,	   pp.	   24-­‐49).	   Circumstances,	   however,	  
brought	  them	  into	  the	  political	  fold	  once	  again.	  
The	  movement	  for	  democracy	  in	  Central	  America	  emerged	  in	  1944.	  It	  began	  
in	   San	   Salvador	   in	  March	   1944	   (Parkman,	   1988	   p.	   34).	   The	   “strike	   of	   the	   fallen	  
arms”	  was	  a	  non-­‐violent	  protest	   conducted	  by	  10,000	   students,	  which	   led	   to	   the	  
military’s	  removal	  of	  Martínez	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  more	  progressive	  general	  (Parkman,	  
1988,	   p.	   35).	   Later,	   in	   May	   1944,	   protests	   of	   Honduran	   unionists	   led	   to	   violent	  
clashes	  with	  the	  military	  (MacCameron,	  1983,	  p.	  17).	  While	  the	  vocal	  demands	  for	  
the	  removal	  of	  Andino	   failed	  until	  1949,	  an	   immediate	  compromise	  was	  made	   in	  
the	  meeting	  of	  union	  wage	  demands.	  In	  June	  1944	  Guatemalan	  campesinos	  staged	  a	  
general	   strike	   of	   over	   100,000	   workers	   against	   Ubico’s	   murder	   of	   dissident	  
schoolteachers	  (Greib,	  1979,	  p.	  272).	  Guillermo	  Toriello	  proudly	  read	  Roosevelt’s	  
Atlantic	   Charter	   to	   a	   vociferous	   audience	   in	   June	   1944,	   demanding	   Ubico’s	  
resignation	   (Ameringer,	   1974,	   p.	   52).	  While	   democracy	   failed	   in	  El	   Salvador	   and	  
Honduras,	   Guatemalan	   resolve	   ensured	   its	   success.	   The	   fraudulent	   Guatemalan	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Presidential	   elections	  of	   September	  1944,	  which	   resembled	   those	   in	  El	   Salvador,	  
resulted	  in	  the	  defeat	  of	  exiled	  Professor	  Arévalo	  to	  Ubico’s	  Chief	  Lieutenant	  Ponce	  
Vaides	  by	  45,000	  to	  3,000	  votes	  in	  a	  nation	  of	  approximately	  three	  million	  (Greib,	  
1979,	  p.	  277).59	  When	   the	   result	  was	  publicised	   in	  October,	   three	  young	  military	  
officers	  –	  Francisco	  Arana,	   Jacobo	  Árbenz	  and	   Jorge	  Toriello	  –	   shot	  and	  mortally	  
wounded	   Vaides	   (Greib,	   1979,	   p.	   279).	   The	   October	   revolutionaries	   called	   for	  
elections	  in	  January	  1945,	  expanding	  suffrage	  to	  all	  literate	  males	  (Schlesinger	  and	  
Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  35).	  Arévalo	  won	  the	  1945	  election	  in	  a	  landslide	  (Schlesinger	  and	  
Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  35).	  The	  new	  Guatemalan	  constitution	  of	  1945	  made	  its	  citizens	  as	  
politically	  ‘free’	  as	  members	  of	  the	  ‘first	  world.’	  However,	  the	  alleviation	  of	  severe	  
rural	   poverty	   was	   more	   important	   to	   Guatemalans	   than	   political	   rights.	   The	  
relationship	  between	  capital	  and	  labour	  required	  revision.	  In	  1947,	  Arévalo	  passed	  
a	  sweeping	  labour	  code	  that	  established	  a	  minimum	  wage	  and	  a	  48-­‐hour	  working	  
week	   (Gleijes,	  1991,	  p.	  51).	  Guatemala’s	   largest	  employers,	   including	   the	   (UFCo),	  
protested	   this	   decision.	   Guatemala	   had	   emulated	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   and	  
sought	  to	  extend	  this	  influence	  to	  its	  neighbours.	  	  
Long-­‐term	   conservative	   oligarchic-­‐military	   alliances	   also	   ruled	   the	  
resource-­‐rich	  nations	  of	  Peru	  and	  Venezuela,	  and	  the	  plantation	  economy	  of	  Cuba.	  
1945	  brought	  sweeping	  change	  to	  Lima	  (Haworth,	  1992,	  p.	  177).	  The	  government	  
of	   Manuel	   Prado	   y	   Ugarteche	   was	   challenged	   by	   widespread	   strikes	   against	  
industrial	   working	   conditions.	   Haya	   de	   la	   Torre	   saw	   his	   opportunity	   to	   obtain	  
power	   for	   his	   Aprista	   party	   (Haworth,	   1992,	   p.	   176).	   The	   workers	   demanded	  
fundamental	   reforms,	   yet	   the	   oligarchs	   refused	   them.	   The	   weakness	   of	   Haya’s	  
‘Aprismo,’	  however,	  was	  in	  its	  failure	  to	  form	  cross-­‐class	  alliances	  (Klaren,	  2000,	  p.	  
289).	  While	  Haya	  enjoyed	  cult	  status	  in	  Lima,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Peruvians	  lived	  
outside	  the	  capital.	  In	  those	  areas,	  the	  Liberals	  maintained	  the	  working-­‐class	  vote	  
(Klaren,	   2000,	   pp.	   289-­‐295).	  Accordingly,	   the	   southern	  Liberals,	   led	  by	   José	  Luis	  
Bustamante,	  committed	  to	   fulfilling	  much	  of	   the	  Aprista	  program	  in	  exchange	   for	  
the	  presidential	  nomination.	  Unfortunately	  for	  those	  who	  “saw	  [APRA]	  as	  a	  vehicle	  
for	   anti-­‐Imperialism,	   agrarian	   reform	   and	   economic	   planning,”	   Haya’s	   political	  
difficulties	  meant	  that	  APRA	  did	  not	  “initiate	  any	  such	  program”	  during	  this	  period	  
(Betrum,	  1995,	  p.	  427).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  A	  mere	  1.6	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  voted	  in	  1944.	  This	  indicates	  the	  
exclusionary	  nature	  of	  Guatemalan	  oligarchic	  politics.	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Tyrants	   throughout	   the	   twentieth	   century	   had	   ruled	   Venezuela.	   Political	  
unrest	   in	   Caracas	   culminated	   in	   an	   AD-­‐initiated	   coup	   d’état	   that	   led	   to	   general	  
elections	  in	  1946	  (Ellner,	  1992,	  p.	  147).	  The	  AD	  leader,	  Betancourt,	  prioritised	  the	  
renegotiation	  of	  oil	  profits	  to	  fulfil	  his	  social	  agenda.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  heavy	  popular	  
pressure,	   the	  Hydrocarbon	  Act,	  which	  ensured	  Venezuela	  half	  of	  oil	   ‘profits,’	  was	  
initiated	   in	   1943.	   Betancourt	   and	   his	   successor,	   Rómulo	   Gallegos,	   established	   a	  
national	   oil	   company,	   which	   would	   eventually	   lead	   to	   the	   expropriation	   of	   the	  
industry	  (Bucheli	  and	  Aguilera,	  2010,	  p.	  365).	   In	  Cuba,	  after	  a	  decade	  of	  Batista’s	  
rule,60	  the	  tyrant	  was	  defeated	  in	  free	  elections	  by	  the	  Auténtico	  candidate	  Ramón	  
Grau	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  16).	  The	  return	  to	  civilian	  rule	  was	  directly	  motivated	  
by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter.	  While	  the	  Auténticos	  possessed	  an	  idealistic	  
social	   policy,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   plantation	   economy	   limited	   their	   success	   during	  
their	  eight-­‐year	  rule	   (Ameringer,	  2000,	  pp.	  25-­‐60).	  Civilian	  rule	  was	  returning	   to	  
the	  region.	  
Latin	   America’s	   social	   democrats	   shared	   a	   vision	   for	   Latin	   America.	   They	  
also	   shared	   a	   collective	  disdain	   for	   the	   region’s	  military	  dictators.	  Together	   they	  
formed	  a	  regional	  alliance,	  known	  as	  the	  Caribbean	  Legion,	  in	  1947.	  The	  US	  State	  
Department	   described	   the	   legion	   as	   “one	   of	   the	   principal	   causes	   of	   unrest	   and	  
instability	   in	   the	   Caribbean”	   (Gleijes,	   1989,	   p.	   134).	   The	   Caribbean	   Legion	   was	  
composed	   of	   former	   and	   current	   political	   exiles	   of	   the	   Caribbean	   dictatorships.	  
Among	  its	  members	  were:	  Presidents	  Arévalo	  and	  Betancourt;	  politicians	  Haya	  de	  
le	   Torre	   and	   Gaitán;	   and	   rebel	   exiles	   including	   José	   Figueres	   and	   Juan	   Bosch	  
(Gleijes,	   1989,	   p.	   135).	   The	   Legion	   was	   not	   a	   formal	   political	   bloc	   of	   nations.	  
Rather,	   it	  was	   an	   alliance	   against	   fascism	   in	  Latin	  America,	   intended	   to	   fulfil	   the	  
Atlantic	   Charter	   of	   the	   late	   President	   Roosevelt.	   By	   1947,	   democracy	   was	  
spreading	  throughout	  the	  Caribbean.	  Two	  long-­‐term	  regimes,	  however,	  stood	  firm	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  change.	  The	  Nicaraguan	  Somoza	  and	  the	  Dominican	  Trujillo	  regimes	  
were	   targeted.	   Arévalo	   funded	   the	   failed	   invasion	   of	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	   in	  
1947,61	  among	   other	   ambitious	   attempts	   to	   restore	   self-­‐determination	   (Gleijes,	  
1989,	  p.	  142).	  He	  gave	  supplied	  arms,	  purchased	  from	  Argentina’s	   Juan	  Perón,	   to	  
both	  Nicaraguan	   and	  Dominican	   exiles	   (Gleijes,	   1989,	   p.	   142).	  While	   these	   raids	  
were	   thwarted	  by	   the	  military,	   in	  Costa	  Rica	   a	   small	   force,	   led	  by	  Figueres,	   took	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Four	  of	  which	  (1940-­‐1944)	  were	  constitutional.	  
61	  A	  young	  Fidel	  Castro	  was	  among	  the	  volunteers	  for	  the	  Dominican	  invasion.	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power	  from	  the	  oligarchic	  government	  (Cruz,	  1992,	  p.	  297).	  Figueres	  pragmatically	  
left	  the	  Legion	  once	  in	  power,	  yielding	  to	  US	  demands	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  65).	  	  	  
From	   1944	   until	   1948	   social	   democracy	   flourished	   throughout	   the	  
Caribbean	  Basin.	  The	  governments	  of	  Guatemala,	  Cuba,	  Costa	  Rica,	  Venezuela	  and	  
Peru	  were	   fundamentally	   changed.	  Additionally,	   ideals	   of	   social	   democracy	  were	  
evident	   within	   the	   intellectual	   circles	   of	   El	   Salvador,	   Honduras,	   the	   Dominican	  
Republic	  and	  Colombia.	  These	  social	  democratic	  ‘revolutions’	  and	  ‘evolutions’	  were	  
far	   less	   radical	   than	   either	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   of	   1910-­‐1920	   or	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	  of	  1959.	  However,	  its	  leaders	  were	  pragmatically	  committed	  to	  reform.	  
They	   were	   capitalists	   who	   supported	   most	   forms	   of	   private	   property.62	  They	  
sought	   to	  use	   their	  nation’s	  resources	   to	   fulfil	   the	  necessary	  social	  and	  economic	  
programs	  promised	  to	  their	  respective	  citizens.	  Yet	  these	  leaders	  inherited	  nations	  
that	   were	   severely	   underdeveloped.	   While	   the	   Venezuelan	   oil	   seizures	   could	  
potentially	  provide	  the	  necessary	  capital	  to	  fund	  development,	  the	  other	  nations	  of	  
the	  region	  did	  not	  have	  that	  luxury	  (Bucheli	  and	  Aguilar,	  2010,	  p.	  366).	  For	  those	  
nations,	  their	  only	  significant	  resources	  were	  land	  and	  labour,	  and	  they	  sought	  to	  
fully	   utilise	   both.	   Across	   the	   region,	   an	   emphasis	   was	   placed	   on	   education,	  
healthcare,	   social	   security	   and	   employment	   opportunities	   (Stein,	   1980,	   p.	   162;	  
Alexander,	  1982,	  p.	  235;	  Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  33).	  They	  sought	  to	  bring	  more	  of	  the	  
campesinos	  into	  productive	  economic	  activities.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  campesinos,	  
however,	   this	   meant	   additional	   agricultural	   labour.	   By	   producing	   food	   on	  
expropriated	   government	   land,	   their	   dependency	   would	   diminish.	   For	   the	  
industrial	   labourers,	   it	   meant	   more	   employment	   in	   ISI	   production	   and	   higher	  
remuneration	   for	   their	   labour	   (Drake,	   1989,	   p.	   75).	   By	   reducing	   the	   need	   for	  
imports	   and	   regulating	   foreign	   capital,	   many	   of	   these	   new	   democratic	  
governments	   sought	   to	   slowly	   develop	   their	   internal	   economies.	   These	   actions	  
were	  not	  radical,	  but	  rather	  pragmatic	  steps	  to	  improve	  the	  lives	  of	  their	  citizens.	  
	  
Bradenism	  
These	  shifts	  towards	  democracy	  were	  made	  possible	  because	  the	  US	  State	  
Department’s	  approach	  had	  evolved	  during	  WWII.	  The	  resignation	  of	  Cordell	  Hull	  
in	  1944	  led	  to	  the	  appointment	  of	  George	  Stettinius	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (Gellman,	  
1995,	   p.	   372).	   Additionally,	   purges	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   division	   of	   the	   State	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Opposition	  to	  private	  property	  primarily	  targeted	  ‘monopoly	  capital.’	  The	  obvious	  examples	  are	  
foreign	  resource	  ownership	  and	  wasteful	  land	  monopolization.	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Department	   during	  WWII	   led	   to	   the	   replacement	   of	   Sumner	  Welles	  with	  Nelson	  
Rockefeller	   (Gellman,	   1995,	   p.	   372).	   Diplomats	   with	   little	   Latin	   American	  
experience	   filled	   the	   division.	   Of	   especial	   significance	   was	   the	   appointment	   of	  
Spruille	   Braden.	   As	   Ambassador	   to	   Argentina	   in	   1945	   he	   waged	   a	   political	   war	  
against	  the	  national	  revolution	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  “Peronism”	  (Braden,	  1971,	  p.	  
316).	   Braden	   (1971)	   considered	   its	   government	   as	   “pro	   Nazi”	   (p.	   316).	   While	  
‘Bradenism’	   is	   often	   the	   focus	   of	   anti-­‐US	   critique,	   it	  was	   in	   fact	   a	   brief	   historical	  
period	  in	  which	  democratic	  action	  was	  favoured	  over	  dictatorships,	  as	  fascism	  was	  
considered	   the	   greatest	   threat	   to	   American	   regional	   interests.	   According	   to	  
Ameringer	  (1996),	  “Braden	  was	  a	  firm	  believer	  in	  positive	  action	  to	  attain	  the	  goal	  
of	   democracy	   in	   the	   Americas”	   (p.	   11).	   The	   US	   adhered	   to	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   its	  
Atlantic	  Charter	  and	  the	  Four	  Freedoms	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  fascist	  influence	  under	  
Braden.	   To	   secure	   the	   global	   moral	   leadership	   that	   it	   desired,63 	  Washington	  
accepted	   and	  often	   supported	   the	   spontaneous	  democratic	   revolutions	   emerging	  
in	   Latin	   America.	   It	   also	   had	   to	   promote	   its	   alliance	   with	   the	   USSR	   with	  
communists	   given	   additional	   freedoms,	   and	   diplomatic	   ties	   between	   Latin	  
American	  states	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  were	  promoted	  (Cabellero,	  1986,	  pp.	  138).	  
From	  1941-­‐1945	  Hitler	  was	  the	  enemy;	  the	  US	  was	  at	  war	  with	  fascism.	  While	  the	  
US	   made	   no	   effort	   to	   remove	   the	   extreme	   right-­‐wing	   dictatorships	   in	   the	  
Dominican	  Republic	  or	  Nicaragua,	  it	  did	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  undermine	  its	  two	  
largest	  economic	  obstacles	  in	  Getúlio	  Vargas	  and	  Juan	  Domingo	  Perón.	  Bradenism	  
sought	   to	   install	   democratic	   and	   free-­‐market	   values	   to	   Latin	   America	   without	  
relying	  directly	  on	  military	  force.	  These	  same	  two	  leaders	  were	  targeted	  a	  decade	  
later	   for	   their	   perceived	   ‘communism’	   demonstrating	   the	   fluidity	   of	   American	  
propaganda	  and	  the	  continuity	  of	  its	  actual	  objectives.	  	  
Argentina	   remained	  neutral	  during	  WWII.	   Its	  dependence	  upon	  grain	   and	  
meat	  exports	  to	  Europe	  meant	  that	  a	  declaration	  of	  support	  for	  either	  side	  would	  
significantly	   damage	   its	   domestic	   economy	   (Tulchin,	   1989,	   p.	   35).	   Argentina	  
exported	  significant	  amounts	  of	  goods	  to	  Britain,	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  throughout	  most	  
of	  the	  war.	  It	  also	  feared	  for	  its	  security	  under	  wartime	  conditions	  (Francis,	  1979,	  
p.	  108);	  Argentina’s	  relative	  isolation	  to	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  hemisphere	  made	  it	  
an	  obvious	  target	  for	  Nazi	  aggression	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  an	  Argentine	  declaration	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of	  war.64	  In	  October	  1943,	  the	  conservative	  military	  dictatorship	  of	  Ramón	  Castillo	  
was	   replaced	   by	   the	   nationalist	   military	   dictatorships	   of	   Pedro	   Ramírez	   and	  
Edelmiro	  Farrell	   (Rock,	  1986,	  p.	  251).	  The	  nationalists	  were	  extremely	  hostile	   to	  
foreign	   influence,	   and	   openly	   supported	   semi-­‐fascist	   policies	   of	   corporatism	   and	  
populism	   (Rapoport,	   1992,	   pp.	   107-­‐110).	   From	   within	   this	   group	   of	   nationalist	  
military	   leaders,	   Perón	   emerged	   as	   a	   populist	   force	   from	   within	   the	   military	  
(Horowitz,	   1999,	   p.	   29).	   As	   Secretariat	   for	   Labour	   and	  Welfare,	   Perón	   sought	   to	  
drastically	   improve	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   lower	   classes	   (Horowitz,	   1999,	   p.	   29).	   Perón	  
was	  not	  however	  a	  humanitarian;	  rather,	  he	  was	  a	  populist	  and	  a	  pragmatist.	  He	  
gave	  concessions	  to	  win	  support.	  By	  doing	  so,	  however,	  his	  nationalist	  government	  
made	  powerful	  enemies	  within	   the	  oligarchic	  and	  manufacturing	  classes	   through	  
their	  taxation	  and	  tariff	  policies	  (Rapoport,	  1992,	  p.	  114).	  Perón	  sought	  protection	  
from	  the	  industrial	  unions.	  In	  order	  to	  court	  the	  working	  class,	  Farrell	  and	  Perón	  
offered:	  a	  20	  per	  cent	  reduction	  in	  rural	  rents;	  lower	  tram	  fares;	  nationalised	  vital	  
services;	  and	  nationalised	  grain	  production	   to	  reduce	   food	  prices	   (Rock,	  1986,	  p.	  
250).	  Perón	  emerged	  as	  the	  popular	  choice	  to	  lead	  Argentina	  in	  1946.	  
Brazil	  was	   the	  most	   important	  nation	   for	  US	  security	  policy	  during	  WWII.	  
The	  US	   focussed	  on	  an	  alliance	  with	  Brazil	   committed	   to	  hemispheric	  defence	   in	  
1940-­‐41.	   Its	   leader,	  Getúlio	  Vargas	  had	  staged	  the	   ‘Revolution	  of	  1930	  and	  was	  a	  
military	  strongman	  who	  persecuted	  opponents	  (Levine,	  1970,	  p.	  5).	  For	  example,	  
in	   1935	   Vargas	   destroyed	   Brazilian	   communism	   and	   the	   arrested	   its	   leader,	  
Prestes	   (Bethel,	  1992,	  p.	  37).	  The	   ‘Estado	  Novo’	  demanded	  absolute	  control	  over	  
capital,	   labour	   and	   the	   political	   process	   (Conniff,	   1999b,	   47).	   Vargas	   was	   also	  
heavily	   influenced	   by	   progressive	   economists,	   such	   as	   Aranha,	   who	   revived	   the	  
Brazilian	   economy	   through	   industrial	   development,	   the	   restructure	   of	   Brazilian	  
debt	   and	   regulatory	   controls	   (Bethel,	   1992,	   p.	   39;	   Dulles,	   1967,	   p.	   210).	   Vargas	  
believed:	  	  
A	   balanced	   economy	   no	   longer	   allow[ed]	   privileged	   classes	   to	   enjoy	   a	  
monopoly	  of	  comfort	  and	  benefit…The	  state,	   therefore,	  should	  assume	  the	  
obligation	   of	   organising	   the	   productive	   forces,	   to	   provide	   people	  with	   all	  
that	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  collective	  welfare	  (in	  Dulles,	  1967,	  2010,	  p.	  138).	  
While	  US	   business	   interests	   opposed	  Vargas’	   planned	   economic	   system,	   in	   1941	  
the	   approaching	   war	   relegated	   economic	   concerns	   to	   the	   margins.	   The	   German	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  This	  factor	  also	  accounted	  for	  Chilean	  neutrality	  until	  US	  victories	  in	  the	  Pacific	  ensured	  its	  safety	  
in	  1943.	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threat,	   Vargas	   asserted,	   would	   challenge	   the	   industrial	   capacity	   of	   the	   Western	  
Hemisphere.	  Vargas	  gave	  his	  full	  military	  support	  to	  the	  Allies	  in	  exchange	  for	  an	  
EXIM	  loan	  of	  US$45	  million,	   to	  construct	  heavy	   industry	  (Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  187).	  
The	   ability	   to	   produce	   steel	   independently65	  allowed	   Vargas	   to	   accelerate	   his	  
program	   of	   internal	   industrialisation,	   limiting	   its	   dependence	   upon	   foreign	  
imports.	  This	   industrialisation	  was	  also	  popular	  with	   the	  Brazilian	  working	  class	  
(Conniff,	   1999a,	   p.	   49).	   Vargas	   posed	   a	   similar	   economic	   threat	   to	   US	   trade	   and	  
investment	  as	  Perón;	  however,	  Brazil	  was	  an	  important	  WWII	  ally	  and	  treated	  as	  
such.	  
Bradenism	  sought	  to	  remove	  the	  dictatorships	  of	  Argentina	  and	  Brazil.	  The	  
US	   falsely	   believed	   that	   democratic	   governments	   would	   be	   more	   pliable	   with	  
regards	   to	   trade,	   investment	   and	   diplomacy.	   In	   1945-­‐46	   the	   enemy	   was	   still	  
fascism.	  As	  such,	  these	  two	  governments	  required	  special	  attention.	  In	  Argentina,	  
Peron’s	  social	  policies	  had	  made	  him	  extremely	  popular	  amongst	  the	  working	  class	  
(Rapoport,	   1992,	   p.	   109).	   However,	   a	   coalition	   of	   forces	   was	   seeking	   to	   work	  
against	   the	   former	  military	   general	   and	   elections	  were	   called	   for	   February	  1946	  
(Rapoport,	   1992,	   p.	   116).	   The	   coalition	   of	   conservatives,	   liberals,	   radicals	   and	  
communists	  possessed	  ample	  resources	  to	  destroy	  Perón’s	  image	  (Dorm,	  2006,	  p.	  
63).	  Perón	  was	  not	  expected	  to	  win	  in	  1946	  as	  all	  of	  the	  major	  parties	  opposed	  his	  
leadership	   (Horowitz,	   1999,	   p	   33).	   Political	   sabotage	   of	   Perón’s	   policies	   was	  
prevalent	   in	   the	   lead	   up	   to	   the	   election.	   Seeing	   an	   opportunity	   to	   remove	  
nationalist	  rule,	  Truman	  sent	  Braden	  to	  Buenos	  Aires	  in	  late	  1945	  (Dorm,	  2006,	  p.	  
63).	  Braden,	  a	  man	  described	  by	  Dean	  Acheson	  as	  “the	  only	  bull	  to	  carry	  his	  own	  
China	  shop,”	  brought	   together	   the	  coalition	  and	   issued	  a	  propaganda	   ‘Blue	  Book’	  
designed	  to	  decrease	  Perón’s	  popularity	  (G.	  Smith,	  1994,	  p.	  57;	  Dorm,	  2006,	  p.	  63).	  
However,	  when	  the	  Argentinean	  people	  discovered	  this,	  the	  election	  was	  perceived	  
as	  Perón	  versus	  Braden.	  The	  emerging	  Partido	  Laborista,	  which	  was	  modelled	  on	  
the	  British	  Labor	  Party,	  and	  held	  similarities	  to	  the	  social	  democratic	  parties	  in	  the	  
Caribbean,	   supported	   Perón,	   envisaging	   the	   type	   of	   social	   change	   witnessed	   in	  
Western	  Europe	  (Horowitz,	  1999,	  p.	  33).	  This	  support	  was	  crucial	  to	  Perón	  as	  he	  
went	   on	   to	   win	   the	   election	   and	   in	   the	   following	   years	   developed	   an	   anti-­‐US	  
economic	  policy.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  Brazil	  is	  a	  large	  iron	  ore	  producer.	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At	  the	  end	  of	  WWII,	  Vargas	  prepared	  for	  democratic	  elections	  in	  Brazil.	  He	  
had	   continued	   his	   rule	   unconstitutionally	   throughout	   WWII	   by	   claiming	  
emergency	  wartime	  measures	   (Bethel,	   1992,	   p.	   43).	  However,	   by	   early	  1944	   the	  
calls	   for	   his	   removal	   became	   louder	   within	   Brazil.	   In	   April	   1944	   the	   NY	   Times	  
announced	  “Vargas	  Promises	  Brazil	  Democracy”	  (García,	  1944).	  This	  was	  done	  for	  
a	  local	  and	  international	  audience,	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  had	  grown	  weary	  of	  
this	  promise.	  During	  1944	  an	  alliance	  of	  significant	  politicians	  emerged	  demanding	  
elections	   in	  Brazil.	  They	  included	  old	  oligarchic	  elements,	  as	  well	  as	  progressives	  
such	  as	  Aranha	  (Bethell,	  1992,	  p.	  45).	  In	  January	  1945	  Adolf	  A.	  Berle,	  a	  new	  dealer	  
close	  to	  the	  Roosevelt	  administration,	  was	  sent	  to	  Brazil	  to	  oversee	  the	  democratic	  
transition	   (Dulles,	   1967,	   p.	   257).	   Like	   Braden,	   Berle	   met	   with	   opponents	   of	   the	  
Vargas	  regime,	  including	  communists,	  on	  several	  occasions	  (Dulles,	  1967,	  p.	  257).	  
Vargas	  also	  softened	  his	  approach	  to	  ‘subversives’	  such	  as	  the	  communist	  Prestes	  
(Bethell,	  1992,	  p.	  47).	  Following	  his	  release	  from	  prison,	  Prestes	  and	  Berle	  met	  on	  
several	  occasions	  to	  discuss	  the	  elections.	  Prestes	  believed	  he	  had	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  
working	   class;	   during	   1945,	   however,	   it	   became	   apparent	   that	   Vargas	   was	   still	  
influential	  (Aguilar,	  1968,	  p.	  34).	  The	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  the	  1945	  elections	  were	  
the	   Social	   Democratic	   Party	   (PSD),	  who	   promoted	   Eurico	   Gaspar	   Dutra,	   and	   the	  
National	  Democratic	  Union	   (UDN)	   (Bethell,	   1992,	  p.	   44).	  Vargas	   endorsed	  Dutra,	  
who	  won	  easily.	  Dutra	  committed	  to	  following	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  policies	  of	  
Vargas,	   in	   addition	   to	   restoring	   democratic	   values	   and	   civility	   (Dulles,	   1967,	   p.	  
261).	  In	  practice,	  however,	  Dutra	  drew	  closer	  to	  the	  US	  as	  he	  closed	  the	  Brazilian	  
National	   Coffee	   Department	   in	   addition	   to	   opening	   up	   Brazil	   to	   free	   American	  
trade	   (Bethel,	   1992,	   p.	   63).	  His	   commitment	   to	   labour	  was	   undermined	   by	   poor	  
economic	   conditions,	   which	   impacted	   his	   presidency.	   Moreover,	   ‘Bradenism’	  
worked	   in	   Brazil.	   The	   US	   committed	   to	   a	   democratic	   government	   who	   in	  
reciprocation	   adhered	   to	   its	   demands.	   However,	   the	   unregulated	   push	   towards	  
democracy	  throughout	  the	  region	  meant	  this	  political	  policy	  was	  terminated	  after	  
1946.	  
	  
A	  Democratic	  Latin	  America	  
Democracy	  came	  to	  Latin	  America	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  
label	   disparate	   movements	   under	   a	   single	   category.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   period	  
between	  1944	  and	  1948	  saw	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  self-­‐determination	  throughout	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Latin	   America.	   This	   in	   turn	   resulted	   in	   the	   increased	   importance	   of	   mass	  
participation	   in	   politics	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   region’s	   history.	   The	   two	   main	  
factors	   driving	   the	   push	   towards	   democracy	   in	   Latin	   America	   were	   social	  
democracy	   and	   the	   populism	   of	   the	   ex-­‐caudillos,	   with	   the	   support	   of	   social	  
democratic	   groups.	   The	   social	   democrats	   originated	   from	   the	   upper	   and	  middle	  
classes	   of	   society.	   They	   were	   intellectuals	   who	   sought	   to	   use	   the	   idealism	   of	  
democracy	  and	  liberalism	  to	  improve	  their	  nation-­‐states.	  The	  key	  tenets	  of	  social	  
democracy	  were	  nationalism,	  political	  and	  economic	  sovereignty,	  anti-­‐imperialism,	  
moderate	   economic	   development,	   labour	   reform,	   land	   reform	   and	   social	  
development	   through	   education,	   healthcare	   and	   social	   security.	   These	   policies	  
were	  a	  direct	   response	   to	   their	   support	  base	   amongst	   the	   rural	   and	  urban	  poor.	  
This	   strategy	   was	   developed	   during	   the	   Mexican	   Revolution	   and	   expanded	   in	  
Guatemala,	  Cuba,	  Venezuela,	  Peru,	  and	  Costa	  Rica	  during	  this	  period.	  The	  policies	  
of	   military	   populism	   appeared	   similar	   to	   social	   democracy	   as	   manifested	   in	  
Argentina	   and	  Brazil.	   However,	   their	   direct	   application	  was	   vastly	   different.	   The	  
populists	   drew	   their	   support	   from	   the	   rural	   and	   urban	   poor	   by	   making	   token	  
gestures	  to	  those	  classes;	  it	  was	  done,	  however,	  for	  political	  survival	  rather	  than	  as	  
an	  ideological	  mission.	  While	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  masses	  improved,	  it	  came	  at	  a	  cost.	  In	  
1944,	  only	  Mexico,	  Chile,	  Uruguay,	  Colombia	  and	  Costa	  Rica	   could	   reasonably	  be	  
considered	   democratic.	   In	   four	   short	   years	   the	   nations	   of	   Cuba,	   Guatemala,	  
Venezuela,	   Ecuador,	   Peru,	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   extended	   suffrage,	   fulfilling	   one	  
part	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter.	  In	  these	  nations	  the	  Latin	  Americans	  
took	  ‘their	  share’	  of	  the	  freedoms	  won	  through	  their	  participation	  in	  WWII.	  	  
This	   ‘share’	   came	  at	   the	   expense	  of	  US	   trade	  and	   investment.	   It	   remained	  
unclear,	   after	   his	   death	   in	   April	   1945,	   what	   Franklin	   Roosevelt	   meant	   by	   Latin	  
America’s	   post-­‐war	   ‘share’	   (Jenkins,	   2003,	   p.	   166).	   However,	   given	   the	   political	  
economy	  of	  the	  region,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  a	  ‘Marshall	  Plan’	  style	  proposal	  was	  ever	  
considered.	   It	   is	   more	   likely	   that	   Roosevelt	   was	   promising	   political	   and	   social	  
parity	   to	   the	  developed	  world,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  position	  of	  Berle	  and	  Braden.	  
Regardless	   of	   Roosevelt’s	   intentions	   through	   this	   statement,	   Latin	   America	  
interpreted	   its	   share	   as	   evident	   within	   both	   the	   Atlantic	   Charter	   and	   Four	  
Freedoms.	   Hence,	   it	  was	   assumed	   that	   the	   US	  would	   give	   continuing	   support	   to	  
Latin	   American	   democracy	   at	   all	   costs.	   Yet	   Latin	   American	   democracy	   was	  
detrimental	   to	  US	   trade	  and	   investment	   in	   the	   region	   in	  numerous	  ways.	  Firstly,	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the	   generation	   of	   Latin	   American	   social	   democrats	   and	   military	   populists	   that	  
emerged	   during	   1944-­‐1948	   espoused	   economic	   development	   and	   sovereignty	  
from	   foreign	   powers	   and	   corporations.	   Autonomy	   over	   natural	   resources	  
threatened	  US	   control	   of	   Latin	   American	   resources,	   as	  well	   as	   corporate	   profits.	  
Secondly,	   the	   commitment	   to	  organised	   labour	   threatened	   the	  profitability	  of	  US	  
corporations	   producing	   mineral,	   agricultural	   and	   manufacturing	   goods	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   For	   example,	   the	   Guatemalan	   Labour	   Code	   of	   1947	   established	   a	  
minimum	  wage	   four	   times	  higher	   than	   that	   paid	  by	   the	  UFCo,	   to	   ensure	   a	   living	  
wage	  for	  peasants.	  Finally,	  land	  reform	  threatened	  the	  dependency	  of	  monoculture	  
economies.	   Land	   reform,	   as	   executed	   in	   Mexico	   during	   the	   1930s,	   posed	   a	  
significant	   threat	   to	   US	   food	   exports	   throughout	   Latin	   America.	   Moreover,	   this	  
democratic	   revolution	   challenged	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   US	   and	   Latin	  
America.	  
The	  US	  was	  handicapped	  by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter.	  It	  could	  not	  
oppose	   democratic	   regimes	   in	   Latin	   America	   with	   landmark	   diplomatic	  
agreements	  approaching	  in	  1947-­‐1948.66	  However	  Latin	  American	  democracy	  was	  
seen	   to	  be	   a	   serious	   impediment	   to	  US	  objectives	   in	   the	   region.	  These	   goals	  had	  
been	  set	  out	  in	  1904	  by	  Theodore	  Roosevelt,	  were	  reiterated	  by	  George	  Kennan	  in	  
1950	   and	   continued	   to	   operate	   into	   the	   modern	   era.	   The	   US	   demanded	   the	  
monopolisation	   of	   Latin	   American	   resources	   and	   markets	   and	   sought	   impose	  
political	   and	   military	   influence	   to	   achieve	   these	   goals.	   Latin	   America	   was	   an	  
important	   region	   to	   the	   US	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   global	   economy,	   but	   it	   could	   not	  
achieve	   its	   full	   objectives	   whilst	   within	   the	   US	   sphere	   of	   influence.	   Agricultural	  
independence	   and	   industrialisation	   required	   the	   protection	   of	   markets	   from	  
foreign	   influence.	   The	   independence	   of	   Latin	   America	   required	   the	   domestic	  
control	   of	   the	   region’s	   resources,	   including	   oil.	   Sovereignty	   required	   insulation	  
from	  foreign	  influence.	  Most	  significantly,	  democracy	  meant	  a	  fundamental	  change	  
in	   the	   social,	   political,	   economic	  and	  cultural	   life	  of	  Latin	  America.	  The	  period	  of	  
1944-­‐1948	   was	   an	   impasse	   in	   Latin	   American	   political	   history.	   This	   impasse	  
directly	   affected	   the	   US’	   political,	   economic	   and	   military	   future	   in	   the	   region.	  
George	  Marshall	  travelled	  to	  Bogotá	  in	  March	  1948	  but	  these	  problems	  remained	  
unresolved	   (Randall,	   1979,	   p.	   188).	   In	   1948,	   the	   direction	   of	   US	   policy	   towards	  
Latin	  America	  was	  unclear.	  With	  an	  undefined	  enemy	  Washington	  could	  not	  wage	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  These	  diplomatic	  agreements	  included	  the	  1947	  Rio	  Pact	  and	  the	  1948	  creation	  of	  the	  
Organisation	  of	  American	  States	  (G.	  Smith,	  1994,	  pp.	  61-­‐69).	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a	  war	   against	   a	   Latin	  American	   region	   simply	   taking	   its	   share	   of	  wartime	   spoils	  
through	   democratic	   revolution	   and	   independent	   economic	   policies.	   However,	  
during	  1947	  and	  1948	  the	  communist	  enemy	  was	  to	  become	  clearly	  defined.	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Defining	   the	   Enemy:	   Colombia’s	   Bogotázo	   and	   the	   Pan-­‐
American	  Alliance	  
This	  thesis	  has	  thus	  far	  demonstrated	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  ‘Cold	  War’	  between	  Latin	  
America’s	   social	   progressives	   and	   US	   global	   policy.	  While	   distinct	   patterns	   have	  
defined	   periods	   of	   this	   struggle,	   they	   were	   until	   1948	   bilateral	   rather	   than	  
multilateral.	   In	   1948	   this	   situation	   changed.	   The	   assassinations	   of	   Jorge	   Eliécer	  
Gaitán,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   Bogotázo,	   brought	   a	   new	   definable	   enemy	   to	   Latin	  
America	   in	   the	   form	  of	   communism	   (Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   134).	  US	   Secretary	   of	   State	  
George	  Marshall’s	  calculated	  creation	  of	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  
the	   Bogotázo,	   lent	   credibility	   to	   the	   next	   two	   decades	   of	   communist	  
characterisation.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Marshall	  changed	  the	  nature,	  and	  eventual	  outcome,	  
of	  the	  longstanding	  ‘Cold	  War’	  between	  Latin	  America’s	  social	  classes.	  This	  chapter	  
will	  begin	  by	  examining	  the	  communist	  movement,	  as	  it	  existed	  in	  the	  mid-­‐	  to	  late-­‐
1940s.	  This	  will	  demonstrate	   the	  minimal	  Soviet	   ‘threat’	   to	  Latin	  America.	   It	  will	  
also	   explain	   the	   initiation	   of	   the	   global	   Cold	  War	   between	   the	  US	   and	  USSR	   and	  
Latin	  America’s	   role	  within	   that	   struggle.	   The	   chapter	  will	   re-­‐examine	   the	   cause	  
and	   consequences	   of	   Gaitán’s	   death	   and	   Marshall’s	   anti-­‐communist	   accusations.	  
Accordingly,	  it	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  events	  of	  April	  1948	  altered	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
Latin	   American	   ‘Cold	   War.’	   Finally,	   this	   chapter	   will	   also	   demonstrate	   the	  
connection	   between	  Marshall’s	   actions	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Democratic	   events	   of	   1948-­‐
1952.	  
	  
Enemies	  of	  the	  State	  
The	   wartime	   collaboration	   between	   the	   USSR	   and	   the	   US	   increased	   the	  
prestige	   of	   global	   communism.	   The	  May	   1943	   dissolution	   of	   the	   Comintern	  was	  
seen	  as	  an	  abandonment	  of	  the	  Soviet	  policy	  of	  world	  revolution	  (Caballero,	  1986,	  
p.	   146).	   While	   the	   US	   believed	   “connections	   are	   generally…[existent]	   between	  
Soviet	   diplomatic	   missions	   and	   local	   communist	   groups,”	   the	   US	   encouraged	  
diplomatic	   ties	   as	   a	   demonstration	   of	   wartime	   unity	   (Gaddis,	   1972,	   pp.	   51-­‐52).	  
Fulgencio	  Batista	  was	  encouraged	  to	  include	  Cuban	  communists	  in	  his	  government	  
as	   further	   evidence	   of	   acceptance	   of	   diplomatic	   ties	   with	   the	   USSR	   (Ameringer,	  
2000,	  p.	  13).	  Several	  free	  Latin	  American	  political	  parties	  were	  established	  in	  this	  
period,	   allowing	   the	   establishment	   of	   regional	   communism.	   US	   policy	   did	   not	  
immediately	   change	   at	   the	   conclusion	   of	   hostilities	   in	   1945.	   The	  US	   communists	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continued	  to	  operate	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Earl	  Browder	  (Ryan,	  1997,	  pp.	  232-­‐
238).	  Browder	  utilised	   the	   temporary	  US-­‐USSR	  and	  his	   support	   of	   the	  Roosevelt	  
administration	  and	  raise	  the	  prestige	  of	  communism.	  Between	  1944	  and	  1945,	  the	  
peak	  membership	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  USA	  (CPUSA)	  was	  100,000	  (Ryan,	  
1997,	   p.	   2).	   This	   pragmatism	   was	   increasingly	   influential	   for	   Latin	   American	  
communists,	   who	   often	   followed	   the	   lead	   of	   Browder	   (Ryan,	   1997,	   p.	   186).	   The	  
Latin	  American	  communists	  supported	  the	  Allied	  campaign	  against	  the	  Axis.	  This	  
was	  because	  it	  served	  their	  “loyalty”	  to	  the	  USSR	  (Ryan,	  1997,	  p.	  186.)	  This	  led	  to	  a	  
temporary	   détente	   in	   which	   the	   US	   did	   not	   actively	   prevent	   Latin	   American	  
communism	  between	   1945	   and	   1947.	   Its	   larger	   challenge	  was	   its	   relations	  with	  
the	   new	   democratic	   governments	   who	   sought	   to	   realign	   their	   dependent	  
relationships	   to	  Washington,	  which	  was	   isolated	   from	  anti-­‐communism	  until	   the	  
late	  1940s.	  The	  number	  of	  communists	  increased	  from	  100,000	  to	  approximately	  
400,000	   between	   1940	   and	   1947	   (P.	   Smith,	   2000,	   p.	   128).	   This	  must	   be	   kept	   in	  
context,	  however.	  The	  approximate	  population	  of	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  
was	  180,000,000	  (Brea,	  2003,	  p.	  6).	  Communists	  represented	  0.22	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  
Latin	  American	  population	  at	  their	  peak.	  While	  they	  were	  not	  an	  immediate	  threat	  
to	   US	   interests	   in	   Latin	   America,	   they	  were	   numerically	   large	   and	   vocally	   loud–
enough	  to	  inspire	  fear	  within	  the	  international	  community.	  
A	   survey	   of	   regional	   communism	   from	   1945	   to	   1948	   demonstrates	   that	  
communism	  did	  exist	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Yet	  its	  impact	  was	  extremely	  limited.	  The	  
most	   significant	   national	   communist	   movement	   was	   in	   Brazil.	   Following	   the	  
release	  of	  Luís	  Carlos	  Prestes	  from	  federal	  prison	  in	  194467,	  the	  communists	  rallied	  
a	   claimed	  membership	   of	   150,000,	   competed	   in	   national	   elections	   and	   offered	   a	  
perceived	   challenge	   to	   the	   populism	   of	   Vargas	   (Poppino,	   1963,	   p.	   135,	   231).	   In	  
Uruguay,	   communists	   worked	   within	   the	   democratic	   system	   to	   some	   success,	  
possessing	   a	   small	   membership	   of	   approximately	   50,000	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   p.	  
131).	   While	   Argentina	   formed	   the	   first	   Communist	   Party	   in	   1919,	   and	   also	  
possessed	  the	  largest	  membership	  during	  the	  1920s,	  membership	  declined	  during	  
the	   1940s	   (Aguilar,	   1968,	   p.	   10).	  While	   lacking	   in	   numbers,	   Chile	   possessed	   the	  
strongest	  regional	  Communist	  Party	  as	  it	  routinely	  commanded	  ten	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  
Chilean	  electoral	  vote	  (Drake,	  1978,	  p.	  178).	  In	  Colombia	  the	  party	  possessed	  less	  
than	   4,000	   members	   (Coleman,	   2008,	   p.	   52).	   The	   divisions	   of	   Venezuelan	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  At	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  American	  diplomat	  Adolph	  Berle.	  
	   112	  
communists	  between	  “red”	  and	  “black”	  leadership	  reduced	  the	  party	  to	  irrelevance	  
during	   the	   brief	   democratic	   period	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   pp.	   262-­‐270).	   The	   Cuban	  
communists	   thrived	   during	   the	   Batista	   period	   as	   their	   membership	   grew	   to	   an	  
estimated	   150,000	   in	   1944	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   p	   285).	  Mexican	   communism	   only	  
had	  13,000	  members	   in	   1946,	  well	   under	   the	   requirements	   to	   form	  an	   electoral	  
political	  party	  (Levy	  and	  Szelky,	  1987,	  p.	  39).	  In	  tiny	  Guatemala,	  fifty	  ‘communists’,	  
including	   exiled	   members	   of	   Arevalo’s	   the	   Revolutionary	   Action	   Party	   (PAR)	  
government	   formed	   the	   Democratic	   Vanguard	   in	   1947	   (LaCharité,	   Kennedy	   and	  
Thienal,	  1964,	  p.	  44).	  This	  evolved	  into	  the	  Guatemalan	  Communist	  Party	  in	  1949,	  
with	  a	  peak	  membership	  of	  4,000	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  (Schneider,	  1955,	  p.	  318).	  The	  
communists	  were	  not	  able	  to	  command	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  Latin	  American	  
society.	  
There	   were	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   that	   inhibited	   the	   expansion	   of	   Latin	  
American	   communism.	   Firstly,	   the	   communists	   were	   directly	   competing	   with	  
populists	   and	   democrats.	   The	   Argentinean	   communists	   worked	   with	   Braden’s	  
Democratic	   Front	   against	   Perón	   in	   1946	   (Dorm,	   2006,	   p.	   63).	   The	   Brazilian	  
communists	   fought	   the	   popular	   appeal	   of	   Vargas’	   Social	   Democratic	   Party	  
(Poppino,	   1963,	   p.	   114).	   Gaitánism	   overwhelmed	   the	   Colombian	   Communists	  
(Green,	  2003,	  p.	  205).	  The	  Venezuelans	  and	  Peruvians	  could	  not	  compete	  with	  AD	  
and	  the	  Apristas	  (Alexander,	  1982,	  pp.	  233-­‐234;	  Graham,	  1992,	  p.	  35).	  The	  Mexican	  
communists	   were	   up	   against	   with	   the	   popular	   revolutionary	   party	   (Alexander,	  
1963,	  pp.	  339-­‐345).	  The	  Guatemalans	  could	  not	  overcome	   the	  appeal	  of	   the	  PAR	  
governments	   of	   Arevalo	   and	  Arbenz	   (Gleijes	   1991,	   p.	   278).	   Communism	  became	  
insignificant	  to	  the	  geopolitical	  climate	  by	  the	  late	  1940s.	  Furthermore,	  the	  fear	  of	  
these	   populists	   led	  many	   communists	   into	   ill-­‐advised	   alliances	  with	   the	   region’s	  
dictators.	   In	  defiance	  of	   the	  1935	  Comintern	  objective	  of	   the	  Popular	  Front	   (PF),	  
the	  Cuban	  communists	  worked	  against	  Ramón	  Grau’s	  Auténticos	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  
p.	  13).	  	  
The	  greatest	  factor,	  however,	  was	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  communists	  to	  identify	  
their	   goals	   with	   those	   of	   the	   industrial	   unions	   and	   the	   illiterate	   campesinos.	  
Communist	   ideology	   meant	   little	   without	   practical	   reforms	   to	   improve	   people’s	  
lives.	  Marx’s	  ideas	  are	  relevant	  within	  a	  European	  context	  while	  their	  relevance	  to	  
Latin	  America	  was	  less	  evident.	  This	  failure	  stems	  from	  the	  class	  origins	  of	  many	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communists	   and	   the	   underdeveloped	   state	   of	  most	   Latin	   American	   economies.68	  
The	   overwhelming	  majority	   of	   communists	   were	   literate,	   which	  made	   them	   the	  
minority	   in	   every	   Latin	  American	   state	   except	  Argentina	   and	  Uruguay	   (Poppino,	  
1963,	   p.	   98).	   The	   core	   leadership	   was	   largely	   university	   trained,	   often	   through	  
foreign	  elite	   institutions	   (Poppino,	  1963,	  p.	  98).	  Moreover,	   the	   communists	  were	  
idealists	   from	   the	   higher	   classes	   of	   society	   who	   did	   not	   grasp	   how	   to	   court	  
membership	  from	  below.	  Many	  did	  not	  see	  this	  as	  necessary	  during	  the	  1940s.	  
In	   certain	   cases	   communists	   followed	   the	   1935	   directive	   and	   formed	  
popular	   fronts.	   These	   were	   democratic	   movements	   that	   raised	   the	   prestige	   of	  
many	  competing	  ideologies.	  The	  best	  example	  of	  a	  Latin	  American	  PF	  government	  
was	   in	  Chile	   from	  1935	  to	  1948.	  This	  governmental	  era	  saw	  an	  alliance	  between	  
communists,	   Socialists	   and	   the	   Radical	   Party,	   who	   were	   the	   dominant	   member	  
(Drake,	   1978,	   p.	   174).	   Each	   of	   the	   PF	   presidents	   came	   from	   the	   Radical	   Party;	  
however	   the	   communists,	   who	   commanded	   approximately	   10	   per	   cent	   of	   the	  
primary	   vote,	  were	   influential	   in	   cabinet	   positions.	   The	  PF	  began	   to	  disintegrate	  
between	   1945	   and	   1948	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   The	   Socialist	   Party	   became	  
fractious,	  which	  significantly	  reduced	  their	  percentage	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  after	  1946	  
brought	   oligarchic	   liberals	   into	   the	   PF	   (Drake,	   1978,	   p.	   273).	   The	   Liberals	  
introduced	   a	   free-­‐trade	   economic	   policy	   that	   hurt	   the	   working	   class.	   Per-­‐capita	  
income	  declined	   in	   this	  period	  as	   the	  Radicals	  became	   increasingly	   conservative,	  
distancing	   themselves	   from	   their	   former	   allies	   (Drake,	   1978,	   p.	   284).	   This	  
alienated	  the	  communists	  from	  their	  ideals.	  The	  municipal	  elections	  of	  1947	  saw	  a	  
rapid	  increase	  in	  the	  popularity	  of	  communism.	  The	  communists	  received	  17	  per	  
cent	   of	   the	   vote	   (Drake,	   1978,	   p.	   287).	   In	   working	   class,	   especially	   mining,	  
electorates,	   this	   was	   much	   higher	   (Drake,	   1978,	   p.	   287).	   The	   popularity	   of	  
communism,	   however,	   caused	   its	   demise	   in	   1948.	   To	   protect	   its	   electoral	   future	  
and	   economic	   philosophy,	   Gabriel	   Videla’s	   Radical	   government	   crushed	  
communism,	   in	   a	  move	   to	   appease	   the	   business	   community	   (Loveman,	   2001,	   p.	  
220).	   The	   success	   of	   electoral	   communism	   demonstrated	   the	   popular	   desire	   for	  
change.	  The	  Socialist	  Party’s	  demise,	  between	  1946	  and	  1950,	   left	   a	   void	   for	   the	  
communists	  to	  fill	  (Drake,	  1978,	  p.	  272).	  Chileans	  demanded	  change,	  but	  were	  less	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  The	  means	  of	  production	  were	  different	  in	  Latin	  America	  to	  that	  of	  Europe.	  While	  this	  did	  not	  
automatically	  reduce	  communism	  to	  irrelevancy,	  it	  posed	  a	  difficult	  challenge.	  The	  Latin	  American	  
communists	  were	  forced	  to	  reinterpret	  European	  Marxism	  to	  fit	  their	  various	  societies.	  Herein	  was	  
the	  challenge	  for	  Latin	  American	  Marxists:	  to	  distinguish	  between	  Marxist	  theory	  and	  the	  actual	  
application	  of	  communism	  in	  Latin	  America.	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concerned	  with	   the	  means	  by	  which	   this	  might	  be	  achieved.	  However,	   the	  Videla	  
government	   ended	   the	   communist	   threat	   in	   1948.	   Moreover,	   the	   demise	   of	   the	  
Popular	  Front	  further	  condemned	  Latin	  American	  communism	  to	  irrelevancy.	  
	  
The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  National	  Security	  State	  
The	   wartime	   collaboration	   between	   the	   US	   and	   the	   USSR	   was	   a	   military	  
success	  (Martel,	  1979,	  pp.	  25-­‐56).	  They	  combined	  to	  defeat	  the	  dual	  threats	  of	  Nazi	  
Germany	   and	   Imperial	   Japan.	   During	   this	   time,	   the	   US	   provided	   substantial	  
assistance	   to	   the	   USSR	   through	   Lend-­‐Lease	   (Martel,	   1979,	   pp.	   25-­‐56).	   However,	  
despite	  their	  coalition,	  a	  coming	  conflict	  was	  evident	  (Kolko,	  1968,	  p.	  485).	  WWII	  
was	   primarily	   a	   struggle	   for	   geopolitical	   influence	   in	  which	   the	   Soviets	   ensured	  
their	   political	   dominance	   throughout	   Eastern	   Europe	   on	   their	   march	   to	   Berlin	  
(Roberts,	   2006,	   pp.	   298-­‐305).	   Those	   nations	   that	   bordered	   Russia	  were	   seen	   as	  
pivotal	   to	   the	   continuation	   of	   Russia’s	   ideological	   experiment	   with	   communism	  
and	   its	   long-­‐term	   security	   (Gorliski	   and	   Khlevniuk,	   2004,	   p.	   70).	   Similarly,	   the	  
Allies	  consolidated	  their	  influence	  in	  the	  Mediterranean	  (Gaddis,	  2005,	  p.	  29).	  The	  
US	  decision	  to	  attack	  North	  Africa	  and	   Italy,	  prior	   to	  opening	   the	  second	   front	   in	  
June	   1944,	   was	   strategic	   (Hull,	   1948b,	   p.	   1127).	   It	   sought,	   with	   Britain,	   the	  
monopolisation	  of	   intercontinental	   trade	   through	   the	  Suez	  Canal	   (Hull,	  1948b,	  p.	  
1127).	  The	  US	  called	  for	  a	  second,	  Soviet,	  front	  in	  Asia,	  following	  the	  fall	  of	  Berlin	  
in	  April	   1945	   (De	  Santis,	   1980,	  p.	   155).	  However,	   Lend-­‐Lease	  was	   terminated	   in	  
April	   1945	   (Martel,	   1979,	   pp.	   94-­‐97).	   This	   indicated	   the	   end	   of	   the	   US-­‐USSR	  
alliance.	  Furthermore,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  pre-­‐
empted	  the	  Soviet	  arrival,	  ensuring	  the	  Americans	  a	  wider	  sphere	  of	  influence	  (De	  
Santis,	   1980,	   p.	   156).	   The	   Cold	   War	   was	   the	   logical	   continuation	   of	   this	   geo-­‐
political	  struggle	  for	  global	   influence	  between	  the	  two	  remaining	  superpowers.	  It	  
required	   the	   division	   of	   the	   globe	   into	   political	   and	   economic	   “spheres	   of	  
influence”	  (De	  Santis,	  1980,	  p.	  131).	  Each	  economic	  system	  sought	  to	  demonise	  the	  
other	   as	  monolithic,	   imperialistic	   and	   set	   on	  world	   domination.	   Throughout	   the	  
USSR	   and	   Eastern	   Europe,	   anti-­‐capitalist	   propaganda	   was	   prevalent	   (Roberts,	  
2006,	  pp.	  305-­‐330).	  This	  ensured	  the	  largely	  peaceful	  transition	  to	  communist	  rule	  
in	   many	   nations.69	  In	   the	   West,	   communism	   was	   denounced.	   George	   Kennan’s	  
(1946)	   infamous	   ‘X’	   article	   in	   Foreign	   Affairs	   provided	   a	   vision	   of	   a	   Soviet-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  While	  in	  other	  cases	  Soviet	  military	  forces	  were	  used,	  most	  notably	  Hungary	  in	  1956	  (Kirov,	  
1999,	  p.	  137).	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dominated	  Europe.70	  Churchill’s	  warning	  of	  an	  “iron-­‐curtain”	  drew	  comparisons	  to	  
the	  militarism	  of	  Nazi	   Germany	   (Gaddis,	   1972,	   p.	   199).	   Reports	   of	   the	   spread	   of	  
“red	  fascism”	  necessitated	  an	  aggressive	  foreign	  policy	  from	  Washington	  (Schmitz,	  
1999,	  p.	  240).	  The	  two	  ideologies	  were	  antithetical	  to	  one	  other,	  and	  destined	  for	  
conflict.	  	  
President	   Franklin	  Roosevelt	   had	   envisaged	   the	  United	  Nations	   (UN)	   as	   a	  
global	  forum	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  peace	  (De	  Santis,	  1980,	  p.	  81).	  An	  idealist	  by	  
nature,	   Roosevelt	   believed	   in	   the	   Wilsonian	   “liberal-­‐internationalist”	   culture	   of	  
American	   policy,	  which	   promoted	   the	   universal	   extension	   of	   American	   values	   in	  
“free-­‐trade,	  political	  democracy,	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law”	  (De	  Santis,	  1980,	  p.	  199).	  The	  
UN	   was	   the	   forum	   to	   ensure	   the	   proliferation	   of	   these.	   The	   UN	   also	   sought	   to	  
maintain	  Washington’s	  globalist	  stance	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  world	  (Meisler,	  2011,	  p.	  3).	  
The	  collapse	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  (LoN)	  had	  led	  to	  WWII,	  which	  demonstrated	  
the	   importance	   of	   US	   global	   leadership	   to	   ensure	   global	   peace	   and	   economic	  
stability	   (Meisler,	  2011,	  p.	  4).	  The	  rapid	  decolonisation	  of	  Europe	  would	  provide	  
lucrative	  opportunities	  to	  US	  traders	  and	  investors.	  The	  only	  significant	  threat	  to	  
this	   expansion	   was	   the	   communism	   of	   the	   USSR.	   The	   Soviets	   needed	   to	   be	  
contained	  through	  US	  and	  UN	  security	  policy.	  The	  Security	  Council	  was	  composed	  
of	  the	  victors	  of	  WWII,	  four	  nations	  of	  which	  were	  capitalist	  (Gaddis,	  1972,	  p.	  226).	  
Russia’s	   initial	  optimism	  about	   the	  global	   forum	  was	  crushed	  during	  preliminary	  
talks	   between	   newly	   inaugurated	   President	   Harry	   Truman	   and	   Russian	   Foreign	  
Minister	   Vyacheslav	   Molotov	   (Freeland,	   1985,	   p.	   31).	   Truman’s	   demands	   upon	  
Russia’s	   administration	   of	   Poland	   not	   only	   defied	   promises	   made	   by	   Roosevelt;	  
they	  revealed	  the	  underlying	  intentions	  of	  the	  UN	  (Gaddis,	  1972,	  p.	  204).	  The	  UN	  
was	  designed	  by	   the	  US	   to	   condemn	  Soviet	  policy	  within	   its	   sphere	  of	   influence,	  
while	  no	  criticism,	  or	  even	  discussion	  of	  US	  policy	  in	  its	  many	  spheres	  was	  deemed	  
relevant. 71 	  The	   UN	   represented	   the	   globalisation	   of	   US	   political,	   social	   and	  
economic	   ideals.	   Nations	   who	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   these	   ideals	   would	   incur	  
criticism.	  
After	   WWII	   the	   US	   ascended	   to	   global	   military	   dominance.	   The	   pre-­‐war	  
isolationist	   policies	   of	   the	  US	   had	   allowed	   it	   to	  maintain	   a	   small	  military	  with	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  The	  Foreign	  Affairs	  magazine	  was	  the	  mouthpiece	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  CFR	  (Shoup	  and	  Minter,	  
1977,	  p.	  44).	  
71	  For	  example,	  Jacobo	  Árbenz’s	  letters	  to	  the	  UN	  during	  the	  US-­‐led	  invasion	  of	  Guatemala	  were	  
ignored	  on	  the	  initiative	  advice	  of	  the	  US	  ambassador	  Henry	  Cabot	  Lodge	  (Gleijes,	  1991).	  
	   116	  
sustainable	  annual	  budget.	  In	  1929	  the	  US	  had	  a	  standing	  army	  of	  185,000	  and	  an	  
annual	   military	   budget	   of	   US$500	  million	   (Ambrose,	   1971,	   p.	   3).	   Their	   purpose	  
was	   defence	   from	   external	   enemies.	   By	   1971	   it	   possessed	   a	   standing	   army	   of	  
1,517,000	   troops72	  stationed	   in	   119	   different	   countries,	   security	   alliances	   with	  
forty-­‐eight	  nations	  and	  an	  annual	  military	  budget	  of	  US$80	  billion	  (Ambrose,	  1971,	  
p.	  4).	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  was	  global	  defence	  against	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  
enemies.	   This	   proliferation	   in	   military	   power	   had	   required	   an	   overhaul	   of	   the	  
military	   bureaucracy	   under	  Truman.	  On	   July	   26,	   1947,	   the	  National	   Security	  Act	  
reorganised	  US	  defence	  and	  created	  the	  largest	  permanent	  military	  force	  in	  global	  
history	   (Hogan,	   1998,	   p.	   66).	   The	   separate	   Army,	   Navy	   and	   Intelligence	  
departments	   were	   brought	   under	   the	   uniform	   Department	   of	   Defence	   (DOD)	  
(Zegart,	   1999,	   p.	   58).	   The	   Secretary	   of	   Defence	  was	   only	   one	   facet	   of	   the	   newly	  
formed	   National	   Security	   Council	   (NSC)	   (Zegart,	   1999,	   p.	   54).	   The	   NSC	   became	  
responsible	   for	   all	   foreign	  policy	   decisions	   (Hogan,	   1998,	   p.	   66).	  Within	   the	  NSC	  
were	   the	   President,	   the	   Joint	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff	   (JCS),	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State,	   the	  
Defence	  Secretary	  and	  various	  other	  departmental	  heads	  (Zegart,	  1999,	  p.	  63).	  The	  
NSC	  took	  the	  responsibility	  for	  forming	  foreign	  policy	  independently	  from	  the	  US	  
Congress.	   Following	   the	   July	   1947	   National	   Security	   Act,	   the	   US	   set	   up	   security	  
treaties	   over	   the	   globe.	   In	   1947,	   the	  Rio	   Pact	  was	   forged	   between	   the	  American	  
states	  (G.	  Smith	  p.	  58).	  In	  1949,	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organisation	  (NATO)	  was	  
formed	   (Pogue,	   1989,	   p.	   325).	   Similar	   arrangements	   took	   place	   in	   Asia	   and	   the	  
Pacific.	  Through	  its	  vast	  networks,	  the	  NSC	  sent	  US	  military	  personnel,	  equipment	  
and	   funds	   to	   every	   corner	   of	   the	   globe	   to	   ensure	   the	   widest	   possible	   defence	  
against	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  enemies.	  
The	  extension	  of	  US	  global	  military	  influence,	  and	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  NSC,	  
also	  allowed	  it	  to	  establish	  the	  largest	  intelligence	  organisation	  in	  US	  history.	  The	  
Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA)	  coordinated	  foreign	  intelligence	  with	  every	  ally,	  
and	   on	   every	   enemy	   during	   the	   Cold	   War	   (Weiner,	   2007).	   However,	   economic	  
circumstances	  were	  threatening	  the	  docility	  of	  America’s	  allies	  in	  Europe.	  The	  war-­‐
torn	  nations	  were	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  promises	  of	  communists.	  By	  1947	  the	  US	  was	  
forced	   to	   act	   in	   Europe,	   specifically	   in	   Greece	   and	   Turkey,	   to	   maintain	   the	  
dominance	   of	   capitalism	   on	   the	   continent	   (Pisani,	   1991,	   p.	   60).	   Foreign	   aid	  was	  
also	  used	  to	  promote	  US	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  in	  Europe.	  According	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  This	  represents	  an	  increase	  of	  486	  per	  cent	  after	  adjustment	  for	  population	  growth	  (Ambrose,	  
1972;	  Population	  Statistics)	  
	   117	  
Pisani	  (1991),	   the	  Marshall	  Plan	  was	  an	  effective	  tool	  of	  propaganda	  (p.	  66).	  The	  
European	  Marshall	  Plan	  was	  the	  single	  greatest	  act	  of	  aid	  in	  human	  history,	  as	  the	  
US	  committed	  US$13.015	  billion	  in	  economic	  and	  technical	  assistance	  to	  European	  
nations	  (Mee,	  1984,	  p.	  258).	  However,	   the	   line	  between	  economic	  assistance	  and	  
military	   intervention	  was	  blurred	   in	  both	  Greece	  and	  Turkey.	  The	  US	   funded	   the	  
anti-­‐communists’	  political	   campaigns	   to	  ensure	   their	   success	   (Mee,	  1984,	  pp.	  38-­‐
49).	  In	  addition,	  they	  provided	  aid	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  capitalist	  
system	  in	  these	  nations.	  The	  policies	  in	  Greece	  and	  Turkey	  were	  so	  successful	  they	  
were	   extended	   to	   the	   remainder	   of	   Europe.	   Foreign	   aid	   bought	   influence	   on	   the	  
continent,	   but	   it	   was	   offered	   conditionally.	   It	   depended	   upon	   European	   nations	  
buying	  US	  goods,	  committing	  to	  representative	  democracy	  and	  implementing	  free-­‐
market	   policies	   (Mee,	   1984,	   pp.	   250-­‐290).	   However,	   it	   was	   not	   successful	   in	  
extending	  the	  capitalist	  system	  beyond	  the	  iron	  curtain.	  Molotov	  forbade	  Eastern	  
European	   states	   from	   taking	  Marshall	   Aid	   (Roberts,	   2006,	   p.	   317).	   The	  Marshall	  
Plan	   divided	   Europe,	   initiating	   a	   permanent	   position	   of	   Cold	  War	   (Vyshinski	   as	  
cited	   in	   Roberts,	   2006,	   p.	   317).	   Additionally,	   5	   per	   cent	   of	   Congress-­‐approved	  
Marshall	  Aid	  was	  funnelled	  to	  the	  CIA	  to	  support	  resistance	  movements	  in	  Eastern	  
Europe	  (Weiner,	  2007,	  p.	  28).	  Marshall	  explained	  that	  “they	  wanted	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
act	  quickly	  in	  an	  emergency”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Pisani,	  1991,	  p.	  68).	  
	  
The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Regional	  Security	  System	  
Latin	   America	   is	   generally	   viewed	   as	   a	   peripheral	   part	   of	   US	   Cold	   War	  
policy	   in	   the	  years	  preceding	   the	  Cuban	  Revolution.	  However,	  Washington	  began	  
manoeuvring	   to	   defend	   the	  Western	   Hemisphere	   from	   Soviet	   aggression	   during	  
and	   immediately	  after	  WWII.	   Its	  role	   in	   the	  US-­‐led	  capitalist	  security	  system	  was	  
ensured	  between	  1945	  and	  1948.	  Pach	  (1991)	  argues	  that	  WWII	  Lend-­‐Lease	  was	  a	  
mechanism	   the	   JCS	   used	   to	   achieve	   “the	   standardisation	   of	   hemispheric	  military	  
establishments…thus	  ensuring	  the	  orientation	  of	  Latin	  America	  towards	  the	  United	  
States”	   (p.	  41).	  This	   also	  applied	   to	  personnel	   training.	  Gill	   (2004)	   indicates	   that	  
the	  estrangement	  of	  military	  relations	  between	  Latin	  America	  and	  Europe	  during	  
WWII	   allowed	   for	   the	   effective	   US	   monopolisation	   of	   leadership	   (p.	   62).	   This	  
leadership	  was	   institutionalised	   in	  1946	  (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  62).	  Child	  (1980)	  sees	   the	  
“early	   Cold	   War	   period	   [as]	   one	   of	   consolidation	   of	   codification”	   of	   the	   inter-­‐
American	  military	   system	   (p.	   72).	   That	   is,	   the	  US	   attempted	   to	   extend	   the	  WWII	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alliances,	   by	   continuing	   and	   expanding:	   arms	   sales,	   exclusive	   rights	   to	   military	  
assistance,	  personnel	  training	  and,	  above	  all,	  a	  political	  alliance	  to	  institutionalise	  
this	   inter-­‐American	  military	   system.	   Smith	   (1994)	   sees	   the	  1947	  Rio	  Pact	   as	   the	  
logical	  extension	  of	  the	  1823	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  (p.	  52).	  Moreover,	  the	  US	  took	  the	  
opportunity	  provided	  by	  WWII	  to	  increase	  its	  control	  over	  Latin	  America.	  This	  was	  
unprecedented	  in	  regional	  history.	  This	  section	  will	  detail	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
inter-­‐American	  military	  system,	  and	  the	  way	  it	  served	  US	  economic	  interests.	  
	   In	  March	  1945	  the	  inter-­‐American	  community	  descended	  upon	  the	  ancient	  
Mayan	  City	  of	  Chapultepec	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  71).	  The	  conference	  at	  Chapultepec	  had	  
three	  aims:	  to	  return	  Argentina	  to	  the	  community	  of	  American	  nations;	  to	  establish	  
a	   regional	   organisation;	   and	   to	   receive	   guarantees	   that	   Roosevelt’s	   promised	  
“share”	  would	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  industrial	  assistance	  at	  the	  war’s	  end	  (Gellman,	  
1979,	  p.	  157).	  Argentina’s	  wartime	  belligerence	  had	  isolated	  it	  from	  the	  US	  and	  the	  
international	  community	  (Tulchin,	  1989,	  p.	  55).	  The	  USSR	  demanded	  that	  the	  UN	  
be	   exclusively	   comprised	  of	  wartime	  victors	   (Dallin,	   1962,	   p.	   58).	  Argentina	  was	  
coerced	  into	  an	  eleventh-­‐hour	  declaration	  of	  war	  against	  the	  Axis	  (Peterson,	  1964,	  
p.	  441).	  This	  token	  gesture	  ensured	  that	  Argentina	  could	  join	  both	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  
proposed	  OAS.	  By	  1945	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  war	  was	  assured,	  as	  was	  the	  economic	  
superiority	   of	   the	  US	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	   economy.	   Latin	  America	  had	  only	  played	  a	  
limited	  role	  in	  the	  physical	  victory,	  yet	  its	  loyalty	  in	  trade	  had	  been	  significant.	  By	  
allowing	  the	  US	  monopoly	  rights	  to	  their	  commodities,	  the	  Latin	  American	  nations	  
had	   played	   a	   large	   role	   in	   the	   industrial	   output	   of	   the	   Allied	   war	   machine.	  
Additionally,	  they	  sacrificed	  immediate	  development	  for	  long-­‐term	  commitments.	  
By	   focussing	   their	   energies	   on	   resource	   extraction,	   the	   nations	   of	   the	   Latin	  
America	   delayed	   industrialisation	   at	   a	   time	   when	   ISI	   development	   was	   proving	  
quite	  possible.	  This	  sacrifice	  was	  made	  by	  virtually	  every	  nation,	  and	  it	  had	  been	  
made	  under	  false	  pretences.	  However,	  they	  remained	  patient.	  While	  they	  received	  
no	  aid	   in	  1945,	  many	  Latin	  American	   leaders	   remained	  optimistic	   that	  when	   the	  
OAS	  was	  formed,	  remuneration	  would	  be	  forthcoming.73	  
WWII	  witnessed	  unprecedented	  military	  engagement	  between	   the	  US	  and	  
Latin	   America.	   The	   continental	   mobilisation	   against	   the	   duel	   threats	   of	   Nazi	  
Germany	   and	   Imperial	   Japan	   allowed	   the	   US	   the	  most	   extensive	   access	   to	   Latin	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Only	  2.1	  per	  cent	  of	  US	  global	  aid	  went	  to	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  ten	  years	  after	  WWII	  (Beisner,	  
2006,	  p.	  571).	  Aid	  to	  the	  twenty	  Latin	  American	  republics	  amounted	  to	  less	  than	  that	  granted	  to	  
Luxemburg	  and	  Belgium	  (Beisner,	  2006,	  p.	  571).	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America’s	   military	   in	   its	   history	   (Child,	   1980,	   pp.	   11-­‐48).	   Latin	   America	   was	  
significant	   to	   US	   security	   during	  WWII	   on	   three	   fronts:	   the	   region’s	   productive	  
capacity	   of	   raw	  materials;	   the	   region’s	   increased	   its	   ability	   to	   protect	   itself	   from	  
external	  threats;	  and	  that	  it	  gave	  vocal	  support	  to	  US	  moral	  leadership	  of	  the	  war	  
effort.	   Each	   of	   these	   areas	   would	   remain	   significant	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   economic	  
climate.	   The	  US	  was	  maintaining	   a	   permanent	  wartime	   economy	   (Pach,	   1991,	   p.	  
8).74 	  The	   production	   of	   raw	   materials	   has	   already	   been	   discussed	   in	   detail.	  
However,	  given	  the	  US’	  determination	  to	  continue	  a	  permanent	  war	  economy,	   its	  
reliance	  on	  Latin	  American	  goods	  would	  be	  maintained	  and	  eventually	  increased.	  
The	  ability	  of	  US	  corporations	  to	  extract	  resources	  at	  very	  low	  costs	  was	  a	  central	  
security	   aim	   of	   the	   US.	   During	   WWII	   the	   US	   supported	   the	   increasing	   military	  
capacity	   of	   Latin	   America	   in	   three	   ways:	   financial	   assistance,	   arms	   sales	   and	  
personnel	  training	  (Child,	  1980,	  pp.	  11-­‐48).	  Each	  of	  these	  was	  continued	  into	  the	  
Cold	  War	  era	  (Pach,	  1991,	  p.	  8).	  In	  1949,	  wartime	  military	  assistance	  was	  evolved	  
into	  the	  Military	  Assistance	  Program	  (MAP)	  (Pach,	  1991,	  p.	  215).	  Prior	  to	  WWII	  the	  
US	  had	  only	  a	   small	   share	  of	  military	  sales	   to	  Latin	  America	   (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  18).	  
However,	  the	  US	  replaced	  Germany	  as	  the	  primary	  arms	  supplier	  to	  Latin	  America,	  
through	   the	   Lend-­‐Lease	   policy	   of	   WWII	   (Child,	   1980,	   p.	   48).	   The	   process	   was	  
accelerated	   after	   the	   war,	   with	   US	   manufacturers	   ensuring	   virtual	   monopoly	  
conditions.	   In	   addition	   to	   arms	   sales,	   the	   US	   also	   sought	   to	   dominate	   military	  
training	  during	  WWII	  (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  63).	  During	  WII	  the	  US	  sent	  attachés	  to	  most	  
Latin	  American	  countries	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  19).	  The	  US	  also	  sought	  to	  continue	  this	  
process	   into	   the	   Cold	   War.	   Accordingly,	   the	   US	   established	   the	   Latin	   American	  
Ground	  School	  (LAGS)	  in	  1946	  (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  63).	  
Support	   for	   US	   moral	   leadership	   at	   international	   forums	   was	   significant.	  
During	  WWII,	   the	   US	   had	   committed	   to	   both	   the	   Atlantic	   Charter	   and	   the	   Four	  
Freedoms.	   The	   UN	   adopted	   these	   ideals.	   Following	   1945,	   the	   Latin	   American	  
nations	   also	   supported	   these	   ideals	   and	   continued	   to	   condemn	   any	   system	   that	  
opposed	   them	   (Whitaker,	  1964,	  p.	  172).	   In	   the	  Cold	  War	   context,	   this	  meant	   the	  
USSR.	  The	  dominating	   ideology	  of	   the	  UN	   threatened	   the	   significance	  of	   regional	  
organisations	   (Slater,	   1969,	   p.	   30);	   this	   in	   turn	   imperilled	   the	   inter-­‐American	  
relationship.	  According	  to	  former	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Hull,	  “there	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  
the	  need	  for	  spheres	  of	  influence,	  for	  alliances,	  for	  balance	  of	  power	  or	  any	  other	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  President	  Eisenhower	  would	  later	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  ‘Military-­‐Industrial	  Complex’	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the	   special	   arrangements	   which,	   in	   the	   unhappy	   past,	   the	   nations	   strove	   to	  
safeguard	  their	  security	  or	  to	  promote	  their	  interests”	  (as	  cited	  in	  G.	  Smith,	  1994,	  
p.	   41).	   By	   1945,	   however,	   the	   geopolitical	   climate	   had	   changed.	   Regionalism	  
became	   the	   priority	   of	   the	   US	   at	   the	   UN	   (Schwartzberg,	   2003,	   p.	   68).	   The	   Latin	  
American	  voting	  bloc	  was	   significant	  at	   the	  UN,	  as	   they	  comprised	   twenty	  of	   the	  
fifty	   foundational	   UN	   members	   (Whitaker,	   1964,	   p.	   170).	   Their	   support	   of	   US	  
moral	   global	   leadership	   made	   them	   valuable	   allies.	   Articles	   51-­‐54	   of	   the	   UN	  
Charter	   undermined	   Hull’s	   vision	   by	   allowing	   the	   formation	   for	   regional	  
organisations	  (G.	  Smith,	  1994,	  p.	  54).	  The	  US	  and	  the	  USSR	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  
their	   respective	   spheres	   of	   influence	   through	   political,	   military	   and	   economic	  
alliances.	  The	  Latin	  American	  delegations	  vociferously	  supported	  these	  resolutions	  
(Whitaker,	   1964,	   p.	   177).	   They	   foresaw	   the	   OAS	   as	   a	   mechanism	   for	   economic	  
development,	  and	  regionalism	  as	  a	  guarantee	  of	  financial	  assistance	  (Pogue,	  1989,	  
p.	   384).	  While	   this	  was	   not	   the	   uniform	  view	   in	  Washington,	  Marshall	  wanted	   a	  
regional	  organisation	  to	  protect	  American	  interests	  (Pogue,	  1989,	  p.	  383).	  	  
The	   US	   sought	   to	   cement	   its	   influence	   in	   Latin	   America	   in	   two	   forms:	  
protection	  against	  ‘external’	  enemies	  and	  protection	  against	  ‘internal’	  threats	  to	  US	  
regional	   interests.	   The	   1947	   Rio	   Pact	   was	   the	   most	   extensive	   inter-­‐American	  
military	  alliance	  in	  history	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  71).	  The	  official	  ‘Inter-­‐American	  Treaty	  
of	  Mutual	  Assistance’	   (1947)	   effectively	   brought	   the	   entire	  Western	  Hemisphere	  
into	   the	  US	  security	  zone.	   It	  was	   the	   regional	   reinforcement	  of	   the	  1823	  Monroe	  
Doctrine.	  While	   the	   Rio	   Pact	   was	   extensive,	   its	   necessity	   was	   questionable.	   The	  
only	  viable	  threat	  to	  hemispheric	  defence,	  the	  USSR,	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  
security	   in	   Eurasia	   (Roberts,	   2006,	   pp.	   303-­‐310).	  With	   the	   exception	   of	   Mexico,	  
Argentina	   and	   Uruguay,	   Latin	   American	   leaders	   had	   ended	   diplomacy	   with	   the	  
USSR	  (Prizel,	  1992,	  p.	  2).	  The	  other	  component,	   the	  OAS,	  was	  a	   forum	  to	  discuss	  
political	   and	   economic	   developments	   in	   the	   region	   (Schwartzberg,	   2003,	   p.	   85).	  
Although	  both	   the	  US	  and	   the	  Latin	  Americans	   saw	   the	   importance	  of	   a	   regional	  
economic	   alliance,	   their	   visions	   of	   its	   purpose	   were	   quite	   different.	  While	   Latin	  
America	   foresaw	   significant	   technical	   assistance	   from	   the	   US,	   the	   US	   sought	   to	  
maintain	   the	   economic	   status	   quo	   through	   its	   UN	   agencies.75	  The	   conference	   in	  
March	  and	  April	  1948	  saw	   the	  US	  dictate	  economic	   terms	   (Pogue,	  1989,	  p.	  386).	  
There	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   declared	   that	   there	  would	   be	   “no	  Marshall	   Plan	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  This	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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Latin	   America”	   (Coleman,	   2008,	   p.	   54).	   To	   quell	   the	   region’s	   outrage,	   Marshall	  
gained	   congressional	   approval	   to	   increase	   the	   EXIM	   lending	   capacity	   by	  US$500	  
million	   (Coleman,	   2008,	   p.	   55).	   However,	   many	   Latin	   American	   leaders	   were	  
reluctant	   to	   link	   their	   political	   futures	   to	   Washington	   without	   a	   significant	  
economic	   commitment	   (Baulac,	   1948).	   Fortunately	   for	   Marshall,	   the	   Bogotázo	  
would	  recast	  the	  political	  dialogue	  of	  the	  OAS.	  
	  
April	  9,	  1948	  
Gaitán	   is	   a	   polarising	   figure	   within	   the	   literature	   on	   Colombian	   political	  
history.	   Fidel	   Castro	   (2007)	   indicated	   that	   “Gaitán	   represented	   hope	   and	  
development	   for	   Colombia	   (p.	   98).	   The	   US	   National	   Security	   Council	   (1953)	  
labelled	   Gaitán	   an	   “impractical	   idealist”;	   while	   the	   FBI	   (1946)	   labelled	   him	   a	  
“demagogue”.	  It	  is	  these	  polarised	  views	  that	  make	  Gaitán	  an	  intriguing	  historical	  
figure.	   Herbert	   Braun	   (1985)	   and	   John	   Green	   (2003)	   authored	   the	   two	   best-­‐
conceived	   political	   biographical	   accounts	   of	   Gaitán	   and	   the	   movement	   he	  
epitomised.	  Green	  (2003)	  highlights	  “otherworldly”	  allure	  of	  Gaitánismo	   (p.	  203).	  
He	   notes	   that	   in	   the	   province	   of	   Bolívar,	   “all	   the	   campesinos	   have	   a	   portrait	   of	  
Gaitán	   in	   their	   homes,	   and	   daily	   tend	   it	   with	   a	   mystique	   that	   approaches	  
adoration”	   (Green,	   2003,	   p.	   203).	   Braun	   (1985)	   saw	   Gaitán’s	   downfall	   as	  
“inevitable”	   (p.	   134).	   He	   argues,	   “he	   was	   too	   dangerous	   and	   too	   feared	   by	   the	  
leaders	  of	  both	  parties”	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  134).	  More	  significant	  than	  his	  cult	  status,	  
however,	  was	   the	  movement	   that	  he	  spawned.	  Green	  (2003)	  asserts,	   “by	  1944	   it	  
was	   clear	   that	   Gaitánismo	   represented	   a	   pronounced	   intellectual	   tradition	   in	  
Colombia	  that	  may	  be	  referred	  as	  a	  home	  grown	  left”	  (p.	  205).	  This	  home	  grown	  
left	   espoused	   similar	   maximum	   and	   minimum	   programs	   to	   social	   democratic	  
parties	  in	  neighbouring	  Peru	  and	  Venezuela.	  Gaitán’s	  growing	  independence	  from	  
the	  Colombian	  Liberal	  Party	  increased	  the	  allure	  of	  both	  the	  man	  and	  Gaitánismo.	  
This	  section	  will	  explore	  this	  movement	  and	  the	  events	  that	  led	  to	  Gaitán’s	  death	  
and	  the	  subsequent	  Bogotázo.	  
Gaitán	   was	   a	   significant	   reformer	   in	   Colombian	   politics.	   Like	   most	   social	  
democrats,	  he	  sought	  an	  independent	  path	  in	  his	  early	  career	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  59).	  
However,	  in	  the	  late	  1930s	  and	  early	  1940s	  he	  became	  a	  pivotal	  part	  of	  the	  ruling	  
Liberal	  Party.	  Gaitán	  ensured	  that	  the	  Liberals	  maintained	  the	  support	  of	  the	  newly	  
enfranchised	  working	  class.	  As	  Bogotá	  Mayor	  and	  Colombian	  Minister	  for	  Labour,	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Gaitán	  forged	  a	  sympathetic	  relationship	  with	  the	  industrial	  working	  class	  (Green,	  
2003,	   p.	   96).	   He	  was	   the	   popular	   choice	   for	   President	   in	   1946	   (Braun,	   1985,	   p.	  
134).	  However,	   the	  Liberal	   Party	  betrayed	  Gaitán.	  Realising	   the	   consequences	  of	  
his	   social	   policies,	   the	   oligarchic	   Liberal	   Party	   endorsed	   Gabriel	   Turbay	   for	  
President	  instead	  (Osterling,	  1989,	  p.	  85).	  Gaitán	  ran	  independently.	  Realising	  the	  
division,	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  who	  had	  not	  competed	  in	  an	  election	  since	  1930,	  
promoted	   Ospina	   Pérez	   in	   the	   final	   weeks	   before	   the	   election.	   Pérez	   won	   with	  
roughly	  38	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  vote	  (Osterling,	  1989,	  p.	  85).	  The	  change	  of	  presidency	  
in	  1946	  sparked	  the	  initial	  stages	  of	  ‘La	  Violencia’	  in	  rural	  Colombia	  (Rolden,	  2002,	  
pp.	   60-­‐68).	   The	   peasants,	   who	   had	   been	   given	   legal	   temporary	   residence	   upon	  
vacant	   oligarchic	   land	   by	   the	   Liberal	   government,	   were	   forcibly	   evicted	   by	  
paramilitary	   groups,	   forcing	   them	   into	   hacienda	   labour	   on	   coffee	   plantations	  
(Osterling,	   1989,	   pp.	   86-­‐87).	   As	   conditions	   worsened,	   Gaitán’s	   popularity	  
increased.	  Those	  who	  stood	   to	   lose	  badly	  under	  Gaitán	   “conceded	   that	  he	  would	  
have	   become	   president”	   in	   the	   1950	   election	   (Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   201).	   Gaitán	  
represented	  a	  monumental	  shift	  in	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  in	  Colombia.	  
Colombian	   society	   has	   historically	   been	   divided	   on	   ideological	   grounds	  
(Stafford	   and	   Palacious,	   2002,	   pp.	   239-­‐280).	   While	   previous	   conflicts	   had	   been	  
between	  the	  two	  oligarchic	  political	  parties,	   the	  promises	  of	  social	  equality	  made	  
by	  Gaitán,	  as	  well	  as	  others,	  had	  changed	  the	  social	  dynamics	  (Randall,	  1992,	  pp.	  
110-­‐120).	  Between	  the	  1946	  election	  and	  Gaitán’s	  death,	  the	  dynamics	  of	  old	  party	  
alliances	  permanently	  altered.	  The	  parties	  had	  conspired	  to	  defeat	  Gaitán	  (Braun,	  
1985,	  p.	  115).	  Yet	  the	  people	  wanted	  him	  to	  be	  president.	  The	  democratic	  options	  
were	   now	   between	   the	   oligarchs	   and	   the	   ‘Gaitánistas.’	   Gaitán’s	   social	   policies	  
sought	   to	   make	   Colombian	   society	   more	   equitable.	   According	   to	   the	   extensive	  
research	   of	   the	   US	   State	   Department	   (1947),	   the	   Gaitánista’s	   national	   social	  
program	   included:	   freedom	   of	   speech,	   freedom	   of	   press,	   more	   democratically	  
elected	  positions,	  separation	  of	  politics	  and	  capital,	  wage	  reform,	  price	  controls	  on	  
basic	  consumer	  goods,	  universal	  primary	  education	  and	  obligatory	  social	  security.	  
These	  programs	  would	  have	  limited	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  ensured	  permanent	  class	  
division	  by	  promoting	   social	  mobility.	  Both	  oligarchic	  parties	   sought	   to	  maintain	  
control	  of	  the	  export	  economy	  (Green,	  2003,	  p.	  159).	  The	  reliance	  on	  coffee	  exports	  
enriched	  a	  select	  few	  while	  it	  impoverished	  the	  nation.	  Gaitán’s	  economic	  policies	  
sought	  to	  modernise	  the	  Colombian	  economy.	  Those	  policies	  included:	  control	  and	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regulation	   of	   Direct	   Foreign	   Investment	   (DFI),	   customs	   reform,	   tax	   revision,	  
nationalisation	   of	   breweries,	   nationalisation	   of	   public	   works	   and	   large-­‐scale	  
unionism	   (SD	   Anonymous,	   1947).	   These	   reforms	   sought	   to	   make	   Colombia	   less	  
dependent	   upon	   foreign	   trade.	   But	   perhaps	  most	   importantly,	   Gaitán	  would	   not	  
have	  been	  as	  pliable	  to	  US	  demands	  as	  oligarch	  leaders	  in	  Colombia.	  	  
On	  April	  9	  1948	  Juan	  Roa	  Sierra	  shot	  and	  mortally	  wounded	  Gaitán	  outside	  
his	  Bogotá	  office	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p	  134).	  The	  official	  story,	  which	  initially	  followed,	  
stated	   that	   Sierra	   was	   the	   nephew	   of	   a	   man	   convicted	   by	   Gaitán’s	   law	   firm	  
(Randall,	   1992,	   p.	   193).	   However,	   further	   investigation	   questioned	   this	   rather	  
innocuous	   assumption.	   After	   firing	   the	   shots,	   Sierra	   took	   refuge	   in	   a	   local	  
pharmacy.	   As	   the	   crowd	   began	   to	  multiply,	   Sierra	   spoke	   to	   a	   sole	   policeman.	   In	  
response	  to	  the	  policeman’s	  request	  to	  “tell	  me	  who	  ordered	  you	  to	  kill,	  for	  you	  are	  
going	  to	  be	  lynched	  by	  the	  pueblo,”	  Sierra	  replied,	  “Oh	  senõr…the	  powerful	  things	  I	  
cannot	  tell	  you”	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  135).	  Within	  fifty	  minutes	  of	  the	  assault	  both	  men	  
were	  dead	  and	  Bogotá	  was	   left	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  civil	  war.	  The	  true	  motivation	   for	  
Gaitán’s	   death	   remains	   unresolved.	   While	   some	   have	   asserted	   US	   complicity,	  
Herbert	   Braun’s	   (1985)	   analysis	   of	   “his	   death	   [as]	   inevitable”	   is	   the	   most	  
penetrating	   (p.	   135).	  Gaitán	   “was	   too	  dangerous	   and	   too	   feared	  by	  both	  parties”	  
(Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   135).	   While	   Gaitán	   certainly	   posed	   a	   threat	   to	   US	   interests	   in	  
Colombia,	   the	   threat	   posed	   to	   the	   local	   oligarchy	   was	   far	   greater.	   However,	   the	  
case	  arguing	  American	  previous	  knowledge	  of	  the	  attack	  and	  subsequent	  protests	  
is	  compelling.	  The	  human	  rights	  lawyer	  Paul	  Wolf	  (2004),	  in	  attempting	  to	  account	  
for	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Civil	  War,	  took	  both	  the	  CIA	  and	  FBI	  to	  court	  for	  
defiance	   of	   the	   Freedom	  of	   Information	  Act	   (FOIA).	  While	   the	   court	   ruled	   in	   his	  
favour,	   many	   documents	   pertinent	   to	   Gaitán	   were	   omitted	   or	   concealed	   (Wolf,	  
2004).	   It	   is	  extremely	  unlikely	   that	   the	  CIA	  or	  FBI	  killed	  Gaitán.76	  However,	   their	  
prior	   knowledge	   would	   have	   given	   them	   the	   opportunity	   to	   plan	   their	   post-­‐
Bogotázo	  reaction	  in	  advance.	  
The	  Colombian	  Bogotázo	  was	  a	  violent	  protest	   that	  cost	   fourteen	  hundred	  
lives	   in	   forty-­‐eight	   hours	   (Coleman,	   2008,	   p.	   55).	   It	   was	   a	   direct	   response	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Some	  sources	  have	  claimed	  CIA	  complicity	  in	  Gaitán’s	  death.	  While	  this	  is	  feasible,	  the	  direct	  
threat	  posed	  to	  the	  Colombian	  oligarchy	  by	  Gaitán	  outweighed	  that	  to	  the	  US.	  Additionally,	  the	  CIA	  
were	  criticized	  for	  their	  ignorance	  of	  Colombian	  affairs	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Bogotázo.	  Therefore,	  this	  
thesis	  has	  concluded	  that	  the	  Colombian	  oligarchy	  is	  responsible	  for	  Gaitán’s	  assassination	  and	  the	  
subsequent	  Bogotázo.	  US	  involvement	  was	  far	  more	  significant	  in	  the	  propaganda	  that	  followed	  the	  
Bogotázo	  than	  the	  event	  itself.	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Gaitán’s	  assassination.	  Those	  who	  witnessed	  Gaitán’s	  death	  quickly	  mobilised	  the	  
masses	  by	  spreading	  the	  message	  “they	  have	  killed	  Gaitán”	  (Braun,	  1985,	  p.	  135).	  
The	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  word	  “they”	  led	  to	  uncontrolled	  violence	  throughout	  the	  city.	  
The	  mob’s	  first	  action	  was	  to	  lynch	  Sierra	  inside	  the	  pharmacy.	  This	  small	  group	  of	  
followers	   then	   dragged	   Sierra’s	   mutilated	   corpse	   outside	   and	   began	   marching	  
towards	   the	   centre	   of	   Bogotá	   (Green,	   2003,	   p.	   261).	   As	  word	   spread,	   the	   crowd	  
grew	  larger.	  Within	  two	  hours	  the	  mob	  had	  grown	  to	  approximately	  200,000.	  The	  
protesters	  assumed	  “they”	  –	  those	  who	  had	  killed	  Gaitán	  –	  were	  the	  conservative	  
government	   of	   Ospina	   Pérez	   	   (Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   135).	   Accordingly,	   their	   march	  
headed	  to	  the	  Presidential	  palace.	  Civil	  order	  quickly	  declined	  as	  the	  Bogotá	  police	  
were	   amongst	   Gaitán’s	   most	   loyal	   supporters,	   and	   they	   too	   joined	   the	   march	  
(Braun,	   1985,	   p.	   138).	   Liberal	   politicians	   unsuccessfully	   sought	   to	  moderate	   the	  
rage.	   The	   military	   were	   prepared	   at	   the	   presidential	   palace.	   They	   aggressively	  
suppressed	  the	  protest,	  killing	  those	  who	  would	  not	  leave	  (Coleman,	  2008,	  p.	  55).	  
The	   following	   forty-­‐eight	   hours	   saw	   aggressive	   street	   battles	   between	   Gaitán	  
loyalists	  and	  the	  Colombian	  military	  (Coleman,	  2008,	  p.	  55).	  The	  Bogotázo	  was	  the	  
catalyst	  for	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  the	  Colombian	  Civil	  War,	  La	  Violencia.	  It	  gave	  an	  
urban	  theatre	  to	  a	  rural	  civil	  war.	  La	  Violencia	   lasted	  ten	  additional	  years,	  caused	  
200,000	  deaths	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  conservative	  coalition	  of	  oligarchic	  rule	  in	  1958	  
(Rolden,	  2002,	  p.	  73,	  220).	  The	  the	  Bogotázo	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  conspiracy,	  as	  
there	   is	   insufficient	   evidence	  of	   communist	   involvement	  and	   it	  did	  not	   serve	   the	  
interests	   of	   communists	   (Alexander,	   1963,	   p.	   251).	   While	   there	   were	   young	  
nationalists,	  including	  Fidel	  Castro,	  in	  Bogotá	  protesting	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  OAS,	  
their	   role	   in	   the	  Bogotázo	  was	   extremely	   peripheral	   (Tunzelman,	   2011,	   p.	   40).77	  
The	  Bogotázo	  was	  a	  spontaneous	  reaction	  to	  the	  assassination	  of	  Gaitán	  directed	  at	  
those	  perceived	  as	  responsible.	  	  
US	   intelligence	  did	  not	  believe	   that	  Gaitán	  or	  his	   followers	  were	  affiliated	  
with	   international	   communism.	   However,	   the	   FBI	   (1946)	   and	   State	   Department	  
(1947)	   were	   aware,	   and	   cautious,	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   Gaitánism	   on	   the	   Colombian	  
political	   system.	   The	   FBI	   was	   responsible	   for	   regional	   intelligence	   during	  WWII	  
and	   the	   early	   Cold	   War	   period	   (Darling,	   1990;	   Gellman,	   1979).	   Prior	   to	   the	  
initiation	   of	   the	   CIA	   in	   1947,	   the	   FBI	   had	   vast	   regional	   networks.	   Its	   director,	   J.	  
Edgar	   Hoover	   (1945),	   identified	   the	   “threat”	   of	   Gaitán	   and	   his	   “manifestation”	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  While	  Castro	  stole	  arms	  in	  Bogotá,	  he	  sought	  refuge	  in	  the	  Cuban	  embassy	  when	  fighting	  became	  
too	  severe	  (Tunzelman,	  2011,	  p.	  40).	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prior	  to	  the	  May	  1946	  elections.	  While	  linking	  Gaitán	  to	  European	  fascists,	  Hoover	  
(1945)	   argued,	   “collaboration	   between	   the	   Gaitánistas	   and	   the	   communists	   has	  
been	   terminated”.	   Further	   FBI	   documents	   reveal	   that	   the	   Gaitánistas	   had	  
persecuted	   communists	   in	   rural	   Colombia	   in	   competition	   for	   campesino	   support	  
(FBI,	   1946).	   State	  Department	   informer	   Joseph	  Ray	   (1947)	   indicated	   that	  Gaitán	  
“was	  the	  worst	  enemy	  of	  communism”.	  The	  FBI	  (1946)	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  
(1947)	   both	   compiled	   summaries	   of	   the	   political	   history	   and	   policy	   of	   Gaitán’s	  
movement.	   No	   document	   argues	   that	   Gaitán	   was	   a	   communist	   or	   under	   the	  
influence	   of	   communism.	   In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Bogotázo,	   the	   CIA	  
claimed	   not	   to	   know	   of	   Gaitán’s	   movement	   or	   the	   motivation	   for	   civil	   unrest	  
(Darling,	   1990). 78 	  This	   symbolised	   a	   failure	   for	   the	   newly	   instituted	   CIA.	  
Nevertheless,	   Marshall’s	   State	   Department	   was	   fully	   aware	   of	   Gaitán,	   Gaitánism	  
and	  the	  origins	  of	   the	  Bogotázo.	   In	  the	   five	  days	  prior	  to	  Marshall’s	  accusation	  of	  
Soviet	   interference	  he	  was	   in	  contact	  with	  Willard	  Baulac,	   the	  US	  ambassador	   to	  
Colombia,	   who	   possessed	   this	   intelligence	   (Pogue,	   1989,	   p.	   387).	   Baulac	   saw	  
communists	  and	  “left-­‐liberals”	  as	  synonymous	  (Pogue,	  1989,	  p.	  387).	  Furthermore,	  
he	  and	  Marshall	  concluded	  that	  ‘communists’	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  Colombian	  
Bogotázo,	   despite	   the	   evidence	   provided	   by	   their	   staff.	   The	   consequence	   was	   a	  
continental	  civil	  war	  far	  greater	  than	  La	  Violencia.	  
Despite	   the	   intelligence	   of	   the	   US	   State	   Department,	   Marshall	   used	   the	  
violence	  of	  the	  Bogotázo	  to	  initiate	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  Secretary	  of	  
the	   State	  was	   in	   Bogotá	   attending	   the	   first	  meeting	   of	   the	   OAS	   (Pogue,	   1989,	   p.	  
382).	  During	   the	   violence,	  Marshall	   sat	   solemnly	   in	   a	   hotel	   room	  as	  many	   of	   his	  
fellow	  delegates	  sought	  a	  panicked	  evacuation	  (Pogue,	  1989,	  p.	  387).	  Marshall	  saw	  
the	   events	   in	   Bogotá	   as	   “concrete	   evidence…of	   the	   vitality	   of	   hemispheric	  
communism	  and	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  security	  against	  it”	  (Randall,	  1992,	  p.	  189).	  As	  
the	   violence	   subsided,	   on	   April	   14	   Marshall	   ordered	   the	   delegates	   to	   return	   to	  
work.	  Addressing	  them,	  Marshall	  stated:	  	  
This	   situation	   must	   not	   be	   judged	   on	   a	   local	   basis,	   however	   tragic	   the	  
immediate	  results	  to	  the	  Colombian	  people…It	  is	  the	  same	  definite	  pattern	  
to	  events	  which	  provoked	  strikes	   in	  France	  and	   Italy…	   In	  actions	  we	   take	  
here…we	  must	  keep	  clearly	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  is	  a	  world	  affair	  –	  not	  merely	  a	  
Colombian	  or	  Latin	  American	  [one]	  (cited	  in,	  Randall,	  1992,	  p.	  193).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case	  they	  would	  not	  hesitate	  to	  release	  their	  documents	  to	  Paul	  Wolf.	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Marshall	   made	   direct	   and	   intentional	   reference	   to	   the	   global	   Cold	   War.	   He	  
internationalised	   the	   conflict.	   His	   comment	   demonstrated	   the	   violence	   of	  
‘communism’	  to	  the	  region’s	  oligarchs,	  which	  motivated	  compliance	  regarding	  US	  
anti-­‐communist	  policies	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  Latin	  American	  Cold	  War	  was	  also	  sold	  
to	  the	  international	  community.	  The	  New	  York	  Times’	  (1948)	  front	  cover	  on	  April	  
15	  read:	  “Marshall	  Blames	  Reds	  in	  Colombia;	  Secretary	  Tells	  Conferees	  That	  World	  
Communism	   Set	   Off	   Revolt	   in	   Country”.	   Marshall	   intentionally	   fabricated	   the	  
relationship	  between	   the	  Bogotázo	   and	   the	   international	  Cold	  War	   to	   further	  US	  
interests	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  
	   The	   Conservative	   Colombian	   President	   Ospina	   Pérez	   echoed	   Marshall’s	  
accusation.	   Events	   in	  Bogotá	   exacerbated	  Colombia’s	   Civil	  War	   (Rolden,	   2002,	   p.	  
75).	  Many	  peasants	  had	   rallied	   to	   the	  promises	  of	   a	  Gaitán-­‐led	  Colombia	   (Green,	  
2003,	  p.	  266).	  Gaitán’s	   social	  program	  had	  promised	   to	  drastically	   improve	   their	  
livelihood,	   despite	   his	   reluctance	   to	   promote	   permanent	   land	   redistribution	  
(Green,	   2003,	   pp.	   115-­‐145).	  His	   death	   fuelled	   the	   violence	   in	   rural	   Colombia	   for	  
two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   the	   peasants	   protested	  more	   actively	   immediately	   after	   the	  
Bogotázo	   (Rolden,	   2002,	   p.	   73).	   Secondly,	   and	   more	   significantly,	   the	   conflict	  
between	   landlords	   and	   peasants	  was	   reframed	  within	   the	   global	   struggle	   of	   the	  
Cold	   War.	   Pérez	   “pointed	   to	   popular	   insurrections	   in	   certain	   towns	   as	  
incontrovertible	  evidence	  of	  a	  larger	  predicted	  communist	  plot	  to	  seize	  control	  of	  
Colombia”	   (Rolden,	   2002,	   p.	   68).	   Moreover,	   Pérez	   furthered	   Marshall’s	   claim	   of	  
urban	  communism	  within	  the	  Bogotázo	  to	  define	  all	  class	  struggle	  in	  Colombia	  as	  a	  
communist	   insurrection.	   The	   conflict	   over	   rural	   land	  was	   older	   than	   Colombian	  
independence,	  dating	  back	  to	  the	  days	  of	  the	  conquistadors.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  global	  
Cold	  War,	  however,	  it	  would	  require	  military	  intervention.	  Pérez	  sent	  the	  military	  
to	   those	   rural	   departments	   with	   peasant	   unrest,	   predicating	   the	   massacre	   of	  
peasant	   ‘armies’	   throughout	   Colombia	   (Randall,	   1992,	   p.	   73,	   196).	   Peasants	  who	  
had	   illegally	   squatted	   on	   oligarchs’	   lands	   in	   protest	  were	   viewed	   as	   ‘insurgents’.	  
The	   perceived	   threat	   of	   communism	   in	   rural	   Colombia	   justified	   the	   systematic	  
genocide	  of	  the	  indigenous	  population.	  Those	  who	  remained	  became	  increasingly	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“Congressmen,	   columnists	   and	  patriots	   of	   the	  press”	   clearly	   identified	   the	  
Bogotázo	  as	  an	  aggressive	  policy	  of	  the	  USSR	  (Darling,	  1990,	  p.	  240).	  A	  broad	  anti-­‐
communist	  coalition	   in	  Latin	  America	  became	  a	  security	  priority	  of	   the	  US	   in	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   the	   Bogotázo.	   This	   thesis,	   however,	   will	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  
Bogotázo	   did	   not	   motivate	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   declaration	   of	   April	   1948.	   Anti-­‐
communism	   in	  Latin	  America	  was	  a	   long-­‐term	  policy	  objective	   that	  predated	   the	  
violence	   in	   Bogota.	   On	   April	   8	   Ambassador	   Baulac	   (1948)	   held	   preliminary	  
discussions	   with	   Colombia’s	   foreign	   minister	   Laureano	   Gómez	   regarding	   the	  
potential	   anti-­‐communist	   declaration	   of	   the	   OAS.	   While	   Gómez	   enthusiastically	  
supported	  Washington’s	  position,	  he	   identified	  a	  number	  of	   reservations	  held	  by	  
the	  Latin	  American	  delegations	  in	  Bogotá	  (Baulac,	  1948).	  Gómez	  identified	  several	  
progressive	   governments	   who	   would	   immediately	   condemn	   an	   anti-­‐communist	  
declaration	  as	  interventionism	  	  (Baulac,	  1948).	  For	  example,	  the	  Guatemalan	  Juan	  
Arévalo	   and	   the	   Venezuelan	   Rómulo	   Betancourt	   led	   nations	   that	   were	  
experiencing	   political	   freedom	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   A	   foreign	   power	   dictating	   the	  
eradication	  of	  a	  peripheral	  movement	  would	  not	  be	  acceptable	   to	   them.	  Another	  
reservation	   he	   identified	  was	   economic	   (Baulac,	   1948).	   Latin	   America’s	   goals	   in	  
Bogotá	  were	  distinct	  from	  Washington’s.	  The	  Latin	  American	  governments	  sought	  
economic	  assistance	  in	  return	  for	  far-­‐reaching	  diplomatic	  support	  (Pogue,	  1989,	  p.	  
386).	   The	   Chilean	   and	   Uruguayan	   delegations	   also	   expressed	   their	   reservations	  
against	   US-­‐led	   intervention	   of	   any	   kind	   (Gómez	   as	   cited	   in	   Baulac,	   1948).	  
According	   to	   Gómez,	   they	   sought	   to	   modify	   the	   target	   of	   the	   declaration	   to	   the	  
USSR	   specifically,	   rather	   than	   communism	   generally	   (as	   cited	   in	   Baulac,	   1948).	  
However,	   this	  was	   the	  exact	  distinction	   the	  NSC	   sought	   to	  undermine.	  The	  USSR	  
was	  an	  external	  enemy	  with	  no	  power	  to	  invade	  the	  Americas.	  Communism,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand,	   could	   be	   interpreted	   in	  many	  ways,	  which	  made	   it	   the	   ideal	   enemy.	  
The	  Latin	  Americans	  required	  visual	  evidence	  of	  the	  communist	  threat,	  which	  the	  
Bogotázo	  provided.	  
The	  OAS	   signatories	   condemned	   international	   communism	   for	   its	   ‘role’	   in	  
the	  Bogotázo.	   A	   document	   entitled	   ‘The	  Menace	   of	   communism’	   condemned	   any	  
organisation	   operating	   in	   the	   Western	   hemisphere	   that	   was	   antithetical	   to	   US	  
interests	  (OAS	  as	  cited	  in	  Holden	  and	  Zolov,	  2000,	  p.	  193).	  It	  stated,	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By	  its	  anti-­‐democratic	  nature	  and	  its	   interventionist	  tendency	  the	  political	  
activity	   of	   international	   communism	   or	   any	   other	   totalitarian	   doctrine	   is	  
incompatible	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   American	   freedom,	   which	   rests	   on	   two	  
undeniable	   postulates:	   the	   dignity	   of	   man	   as	   an	   individual	   and	   the	  
sovereignty	  of	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  state	  (OAS	  as	  cited	  in	  Holden	  and	  Zolov,	  2000,	  
p.	  193).	  
This	   declaration	   sought	   to	   outlaw	   the	   region’s	   communist	   parties.	   While	   many	  
nations	   outlawed	   communism	   prior	   to	   the	   Bogotázo	   for	   domestic	   reasons,	   full	  
eradication	   was	   expected	   after	   this	   document.	   The	   OAS	   also	   committed	   to	  
condemn	  the	  USSR	  at	  the	  UN.	  Any	  government	  who	  “suppressed	  political	  and	  civil	  
rights”	  was	  to	  earn	  the	  condemnation	  of	  the	  OAS	  at	  the	  UN	  (OAS	  as	  cited	  in	  Holden	  
and	  Zolov,	  2000,	  p.	  194).	  In	  order	  to	  ensure	  unanimous	  support,	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  
“standard	   of	   living”	   was	   set	   as	   a	   goal	   in	   the	   war	   against	   communism	   (OAS	   in	  
Holden	   and	   Zolov,	   2000,	   p.	   194).	   Yet	   no	   practical	   measures	   were	   proposed	   or	  
carried	  out.	  The	  final	  commitment	   imposed	  upon	  the	  OAS	  members	  was	  the	  “full	  
exchange	  of	  information”	  regarding	  indigenous	  communist	  organisations	  (OAS	  	  as	  
cited	  in	  Holden	  and	  Zolov,	  2000,	  p.	  194).	  
Latin	   American	   diplomats	   attempted	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	   US	  
intelligence	  during	  WWII.	  The	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  FBI	  undermined	  their	  concept	  
of	  national	  security	  and	  sovereignty.	  Additionally,	  domestic	  Latin	  American	  issues	  
had	  no	  potential	  to	  threaten	  the	  security	  of	  the	  global	  hegemon.	  Accordingly,	  Latin	  
American	  affairs	  served	  no	  ‘security’	  purpose	  against	  an	  external	  enemy.	  The	  CIA	  
inherited	   a	   difficult	   intelligence	   landscape	   (Weiner,	   2007,	   pp.	   3-­‐15).	   Despite	  
Washington’s	   problems	   with	   the	   USSR,	   the	   states	   of	   Latin	   America	   protested	  
against	   the	   foreign	   surveillance	   of	   their	   domestic	   politics	   as	   both	   irrelevant	   and	  
intrusive	   upon	   their	   sovereignty	   (Baulac,	   1948;	   Pogue,	   1989,	   p.	   385).	   However,	  
many	   in	   Latin	   America	   did	   not	   grasp	   that	   the	   US	  was	   not	   protecting	   itself	   from	  
external	   enemies;	   rather,	   it	   was	   protecting	   its	   sphere	   of	   influence	   from	   internal	  
enemies	   of	   its	   own	   interests.	   In	   this	   respect,	   intelligence	  was	   the	  most	   powerful	  
weapon	   in	   its	   arsenal.	   By	   guaranteeing	   a	   “full	   exchange	   of	   information,”	   the	   CIA	  
was	  given	   full	  access	   to	  Latin	  America	   intelligence	   for	   the	   first	   time	  (Holden	  and	  
Zolov,	   2000,	   p.	   194;	   Weiner,	   2007,	   p.	   65).	   Communism	   was	   the	   pretext	   that	  
justified	   this.	   Firstly,	   the	   CIA	   could	   force	   Latin	   Americans	   to	   outlaw	   communist	  
parties	  and	  extradite	   its	   leaders.	  Secondly,	   the	  CIA	  could	  monitor	  the	  actions	  and	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policies	   of	   governments	   and	  political	   parties,	  which	  would	   report	   directly	   to	   the	  
NSC,	   of	   which	   the	   CIA	   director	   is	   a	   member,	   on	   which	   leaders	   were	   the	   most	  
desirable	  in	  individual	  nations.	  Thirdly,	  the	  CIA	  could	  provide	  support	  to	  preferred	  
political	  movements	  and	  leaders,	  leading	  to	  the	  dozens	  of	  the	  military	  coups	  which	  
define	   the	   Cold	   War	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Finally,	   the	   CIA	   could	   eventually	   act	  
unilaterally,	   with	   “plausible	   deniability”	   of	   US	   action,	   to	   eliminate	   unsavoury	  
political	  actors	  (Greenberg,	  2007,	  p.	  692).	  While	  it	  took	  several	  years	  for	  the	  CIA	  to	  
become	  fully	  operational,	  its	  access	  to	  Latin	  American	  politics	  would	  not	  have	  been	  
as	   extensive	   without	   the	   Colombian	   Bogotázo	   and	   the	   corresponding	   anti-­‐
communist	  declaration.	  
	  
The	  Cold	  War	  
The	  Latin	  American	  Cold	  War	  theatre	  was	  isolated	  from	  the	  global	  struggle	  
between	  communism	  and	  capitalism.79	  Rather,	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America	  was	  
a	   continental	   civil	  war	   between	   the	   region’s	   social	   classes.	   From	   1941-­‐1948	   the	  
lower	   classes	   were	   winning,	   and	   authoritarianism	  was	   in	   decline.	   Social	   reform	  
was	  prioritised	   throughout	   the	   hemisphere	  with	   populism	   also	   increasing,	   along	  
with	  self-­‐determination.	  Political	  leaders	  were	  utilising	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  masses	  to	  
consolidate	   democratic	   rule.	   In	   most	   cases,	   the	   unions	   became	   stronger	  
(Greenfield	   and	   Maram,	   1987,	   pp.	   3-­‐15).	   Revolutionary	   Mexico	   had	   set	   the	  
precedent	   for	   resource	   and	   land	   reform	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   foreign	   capital.	   The	  
oligarchy	   was	   receding;	   while	   it	   remained	   economically	   powerful,	   it	   reluctantly	  
forfeited	  much	  of	  its	  political	  power.	  A	  new	  modern	  Latin	  America	  was	  envisaged.	  
The	  populist	  leaders	  relied	  upon	  US	  promises	  of	  support	  and	  economic	  assistance;	  
however,	  when	  this	  support	  was	  refused,	  the	  region	  reached	  an	  impasse.	  It	  could	  
continue	   its	  development	  projects	   independently,	  at	   the	  expense	  of	  US	   trade	  and	  
investment,	   or	   it	   could	  withdraw	  promises	   of	   development	   from	   the	   campesinos	  
and	   return	   to	   oligarchic	   and	   militaristic	   control.	   Each	   nation’s	   response	   to	   this	  
impasse	  was	  unique.	  Despite	  this	  the	  US	  adopted	  a	  universal	  policy,	  supporting	  the	  
region-­‐wide	  regression	  of	   social	   reform	  and	  economic	  development	   in	  pursuit	  of	  
American	  economic	   interests	  during	   the	  Cold	  War.	  Those	  nations	  who	  defied	   the	  
US	   were	   labelled,	   to	   varying	   degrees,	   as	   communist.	   The	   US	   chose	   the	   side	   of	  
regress	   over	   progress	   in	   the	   Cold	  War	   to	   ensure	   its	   regional	   interests	   remained	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  Until	  at	  least	  1961.	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secure.	   Its	   pretext	   was	   communism.	   However,	   as	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Bogotázo	  
demonstrates,	  this	  was	  a	  purposeful	  distortion	  of	  events.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  thus	  far	  demonstrated	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  ‘Cold	  War’	  in	  Latin	  
America.	   The	   Colombian	   Bogotázo	   changed	   the	   nature	   of	   that	   struggle,	   and	  
Marshall’s	   declaration	   regionalised	   and	   globalized	   the	   ‘Cold	   War.’	   This	   led	   to	   a	  
rapid	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  US	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  Latin	  America	  between	  1948	  and	  
1950.	   By	   supporting	   oligarchic	   regression	   over	   social	   democracy	   and	   other	  
progressive	   movements,	   the	   US	   gained	   several	   advantages.	   The	   Cold	   War	   also	  
permanently	   altered	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘national	   security’.	   Traditional	   wars	   had	  
focussed	  upon	  external	  political	  enemies.	  The	  1823	  Monroe	  Doctrine	  had	  sought	  to	  
discourage	   French	   and	   Russian	   re-­‐colonisation	   of	   independent	   Latin	   America	  
(May,	   1975,	   p.	   211).	   The	   1895	   Fish	   Memorandum	   had	   sought	   to	   prevent	   the	  
colonies	  of	  weak	  European	  powers	  passing	   into	   the	  hands	  of	  powerful	  European	  
states	  (Perkins,	  1966,	  p.	  25).	  The	  Roosevelt	  (1904)	  Corollary	  had	  sought	  to	  prevent	  
European	   aggression	   from	   defaulting	   against	   Latin	   American	   states.	   The	   1938	  
Declaration	   of	   Lima	   had	   stated	   that	   an	   attack	   on	   one	   American	   state	   would	   be	  
retaliated	  against	  by	  all	  American	  states	  (Inter-­‐American	  States,	  1938).	  However,	  
after	  WWII	   there	  were	   no	   credible	   threats	   to	   American	   territorial	   integrity.	   The	  
primary	   focus	  of	  US	   ‘security’	  became	   internal	  Latin	  American	  politics.	  While	   the	  
pretext	   was	   communism,	   the	   reality	   was	   quite	   different.	   The	   creation	   of	   a	  
permanent	  wartime	   economy	  made	   the	   subjugation	   of	   Latin	   America	   a	   national	  
priority.	   It	   required	   passivity	   in	   regard	   to	   resource	   extraction,	  military	   relations	  
and	   diplomatic	   support	   (Kennan,	   1950).	   The	   expansion	   of	   intelligence,	   military	  
training,	   military	   funding	   and	   arms	   sales	   made	   many	   Latin	   American	   states	  
appendages	  of	  US	  imperial	  policy.	  The	  army	  was	  not	  built	  up	  to	  protect	  against	  a	  
foreign	  threat;	  it	  was	  bolstered	  to	  ensure	  that	  ‘internal	  enemies’	  were	  monitored,	  
persecuted	   and	   demonised.	   All	   persons	   antithetical	   to	   US	   imperial	   policy	   were	  
labelled	  as	  communists.	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The	   Miller	   Doctrine:	   The	   Conservative	   Counter-­‐Revolution	   in	  
Latin	  America	  
This	  chapter	  explains	  how	  an	  expanded	  Cold	  War	  theatre	  was	  imposed	  upon	  Latin	  
America	   between	   1948	   and	   1952.	   The	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   was	   installed	  
through	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  OAS	  in	  1948.	  Over	  the	  next	  four	  years,	  the	  Truman	  
administration	   reconfigured	   US	   foreign	   policy	   to	   confront	   ‘communism’	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   George	   Kennan	   (1950),	   Louis	   Halle	   (1950)	   and	   Francis	   Truslow	   were	  
influential	   in	   the	   development	   of,	   what	  would	   come	   to	   be	   known	   as,	   the	   ‘Miller	  
Doctrine’	  (Truslow	  as	  cited	  in	  Schmitz,	  1999,	  p.	  156).	  In	  1950,	  US	  Undersecretary	  
of	  State	   for	   Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  Edward	  G	  Miller	  asserted,	   “we	   today	  consider	  
any	  attempt	  to	  extend	  the	  communist	  system	  to	  any	  portion	  of	  this	  hemisphere	  as	  
dangerous	   to	   our	   peace	   and	   safety,”	   further	   authorising,	   “certain	   protective	  
measures”	   (G	   Smith,	   1994,	   p.	   71-­‐72).	  Miller	   had	   deconstructed	  Hull’s	   1933	   non-­‐
interventionist	   policy	   by	   1950,	   the	   effects	   of	   which	   are	   evident	   throughout	   the	  
Latin	  American	  Cold	  War.	  This	  chapter	  will	  analyse	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  policy	  shift.	  It	  
will	   also	   seek	   to	   explain	   the	   relationship	   between	   Latin	   American	   governments	  
promoting	   economic	   nationalism	   and	   the	   US.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   will	   examine	   the	  
political-­‐economic	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  visions	   for	   the	  hemisphere.	  This	  
chapter	  will	   then	   detail	   the	   conservative	  military	   coups	   in	   Colombia,	   Venezuela,	  
Peru,	  Cuba,	  Haiti	  and	  Paraguay.	  It	  will	  argue	  that	  each	  of	  these	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  and	  Washington’s	  policy	  reversals	  under	  the	  ‘Miller	  
Doctrine.’	   Finally,	   this	   chapter	  will	   present	   its	   conclusions	   on	   the	   causes	   of	   anti-­‐
communism	   in	   Latin	   America.	   It	   will	   argue	   that	   the	   US	   sought	   to	   keep	   Latin	  
America	  as	  a	  dependent	  appendage	  of	  the	  global	  capitalist	  economy	  in	  the	  service	  
of	  the	  Cold	  War	  against	  the	  USSR.	  
	  
Anti-­‐communism	  and	  US	  Policy	  Development	  
US	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  was	  defined	  by	  anti-­‐communism	  during	  the	  
second	  Truman	  administration.	  Steinberg	  (1984)	  argues	  that	   the	  purge	  of	   the	  US	  
State	   Department	   created	   “a	   mental	   straightjacket”	   that	   dictated	   all	   facets	   of	  
foreign	   policy	   (p.	   59).	   He	   continues	   that	   the	   “unfolding	   of	   the	   loyalty	  
program…served	  to	  maintain	  the	  generalised	  atmosphere	  of	   fear”	   in	  the	  US	  State	  
Department	  (Steinberg,	  1984,	  p.	  59).	  Boyle	  (2005)	  asserts	  that	  “the	  deep	  fears	  and	  
anxieties	  of	  America	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  created	  the	  irrationality	  of	  the	  Red	  Scare”	  (p.	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21).	   The	   chronological	   association	   between	   the	   domestic	   red	   scare	   and	   the	  
regression	   of	   US	   State	   Department	   policy	   towards	   Latin	   America	   is	   not	   a	  
coincidence.	   The	   US	   State	   Department	   changed	   between	   1947	   and	   1952.	   Its	  
members	  were	  forced	  to	  commit	  their	  steadfast	  loyalty	  to	  the	  US	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  
McCarthyite	  witch-­‐hunt.	   The	   liberalism	   that	   Schwartzberg	   (2003)	   claims	   defines	  
the	   early	   Cold	   War	   Latin	   American	   bureau	   was	   reversed.	   Anti-­‐communism	  
superseded	   pro-­‐Democratic	   sentiments	   in	   the	   Latin	   American	   bureau.	   The	  
replacement	   of	   Braden	  with	   the	   corporate	   lawyer,	  Miller,	   exemplifies	   this	   point.	  
Anti-­‐communism	  was	   confirmed	   as	   hemispheric	   policy	   by	   1949.	   Arévalo	   (1963)	  
claims	  that	  anti-­‐communism	  is	  “more	  than	  a	  doctrine,	  more	  than	  a	  political	  theory,	  
it	  wears	  the	  garb	  of	  a	  practical	  tool…a	  barricade	  to	  hold	  back	  social	  progress…”	  (p.	  
36).	   This	   is	   confirmed	   by	   Niblo	   (2006),	   who	   identified	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  
“communist	  line”	  in	  US	  critique	  of	  economic	  nationalism	  in	  Latin	  America	  (p.	  231).	  
This	   section	   will	   detail	   the	   evolution	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Latin	  
America	  during	  the	  second	  Truman	  administration,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  anti-­‐
communism	  as	  an	  international	  discourse.	  	  
One	   cannot	   percieve	   US	   anti-­‐communist	   policies	   towards	   Latin	   America	  
without	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   context	   of	   US	   domestic	   politics.	   The	   perceived	  
failures	   of	   the	   Truman	   administration	   to	   contain	   communism	   in	   Eurasia	  
radicalised	  the	  US	  Republican	  Party	  (Belfrage,	  1989,	  p.	  117).	  The	  perceived	  ‘loss’	  of	  
China	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   result	   of	   weakness	   and	   subversion	   within	   the	   US	   State	  
Department.	  To	  combat	  these	  incorrect	  charges,	  Truman	  attacked	  the	  far	  left	  of	  US	  
politics,	  demanding	  “unswerving	  loyalty	  to	  the	  United	  States”	  (Steinberg,	  1984,	  p.	  
27).	  In	  late	  1947	  the	  FBI	  targeted	  US	  communists	  and	  progressives,	  including	  the	  
influential	  New	  Dealer	  Henry	  Wallace	   (Steinberg,	   1984,	   p.	   27).	   Steinberg	   (1984)	  
argues:	  	  
The	   paradox	   of	   the	   communist	   issue	   during	   the	   Cold	   War	   was	   that	  
American	  communists	  were	  almost	  universally	  defined	  as	  representing	  no	  
danger	   to	   the	   United	   States,	   but	   their	   presence	   was	   used	   to	   fabricate	   a	  
sufficient	   hysteria	   to	   create	   an	   American	   mental	   straight	   jacket	   on	   both	  
domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  (p.	  59).	  
The	  membership	  of	   the	  CPUSA	  had	  peaked	  during	  WWII	  under	   the	   leadership	  of	  
Browder,	   who	   effectively	   collaborated	   with	   members	   of	   the	   Roosevelt	  
administration	   (Ryan,	   1997,	   p.	   232).	   As	   World	   War	   turned	   to	   Cold	   War,	   the	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relevance	   of	   the	   communists	   decreased	   within	   American	   politics.	   Despite	   this	  
reality,	  the	  Republicans	  continued	  their	  attacks	  on	  Truman’s	  handling	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War	  (Belfrage,	  1989,	  p.	  119).	  Truman	  began	  dismantling	  the	  American	  communist	  
movement	   through	  mass	  deportations	  and	  police	  action	   (Steinberg,	  1984,	  p.	  51).	  
However,	  this	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  quell	  public	  fear.	  In	  1950	  the	  Republicans	  swept	  
anti-­‐communist	   paranoia	   through	   both	   houses	   of	   Congress	   (Belfrage,	   1989,	   p.	  
137).	  Wisconsin	   Senator	  George	  McCarthy	  was	  a	   vociferous	   critic	   of	   the	  Truman	  
administration	   (Schrecker,	  1998,	  p.	  241).	  His	   anti-­‐communist	  witch-­‐hunt	  of	  both	  
political	  and	  civilian	  agencies	  and	  individuals	  led	  to	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	  anti-­‐
communism	  in	  both	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  (Schrecker,	  1998,	  pp240-­‐265).	  	  
Domestic	   politics	   directly	   influenced	   the	   US	   State	   Department.	  
Washington’s	  priorities	  were	  given	  precedence	  over	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  
Latin	  America.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  perceived	  ‘threat’	  of	  global	  communism,	  Truman	  
defined	   his	   foreign	   policy	   as	   the	   “support	   [of]	   free	   peoples	   who	   are	   resisting	  
attempted	   subjugation	   by	   armed	   minorities	   or	   by	   outside	   pressure”	   (Freeland,	  
1985,	   p.	   85).	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Dean	   Acheson	   sent	   the	   European	   expert	   George	  
Kennan	  to	  examine	  the	  potential	  of	  communism	  in	  Latin	  America	  in	  1950	  (Beisner,	  
2006,	  p.	  571).	  Kennan’s	  appointment	  demonstrates	  the	  structural	  weakness	  of	  the	  
US’	  approach	  to	  Latin	  America.	  By	  assuming	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  European	  
conflict	  and	  events	  in	  Latin	  America,	  the	  US	  was	  neglecting	  Latin	  America’s	  actual	  
place	  in	  the	  world.	  Kennan	  admitted,	  in	  his	  1948	  study	  of	  global	  communism,	  that	  
he	  had	  omitted	  Latin	  America	  due	  to	  an	  ignorance	  of	  the	  area	  (as	  cited	  in	  G.	  Smith,	  
1984,	  p.	  68).	  Kennan	  was	  a	   ‘Cold	  Warrior’	  who	  had	  served	  as	  ambassador	   to	   the	  
USSR;	  his	  understanding	  of	  Latin	  American	  politics	  was	  negligible.	  His	  first	  trip	  to	  
Latin	  America	  occurred	  in	  1950.	  There,	  he	  found	  substantial	  differences	  between	  
European	  and	  Latin	  American	  radicals.	  He	  stated	  “most	  people	  who	  go	  by	  the	  name	  
communist	   in	   Latin	   America	   are	   a	   somewhat	   different	   species	   than	   in	   Europe”	  
(Kennan,	  1950).	  While	  he	  suggested	  that	  communism	  was	  a	  serious	  manifestation,	  
“anti-­‐Americanism”	   seemed	   a	   larger	   threat	   to	   US	   interests	   than	   communism	  
(Kennan,	  1950).	  He	  recognised	  that	  Latin	  American	  poverty	  generated	  the	  greatest	  
revolutionary	   potential	   and	   recommended	   substantial	   humanitarian	   aid	   to	  
improve	   the	   image	   of	   the	   US	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Despite	   his	   findings,	   which	  
suggested	  only	  a	  limited	  threat	  to	  hemispheric	  security	  from	  communism,	  Kennan	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(1950)	  proposed	  a	  realist	  approach	  to	  Latin	  American	  diplomacy	  in	  1950.	  He	  saw	  
the	  vital	  interests	  of	  the	  US	  in	  Latin	  America,	  as	  many	  had	  before	  him.	  	  
Kennan	  defined	  US	  interests	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  policies	  that	  had	  to	  be	  
employed	  to	  ensure	  them.	  Firstly,	  he	  identified	  the	  significance	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  
to	  US	  moral	  leadership.	  Kennan	  stated	  that	  	  
People	   will	   not	   be	   inclined	   to	   believe	   that	   communist	   penetration	   bears	  
serious	  dangers	  for	  them,	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  no	  tangible	  evidence	  in	  that	  
direction…[and	   that]…if	   the	  countries	  of	  Latin	  America	  should	  come	   to	  be	  
generally	  dominated	  by	  an	  outlook	  which	  views	  our	  country	  as	  the	  root	  of	  
all	   evil	   and	   sees	   salvation	   only	   in	   the	   destruction	   of	   our	   power…[the	  
American	   global	   political	   program]…	   could	   not	   be	   successful	   (Kennan,	  
1950).	  
Kennan	  saw	  communism	  as	  only	  one	  facet	  of	  Washington’s	  hemispheric	  challenge.	  
Secondly,	  he	  (1950)	  argued	  that	  trade	  was	  central	  to	  US	  interests	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
He	   admitted	   that	   many	   of	   the	   corporate	   practices	   of	   US	   capitalists	   were	  
detrimental	   to	   certain	  national	  political	   economies	  and	   the	  US’	   image	   in	  general.	  
However,	   it	   is	   significant	   that	   in	   this	   classified	   document	   Kennan	   (1950)	   also	  
stated	   “no	  one	  must	  ever	  admit	   it”.	  Kennan	  suggested	   that	   the	  State	  Department	  
should	   regulate	   those	   foreign	   business	   that	   motivate	   anti-­‐American	   sentiments.	  
Thirdly,	   he	   insisted	   that	   US	   companies	   should	   monopolise	   Latin	   American	  
commodities	   to	   starve	   the	   Soviets	   of	   vital	   raw	  materials.	   To	   achieve	   these	   three	  
goals,	  Kennan	  (1950)	  advised	  Truman	  to	  “create…incentives	  which	  will	  impel	  the	  
governments	   and	   societies	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   countries	   to	   resist	   communist	  
pressures”.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	  US	   significantly	   increased	   their	   financial	   and	  military	  
support	  of	  unconstitutional	  governments	  who	  staunchly	  opposed	  communism.	  
To	  explain	  this	  contradiction,	  the	  SD	  official	  Louis	  Halle	  supported	  Kennan’s	  
“Corollary	  to	  the	  Monroe	  Doctrine”	  (Y,	  1950,	  pp.	  565-­‐580).	  As	  Kennan	  had	  done	  in	  
1946,	  Halle	  wrote	  anonymously	   to	   the	   influential	  Foreign	  Affairs	   journal	   in	  1950	  
under	  the	  pseudonym	  “y”.	  The	  ‘y’	  telegram	  supported	  Kennan’s	  assertions	  through	  
an	   examination	   of	   Latin	   American	   politics.	   Halle	   publicised	   US	   support	   for	  
dictatorial	   regimes	  by	   arguing	   that	   Latin	  American	   countries	  were	  not	   ready	   for	  
democracy	   (Y,	   1950,	   p.	   578).	   Halle	   examined	   the	   rise	   of	   radicalism,	   particularly	  
communism,	  within	  democratic	  states.	  According	  to	  Halle	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The	  ferment	  of	  new	  ideas	  –	  ideas	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  democracy,	  ideas	  
emphasising	   emancipating	   from	   the	  United	   States	   among	   other	   sources	   –	  
contributes	  to	  [Latin	  American]	  instability,	  as	  it	  also	  does	  to	  their	  progress	  
(Y,	  1950,	  p.	  578).	  
Until	   the	   Latin	   Americans	   could	   operate	   a	   political	   system	   that	   deemphasised	  
economic	  and	  social	  democracy,	  the	  US	  should	  cease	  to	  promote	  civilian	  rule.	  For	  
Halle,	   security	   and	   “stability”	   were	   more	   important	   than	   Wilsonian	   idealism	  
promoting	   liberal	   and	   social	   democracy	   (Y,	   1950,	   p.	   579).	   Halle’s	   view	   was	  
supported	   by	   Policy	   Planning	   staff	   member	   Francis	   Truslow,	   who	   made	   a	  
distinction	  between	  “a	  dictatorship	  such	  as	   [Anastasio]	  Somoza’s,	  which	   involves	  
autocratic	   rule	   and	   totalitarianism,	  which	  we	   define	   as	   autocratic	   rule	   plus	   total	  
absolute	  control	  of	  economic	  life,	  as	  for	  example	  communism”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Schmitz,	  
1999,	  p.	  156).	  Halle	  and	  Truslow	  explicitly	  gave	  their	  support	  to	  authoritarian	  rule	  
in	  their	  struggle	  against	  Latin	  American	  communism.	  Given	  the	  consensus	  in	  1950	  
that	   communism	   was	   a	   legitimate	   enemy,	   the	   US	   gave	   preference	   over	  
authoritarian	  regimes	  to	  democratic	  ones.	  
Truman	   entrusted	   this	   radical	   evolution	   in	   foreign	   policy	   to	   Miller	  
(Schwartzberg,	  2003,	  p.	  196).	  Miller	  sought	  to	  undermine	  all	   legacies	  of	  the	  Good	  
Neighbour	  Policy	  of	  1933	  by	  refuting	   the	  Montevideo	   treaty	  on	  non-­‐intervention	  
(Schwartzberg,	   2003,	   p.	   198).80	  By	   1950,	   internal	   and	   external	   threats	   to	   Latin	  
American	  security	  were	  blurred.	  According	  to	  Miller,	  the	  use	  of	  ‘collective	  force’	  to	  
combat	   communists	   “far	   from	   representing	   intervention…is	   the	   alternate	   to	  
intervention”	   (Lafeber,	   1984,	   p.	   437).	   The	   ‘Miller	   Doctrine’	   committed	   the	   US	   to	  
protecting	   the	   status	   quo	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Through	   sufficient	   anti-­‐communist	  
propaganda	   the	   US	   could	   intervene	   in	   any	   sovereign	   state	   that	   challenged	   its	  
political,	   economic	   or	  military	   dominance	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Additionally,	   the	   US	  
expanded	   the	   Military	   Assistance	   Program	   (MAP)	   during	   the	   second	   Truman	  
presidency	   (Pach,	   1991,	   pp.	   29-­‐34).	   The	   MAP	   gave	   favourable	   EXIM	   loans	   to	  
military	   regimes	   in	   alliance	   with	   Washington	   (Pach,	   1991,	   p.	   51).	   During	   the	  
program’s	  first	  five	  years	  Nicaragua	  received	  more	  funding	  than	  any	  other	  nation	  
in	   Latin	   America	   (Gill,	   2006,	   p.	   72).	   The	   US	   was	   actively	   undermining	   the	  
conditions	   for	   democratic	   rule	   in	   Latin	   America	   through	   its	   anti-­‐communist	  
policies.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  Schwartzberg	  (2003)	  asserts	  that	  this	  was	  the	  result	  of	  Miller’s	  “pessimism”	  about	  the	  longevity	  
of	  Latin	  American	  democracy	  (p.	  198).	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Many	   Latin	   American	   governments	   attempted	   to	   prove	   their	   anti-­‐
communist	   commitment	   following	   the	   Colombian	   Bogotázo	   of	   1948.	   Between	  
1947	  and	  1955	  the	  majority	  of	  regional	  Communist	  Parties	  were	  banned.	  Brazil’s	  
1947	   banning	   of	   the	   Prestes	   Communist	   Party	   preceded	   the	   Bogotázo	   (Levine,	  
1998,	   p.	   76).	   In	  many	   countries	   political	   freedoms	  were	   so	   limited	   that	   the	   pre-­‐
1948	   ban	   on	   communism	   was	   a	   concession	   to	   the	   US	   with	   no	   practical	  
application.81	  However,	  the	  Colombian	  Bogotázo	  created	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  
anti-­‐communist	  paranoia	  that	  led	  to	  regional	  bans.	  In	  Chile,	  where	  the	  communists	  
had	  significant	  electoral	  appeal,	   the	  US	  and	  its	  oligarchic	  allies	   feared	  communist	  
influence,	  especially	  amongst	  industrial	  unions.	  The	  1948	  “Law	  for	  the	  Permanent	  
Defence	  of	  Democracy”	  outlawed	  Chilean	  communism	  for	  almost	  a	  decade	  (Drake,	  
1978,	   pp.	   287-­‐289).	   The	   Cuban	   democratic	   government	   of	   Carlos	   Prío	   also	  
outlawed	   communism	   in	   1950	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   119).	   This	   action	   enraged	  
progressive	  Auténtico	  politicians	  such	  as	  Eddy	  Chibás	  (Castro,	  2007,	  p.	  101).	  The	  
violent	   overthrow	   of	   governments	   in	   Venezuela,	   Peru,	   Paraguay,	   Guatemala	   and	  
Argentina	   led	   to	   the	   eradication	   of	   the	   communist	   parties	   in	   those	   countries	  
(Schmitz,	   1999,	   pp.	   155-­‐170).	   The	  only	  major	   Latin	  American	  nations	   to	   avoid	   a	  
complete	  ban	  on	  communists	  were	  Mexico	  and	  Uruguay	  (Alexander,	  1963,	  p.	  146,	  
340).	   By	   late	   1955,	   official	   Communist	   Parties	   and	   groups	   had	   been	   virtually	  
eradicated	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Its	   members	   were	   forced	   underground	   until	  
conditions	   changed	   in	   the	   late	   1950s.	   However,	   anti-­‐communism	   continued	   to	  
serve	  a	  purpose	  for	  the	  US.	  It	  motivated	  an	  evolution	  in	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  
military	  relationship	  between	  the	  continents.	  
	  
The	  US	  and	  Latin	  American	  Economic	  Nationalism	  
The	   CFR	   determined	   Latin	   America’s	   role	   in	   the	   world	   economy	   during	   WWII	  
(Shoup	  and	  Minter,	  1977,	  pp.	  158-­‐166).	  Marshall	  consolidated	  this	  in	  1948	  (Pogue,	  
1989,	   p.	   386).	   This	   role,	   however,	   stood	   in	   direct	   conflict	   with	   the	   US	   wartime	  
rhetoric	   of	   the	   Four	   Freedoms	   and	   the	   Atlantic	   Charter.	   The	   US	   did	   not	   overtly	  
reveal	  its	  economic	  intentions	  at	  the	  regional	  forums.	  Rather,	  it	  set	  about	  achieving	  
its	  goals	  in	  individual	  states	  by	  removing	  barriers	  to	  trade	  and	  inhibitors	  to	  foreign	  
investment	  and	  handicapping	   industrialisation,	  which	  directly	   competed	  with	  US	  
exports.	  Essentially,	  the	  US	  sought	  to	  keep	  Latin	  American	  nations	  in	  a	  relationship	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Most	  notably	  Nicaragua,	  Haiti,	  El	  Salvador	  and	  the	  Dominican	  Republic.	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of	  dependency,	  without	  control	  of	  their	  economic	  output	  (So,	  1990,	  p.	  90).	  The	  US	  
ensured	  itself	  access	  to	  vital	  raw	  materials	  and	  markets	  for	  industrial	  output	  while	  
retaining	   its	   significantly	  positive	   terms	  of	   trade	  with	   the	   region.	  This	  was	  made	  
possible	   through	   the	   official	   doctrine	   of	   anti-­‐communism.	   In	   its	   dealings	   with	  
Mexico,	  the	  US,	  
Inadvertently	   revealed	   the	   real	   importance	   of	   the	   communist	   Party	   in	  
Mexico	  by	  shifting	  their	  reports	  from	  party	  activity	  to	  what	  they	  called	  the	  
communist	  line,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  any	  radical	  ideas	  they	  disapproved	  of	  (Niblo,	  
2001,	  p.	  284).	  	  
Economic	  development	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  social	  reform	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  
However,	  economic	  development	   in	  Latin	  America	  disadvantaged	  US	  private	  and	  
public	   interests.	  Many	   ‘radical’	   ideas	   that	   came	   to	   be	   defined	   as	   the	   ‘communist	  
line’	   were	   pragmatic	   development	   strategies	   implemented	   by	   the	   US	   during	   the	  
nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  Great	  Depression	  in	  the	  1930s.	  Economic	  nationalism	  
was	   adopted	   by	   both	   social	   democrats	   and	   left-­‐base	   populists	   in	   the	   post-­‐WWII	  
years,	  to	  the	  protestations	  of	  the	  US.	  
The	   three	   primary	   forms	   of	   economic	   nationalism	   prevalent	   from	   1938	  
until	  1948	  were	  commodity	  control,	   labour	  control	  and	  market	  control.	  All	   three	  
were	   detrimental	   to	   the	   US	   economy	   and	   liberal-­‐internationalist	   policy.	  
Commodity	   control	   involved:	   the	   expropriation	   of	   foreign-­‐owned	   mineral	  
reserves;	   the	   predetermination	   of	   economic	   activities	   through	   government-­‐
initiated	   industrial	   or	   agrarian	   development;	   and	   price	   manipulation	   through	  
government	   control	   of	   commodities,	   such	   as	   coffee.	   These	   actions	  were	   directly	  
witnessed	  in	  Brazil	  under	  Vargas,	  in	  Venezuela	  under	  Betancourt	  and	  in	  Argentina	  
under	   Perón	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   pp.	   257-­‐258;	   Bourne,	   1974,	   p.	   166;	   Bucheli	   and	  
Aguilar,	  2010,	  pp.	  366-­‐370).	  Commodity	  control	  returned	  economic	  sovereignty	  to	  
Latin	   American	   states	   and	   was	   labelled	   as	   ‘communist	   by	   the	   US.	   This	   level	   of	  
economic	   independence	   set	   a	   dangerous	   regional	   precedent.	   Labour	   control	  
involved	   the	   improvement	  of	  working	  conditions	   in	  domestic	  and	   foreign-­‐owned	  
industries.	   Mexico	   set	   the	   precedent	   of	   a	   modern	   ‘labour	   code’	   within	   its	   1917	  
constitution.	   After	   WWII,	   many	   other	   Latin	   American	   leaders	   sought	   to	   offer	  
increased	  wages	  and	  conditions	  in	  exchange	  for	  electoral	  support.	  Modern	  Labour	  
codes	  were	   implemented	   in	   Guatemala,	   Brazil	   and	  Argentina	   between	   1945	   and	  
1948	   (Grow,	  2008,	  p.	   11;	  Dulles,	   1967,	  p.	   284;	  Rock,	  1986,	  p.	   259).	  The	  populist	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leaders	   of	   Argentina	   and	   Brazil	   also	   increased	   the	   minimum	   wage	   on	   multiple	  
occasions	   to	   garner	   increased	   electoral	   support.	   This	   conformed	   to	   the	   US	  
conception	   of	   the	   ‘communist	   line’	   as	   workers	   received	   a	   higher	   proportion	   of	  
national	   income.	  Market	  control	   involved	   the	  regulation	  of	  commodities	  entering	  
the	  domestic	  markets.	  This	  involved	  close	  collaboration	  between	  state	  and	  private	  
sectors,	  and	  was	  most	  prominent	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  (Schneider,	  2004,	  p.	  69,	  
177).	  Both	  nations	  attempted	  to	  expand	  their	  economies	  through	  the	  consumption	  
of	   domestically	   produced	   goods.	   This	   decreased	   their	   participation	   in	   the	   global	  
capitalist	   economy,	   again	   conforming	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   ‘communist	   line’	   (in	  
Niblo,	  2006,	  p.	  284).	  Economic	  nationalism	  challenged	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  in	  
Latin	   America	   through	   its	   efforts	   to	   improve	   the	   lives	   of	   its	   citizens,	  while	   anti-­‐
communism	  justified	  the	  US’	  prolonged	  struggle	  against	  it.	  
The	  US	  established	  global	  institutions	  to	  ensure	  its	  pre-­‐eminence	  following	  
WWII.	  These	  US	  institutions	  stood	  in	  direct	  conflict	  to	  the	  economic	  theories	  of	  the	  
Bretton	  Woods	  Conference	  and	   its	   chief	   theoretician	  Lord	  Milton	  Keynes	   (James,	  
1996,	   p.	   45).	   Keynes	   foresaw	   a	   world	   economy	   that	   ensured	   maximum	  
employment	   in	  every	  nation	   (James,	  1996,	  p.	  41).	  To	  ensure	   this,	  he	   suggested	  a	  
global	   economy	   based	   on	   thirty	   key	   resources,	   including	   oil,	   gold,	   other	  mineral	  
extracts	  and	  agricultural	  products	  (Raffner	  and	  Singer,	  2001,	  p.	  5).	  The	  creation	  of	  
a	   fixed	   value	   for	   all	   goods	   would	   stabilise	   the	   exporting	   economies	   of	   the	  
developing	  world	  (Raffner	  and	  Singer,	  2001,	  p.	  5).	  Nations	  could	  plan	  their	  export	  
output	  –	  for	  example	  of	  sugar	  and	  coffee	  –	  on	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	   fixed	  price	  for	  
commodities.	  The	  US	  resisted	  this	  plan	  as	  it	  imposed	  regulation	  on	  an	  unrestricted	  
‘free’	  global	  economy.	  As	  the	  US	  had	  triumphed	  in	  WWII,	  it	  possessed	  a	  free	  hand	  
in	   designing	   the	   post-­‐war	   global	   economy	   through	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	  
International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF),	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development82	  and	   the	   General	   Agreement	   on	   Tariffs	   and	   Trade	   (GATT)	   (James,	  
1999,	  pp.	  41-­‐53).	  Each	  played,	  and	  plays,	  a	  role	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  US	  ideology	  
within	   the	  world	   economic	   system.	   The	   IMF	   regulates	   currency	   and	   holds	   at	   its	  
core	  the	  US	  dollar	  (Eichengreen,	  2007	  p.	  11).	  All	  currencies	  are	  valued	  in	  relation	  
to	   the	   US	   dollar,	   which	   became	   the	   global	   currency	   after	   WWII. 83 	  The	   IMF	  
discourages	   inflationary	  economic	  policies	   that	   threaten	   trade	  (Bandow,	  1992,	  p.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Later	  known	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  (WB)	  (Bandow,	  1992,	  p.	  17).	  
83	  The	  US	  dollar	  gradually	  replaced	  gold	  as	  the	  fixed	  global	  currency	  after	  WWII	  (Eichengreen,	  
2007,	  p.	  11).	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21).	   As	  most	   development	   policies	   require	   at	   least	   a	   modest	   devaluation	   of	   the	  
currency,	  the	  IMF	  was	  designed	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  economic	  relations.	  
At	   its	  core,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  WB	  were	  “mutually	  complementary”	  as	  they	  assisted	  
states	   with	   a	   “short-­‐term	   balance	   of	   payments”	   and	   the	   “longer-­‐term	   flow	   of	  
credit”	  (James,	  1996,	  p.	  47).	  The	  WB	  is	  modelled	  on	  the	  US	  EXIM	  bank	  (Raffner	  and	  
Singer,	  1999,	  p.	  3).	  It	  is	  designed	  to	  encourage	  ‘development’	  programs	  that	  do	  not	  
challenge	   international	   trade.	   Only	   nations	   with	   ‘responsible’	   free	   market	  
economies	  are	  eligible,	  ensuring	  the	  pliability	  of	  the	  developing	  world.	  The	  GATT	  is	  
designed	   to	  promote	  global	   free	   trade	  (Freeland,	  1985,	  p.	  33).	  While	   tariffs	  were	  
still	  significant	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  GATT	  was	  to	  create	  a	  
world	   without	   trading	   barriers.	   The	   US	   set	   about	   creating	   a	   global	   Open	   Door	  
Policy	  as	  the	  victor	  of	  WWII.	  As	  it	  was	  the	  most	  developed	  nation	  on	  earth,	  the	  US	  
stood	  to	  gain	  the	  most	  from	  the	  system.	  
Economic	   policy	   was	   the	   key	   agenda	   at	   the	   Bogotá	   conference	   of	   1948	  
(Coleman,	   2008,	   p.	   54).	   The	   US	   had	   recognised	   the	   Latin	   American	   desire	   for	  
development	  assistance	  prior	  to	  the	  conference	  (Marshall	  as	  cited	  in	  Pogue,	  1989,	  
p.	   383).	   US	   wartime	   rhetoric	   indicated	   that	   this	   assistance	   would	   be	   provided	  
(Roosevelt	  as	  cited	   in	  Gellman,	  1979,	  p.	  157).	   If	  Latin	  America	  sought	   to	  develop	  
they	   would	   be	   reliant	   upon	   a	   European-­‐style	   loan	   program,	   however,	   George	  
Marshall	   announced	   in	   Bogotá	   that	   there	   would	   be	   “no	   Marshall	   Plan	   for	   the	  
Western	   Hemisphere”	   (Coleman,	   2008,	   p.	   55).	   He	   continued,	   “European	  
recovery…was	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   Latin	   American	   development	   and	   the	   United	  
States	  only	  had	  the	  resources	  for	  one	  Marshall	  Plan”	  (Coleman,	  2008,	  p.	  55).	  While	  
the	  US	  provided	  a	  modest	  increase	  in	  EXIM	  capacity,	  Marshall’s	  words	  were	  quite	  
revealing	  (Pogue,	  1989,	  p.	  386).	  By	  stating	  that	  industrial	  development	  in	  Europe	  
was	  beneficial	  for	  Latin	  America,	  Marshall	  was	  reasserting	  Latin	  America’s	  role	  in	  
the	   global	   capitalist	   economy.	   Essentially,	   Marshall	   was	   suggesting	   that	   an	  
economic	  boom	  in	  the	   industrial	  economies	  of	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  would	  facilitate	  
increased	   import-­‐export	   exchange	   for	   Latin	   America’s	   raw	   material-­‐producing	  
economies.	   Marshall,	   and	   his	   colleagues,	   determined	   that	   Latin	   America	   was	   to	  
remain	  a	  raw	  material-­‐producing	  appendage	  of	  the	  global	  capitalist	  economy.	  The	  
global	  economic	   institutions	   lacked	  a	  mechanism	   to	  normalise	  global	   commodity	  
prices.	  While	  coffee	  remained	  at	  US88c	  per	  pound	  in	  1953-­‐4,	  the	  rapid	  decrease	  to	  
US36c	  per	  pound	  in	  1958	  demonstrated	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  Latin	  American	  states	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(Dulles,	   1967,	   p.	   315).	   Industrialisation,	   especially	   ISI,	   could	   shelter	   Latin	  
Americans	  from	  the	  full	  effect	  of	  this	  crisis.	  As	  many	  states	  were	  dependent	  upon	  
foreign	   food,	   their	   currency	   exchange	   was	   exhausted	   prior	   to	   any	   capital	  
investment	  (Prebisch	  as	  cited	  in	  So,	  1990,	  pp.	  93-­‐94).	  	  
To	   ensure	   regional	   dependency	   on	   US-­‐manufactured	   goods,	   the	   US	  
attempted	  to	  isolate	  Argentina	  from	  inter-­‐American	  trade	  (Rock,	  1986,	  p.	  265).	  As	  
the	   war	   ended,	   the	   Americans	   resumed	   their	   commercial	   offensive	   in	   Latin	  
America	   and	   purposely	   undercut	   Argentine	  markets	   in	   Brazil,	   Bolivia	   and	   Chile.	  
According	   to	   Rock	   (1986),	   “in	   some	   cases	   the	   Americans	   re-­‐entered	   the	   Latin	  
American	  markets	  with	   the	  deliberate	  aim…of	  destroying	  Argentina’s	  commerce”	  
(p.	   265).	   With	   a	   lack	   of	   export	   revenues,	   Argentina	   struggled	   to	   fulfil	   its	   social	  
commitments,	   and	   was	   forced	   to	   return	   to	   grain	   and	   meat	   exports	   to	   Western	  
Europe	   in	   the	   1950s	   (Rock,	   1983,	   p.	   161).	   This	   dependency	   upon	   export	  
commodities	   inhibited	   Latin	   America’s	   ability	   to	   develop	   independently.	  
Commodity	  prices	  declined	  due	  to	  decolonisation.	  The	  expansion	  of	  US	  trade	  and	  
investment	   into	   Asia,	   the	  Middle	   East	   and	   Africa	   created	   increased	   competition,	  
which	  further	  undermined	  commodity	  prices.	  By	  1950	  Latin	  America’s	  significance	  
in	   the	   world	   capitalist	   economy	   had	   decreased.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   US	   sought	   to	  
maintain	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  hemisphere,	  at	  little	  expense	  to	  itself.	  	  
The	   final	   crisis	   for	   Latin	   American	   economic	   	   of	   this	   era	   concerned	  
investment	   and	   capital	   flight.	   The	   Argentine	   economist	   Raúl	   Prebisch	   first	  
confronted	   the	  problem	  when	  commissioned	  by	   the	  United	  Nations	   to	   lead	   their	  
Economic	   Commission	   for	   Latin	   America	   (ECLA)	   (Whitaker,	   1964,	   p.	   191).	   The	  
ECLA	  was	  responsible	  for	  devising	  strategies	  to	  improve	  the	  economic	  conditions	  
of	   the	  Western	  hemisphere.	   For	   Prebisch,	   the	   fundamental	   obstacle	   to	   economic	  
development	   in	   Latin	  America	   countries	  was	   their	   declining	   terms	   of	   trade	  with	  
the	  developed	  world	  (as	  cited	  in	  Overbeek,	  1999,	  p.	  571).	  Along	  with	  the	  German	  
economist	  Hans	  Singer,	  Prebisch	  developed	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  to	  explain	  the	  
economic	   problems	   of	   the	   “global	   south”	   (Raffner	   and	   Singer,	   2001,	   p.	   17).	  
Prebisch	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  price	  of	  raw	  materials	  has	  historically	  declined	  in	  
relation	   to	   that	   of	   industrial	   goods	   (as	   cited	   in	   Overbeek,	   1999,	   p.	   571).	  
Accordingly,	   economic	   policies	   that	   promote	   further	   primary	   commodity	  
production	  are	  detrimental	  to	  Latin	  America’s	  economic	  prosperity.	  The	  region	  is	  
forced	   to	   create	   larger	  quantities	   of	   goods	   to	   earn	   foreign	   exchange	   sufficient	   to	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purchase	  necessary	  capital	  equipment.	  Additionally,	  the	  mechanisation	  of	  modern	  
industry	   in	   the	   North	   Atlantic	   meant	   that	   less	   labour	   was	   required	   to	   produce	  
more	   profitable	   goods,	   compared	   to	   Latin	   America’s	   stagnated	   production	  
techniques.	  This	  explained	   the	  continuing	  disparity	  of	  wealth	  between	  nations	   in	  
terms	   of	   international	   division	   of	   labour.	   Without	   the	   policies	   espoused	   by	   its	  
economic	  nationalists,	  Latin	  America	  was	  forfeiting	  the	  opportunity	  to	  be	  included	  
as	  developed	  members	  of	  the	  modern	  world	  economy.	  This	  contradiction	  between	  
popular	  demands	  and	  US	  economic	  policy	  contributed	  to	  the	  regional	  regression	  of	  
the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext.	  
	  
The	  Regional	  Regression	  
The	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  led	  to	  a	  continental	  war	  against	  social	  democracy.	  The	  
US	  did	  not	  directly	   stage	   this	  war.	  However,	   it	   facilitated	   the	   conflict	   through	   its	  
diplomatic	  and	  economic	  stance.	  After	  the	  Colombian	  Bogotázo	  the	  inter-­‐American	  
community	   witnessed	   US	   Cold	   War	   diplomacy.	   Whereas	   the	   brief	   period	   of	  
‘Bradenism’	  had	  discouraged	  military	  coups	  against	  democrats,	   the	  US	  developed	  
new	  Cold	  War	  objectives,	  as	  broadly	  outlined	  by	  the	  Kennan	  Corollary	  (1950).	  The	  
primary	   aim	   was	   anti-­‐communism.	   The	   destruction	   of	   communist,	   and	   non-­‐
communist	   progressives	   became	   reasonable	   justification	   for	   a	   military	   coup.	  
Perceived	   anti-­‐communist	   policies	   were	   an	   essential	   task	   for	   Latin	   American	  
leaders	  to	  undermine	  this	  military	  threat.	  Social	  democratic	  parties	  and	  politicians	  
were	  labelled	  as	  communists	  and	  persecuted	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  military	  coups.84	  The	  
US	  also	   sought	   to	   control	   the	  political	   loyalties	  of	   the	   region.	  Diplomatic	   support	  
for	   unconstitutional	   governments	  was	   expedient	   to	   achieving	  hegemony.	  The	  US	  
attempted	  to	  standardise	  military	  “weapons,	  doctrine	  and	  training”	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  
73).	  This	  made	  military	  dictators	  valuable	  allies.	  The	  US	  also	  sought	  to	  re-­‐establish	  
Latin	   American	   political	   and	   economic	   dependency	   that	   had	   been	   temporarily	  
threatened	  by	  the	  democratic	  surge	  of	  1944-­‐1948.	  Moreover,	  the	  US	  motivated	  this	  
regional	   regression	   through	   its	   diplomatic	   policies,	   which	   saw	  military	   coups	   in	  
Colombia,	  Venezuela,	  Peru,	  Cuba,	  Paraguay	  and	  Haiti	  between	  1948	  and	  1954.85	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Pérez	  Jiménez	  labeled	  the	  AD	  “a	  sectarian	  minority	  with	  a	  foreign	  ideology”	  in	  1950	  (as	  cited	  in	  
Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  280).	  Similarly,	  Manuel	  Odría	  claimed	  his	  government	  would	  “eliminate	  the	  
sectarian	  menace,”	  by	  which	  he	  meant	  APRA	  (as	  cited	  in	  Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  184).	  
85	  The	  cases	  of	  Argentina,	  Brazil	  and	  Guatemala	  are	  unique	  and,	  accordingly,	  will	  be	  treated	  with	  
greater	  depth	  in	  Chapter	  6.	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The	   Colombian	   Bogotázo	   motivated	   this	   regional	   regression.	   It	   also	   had	  
direct	   consequences	   for	  Colombian	  politics.	  Although	   the	   assassination	  of	  Gaitán	  
and	  the	  subsequent	  Bogotázo	  did	  not	  cause	  a	  change	  in	  government,	  it	  did	  indicate	  
a	  departure	  from	  civilian	  rule	  in	  Colombia.	  Engulfed	  by	  the	  Civil	  War	  La	  Violencia,	  
the	  Colombian	  President	  Ospina	  Pérez	   initiated	  martial	   law	   in	  April	  1949	   (Szulc,	  
1959,	   p.	   222).	   Pérez	   also	   dissolved	   the	   Colombian	   national	   congress,	   and	   began	  
ruling	   by	   decree	   (Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	   222).	  La	  Violencia	   had	   several	   aspects,	   but	   the	  
most	  significant	  was	  the	  war	  over	  land.	  During	  the	  long	  reign	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  
concessions	   were	   granted	   to	   tenant	   farmers	   to	   produce	   food	   independently	  
(Osterling,	   1989,	   p.	   85).	   However,	   the	   post-­‐WWII	   surge	   in	   coffee	   prices	   made	  
labour	  a	  valuable	  commodity	  (Coleman,	  2008,	  p.	  65).	  Following	  the	  1946	  election	  
the	  Conservatives	  forced	  peasants	  off	  the	  land	  and	  into	  hacienda	  coffee	  production	  
(Rolden,	  2002,	  p.	  15).	  When	  the	  peasants	  resisted,	  they	  were	  met	  by	  the	  Colombian	  
military	  and	  armed	   regional	  militias	  known	  as	   ‘paramilitarties’	   (Rolden,	  2002,	  p.	  
71).	  After	   1948	   this	   conflict	   escalated.	   The	  peasants	   formed	   insurgent	   groups	   to	  
hold	   on	   to	   the	   land,	   while	   the	   paramilitaries	   massacred	   peasants	   who	   resisted.	  
Pérez’	   failed	   policies	   had	   emboldened	   the	   insurgents,	   who	   were	   beginning	   to	  
receive	  vocal	  support	  from	  the	  communists.	  Accordingly,	  the	  US	  gave	  tacit	  support	  
to	  the	  Colombian	  General	  Rojas	  Pinilla	  to	  take	  power	  in	  1953	  (Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  223).	  
The	   Pinilla	   dictatorship	   sent	   US-­‐trained	   and	   funded	   military	   units	   into	   the	  
countryside	  to	  destroy	  peasant	  insurgencies	  thought	  to	  be	  ‘communist’	  (Alexander,	  
1963,	   p.	   252).	   When	   the	   peasants	   retaliated,	   the	   accusations	   of	   communism	  
increased.	   Colombia	  waged	   a	  war	   on	   its	   own	   citizens	   during	  La	  Violencia	   (Villar	  
and	   Cottle,	   2011,	   p.	   24).	   This	   was	   justified	   through	   domestic	   and	   international	  
policies	  of	  anti-­‐communism.	  
The	   brief	   democratic	   period	   in	   Venezuela	   witnessed	   rapid	   progress.	  
Venezuela	   is	   distinct	   in	   Latin	   America	   for	   its	   oil	   wealth.	   The	   oil	   programs	   of	  
Betancourt	  and	  Gallegos	  generated	  income	  that	  had	  the	  means	  to	  establish	  social	  
security	   and	   basic	   infrastructure	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   pp.	   265-­‐266).	   However	   the	  
oligarchy,	  along	  with	  American	  and	  British	  oil	  companies,	  feared	  oil	  expropriation	  
(Boue,	   1993,	   p.	   12).	   Hence,	   support	   was	   given	   to	   a	   coup	   in	   November	   1948.	  
According	   to	   one	   of	   its	   chief	   conspirers,	   Pérez	   Jiménez,	   the	   military	   acted	   “to	  
prevent	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  oligarchy…a	  sectarian	  minority	  with	  a	  failed	  ideology	  
(Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	   280).	   Jiménez	   asserted	   that	  AD’s	   policies	  were	   communistic	   and	  
	   143	  
were	  opposed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  Venezuelans.	  Prior	  to	  the	  1948	  coup,	  Venezuelan	  
communism	  was	  irrelevant,	  and	  its	  small	  membership	  could	  not	  compete	  with	  that	  
of	  AD	  (Alexander,	  1963,	  p.	  257).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  military	  assumed	  power	  in	  1948	  
and	   Jiménez	   rose	   to	   the	   leadership	   in	   1950	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   p.	   321).	   The	  
contradiction	   of	  US	  policy	   towards	   Latin	  America	   is	   highlighted	  by	   its	   actions	   in	  
Venezuela.	  From	  1948	  the	  ‘Gestapo	  like’	  secret	  police	  eradicated	  AD	  (Szulc,	  1959,	  
p.	  250).	  Its	  leaders	  fled	  to	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  Mexico.	  Venezuelans	  existed	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
terror	   for	   eight	   years.	   Social	   security	   was	   also	   eradicated	   during	   this	   period.	  
Tragically,	  Venezuela	  was	  one	  of	   the	   few	  nations	  globally	   to	   suffer	   a	  decrease	   in	  
childhood	  literacy	  during	  the	  1950s	  (Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  252).	  Throughout	  this	  period	  
Venezuela	  exported	  6.185	  million	  barrels	  of	  oil,	  primarily	   to	   the	  US	  (Bucheli	  and	  
Aguilar,	  2010,	  p.	  366).	  Yet	  none	  of	  this	  revenue	  was	  sown	  back	  into	  the	  nation.	  In	  
fact	   Jiménez’s	   pilfering	   of	   the	   economy,	   in	   addition	   to	  wasteful	   spending,	  meant	  
that	   in	   1958	   Venezuela	   owed	   foreign	   creditors	   US$500	   million	   (Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	  
251).	   He	   also	   signed	   long-­‐term	   oil	   contracts,	   which	   handicapped	   his	   post-­‐1958	  
successors	   (Bucheli	   and	   Aguilar,	   2010,	   p.	   366).	   For	   these	   achievements	   Jiménez	  
was	   awarded	   the	   US	   Legion	   of	   Merit	   in	   1954,	   for	   his	   struggles	   against	   a	  
‘communist’	  threat	  which	  never	  existed	  (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  39).	  	  
The	  military	  also	  moved	  against	  the	  Peruvian	  government	  in	  October	  1948	  
under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Manuel	  Odría	  (Betrum,	  1995,	  p.	  437).	  The	  crisis	  caused	  by	  
a	   decline	   in	   resource	   prices	   undermined	   the	   political	   coalition	   between	  
Bustamante	  and	   the	  Apristas	  (Klaren,	  2000,	  p.	  299).	  Bustamante	   could	  no	   longer	  
fund	  social	  programs	  demanded	  by	  Haya	  de	   la	  Torre.	  The	  April	  disintegration	  of	  
the	   Aprista	   coalition	   was	   followed	   in	   October	   by	   accusations	   of	   communist	  
infiltration	  of	   the	  social	  democratic	  party(Klaren,	  2000,	  p.	  298).	  APRA’s	  omission	  
from	  Peruvian	  politics	  was	  followed	  by	  mass	  union	  demonstrations	  (Klaren,	  2000,	  
p.	  298).	  The	  unrest	  of	  October	  1948	  caused	  “the	  moneyed	  aristocracy	  [to	  turn]	  to	  
Odría	  as	   if	  he	  was	  their	  saviour”	  (Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  161).	   In	  power,	  Odría	  described	  
the	  Apristas	  as	  “communists	  in	  disguise”	  and	  his	  mission	  “was	  to	  save	  the	  country	  
from	  Aprista	   plots	  and	  political	  poisoning	  by	   leftists”	   (Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  180).	  From	  
November	  1948	  the	  Odría	  regime	  arrested	  and	  imprisoned	  Apristas,	  communists,	  
unionists	  and	  social	  activists,	  many	  of	  who	  ‘disappeared’.	  Odría	  “kept	  the	  ghosts	  of	  
APRA’s	   menace	   alive”	   by	   exaggerating	   their	   influence	   within	   the	   Bustamante	  
government	  and	  blaming	   them	   for	   the	  economic	   crisis	   (Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  191).	  The	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death	   penalty	   was	   initiated	   for	   the	   ambiguous	   crime	   of	   “political	   terrorism”	   in	  
1950	   (Betrum,	   1995,	   p.	   437).	   From	  November	   1949	   Odría	   opened	   the	   Peruvian	  
economy	   to	   increased	   foreign	   investment	   and	   trade,	  which	   spurred	   a	   temporary	  
boom	   in	   employment,	   especially	   in	   mining.	   Meanwhile,	   the	   unions	   were	  
undermined	  and	  real	  wages	  plummeted	  (Betrum,	  1995,	  p.	  387).	  Odría’s	  handling	  
of	   the	   economy	  was,	   however,	   not	   as	   compliant	   as	   Jiménez’	   in	   Venezuela,	   often	  
refusing	  US	  demands	  over	  currency	  manipulation	  (Betrum,	  1995,	  p.	  387).	  Odría’s	  
war	  against	   ‘Aprismo’,	   interpreted	  as	  anti-­‐communism,	  also	  won	  him	  a	  US	  Legion	  
of	  Merit	  award	  in	  1953.	  
Cuba’s	   economic	   situation	   had	   limited	   the	   gains	   of	   its	   two	   democratic	  
presidents.	  Although	  Ramón	  Grau	  had	  easily	  won	   the	  presidency	   in	  1944,	  he	  did	  
not	   control	   the	   Legislative	   Congress	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   24).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  
Auténticos	   were	   forced	   to	   rule	   by	   decree.	   Cuba	   was	   “locked	   in	   a	   straight	   jacket	  
economy	  dictated	  by	  sugar”	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  19).	  Grau	  dismissed	  free	  trade,	  as	  
it	  served	  larger	  nations	  while	  punishing	  smaller	  ones.	  Accordingly,	  Grau	  sought	  to	  
regulate	   the	   sugar	  producers	   to	   ensure	  maximum	  benefit	   to	   the	  Cuban	  economy	  
(Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  28).	  Unfortunately,	  an	  upsurge	   in	  US	  sugar	  beet	  production	  
after	  WWII	  limited	  US	  imports	  of	  cane	  sugar	  from	  Cuba	  and	  Brazil.	  Consequently,	  
the	   Cuban	   economy	   declined	   in	   the	   late	   1940s	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   pp.	   28-­‐91).	  
Nevertheless,	   under	   Grau	   political	   freedoms	   were	   at	   their	   greatest	   in	   Cuban	  
history.	   The	  media	  was	   free	   and	   the	   elections	  were	   honest	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	  
25).	   Cuba	   also	   received	   criticism	   for	   harbouring	   Juan	   Bosch’s	   Dominican	   exile	  
group	   prior	   to	   the	   Caribbean	   Legion	   invasion	   of	   1947	   (Gleijes,	   1989,	   p.	   136).	   In	  
1948	   Carlos	   Prío	  was	   elected	   President	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   105).	   He	   governed	  
over	  a	  period	  of	  greater	  US	  influence.	  Prío	  banned	  the	  Communist	  Party	   in	  1948,	  
and	  did	  very	  little	  to	  control	  the	  economy.	  This	  drew	  him	  criticism	  from	  both	  the	  
left	   and	   the	   right.	   Disappointed	  with	   the	   direction	   of	   the	  Auténtico	  government,	  
Eddy	   Chibás	   formed	   the	   Ortodoxo	   party	   in	   1947	   (Harnecker,	   1987,	   p.	   3).	   He	  
claimed	  “Grau	  had	  abandoned	  the	  ideas	  and	  programs	  of	  the	  PRC-­‐A	  –	  nationalism,	  
socialism	  and	  anti-­‐imperialism”	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  44).	  The	  Ortodoxos	  pressured	  
the	   Auténticos	   into	   reform.	   Chibás	   killed	   himself	   in	   1952	   in	   the	   lead-­‐up	   to	   the	  
Batista	   coup	   (Harnecker,	   1987,	   p.	   5).	   Fidel	   Castro	   continued	   his	  mission	   in	   later	  
periods.	   As	   the	   Auténticos	   did	   not	   control	   the	   military,	   both	   Presidents	   were	  
vulnerable	   to	   US	   and	   oligarchic	   opinions.	   Fulgencio	   Batista	   remained	   in	   full	  
	   145	  
military	  control.	  The	  Batista	  regime	  brought	  stability,	  persecuted	  democrats,	  and	  
ensured	  Cuba’s	  place	  within	  the	  OAS.	  Batista’s	  second	  term	  lasted	  seven	  years.	   It	  
has	  been	  suggested	  that	  without	  Batista’s	  tyranny,	  the	  26th	  July	  movement	  would	  
not	   have	   brought	   the	   unique	   brand	   of	   socialism	   to	   Latin	   America	   that	   was	  
established	  under	  Fidel	  Castro.	  
While	   the	  examples	  of	  Colombia,	  Venezuela,	  Peru	  and	  Cuba	  are	  especially	  
significant	  to	  this	  thesis,	  it	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  regional	  regression	  also	  
spread	   to	  Haiti	   and	  Paraguay	  during	   this	  period.	   In	  Paraguay	  Alfredo	  Stroessner	  
staged	  a	  coup	  in	  1954	  (Lewis,	  1980,	  p.	  73).	  Paraguay	  had	  been	  historically	  led	  by	  
strongmen.	  An	  oligarchy	  of	  534	  landowners	  controlled	  73.5	  per	  cent	  of	  Paraguay’s	  
arable	   land	   (Lewis,	  1980,	   p.	  9).	  Meanwhile,	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  population	  of	  1.3	  
million	   lived	   on	   less	   than	   US$200	   per	  month	   (Lewis,	   1980,	   p.	   9).	   Paraguay	  was	  
lacking	   in	   infrastructure.	   Exiles	   in	   Argentina	   sought	   to	   bring	   democracy	   to	  
Paraguay	   in	   the	  early	  1950s.	  However,	   the	  strength	  of	   the	  military	  rendered	   this	  
task	  impossible.	  Stroessner’s	  authoritarian	  rule	  lasted	  over	  forty	  years,	  the	  longest	  
in	   Latin	   America	   (Lewis,	   1980,	   pp.	   73-­‐222).	   In	   1950	   Colonel	   Paul	   Magloire	  
overthrew	  the	  fragile	  democratic	  government	  of	  Haiti	  (Trouillot,	  1990,	  p.	  143).	  The	  
US	   and	   the	   OAS	   had	   sided	   with	   the	   Dominican	   Trujillo	   regime	   over	   Haiti’s	  
harbouring	   of	   Caribbean	   Legion	   fighters	   in	   1947	   (Gleijes,	   1989,	   p.	   144).	   This	  
further	   undermined	   the	   weak	   government	   and	   motivated	   Magloire’s	   coup.	   By	  
1954,	  democracy	  was	  a	  scarce	  political	  system	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Further	  support	  
was	  granted	  to	  the	  standing	  dictatorships	  of	  Nicaragua,	  El	  Salvador,	  Honduras	  and	  
the	  Dominican	  Republic	  (Child,	  1980,	  p.	  104).	  Nicaragua	  in	  particular	  drew	  close	  to	  
the	  US	   through	   its	  opposition	   to	   the	  Caribbean	  Legion	   in	   the	   late	  1940s	   (Gleijes,	  
1989,	  p.	  141;	  Gill,	  2006,	  p.	  72).	  This	  regional	  regression	  in	  political,	  economic	  and	  
social	   life	   in	   Latin	  America	  was	   precipitated	   by	   anti-­‐communism.	   An	   increase	   of	  
MAP	  funding	  for	  unconstitutional	  governments	  and	  a	  focus	  on	  internal	  subversives	  
ensured	   the	   longevity	  of	  authoritarian	  rule	   in	  Latin	  America.	  These	  governments	  
were	   far	   more	   compliant	   than	   their	   social	   democratic	   predecessors.	   US	   policy	  
succeeded	  in	  its	  aims	  from	  1948-­‐1954.	  
	  
The	  US	  and	  Latin	  American	  Democracy	  
Only	   eight	   democratic	   governments	   represented	   Latin	   America	   at	   the	  
Caracas	  conference	  of	  the	  time	  of	  the	  OAS	  in	  May	  1954.	  They	  represented	  Mexico,	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Chile,	   Uruguay,	   Costa	   Rica,	   Bolivia,	   Argentina,	   Brazil	   and	   Guatemala.86	  However,	  
too	   many	   of	   these	   states	   possessed	   independent	   economic	   thoughts	   for	   the	  
American	   Eisenhower	   administration.	   The	  US	  was	  willing	   to	   remove	   democratic	  
governments	   that	   challenged	   its	   regional	   interests.	   By	   1953,	   it	   had	   set	   its	   sights	  
upon	   Perón’s	   Argentina,	   Vargas’	   Brazil,	   and	   above	   all,	   Árbenz’	   Guatemala	   (NSC,	  
1953;	   Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   32).87	  However,	   the	   US	   did	   not	   attack	   every	   democratic	  
government	   in	   Latin	   America.	   It	   did	   not	   need	   to.	   The	   US	   was	   not	   opposed	   to	  
democracy;	   rather,	   it	   was	   opposed	   to	   sovereign	   economic	   and	   political	  
development	  that	  threatened	  its	  vital	   interests.	   If	  democratic	  governments	  posed	  
no	  challenge	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  US,	  then	  no	  action	  was	  necessary.	  This	  was	  the	  
case	   in	   the	  early	  1950s	   in	  Mexico,	  Costa	  Rica	   and	  Chile.	  The	  Mexican	  Revolution	  
under	   Miguel	   Alemán,	   from	   1946	   became	   increasingly	   conservative	   (Schnieder,	  
2004,	   p.	   64).	   Economic	   development	   was	   turned	   back	   under	   Alemán’s	   social	  
reform.	   He	   considered	   Cárdenas’	   ejidos	   (collective	   farms)	   as	   socialistic	   and	  
abandoned	   them	   (Basturo,	   1999,	   p.	   77).	   Alemán	   encouraged	   increased	   DFI	   in	  
defiance	   of	   the	   1917	   Constitution,	   which	   forbade	   majority	   foreign	   control	   of	  
Mexican	   businesses	   (Schnieder,	   2004,	   p.	   64).	   US	   investors	   aided	   in	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  new	  corporatist	  class	  in	  Mexico,	  and	  interpersonal	  ties	  between	  
US	   capitalists	   and	   former	   revolutionaries	   led	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   new,	   often	  
corrupt,	   bourgeoisie	   (Niblo,	   2006,	   p.	   197).	   Alemán	   also	   decreased	   tariffs.	  During	  
this	   period	   of	   economic	   growth,	   real	  wages	   fell	   and	   class	   divisions	   grew	   (Niblo,	  
2006,	   p.	   206).	  However,	  Mexico	  had	  placated	  US	  demands,	  which	  protected	   it	   in	  
the	  immediate	  future.	  	  After	  José	  Figueres	  came	  to	  power	  he	  moderated	  his	  views	  
towards	   the	   United	   States.	   He	   relinquished	   political	   power	   in	   1951,	   ensuring	  
continued	  democratic	  rule	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  71).	  Figueres	  remained	  as	  a	  vocal	  
critic	   of	   US	   policies	   and	   ardent	   supporter	   of	   the	   philosophical	   New	   Deal.	   The	  
successful	   removal	   of	   the	   communists	   from	   the	   Chilean	   Popular	   Front	   led	   to	  
improved	  relations	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Chile	  (Drake,	  1978,	  p.	  291).	  The	  Radicals	  
distanced	   themselves	   from	  the	  Socialists,	  who	  diminished	   their	  connections	  with	  
the	   social	   democratic	   parties	   in	   Peru	   and	   Venezuela	   (Drake,	   1978,	   p.	   291).88	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  The	  Costa	  Rican	  government	  declined	  to	  attend	  the	  conference	  in	  protest	  of	  its	  location	  in	  
Caracas,	  Venezuela.	  
87	  The	  conflict	  between	  these	  regimes	  and	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter.	  
88	  However,	  the	  minority	  Socialist	  Party,	  increasingly	  under	  the	  control	  of	  Salvador	  Allende,	  
continued	  to	  promote	  regional	  solidarity	  with	  social	  democratic	  leaders	  (Drake,	  1978,	  p.	  279).	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Moreover,	   the	   US	   did	   not	   oppose	   democracy.	   It	   opposed	   unregulated	   economic	  
reform	  and	  development	  in	  Latin	  America	  that	  challenged	  its	  vital	  interests.	  Those	  
democracies	   that	   submitted	   to	  Washington’s	   leadership	  were	  granted	  continuing	  
support.	  
The	   only	   state	   that	  witnessed	   a	   democratic	   revolution	   during	   this	   period	  
was	   the	   landlocked	   nation	   of	   Bolivia.	   The	   Bolivian	   Movement	   of	   the	   National	  
Revolution	   (MNR),	   led	   by	   Paz	   Estenssoro	   had	   existed	   in	   exile	   since	   the	   coup	   of	  
1946	   (Malloy,	   1970,	   p.	   127).	   The	  MNR	   philosophy	  was	   social	   democratic,	   while	  
also	   populist	   (Klein,	   1982,	   p.	   220).	   The	   Peruvian	   Apristas,	   along	   with	   the	  
Argentinian	  Perónistas,	  closely	  influenced	  Estenssoro.	  While	  in	  exile	  between	  1946	  
and	  1952,	   the	  MNR	  remained	   influential	  within	   the	  union	  movement	  (Alexander,	  
2009,	  p.	  102).	  MNR-­‐led	  strikes	  were	  continually	  broken	  up	  by	  the	  military	   in	  the	  
late	   1940s	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   p.	   120).	   Outraged,	   the	   nation’s	  workers	   demanded	  
free	   elections.	   The	   government	   submitted	   to	   elections,	   but	   limited	   suffrage	   to	  
106,000	   of	   the	   population	   of	   three	   million,	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   property	   ownership	  
(Malloy,	   1970,	   p.	   152).	   Even	   in	   these	   circumstances,	   the	   MNR	   prevailed	   with	   a	  
small	  majority	  (Malloy,	  1970,	  p.	  152).	  The	  military	  government	  then	  cancelled	  the	  
elections,	  describing	  events	  as	  “not	  a	  coup,	  but	  an	  assumption	  by	  the	  military	  of	  its	  
duty	   to	   protect	   democracy	   and	   freedom	   from	   a	   combined	   communist	   Nazi	  
menace”	   (Malloy,	   1970,	   p.	   154).	   After	   weeks	   of	   violence	   in	   La	   Paz,	   the	   military	  
retreated,	   handing	   power	   to	   Paz	   in	   1952.	   The	   US	   had	   not	   sought	   to	   not	   control	  
events	   in	  Bolivia,	  where	   it	  had	  few	  economic	   interests.	  However,	  after	  the	  MNR’s	  
success,	  US	  diplomatic	  and	  economic	  activity	  increased	  to	  secure	  Bolivia’s	  rich	  oil	  
reserves	   (Rabe,	   1988).	   Paz	   was	   an	   acceptable	   leader	   to	   Washington	   as	   he	  
supported	  Washington’s	  economic	  policy.	  
The	   eradication	   of	   democratic	   action	   increased	   the	   revolutionary	  
momentum	  of	  Latin	  America.	  The	  erosion	  of	  democratic	  rule	  and	  populist	  reform	  
had	   left	   the	  masses	  with	  no	  political	  outlets	   to	  vent	   their	   frustrations.	   It	  became	  
inevitable	   that	   revolutionary	   fronts	   would	   develop	   to	   combat	   this	   widespread	  
tyranny.	  The	  longest	  insurgency	  of	  the	  early	  Cold	  War	  period	  occurred	  in	  Colombia	  
(Leech,	   2011,	   pp.	   7-­‐17).	   The	   organised	   resistance	   to	   government	   paramilitary	  
terror	   in	   the	   countryside	   is	  well	   documented	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   13).	  However,	   the	  
moment	  with	  the	  longest	  historical	  repercussions	  occurred	  in	  Cuba.	  The	  attack	  on	  
the	  Moncada	  Barracks	  was	  launched	  on	  July	  26,	  1953,	  the	  100th	  anniversary	  of	  José	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Martí’s	  birth	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  237).	  Fidel	  Castro	  (2007)	  sought	  to	  stage	  a	  calculated	  
attack	  on	  Batista’s	  army	  to	  acquire	  arms	  and	  inspire	  a	  revolution	  against	  Batista’s	  
rule.	   Castro	  was	   not	   a	   communist	   in	   1953	   (p.	   91).	   He	  was	  well	   versed	   in	   leftist	  
literature,	   however	   he	   possessed	   no	   alliance	   with	   either	   Moscow	   or	   the	   Cuban	  
Communist	   Party,	  which	   had	   been	   outlawed	   in	   1950	   but	   operated	  with	   relative	  
immunity	   in	  Batista’s	  Havana	   (Alexander,	   1963,	  p.	   293).	   It	  was	  not	   an	  attack	   for	  
Socialism;	  rather,	   it	  was	  attack	  against	  tyranny.	  Castro	  (2007)	  sought	  to	  continue	  
the	  revolutionary	  tradition	  of	  Cuba	  (p.	  91).	  Martí	  had	  committed	  his	  life	  to	  ending	  
Spanish	  colonialism.	  Grau	  had	  struggled	  against	  US	  domination	  before	  moderating	  
his	   ideas.	  Chibás	  had	  called	   for	  a	  new	  Cuba	  prior	   to	  his	  death	  and	  Batista’s	   coup	  
(Harnecker,	   1987,	   p.	   14).	   Hence,	   the	   July	   26	   movement	   was	   the	   “revolutionary	  
apparatus	  of	  Chibás’	   followers”	  (Harnecker,	  1987,	  p.	  14).	   In	  1953	  Castro	  was	  not	  
extraordinary,	   despite	   his	   leadership	   of	   this	   movement.	   On	   July	   26,	   1953,	   160	  
poorly	   armed	   and	   organised	   student	   activists	   took	   on	   the	   Cuban	   army	   and	   lost	  
(Harnecker,	   1987,	   p.	   17).	   Castro’s	   Moncada	   cadre	   was	   exiled	   to	   Mexico	   the	  
following	  year	  (Castro,	  2007,	  p.	  150).	  Nevertheless,	  in	  1953	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  Cuban	  
Revolution	  had	  been	  laid.	  
	  
The	  Causes	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  in	  Latin	  America	  	  
	   This	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ‘Cold	  War’	  in	  Latin	  America	  
from	  1933	  until	  1952.	  The	  continued	  power	  of	   the	  oligarchy	  was	  essential	   to	  US	  
interests	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Unlike	   the	   European	   empires,	   the	   US	   did	   not	   desire	  
direct	   control	  of	   colonies.	  Colonialism	   is	  expensive	  and	  motivates	  civilian	  unrest.	  
Rather,	   the	   oligarchy	   ensured	   that	   the	   status	   quo	   was	   retained	   within	   Latin	  
American	  societies.	  This	  situation	  was	  mutually	  beneficial,	  as	  the	  oligarchs’	  power	  
was	   protected	   by	   the	   US.	   This	   status	   quo	   included:	   the	  maintenance	   of	   internal	  
social	   and	   political	   structures;	   the	  maintenance	   of	   internal	   economic	   structures;	  
the	   maintenance	   of	   international	   economic	   relations;	   and	   the	   continuation	   of	  
subservient	  diplomatic	   relations	   to	   the	  US.	  While	   the	  US	  did	  not	  directly	   involve	  
itself	  in	  the	  internal	  politics	  of	  Latin	  American	  states,	  it	  vehemently	  opposed	  states	  
that	  supported	  what	  it	  termed	  “the	  communist	  line”	  (cited	  in,	  Niblo,	  2006,	  p.	  284).	  
Governments	   who	   took	   this	   economic	   position	   included	   regional	   populists	   and	  
social	   democrats.	   Governments	   in	   this	   category	   became	   vulnerable	   to	   military	  
coups.	   Whether	   the	   national	   militaries	   believed	   Washington’s	   communist	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accusations	  is	  irrelevant.	  They	  could	  be	  confident	  of	  US	  support	  if	  they	  maintained	  
‘oligarchic’	   rule	   in	   their	   state.	   This	   explains	   the	   sudden	   anti-­‐communist	  military	  
regression	   of	   the	   late	   1940s	   and	   early	   1950s.	   Anti-­‐communism	  was	   designed	   to	  
eradicate	   social	   reform	   and	   economic	   development	   in	   Latin	   America	   through	  
diplomatic	  support	  for	  military	  governments,	  negotiation	  with	  willing	  democracies	  
and,	  in	  1954,	  through	  direct	  intervention.	  All	  three	  had	  the	  same	  goal.	  	  	  	  
Anti-­‐communism	   motivated	   an	   anti-­‐democratic	   purge	   from	   1948	   until	  
1955.	  More	   significantly,	   it	   removed	   from	   virtually	   every	   Latin	  American	   citizen	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  progress.	  The	  progressive	  era	  in	  Latin	  American	  history	  ended	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  actions	  between	  1948	  and	  1955.	  The	  remainder	  of	  
this	   thesis	   deals	   with	   the	   larger	   consequences	   of	   anti-­‐communism	   in	   Latin	  
America.	  These	  include:	   imposed	  autocracy;	  economic	  dependency;	  radicalisation	  
of	   social	  democrats;	   the	  emergence	  of	  a	   legitimate	  Marxist	   left;	  and	  uncontrolled	  
violence.	   However	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   the	   social	   consequences	   of	   anti-­‐
communism	   in	   Latin	   America.	   In	   the	   immediate	   aftermath	   of	   WWII	   the	   vast	  
majority	  of	   society	  was	  brought	   into	   the	  political	  process.	  Appeals	  were	  made	   to	  
the	   masses	   that	   committed	   to	   progress	   in	   education,	   healthcare,	   infrastructure,	  
labour	  relations,	  manufacturing,	  housing,	  sanitation,	  and	  agricultural	  reform.	  After	  
3-­‐10	   years	   of	   their	   implementation,	   these	   progressive	   initiatives	   were	   taken	  
away.89	  There	   were	   several	   consequences:	   the	   destruction	   of	   unions;	   increased	  
income	   and	   wealth	   disparity;	   decreasing	   real	   wages;	   continuing	   illiteracy;	  
continuing	   preventable	   deaths;	   continuing	   agricultural	   exploitation;	   and	   the	  
disenfranchisement	  of	  the	  working	  class.	  Moreover,	  while	  this	  thesis	  deals	  with	  the	  
grand	   strategies	   of	   the	   US,	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	   strategies	   in	   Latin	  
America,	  the	  social	  costs	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  were	  extensive.	  	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  The	  length	  of	  progressive	  rule	  differed	  in	  individual	  states.	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The	   South	   American	   Problem:	   Eisenhower	   Confronts	  
‘Communism’	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
Anti-­‐communism	  was	  cemented	  as	  US	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America	  between	  1950	  and	  
1952.	   	   However,	   it	   masked	   other	   machinations	   of	   US	   continental	   policy.	   The	  
outcomes	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  in	  Latin	  America	   therefore	  echoed	  those	  of	   the	  US’	  
imperial	   domination	   of	   the	   Caribbean	   in	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century.	   The	  
remainder	   of	   this	   thesis	   will	   explore	   the	   effects	   of	   anti-­‐communism	   on	   inter-­‐
American	  diplomacy	  from	  1953	  until	  1965.	  The	  pivotal	  themes	  of	  this	  section	  will	  
be:	   the	   disconnect	   between	   anti-­‐communist	   rhetoric	   and	   the	   realities	   of	   Latin	  
American	  history;	   the	  preference	  for	  military	  rule	  over	  democracy	  as	  a	  “defence”	  
against	   “communism”;	   the	   implementation	   of	   regional	   free-­‐trade	   economics	  
leading	  to	  the	  eradication	  of	  economic	  nationalism;	  the	  inevitable	  radicalization	  of	  
former	  democratic	  elements	  in	  several	  Latin	  American	  states	  in	  response	  to	  anti-­‐
communism;	   the	   creation	   and	   continuation	   of	   a	   legitimate	   Marxist	   presence	   in	  
Cuba;	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  external	  and	  internal	  forms	  of	  warfare	  throughout	  the	  
region	   as	   the	   doctrine	   of	   counter-­‐insurgency	   took	   hold.	   This	   chapter	   will	   focus	  
upon	  the	  autocracy	  imposed	  forcibly	  on	  Guatemala	  and	  Argentina,	  and	  the	  demise	  
of	  Vargas	  in	  Brazil.	  The	  NSC	  policy	  document	  144/1	  targeted	  those	  members	  of	  the	  
democratic	   left,	   including	   social	   democrats	   and	   the	   military	   populists,	   for	   their	  
“commitment	   to	   change”	   (NSC,	   1953).	   The	   NSC	   (1953)	   argued	   that	   this	  
commitment	   led	   to	   radicalization	   within	   their	   societies,	   and	   that	   “immature”	  
economic	   policies	   challenged	   vital	   US	   interests	   in	   the	   hemisphere.	   NSC	   144/1	  
targeted	  several	  former	  social	  democratic	  governments;90	  however,	  the	  three	  that	  
remained	   were	   Guatemala,	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina.	   Hence,	   this	   chapter	   will	   focus	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  These	  included	  Cárdenas’	  Mexico,	  which	  was	  moderated	  by	  the	  1950s,	  Grau’s	  Cuba,	  Betancourt’s	  
Venezuela,	  Haya’s	  Peru	  and	  Gaitán	  in	  Colombia,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  under	  totalitarian	  rule	  by	  the	  end	  
of	  1953.	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The	  1952	  presidential	  election	  was	  handed	  to	  the	  Republicans	  by	  the	  anti-­‐
communist	  paranoia	  of	  the	  McCarthyite	  crusade	  within	  Congress	  (Ambrose,	  1984,	  
p.	  35).	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  had	  accused	  the	  Democrats	  of	  being	  “soft”	  on	  communism,	  
thereby	  allowing	  the	  “loss”	  of	  China	  in	  1949,	  and	  of	  the	  nuclear	  monopoly,	  as	  well	  
as	   increasing	  anti-­‐American	  activity	   in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Latin	  America	  (Boyle,	  
2005,	  pp.	  37-­‐41).	  Despite	  Truman’s	  actions,	  China	  had	  become	  communist	  under	  
Mao	   Zedong	   and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   had	   developed	   nuclear	   capabilities	   (Gaddis,	  
2005,	   pp.	   37-­‐39).	  However,	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	   criticism	   exploited	   the	   paranoia	  
that	  had	  infiltrated	  US	  political	  discourse	  between	  1950	  and	  1952	  (Belfrage,	  1989,	  
pp.	   117-­‐130).	   Truman’s	   policy	   of	   containment	   aggressively	   defended	   US	   global	  
interests	  from	  Soviet	  expansionism,	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  waging	  war	  in	  Korea	  (Hogan,	  
1998,	  pp.	  41-­‐66).	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  the	  promises	  of	  the	  presidential	  hopeful,	  Dwight	  
David	   Eisenhower,	   to	   “roll-­‐back”	   communism	   fed	   the	   rhetorical	   myth	   that	  
Truman’s	   government	   somehow	  welcomed	   communist	   advances	   globally	   (Boyle,	  
2005,	  p.	  40).	  Eisenhower	  had	  been	  a	  four-­‐star	  General	  in	  WWII	  and	  understood	  the	  
realities	  of	  the	  USSR’s	  pragmatic	  foreign	  policy	  better	  than	  most	  in	  Washington.	  He	  
knew	  that	  any	  aggression	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  would	  initiate	  the	  third	  world	  war	  in	  a	  
generation.	  Hence,	  his	  assertions	  that	  he	  would	  “roll-­‐back”	  communism	  were	  false,	  
designed	   for	   domestic	   consumption	   or	   directed	   towards	   the	   third	  world	   (Boyle,	  
2005,	   p.	   39).	   Eisenhower	   easily	   won	   the	   Presidential	   election	   of	   1952	   with	   the	  
support	   of	   the	  McCarthyites	   (Ambrose,	   1984,	   p.	   35).	   Once	   in	   office,	   Eisenhower	  
chose	  conservative	   realists	   to	   surround	  him.	   John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  who	  had	  been	  a	  
corporate	   lawyer	   for	   Sullivan	   and	   Cromwell,	   in	   addition	   to	   working	   in	   policy	  
development	  for	  the	  CFR,	  was	  chosen	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (Tye,	  1998,	  p.	  176).	  His	  
brother,	   Allen	   Dulles,	   was	   appointed	   head	   of	   the	   CIA	   (Weiner,	   2007,	   p.	   101).	  
George	  Humphrey	  was	  made	  Treasury	  Secretary	  (Ambrose,	  1984,	  p.	  39).	  Together	  
this	  team	  sought	  to	  promote	  fiscal	  responsibility,	  US	  trade	  and	  investment	  abroad,	  
loyalty	  and	  nationalism	  at	  home,	  and	  military	  supremacy	  over	  the	  USSR.	  However,	  
their	  promise	  to	  ‘roll-­‐back’	  communism	  led	  to	  the	  increased	  military	  involvement	  
of	  the	  US	  in	  the	  third	  world.	  
Eisenhower	   sought	   to	   institutionalise	   Truman’s	   anti-­‐communist	   policies	  
towards	  Latin	  America.	  The	  NSC	  convened	  in	  March	  1953	  to	  covertly	  address	  US	  
priorities	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  The	  NSC	  (1953)	  argued	  “there	  is	  a	  trend	  in	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Latin	  America	  toward	  nationalistic	  regimes	  maintained	  in	  large	  part	  by	  appeals	  to	  
the	   masses	   of	   the	   population”	   (p.	   6).	   These	   governments	   posed	   a	   significant	  
challenge	   to	   US	   policy	   in	   the	   region.	   Those	   governments	   reliant	   on	   popular	  
manifestations	   routinely	   served	   nationalist	   principals	   over	   private	   capitalist	  
interests.	   The	   NSC	  went	   on	   to	   state	   “the	   growth	   of	   nationalism	   is	   facilitated	   by	  
historic	   anti-­‐US	   prejudices	   and	   exploited	   by	   the	   communists”	   (NSC,	   1953,	   p.	   7).	  
This	   was	   an	   acknowledgement	   that	   historical	   nationalism	   and	   anti-­‐imperialism	  
preceded	   a	   communist	   threat	   in	   Latin	   America.	   NSC	   144/1	   sought	   to	   utilise	   the	  
Cold	   War	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext,	   developed	   under	   Truman,	   to	   condemn	   the	  
nationalist	   position	   in	   Latin	   America.	   The	   policy	   aims	   of	   NSC	   (1953)	   144/1	  
included:	   hemispheric	   solidarity	   under	   US	   leadership;	   orderly	   and	   pragmatic	  
economic	   development	   motivated	   by	   private	   capitalist	   sources;	   defence	   from	  
foreign	  threats;	  the	  collective	  elimination	  of	  communism;	  the	  defence	  of	  strategic	  
resources	   throughout	   the	   continent;	   and	   the	   centralisation	   of	   Latin	   American	  
military	   forces	   under	   US	   leadership	   (pp.	   7-­‐8).	   It	   declared	   “the	   ultimate	  
standardisation	   of	   Latin	   American	   military	   organisation,	   training,	   doctrine	   and	  
equipment	   along	   US	   lines”	   as	   the	   ultimate	   aim	   of	   US	   military	   policy	   in	   Latin	  
America	   (NSC,	   1953,	   p.	   10).	   The	   US	   prioritised	  military	   assistance	   over	  military	  
action.	   NSC	   144/1	   targeted	   Truman’s	   Military	   Assistance	   Program	   (MAP)	   for	  
expansion.	  It	  stated,	  
In	   determining	   the	   extent	   of	   US	   assistance	   and	   support	   to	   particular	  
American	  states,	  [the	  US	  will	  take]	  into	  consideration	  their	  willingness	  and	  
ability	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  United	  States	  in	  achieving	  common	  objectives	  
(NSC,	  1953,	  p.	  9).	  
These	  “common	  objectives”	  were	  not	  fully	  explained	  in	  NSC	  144/1	  (NSC,	  1953,	  p.	  
9).	   However,	   the	   large	   amount	   of	   aid	   afforded	   to	   the	   Nicaraguan	   regime	   over	  
neighbouring	   Costa	   Rica	   indicated	   the	   preference	   for	   stability	   over	   democracy	  
(Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  72).	  
	  
The	  South	  American	  Problem	  
This	  thesis	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ‘South	  American	  problem’	  by	  first	  
examining	   the	  military	   populist	   regimes	   in	  Brazil	   and	  Argentina,	   and	   the	   factors	  
that	  contributed	  to	  their	  downfall.	  Perónism	  was	  a	  powerful	  ideology	  in	  Argentina.	  
It	  proposed	  socialist	  outcomes	  within	  a	  nationalist,	  capitalist	  framework.	  However,	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the	   most	   significant	   element	   was	   the	   hold	   Perónism	   had	   within	   the	   union	  
movement.	   James	   (1988)	   argues	   that	   Perónism	   had	   the	   “capacity	   to	   absorb,	  
appropriate,	   and	   neutralise,	   the	   symbols	   of	   older	   class	   traditions”	   in	   order	   to	  
maintain	  a	  hegemonic	  grip	  over	  the	  working	  class	  (p.	  35).	  The	  Argentine	  working	  
class	  was	  overwhelmingly	  nationalist.	  Its	  members	  demanded	  a	  combative	  foreign	  
policy	   and	   a	   domestic	   reform	   agenda	   designed	   to	   limit	   class-­‐based	   inequalities	  
(James,	  1988,	  p.	  35).	  McGuire	  (1997)	  reasons	   that	  Perón’s	  support	  was	  based	  on	  
“his	  dispensation	  of	  legal	  and	  organisational	  support	  to	  unions	  and	  of	  material	  and	  
symbolic	  benefits	  to	  workers”	  (p.	  52).	  More	  significant,	  however,	  was	  the	  level	  of	  
Personalism.	  McGuire	  (1997)	  claims,	   “Perónism	  revolved	   from	  the	  outset	  around	  
Perón	   himself,	   rather	   than	   the	   doctrines	   or	   policies	   for	  which	   he	   stood”	   (p.	   54).	  
This	  made	  Perónism	  far	  more	  dangerous	  to	  US	  interests.	  The	  populism	  of	  Getúlio	  
Vargas	   posed	  Washington	  with	   a	   similar	   dilemma.	   Bourne	   (1974)	   demonstrates	  
that	  the	  final	  Vargas	  administration,	  from	  1951-­‐1954,	  adopted	  a	  Perónistic	  form	  of	  
Populism	  (p.	  177).	  This	  was	  demonstrated	  through	  hostility	  to	  US	  economic	  policy,	  
industrial	  wage	   increases	   and	   inflammatory	   national	   addresses	   appealing	   to	   the	  
masses	   (Bourne,	   1974,	   pp.	   177-­‐190).	   This	   section	   will	   demonstrate	   the	   threat	  
posed	  to	  US	  interests	  by	  these	  two	  military	  populists.	  The	  subsequent	  section	  will	  
outline	  Washington’s	  role	  in	  their	  demise.	  
NSC	  144/1	  identified	  a	  specific	  “South	  America	  Problem”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  
1988,	  p.	  29).	  It	  stated	  that	  
Cardenás	  in	  Mexico,	  Árevalo	  in	  Guatemala,	  Figueres	  in	  Costa	  Rica,	  Gaitán	  in	  
	   Colombia,	   Betancourt	   in	   Venezuela,	   Haya	   de	   la	   Torre	   in	   Peru,	   Ibanez	   in	  
	   Chile,	  Perón	  in	  Argentina,	  Vargas	  in	  Brazil,	  Grau	  in	  Cuba,	  all	  achieved	  their	  
	   political	   power	   by	   promising	   change.	   [Yet,	   many	   were]	   immature	   and	  
	   impractical	  idealists	  	  [who]	  not	  only	  [were]	  inadequately	  trained	  to	  conduct	  
	   government	   business	   efficiently	   but	   also	   lack[ed]	   the	   disposition	   to	  
	   combat	   extremists	   within	   their	   ranks,	   including	   communists	   (NSC,	  
	   1953,	  p.	  21).	  
For	  Eisenhower,	  “the	  time	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  South	  America	  problem	  [was]	  now”	  (as	  
cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  29).	  The	  NSC	  listed	  problematic	  leaders	  who	  operated	  social	  
democratic	   and	   populist	   governments	   and	   a	   nationalist	   economy.	   Perón	   and	  
Vargas	  were	  military	  populists.	  Their	  offerings	  to	  the	  broad	  working	  classes	  were	  
designed	  to	  procure	  electoral	  support.	  They	  were	  placed	   in	  the	  same	  category	  as	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social	  democratic	  leaders	  such	  as	  Cárdenas,	  Arévalo,	  Figueres,	  Gaitán,	  Betancourt,	  
Grau	  and	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre,	  who	  focused	  primarily	  upon	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  masses.	  
This	   thesis	  has	  demonstrated	   that	   this	   link	  was	  not	  based	  on	  any	  actual	   existing	  
communist	   threat.	   The	   NSC	   did	   not	   directly	   state	   that	   these	   governments	   were	  
‘communist’;	   rather	   it	   was	   a	   fear	   of	   ‘nationalism’	   and	   the	   perceived	   ‘communist	  
line’.	   Nationalism	   in	   Latin	   America	   encouraged	   governments	   with	   differing	  
ideologies	   to	   privilege	   national	   sovereignty	   over	   foreign	   economic	   and	   political	  
influence.	  Moreover,	   the	  “South	  American	  problem”	  was	  a	  regional	  unwillingness	  
to	  adhere	  to	  US	  globalist	  policy	  (in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  29).	  Much	  of	  this	  ‘problem’	  was	  
solved	  by	  the	  Truman	  administration.	  This	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  nationalism	  of	  
Argentina	  and	  Brazil,	  before	  turning	  to	  Guatemala.	  
The	   Argentine	   government	   of	   Juan	   Domingo	   Perón	   posed	   the	   biggest	  
obstacle	   to	  US	  hegemony	   in	  Latin	  America	  between	  1946	  and	  1955.	  Argentinean	  
public	   opinion	   was	   swayed	   by	   an	   anti-­‐American	   propaganda	   campaign,	   which	  
according	   to	  Robert	  Alexander	   (1979)	  was	  even	  more	  extensive	   than	   that	   in	   the	  
USSR	  (p.	  69).	  Perón’s	  desire	  for	  regional	  leadership	  brought	  him	  into	  conflict	  with	  
Washington	  (Rock,	  1986,	  p.	  275).	  Perón’s	  economic	  policies	  concerned	  American	  
diplomats	  as	  he	  ambitiously	   sought	   to	   change	   the	   role	  of	  Argentina	   in	   the	  global	  
capitalist	   economy.	   The	   establishment	   of	   state	   export	   monopolies	   of	   meat	   and	  
grain	   was	   central	   to	   this	   goal.	   Perón	   siphoned	   profits	   off	   from	   the	   agricultural	  
economy	   to	   “stimulate	   the	   industrialisation	   of	   the	   country”	   (Alexander,	   1979,	   p.	  
64).	   He	   also	   limited	   “the	   control	   of	   foreign	   interests	   over	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	  
economy”	   through	   the	  nationalisation	  of	  key	   industries	   (Alexander,	  1979,	  p.	  64).	  
By	  1951,	  due	  to	  the	  relative	  decline	  of	  the	  British	  Empire,	  the	  US	  had	  become	  the	  
largest	   foreign	   investor	   in	   Argentina.	   To	   prevent	   US	   hegemony	   in	   the	   Southern	  
Cone,	   Perón	   sought	   to	   form	   trading	   relations	   with	   Chile,	   Paraguay	   and	   Bolivia	  
(Dulles,	  1967,	  p.	  317).	  As	  Argentina	  was	  the	  most	  advanced	  industrial	  nation	  in	  the	  
region,	  Perón	  competed	  with	  US	  firms	  for	  raw	  materials	  in	  nations	  such	  as	  Bolivia	  
and	   Paraguay.	   While	   agreements	   were	   signed	   with	   both	   nations	   in	   1952,	   the	  
economic	   implications	   were	   minimal.	   At	   the	   1948	   Bogotá	   conference,	   Perón	  
optimistically	  proposed	  that	  Argentina	  fill	  the	  void	  left	  by	  Washington’s	  refusal	  to	  
offer	   stimulus	   loans	   (Alexander,	   1979,	   p.	   71).	   Perón	   sought	   to	   be	   the	   regional	  
economic	  power	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Washington,	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  nationalism	  in	  
the	  Americas.	  This	  caused	  his	  conflict	  with	  Washington.	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In	  Brazil,	  Getúlio	  Vargas	  initiated	  a	  nationalistic	  economic	  policy	  during	  his	  
second	  presidency,	  from	  1951	  until	  1954.	  The	  centre	  of	  this	  plan	  was	  government	  
control	  over	  foreign	  investment,	  much	  of	  which	  was	  American.	  Upon	  assuming	  the	  
presidency,	   Vargas	   claimed	   that	   foreign	   capitalists	   had	   been	   “bleeding”	   Brazil	  
through	   excessive	   remittance	   (Bourne,	   1974,	   p.	   165).	   Presidential	  Decree	   30363	  
set	  a	  maximum	  profit	  remittance	  of	  8	  per	  cent	  of	  initial	  investment	  annually	  and	  a	  
maximum	  investment	  remittance	  of	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  initial	  investment	  annually	  (SD,	  
February	   20,	   1953).	   Vargas	   sided	  with	   labour	   against	   foreign	   capital,	   as	   he	  was	  
reliant	   upon	   the	   working	   class.	   His	   labour	   policy	   reflected	   this	   reality	   as	   it	  
drastically	  increased	  the	  minimum	  wage	  in	  1952	  and	  again	  in	  1954	  (Bourne,	  1974,	  
p.	  171).	  This	   led	   to	  widespread	   inflation,	  which	  also	  disadvantaged	  army	  officers	  
who	  did	  not	  receive	  broad	  wage	  increases	  (Dulles,	  1967,	  p.	  307).	  Throughout	  1952	  
and	   1953	   the	   US	   State	   Department	   demanded	   that	   Vargas	   change	   his	   economic	  
position.	  The	  Truman	  administration	  sought	  to	  redirect	  Brazilian	  economic	  policy	  
through	  increased	  EXIM	  loans	  made	  in	  order	  to	  have	  Vargas	  limit	  his	  control	  over	  
foreign	   capital,	   especially	   in	   the	   oil	   industry.	   US$120	  million	   of	   new	   loans	  were	  
made	   in	   1952	   (SD,	   May	   1952).	   Vargas	   accepted	   this	   overture	   and	   softened	   his	  
stance,	  yet	  he	   continued	   to	  defy	   IMF	  directives	  by	  controlling	   coffee	  exports	  and	  
running	  duel	  currencies.	  As	  the	  world’s	  largest	  producer	  of	  coffee,	  Brazil	  sought	  to	  
command	   a	   fair	   international	   price	   (Bourne,	   1974,	   p.	   169).	   In	   June	   1954	  Vargas	  
increased	  the	  price	  of	  Brazilian	  coffee	  on	  the	  Wall	  Street	  exchange	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  
Brazilian	  coffee	  was	  boycotted.	   In	  1954	  Brazil	  sold	  one-­‐sixth	  of	   its	  1953	  quantity	  
(Bourne,	   1974,	   pp.	   169-­‐183).	   Increased	   supply	   from	   Asia	   and	   Africa	   decreased	  
Brazil’s	   power	   over	   international	   coffee	   prices.	   The	   duel	   currency	   system	  
discriminated	  against	  foreign	  imports	  as	  it	  made	  domestically	  produced	  consumer	  
goods	   affordable	   to	   the	   working	   class.	   In	   1953,	   the	   IMF	   demanded	   that	   Vargas	  
devalue	   the	   Cruzeiro	   (SD,	   February	   1953).	   Vargas	   refused,	   fearing	   the	   effect	   on	  
real	   wages.	   Vargas’	   unwillingness	   to	   accept	   free-­‐market	   economics	   caused	   a	  
continual	  divide	  in	  US-­‐Brazilian	  relations	  during	  his	  tenure.	  	  
Containing	  “the	  South	  American	  Problem”	  through	  anti-­‐communism	  
Anti-­‐communism	   dominated	   the	   foreign	   policy	   of	   Eisenhower	   and	  Dulles.	  
Anti-­‐communist	   intervention,	  as	  exhibited	   in	  Guatemala,	  was	  not	   the	  only	   tool	   in	  
the	   new	   administration’s	   arsenal.	   Interventions	   are	   costly.	   They	   also	   compound	  
the	   effects	   of	   broad-­‐scale	   anti-­‐Americanism	   throughout	   the	   region.	   More	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importantly,	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   were	   not	   Guatemala.	   They	   were	   developing	  
nations	   with	   large	   populations.	   A	   Guatemala-­‐style	   invasion	   was	   not	   practical	   in	  
either	   scenario	   as	   it	   would	   expose	   American	   interference.	   The	   “South	   America	  
problem”	  was	  one	  of	  economic	  nationalism,	  rather	  than	  a	  problem	  of	  communism	  
(as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  29).	  These	  governments	  were	  denied	  substantial	  US	  aid	  
and	   followed	   an	   independent	   economic	   policies	   detrimental	   to	  US	   interests.	   The	  
first	  solution	  to	  the	  “South	  American	  problem”	  was	  moderation	  through	  economic	  
assistance	   (as	   cited	   in	   Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   29).	   In	   Chile	   and	   Bolivia,	   Washington’s	  
policies	   went	   no	   further	   than	   this.	   When	   this	   tactic	   was	   employed	   in	   both	  
Argentina	   and	   Brazil	   it	   emboldened	   the	   nationalists.	   Washington	   labelled	   the	  
opposition	   to	   US	   economic	   assistance	   and	   intervention	   “communist”	   or	   “leftist	  
ultra-­‐nationalism”	  (SD,	  December	  1953).	  The	  emergence	  of	  radical	  critique	  to	  the	  
left	   of	   Perón	   and	   Vargas	   concerned	   the	   US;	   however,	   it	   also	   provided	   an	  
opportunity	  in	  propaganda.	  The	  second	  solution	  to	  the	  “South	  American	  problem”	  
was	   to	   accept 91 	  the	   reality	   of	   a	   conservative	   military	   coup.	   While	   Vargas’	  
martyrdom	   prevented	   this	   in	   Brazil,	   his	   death	   still	   led	   to	   a	   greater	   role	   for	   the	  
conservatives	  and	  the	  military	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  subsequent	  
years	  (Dulles,	  1970,	  pp.	  3-­‐8).	  The	  final	  solution	  was	  the	  physical	  force	  exhibited	  in	  
Guatemala.	  Moreover,	  anti-­‐communist	  paranoia	  allowed	  Washington	  to	  dispose	  of	  
three	   vociferous	   critics	   in	   Latin	   America.	   While	   the	   means	   were	   extremely	  
different,	   the	   aim	  was	   the	   same	   –	   to	   solve	   the	   “South	   American	   problem…now”	  
(Eisenhower,	  as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  28).	  
Moderation	   through	  economic	  assistance	  brought	  Bolivia	  and	  Chile	   in	   line	  
with	   Washington’s	   economic	   philosophy	   between	   1953	   and	   1955.	   The	   MNR	  
Revolution	  of	  1953	  brought	  a	  social	  democratic	  government	  to	  Bolivia,	  one	  of	  the	  
most	  underdeveloped	  nations	  in	  the	  region	  (Klein,	  1992,	  p.	  234).	  The	  first	  action	  of	  
the	  Paz	  Estenssoro	   government	  was	   to	   nationalise	   the	   tin	   industry	   (Klein,	   1992,	  
pp.	   231-­‐234).	   As	   local	   capitalists	   owned	   this	   industry,	   Paz’s	   actions	   did	   not	  
adversely	  affect	  US	  interests.	  The	  US	  had	  under	  US$10	  million	  invested	  in	  Bolivia	  
(Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   79).	   Hence,	   US	   pragmatism	   in	   tin	   expropriation	   led	   to	   enlarged	  
participation	   in	   oil	   exploitation	   and	   exploration	   (Klein,	   1992,	   pp.	   234-­‐240).	  
Governments	   of	   all	   persuasions	   had	   opposed	   US	   oil	   investment	   since	   the	   1937	  
confiscation.	   Nevertheless,	   Bolivia	   was	   desperate	   for	   foreign	   aid.	   As	   Paz	   was	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focused	   upon	   internal	   development,	   including	   land	   reform,	   he	   was	   eager	   to	  
procure	  US	  loans	  in	  exchange	  for	  access	  to	  Bolivian	  oil	  (Klein,	  1992,	  pp.	  234-­‐240).	  
Between	  1953	  and	  1961	  Bolivia	  received	  US$192.5	  million	  in	  economic	  aid	  (Rabe,	  
1988,	  p.	  77).	  This	  aid	  had	  obvious	  conditions	  attached	  surrounding	  the	  protection	  
of	   the	   capitalist	   economy	  specifically	   focused	  on	  oil	   extraction.	  Denationalisation	  
occurred	   in	   1956,	   allowing	   the	   same	   US	   corporations	   that	   had	   been	   expelled	   in	  
1937	   access	   to	   substantial	   oil	   reserves.	   The	   former	   military	   populist	   Ibáñez	  
returned	   to	   power	   in	   Chile	   in	   1952	   (Loveman,	   2001,	   p.	   222).	   He	   had	   won	   that	  
year’s	  presidential	  elections	  with	  the	  support	  of	   the	  socialists	  and	  his	  promise	  to	  
denounce	  the	  Law	  for	  the	  Permanent	  Defence	  of	  Democracy,	  which	  re-­‐legalised	  the	  
Communist	  Party	  (Loveman,	  2001,	  p.	  222).	  Ibáñez	  inherited	  an	  economy	  suffering	  
hyperinflation.	   In	   1954	   the	   official	   inflation	   rate	   reached	   71	   per	   cent	   (Loveman,	  
2001,	  p.	  223).	   Ibáñez	  chose	   to	  adopt	   the	  US	   free	   trade	  philosophy	  and	  American	  
advisors	  were	   sent	   to	   Chile	   to	   deregulate	   the	   economy	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   80).	   This	  
hurt	  real	  wages,	  however,	  by	  the	  late	  1950s	  it	  had	  eased	  inflation.	  Ibáñez’	  choice	  to	  
accept	  US	  aid	  ensured	  his	  alliance	  and	  dependence	  upon	  Washington	  throughout	  
the	  1950s.	  92	  	  
The	  US	   committed	   to	  undermining	   the	   economic	  philosophy	  of	  Vargas	  by	  
any	  means	  necessary.	  In	  January	  1952	  the	  US	  Ambassador	  Herschel	  Johnson	  asked	  
Edward	  Miller	  -­‐	  “if	  it	  had	  ever	  occurred	  [that]	  Vargas	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  finish	  his	  
term?”	   (SD,	   January	   1952).	   This	   followed	   meetings	   with	   influential	   Brazilian	  
conservatives.	   Johnson	   also	   characterised	   Vargas	   and	   the	   Labor	   Party	   as	  
detrimental	  to	  the	  US	  position	  in	  Brazil	  due	  to	  their	  “scepticism”	  of	  US	  motivations	  
(SD,	   March	   1952).	   After	   this	   cable	   the	   US	   began	   linking	   communism	   to	   the	  
nationalist	  left.	  Johnson	  argued,	  “certain	  influences	  [communism]	  on	  the	  President	  
have	   not	   been	   exaggerated”	   (SD,	   May,	   1952).	   He	   asserted	   that	   Vargas	   and	   the	  
Finance	  Minister	  Horácio	  Lafer	  were	  under	  domestic	  communist	  influence,	  which	  
motivated	   their	   economic	   philosophy	   (SD,	  May,	   1952).	   The	   introduction	   of	   João	  
Goulart	  to	  the	  Cabinet	  deepened	  Washington’s	  suspicions.	  This	  view	  was	  extended	  
in	   December	   1953.	   The	   National	   Intelligence	   Estimate	   argued,	   “Vargas	   might	  
abandon	   his	   conservative	   connections	   and	   seek	   to	   establish	   a	   labour-­‐leftist	  
regime”	   (SD,	   December,	   1953).	   It	   continued	   by	   asserting	   that	   the	   army	   would	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depose	   this	   form	   of	   government.	   The	   report	   stated	   that	   the	   army	   and	   the	  
conservatives	   were	   hostile	   to	   Vargas	   because	   of	   his	   “indifference”	   towards	  
communism	   (SD,	   December,	   1953).	   Regarding	   Vargas’	   signature	   economic	  
package,	   the	   report	   claimed,	   “Brazilian	   ultra-­‐nationalists,	   abetted	   by	   the	  
communists,	   have	   secured	   the	   passage	   of	   a	   law	   prohibiting	   the	   participation	   of	  
foreign	   capital”	   (SD,	   December,	   1953).	   The	   report	   dictated	   the	   US	   approach	   to	  
Vargas.	   The	   US	   did	   not	   utilise	   unilateral	   action	   against	   Vargas	   as	   the	   Brazilian	  
military	  were	  already	  in	  the	  process	  of	  executing	  a	  coup	  beneficial	  to	  US	  interests,	  
with	   its	   own	   pretext	   already	   in	   place.	   On	   August	   5,	   1954,	   the	   conservative	  
journalist	  Carlos	  Lacerda	  was	  wounded	  in	  an	  attack	  attributed	  to	  Vargas	  (Bourne,	  
1974,	   p.	   185).	   From	   this	   moment	   the	   military	   were	   determined	   to	   overthrow	  
Vargas,	   and	   by	   August	   23	   it	   was	   inevitable.	   Vargas	   was	   urged	   to	   resign	   by	   all	  
around	  him	  (Bourne,	  1974,	  p.	  189).	  To	  prevent	  the	  state	  falling	   into	  the	  hands	  of	  
the	  military,	  Vargas	  took	  his	  life	  at	  07:30	  on	  August	  24	  (Bourne,	  1974,	  p.	  195).	  The	  
government	   passed	   to	   the	   Vice	   President	   Café	   Filho	   and	   the	   coup	   was	   averted.	  
During	   his	   short	   presidency,	   Filho	   was	   more	   accommodating	   to	   foreign	  
investment,	   but	   allowed	   democratic	   election	   of	   Juscelino	   Kubitschek	   in	   1956	  
(Dulles,	  1970,	  pp.	  4-­‐12).	  	  
Despite	   Perón’s	   ambitions,	   the	   Argentine	   Revolution	   faced	   several	  
problems	   following	   his	   re-­‐election	   in	   1951.	   The	   death	   of	   his	  wife	   Eva	   distanced	  
Perón	   from	   the	   masses	   (Rock,	   1993,	   p.	   167).	   His	   inability	   to	   communicate	   his	  
philosophy	  to	  the	  Argentine	  people	  emboldened	  conservative	  and	  military	  figures.	  
More	  significant,	   though,	  were	  Perón’s	  economic	  dilemmas.	  Argentina’s	   failure	  to	  
procure	  foreign	  markets	  for	  agricultural	  excess	  was	  the	  direct	  result	  of	  US	  foreign	  
policy.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   reserves	   of	   foreign	   exchange	   dwindled	   by	   1951	  
(Alexander,	   1979,	   p.	   101).	   Argentina’s	   traditional	  markets	   for	  meat	   and	   grain	   in	  
Europe	   had	   largely	   been	   replaced	   by	   Brazilian	   and	   American	   production.	   In	  
addition,	  Argentina’s	  inability	  to	  efficiently	  extract	  and	  utilise	  domestic	  oil	  and	  coal	  
reserves	  meant	  that	  Perón	  was	  reliant	  on	  foreign	  energy	  (Alexander,	  1979,	  p.	  102).	  
1953	  was	   a	   turning	   point.	   The	   revolution	   had	   failed	   to	  meet	   its	   objectives,	   and	  
Perón	  was	  forced	  to	  compromise.	  He	  accepted	  large	  EXIM	  loans	  from	  the	  US	  (Rabe,	  
1988,	   p.	   85).	   He	   also	   invited	   Standard	   Oil	   of	   California	   to	   exploit	   Argentine	   oil	  
reserves	   (Alexander,	   1979,	   p.	   101).	   This	   angered	   nationalists	   and	   leftists	   in	  
Argentina.	   Perón	   was	   caught	   between	   two	   positions.	   According	   to	   the	   US	   State	  
	   159	  
Department	   account	   in	  1954,	   “Perón	  now	  dominates	  Argentina	  more	   completely	  
than	  ever	  before”	  (SD,	  March,	  1954).	  They	  felt	  that	  “Perón	  has	  sometimes	  adopted	  
policies	   advocated	   by	   the	   communists,”	   but	   was	   not	   himself	   a	   communist	   (SD,	  
March,	  1954).	  They	  argued	  that	  if	  his	  current	  pro-­‐US	  policies	  proved	  unsuccessful	  
or	   unpopular	   then	   “Perón	  would	   probably	   revert	   to	   a	   demagogic	   internal	   policy	  
and	   antagonistic	   foreign	   policy”	   which	   would	   “result	   in	   some	   increase	   in	  
communist	   influence”	   (SD,	  March,	  1954).	  They	  also	   foresaw	   that	   “in	   the	  event	  of	  
Perón’s	   demise	   the	   Army	   would	   probably	   have	   the	   predominant	   voice	   in	   the	  
choice	  of	  his	  successor”	  (SD,	  March,	  1954).	  Perón	  had	  polarised	  Argentine	  politics.	  
The	   Nationalists	   to	   his	   left	   decried	   the	   increased	   US	   influence,	   while	   the	  
conservatives	   demanded	  more	   rapid	   change.	   The	   final	   defeat	   for	   Perón	  was	   his	  
break	  with	  the	  Church	  in	  1955	  (Alexander,	  1979,	  p.	  104).	  The	  military	  overthrew	  
Perón	  on	  September	  16,	  1955	  (Potash,	  1980,	  p.	  214).	  Perón	  surrendered	   to	  save	  
the	  destruction	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  coup	  the	  army	  stepped	  up	  
foreign	  investment	  and	  alienated	  the	  role	  of	  labour	  in	  national	  political	  discourse.	  	  
	  
The	  Threat	  of	  Guatemala	  	  
Peter	   Boyle	   (2005)	   suggests	   “Guatemala	   provides	   the	   worst	   example	   of	  
failure	   on	   Eisenhower’s	   part	   to	   differentiate	   between	   nationalist	   reform	   and	  
communist	  subversion”	  (p.	  54).	  However,	  such	  a	  differentiation	  was	  evident	  to	  the	  
NSC	  and	  the	  CIA	  in	  1953,	  hence,	  the	  threat	  of	  Guatemala	  emanated	  from	  a	  source	  
other	  than	  that	  of	   ‘communism.’	  Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer	  (1982)	  highlight	  the	  role	  
of	   the	   UFCo	   in	   the	   overthrow	   of	   the	   Árbenz	   regime	   (p.	   108).	   By	   identifying	   the	  
interconnections	  between	   the	   top	   administrators	   of	   the	  Eisenhower	   government	  
and	   the	   UFCo,	   they	   assert	   that	   the	   US	   corruptly	   condemned	   the	   Guatemalan	  
government	   to	   serve	   private	   capitalist	   interests.	   Many	   historians	   have	   accepted	  
this	   narrative.	   However,	   several	   political	   scientists	   have	   gone	   beyond	   this	  
conclusion	   to	   assert	   the	   structural	   dependency	   challenged	   by	   Árbenz.	   Gleijes	  
(1990)	   has	   highlighted	   the	   economic	   ramifications	   of	   economic	   diversification	  
under	  Árbenz	  (pp.	  167-­‐171).	  Aybar	  de	  Soto	  (1978)	  argues	  that	  the	  US	  overthrew	  
Árbenz	  to	  maintain	  regional	  economic	  dependence	  on	  American	  exports	  (pp.	  150-­‐
176).	   Grandin	   (2010)	   reasons	   that	   Árbenz’s	   attempt	   “to	   implement	   a	  New	  Deal-­‐
style	   economic	   program	   to	   modernise	   and	   humanise	   Guatemala…[was]	   was	  
unacceptable…from	   Washington’s	   early	   1950s	   point	   of	   view”	   (pp.	   42-­‐43).	   This	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section	   will	   identify	   the	   cause	   of	   the	   US	   coup	   in	   June	   1954.	   It	   will	   explain	   the	  
significant	   departure	   from	   the	   rhetoric	   and	   the	   reality	   of	   the	   situation	   in	  
Guatemala.	  
Eisenhower’s	   foreign	  policy	   focused	  on	  Guatemala	  during	  1953-­‐1954.	  The	  
small	  Central	  American	   republic	  demonstrated	   the	  potential	   of	   social	   democracy	  
and	  modest	  economic	  development	  to	  Latin	  America	  (Gleijes,	  1991,	  pp.	  145-­‐170).	  
The	   US	   sought	   to	   eliminate	   the	   Árbenz	   Guatemalan	   government	   by	   claiming	  
extensive	   communist	   infiltration	   within	   the	   democratic	   administrations	   of	   Juan	  
José	  Arévalo	  and	  Jacobo	  Árbenz	  Guzmán.	  While	  most	  scholars	  accept	  that	  Árbenz	  
was	   not	   a	   communist,	   this	   thesis	  will	   also	   demonstrate	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	   the	  
social	  democratic	  position.	  Like	  the	  other	  countries	  of	  Central	  America,	  Guatemala	  
possessed	   a	   plantation	   economy.	   68.1	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	   worked	   in	  
agriculture,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   these	   workers	   within	   the	   coffee	   and	   banana	  
industries	   (Aybar	   de	   Soto,	   1978,	   p.	   150).	   Despite	   its	   agricultural	   commitment,	  
Guatemala	   could	   not	   produce	   enough	   staple	   foodstuffs	   to	   feed	   its	   population	   of	  
approximately	   3	   million	   during	   the	   late	   1940s	   (Aybar	   de	   Soto,	   1978,	   p.	   182).	  
Rather,	   it	   imported	  corn	  and	  wheat	   from	  the	  US,	  who	  provided	  79	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  
imports	  and	  absorbed	  92	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  exports	  in	  1944	  (LaCharité,	  Kennedy	  and	  
Thienal,	  1964,	  p.	  17).	  Guatemala’s	   feudal	  property	  system	  excluded	  97.9	  per	  cent	  
of	   the	  population	   from	  sustainable	  ownership	  (Aybar	  de	  Soto,	  1978,	  p.	  150).	  The	  
Creole	  oligarchy	  monopolised	   land	  to	  ensure	  cheap	   labour	  on	  coffee	  populations.	  
The	   nation’s	   largest	   employer,	   the	   UFCo,	   emulated	   this	   land	   tenure	   pattern	  
(Chapman,	   2007,	   pp.	   56-­‐64).	   The	   UFCo	   monopolised	   arable	   land	   to	   ensure	   the	  
dependency	  of	  the	  workforce	  on	  wage	  labour.	  	  
The	   presidential	   election	   of	   1951	   demonstrated	   a	   significant	   departure	  
from	   the	   moderate	   economic	   policies	   of	   Arévalo.	   The	   greatest	   achievement	   of	  
Arévalo’s	   presidency	   had	   been	   the	   Labour	   Code	   of	   1947,	   which	   increased	   the	  
minimum	  wage	   by	   200	   per	   cent	   (Grow,	   2008,	   p.	   11).	   Arévalo	   did	   not	   attack	   the	  
established	   classes	   that	   prevented	   large-­‐scale	   reform	   in	   Guatemala.	   His	   main	  
departure	   from	   the	  US	   State	  Department	  was	  over	   the	   continuing	   legalisation	  of	  
communism	  (Beisner,	  2006,	  p.	  578).	   	  This	  pragmatism	  was	  promoted	  by	  realism.	  
Arévalo	  survived	  twenty-­‐five	  attempted	  domestic	  insurrections	  during	  his	  six-­‐year	  
presidency	  (Immerman,	  1982,	  p.	  57).	  He	  was	  cautious	  not	  to	  provoke	  “the	  hidden	  
force	   against	   himself	   and	   the	   revolution”	   (Schlesinger	   and	   Kinzer,	   1982,	   p.	   86).	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Árbenz	   emerged	   as	   the	   popular	   candidate	   for	   the	   1951	   presidential	   election.	   A	  
former	  soldier,	  he	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  young	  generals	  responsible	  for	  the	  October	  
Revolution	   of	   1944	   (Greib,	   1979,	   p.	   272).	   Árbenz	   was	   characterised	   as	   a	  
communist	   for	   several	   reasons.	   The	   US	   asserted	   that	   Árbenz’s	   wife,	   the	  
Salvadorian	  María	   Cristina	   Vilanova,	  was	   a	   communist	   sympathiser	   (Immerman,	  
1982,	   p.	   62).	   They	   asserted	   that	   Vilanova’s	   leftist	   friends	   had	   been	   influential	   in	  
obtaining	  for	  Árbenz	  the	  PAR	  nomination	  in	  1950.	  It	  was	  also	  asserted	  that	  Árbenz	  
had	   returned	   such	   favours	   by	   granting	   government	   positions	   to	   communists.	  
While	  the	  conservative	  historian	  Ronald	  Schneider	  (1958)	  claimed	  that	  85	  per	  cent	  
of	   the	   National	   Agrarian	   Department	   were	   ‘communists’,	   only	   a	   handful	   of	  
communists	  were	  present	  in	  the	  department	  (p.	  38;	  Alexander,	  1963,	  p.	  360).	  The	  
majority	  were	  reformers	  who	  used	  leftist	  language.93	  
The	  Guatemalan	  communists	  did	  not	  challenge	  Arévalo’s	   leadership	  of	   the	  
PAR	   or	   Árbenz’s	   election	   campaign.	   Rather,	   they	   exited	   the	   PAR,	   forming	   the	  
“Democratic	   Vanguard”	   in	   1947	   and	   the	   Guatemalan	   Communist	   Party	   (CPG)	   in	  
1951	   (LaCharité,	   Kennedy	   and	  Thienal,	   1964,	   p.	   44).	   The	   leading	   communists	   in	  
this	  era	  were	  José	  Manuel	  Fortuny,	  who	  defected	  from	  the	  PAR,	  and	  Víctor	  Manuel	  
Gutiérrez,	   who	   emerged	   from	   the	   union	   movement	   (LaCharité,	   Kennedy	   and	  
Thienal,	  1964,	  pp.	  46-­‐50).	  Three	  Communist	  Party	  members,	   including	  Gutiérrez,	  
were	  elected	  to	  the	  54	  seat	  Guatemalan	  Congress	  in	  1951	  (LaCharité,	  Kennedy	  and	  
Thienal,	  1964,	  p.	  62).	  Fortuny	  was	  not	  elected.	  Gutiérrez	  was	  an	  active	  communist,	  
visiting	  East	  Berlin	  for	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  in	  1952	  (Alexander,	  
1963,	   p.	   356).	   While	   several	   CPG	   members	   visited	   the	   Eastern	   Bloc,	   reciprocal	  
visits	  were	  rare.	  CPG	  membership	  peaked	  in	  1954	  at	  4,000	  (CIA	  1953;	  Alexander,	  
1963,	  p.	  360).	  The	  main	  obstacle	  to	  communist	  advancement	  was	  the	  popularity	  of	  
Árbenz	  and	  the	  PAR.	  The	  CPG	  program	  failed	  to	  take	  root,	  as	  it	  was	  too	  ideological	  
for	   a	   largely	   illiterate	   nation	   that	   was	   concerned	   with	   basic	   necessities.	   The	  
communists	  instead	  pragmatically	  participated	  in	  the	  democratic	  process,	  as	  they	  
had	   done	   on	   a	  much	   larger	   scale	   in	   Chile	   a	   decade	   earlier.	   To	   assert	   that	   three	  
communists	  controlled	  the	  Árbenz	  government	  is	  illogical.	  The	  PAR	  held	  a	  majority	  
in	   Congress	   and	   could	   implement	   their	   program	   without	   communist	   approval.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  The	  former	  US	  Ambassador	  to	  Guatemala	  identified	  all	  progressives	  as	  communists	  with	  the	  help	  
of	  his	  infamous	  “duck	  test.”	  If	  bureaucrats	  spoke	  and	  looked	  like	  communists,	  the	  Ambassador	  
asserted,	  then	  they	  must	  be	  communists.	  Factual	  evidence	  was	  irrelevant	  (Beals,	  1963,	  p.	  265).	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Nevertheless,	   their	   participation,	   and	   Arévalo	   and	   Árbenz’s	   reluctance	   to	   omit	  
them,	  led	  to	  conflict	  with	  the	  US.	  
The	   Árbenz	   reform	   program	   centred	   upon	   the	   land	   reform	   legislation	  
Decree	  900.	  When	  Árbenz	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  in	  1951,	  10.1	  per	  cent	  of	  arable	  
land	   was	   under	   cultivation	   (Aybar	   de	   Soto,	   1978,	   p.	   150).	   Guatemala	   lacked	  
significant	   mineral	   wealth,	   making	   arable	   land	   the	   most	   valuable	   national	  
commodity.	   The	   power	   of	   the	   Creole	   oligarchy	   was	   a	   consequence	   of	   land	  
monopolisation	  during	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries.	  In	  1951,	  
2.1	  per	   cent	   of	  Guatemalans	  owned	  72.2	  per	   cent	   of	   arable	   land	   (Aybar	  de	   Soto,	  
1978,	  p.	  150).	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  this	  land	  was	  organised	  into	  ‘latifundias,’	  large	  
plantations	   with	   workforces	   producing	   export	   commodities	   (Chapman,	   2007,	   p.	  
56).	  Decree	  900	  expropriated	  large	  amounts	  of	  idle	  land	  from	  Guatemala’s	  largest	  
landowners.	   Árbenz	   stated	   intention	   was	   to	   “eradicate	   feudal	   property	   in	   rural	  
areas	   and	   to	   develop	   capitalist	  methods	   of	   production”	   (Schlesinger	   and	   Kinzer,	  
1982,	  p.	  52).	  It	  did	  not	  challenge	  productive	  agrarian	  industries	  that	  contributed	  to	  
the	  economy,	  including	  that	  of	  the	  UFCo.	  Árbenz	  sought	  to	  harness	  the	  productive	  
labour	  of	  the	  workforce	  to	  advance	  Guatemala’s	  agrarian	  economy,	  building	  upon	  
and	  complimenting	   the	  export	  economy.	  He	  sought	   to	  do	   this	  without	  negatively	  
impacting	   those	   industries	   already	   operating	   in	   Guatemala.	   Decree	   900	   was	  
intended	  to	  purchase	  the	  excess	  fallow	  land	  of	  Guatemala	  and	  redistribute	  it	  to	  the	  
peasants	  (Brocket,	  1988,	  pp.	  97-­‐104).	  Despite	  the	  protests	  of	  landholders,	  the	  first	  
14	  months	  witnessed	   an	   agrarian	   revolution;	   20	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   nation’s	   arable	  
land	  was	   redistributed	   to	   24	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   population	   (Brocket,	   1988,	   p.	   102).	  
While	   the	   National	   Agrarian	   Department	   was	   targeted	   for	   dysfunction	   and	  
corruption,	  the	  speed	  of	  Guatemalan	  land	  reform	  was	  phenomenal.	  	  
Decree	   900	   significantly	   altered	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   Guatemala.	   It	  
decreased	   the	   dependency	   of	   the	   labour	   force	   on	   plantation	   agriculture.	   Decree	  
900	   also	   altered	   Guatemala’s	   relationship	   to	   the	   US.	   The	   production	   of	   staple	  
foodstuffs	   increased	   significantly	   following	   its	   implementation.	   During	   the	   May-­‐
June	   1954	   economic	   embargo,	   Guatemala	   independently	   produced	   many	   staple	  
foodstuffs,	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  land	  redistribution	  policies	  (Aybar	  de	  Soto,	  1978,	  p.	  
182).	  Decree	  900	  was	  also	  symbolically	  against	  US	  monopolisation,	  as	  it	  reclaimed	  
178,000	  acres	  of	  UFCo	  land	  that	  lay	  idle	  (McCann,	  1976,	  p.	  49).	  Árbenz	  allowed	  the	  
UFCo	  to	  maintain	  ample	  land	  to	  ensure	  crop	  rotations	  (McCann,	  1976,	  p.	  49).	  The	  
	   163	  
UFCo	  protested	   this	   action	   vociferously.	  Guatemala	  purchased	   expropriated	   land	  
based	   on	   their	   taxable	   value	   in	   government	   bonds.	   As	   the	   UFCo	   had	   avoided	  
taxation	  for	  over	  five	  decades,	  the	  land	  was	  valued	  at	  US$525,000	  (McCann,	  1976,	  
p.	  49).	  The	  UFCo	  claimed	  that	  this	  land	  was	  worth	  in	  excess	  of	  US$16.5	  million,	  and	  
that	   this	   fee	  must	  be	  paid	   immediately	   in	   cash	   (McCann,	  1976,	  p.	   49).	  The	  UFCo	  
lodged	   its	   grievance	  with	   the	  US	  State	  Department	   (McCann,	  1976,	  p.	   50).	  While	  
the	   UFCo	   had	   few	   friends	   in	   the	   Truman	   administration,	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	  
Eisenhower	   administration	   elevated	   their	   complaint	   to	   a	   matter	   of	   national	  
importance.	   Connections	  with	   the	   UFCo	   proliferated	   throughout	   the	   Eisenhower	  
administration.	   Eisenhower	   was	   a	   personal	   friend	   of	   the	   UFCo	   Public	   Relations	  
Director	  Edmund	  Whitman,	  and	  employed	  his	  wife	  Anne	  as	  his	  secretary	  (McCann,	  
1976,	  p.	  58).	   John	  Foster	  Dulles	  worked	   for	  Sullivan	  and	  Cromwell,	  who	  handled	  
the	  UFCo’s	  legal	  issues	  (Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  108).	  Allen	  Dulles	  served	  
on	   the	   board	   of	   directors	   for	   the	   Schroeder	   Bank,	  which	   handled	  UFCo	   finances	  
(Schlesinger	   and	   Kinzer,	   1982,	   p.	   108).	   Under-­‐Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   Inter-­‐
American	  Affairs,	  John	  Moors	  Cabot,	  and	  UN	  Ambassador	  Henry	  Cabot	  Lodge	  were	  
both	   from	   prestigious	   Boston	   families	   that	   held	   large	   interests	   in	   the	   UFCo	  
(Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  108).	  At	  this	  point	  the	  US	  State	  Department’s	  and	  
the	  UFCo’s	  interests	  began	  to	  overlap.	  	  	  
Land	  was	  not	  the	  only	  impediment	  to	  Guatemalan	  development.	  Guatemala	  
was	  also	  dependent	  upon	  US	  companies	  for	  transport,	  electricity,	  financial	  services	  
and	   export	   exchange,	   which	   made	   the	   Guatemalan	   government	   susceptible	   to	  
foreign	  economic	  warfare.	  The	  World	  Bank	  report	  of	  1951	  highlighted	  Guatemala’s	  
economic	   dependence	   upon	   US	   corporations	   and	   advised	   the	   Árbenz	   regime	   to	  
establish	   domestic	   competition	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   transport,	   the	   ports	   and	   energy	  
production	  (cited	  in	  Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  165).	  The	  internal	  transport	  
of	  Guatemala	  was	  controlled	  by	  two	  US	  firms,	  the	  International	  Railways	  of	  Central	  
American	  (IRCA)	  and	  Grace	  Lines	  (Greib,	  1979,	  p.	  69).	  The	  IRCA	  was	  a	  subsidiary	  
of	  the	  UFCo	  and	  controlled	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Guatemalan	  rail	  (Chapman,	  2007,	  p.	  
56).	  This	  monopolisation	  prevented	   the	   affordable	   internal	  distribution	  of	   goods	  
and	   persons	   as	   US	   interests	   were	   routinely	   prioritised.	   The	   UFCo	   also	   owned	  
Guatemala’s	   only	   deep-­‐water	   port,	   Puerto	   Barrios	   (Chapman,	   2007,	   p.	   56).94	  It	  
effectively	   controlled	   Guatemalan	   import-­‐export	   exchange	   in	   the	   Caribbean.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  Purchased	  by	  the	  UFCo	  in	  1907.	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Furthermore,	   energy	   production	   was	   monopolised	   by	   the	   US	   General	   Electric	  
Company	   (Immerman,	   1982,	   p.	   53).	   Guatemala	   was	   unable	   to	   control	   energy	  
distribution.	  The	  lack	  of	  government	  revenue	  impeded	  its	  economic	  development.	  
With	   negligible	   tariff	   earnings,	   and	   no	   income	   tax,	   the	   Árbenz	   government	   was	  
powerless	   to	   fulfil	   its	   electoral	   promises	   regarding	   health,	   education	   and	  
infrastructure.	   Árbenz	   was	   not	   able	   to	   expropriate	   US	   holdings	   or	   motivate	  
domestic	   competition.	   Accordingly,	   Árbenz	   developed	   a	   pragmatic	   nationalistic	  
platform	  to	  improve	  the	  Guatemalan	  economy.	  
Árbenz	  faced	  several	  obstacles	  during	  his	  presidency.	  He	  sought	  to	  develop	  
a	   modern	   “capitalist	   state”	   through	   advanced	   economic	   development	   (in	  
Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  52).	  His	  first	  manoeuvre	  was	  the	  construction	  of	  
the	   deep-­‐water	   Puerto	   Tomás.	   Árbenz	   commissioned	   the	   US	   company	  Morrison	  
Knudsen	  to	  construct	  this	  port	  in	  1953	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  US$4.8	  million	  (Gleijes,	  1991,	  p.	  
166).	   Árbenz	   also	   advocated	   a	   700-­‐mile	   network	   of	   paved	   roads	   and	   motor	  
vehicles	   to	   replace	   the	   monopolised	   rail	   system	   (Gleijes,	   1991,	   p.	   167).	   Árbenz	  
initiated	   the	  construction	  of	   the	   link	  between	  Guatemala	  City	  and	  Puerto	  Tomás.	  
He	   also	   began	   construction	   on	   a	   large	   hydroelectric	   plant.	   The	   28,000-­‐kilowatt	  
plant	  in	  Juras,	  Escuintla,	  was	  estimated	  to	  cost	  US$6	  million	  (Gleijes,	  1991,	  p.	  166).	  
This	  plant	  sought	  to	  decrease	  consumer	  electricity	  costs	  and	  oil	  dependency.	  The	  
final	  tenet	  of	  Árbenz’s	  reform	  program	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  Guatemala’s	  first	  
income	  tax.	  The	  progressive	  income	  tax	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  Congress	  on	  June	  7,	  
1954	   and	   would	   have	   gone	   into	   effect	   on	   July	   1,	   1954	   (Gleijes,	   1991,	   p.	   168).	  	  
Árbenz	   attempted	   to	   create	   a	  more	   self-­‐sufficient	   capitalist	   economy	   to	   improve	  
the	   lives	   of	   Guatemalans.	   The	   reforms	  were	   less	   radical	   than	   the	   New	  Deal,	   the	  
Mexican	   Revolution,	   or	   post-­‐War	   policies	   in	   Western	   Europe.	   Despite	   the	  
protestations	  of	  the	  US	  corporations,	  Guatemala’s	  reforms	  posed	  a	  miniscule	  threat	  
to	  the	  broader	  US	  economy.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  a	  dozen	  dependent	  plantation	  economies	  
in	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere.	   As	   Árbenz	   stated,	   the	   precedent	   of	   Guatemalan	  
development	   was	   the	   true	   threat	   to	   US	   interests	   (as	   cited	   in	   Schlesinger	   and	  
Kinzer,	   1982,	   p.	   199).	   Independent	   nationalist	   economic	   development	   was	  
discouraged	   by	   the	   US	   and	   IMF.	   Development,	   it	   was	   argued,	   could	   only	   come	  
about	   through	   reduced	   regulation	   and	   increased	   private	   investment	   (NSC	   1953,	  
pp.	   12-­‐17).	   If	   several	   nations	   could	   develop	  without	   US	   assistance	   and	   begin	   to	  
alter	   their	   place	   in	   the	   global	   capitalist	   economy,	   the	   position	   of	   the	   US	   in	   the	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Western	   Hemisphere	   would	   diminish.	   Accordingly,	   Árbenz	   had	   to	   go.	   The	   US	  
would	  use	  all	  necessary	  means	  to	  ensure	  his	  demise.	  	  
	  
Removing	  Árbenz	  Through	  Anti-­‐communism	  
While	  historians	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  Guatemalan	  President	  was	  not	  
a	   communist,	   for	   the	  US	  Ambassador	   John	  Peurifoy	   “he	  would	   certainly	   do	  until	  
one	   came	   along”	   (cited	   in,	   Schlesinger	   and	   Kinzer,	   1991,	   p.	   138).	   Dean	   Acheson	  
was	  unwilling	  to	  undermine	  a	  democratically	  elected	  government	  to	  demonstrate	  
Washington’s	   Cold	   War	   credentials;	   however,	   Eisenhower’s	   administration	  
planned	   their	   campaign	   in	   Guatemala	   during	   1953.	   The	   American	   propaganda	  
campaign	   in	   Guatemala	   faced	   several	   challenges.	   No	   evidence	   of	   significant	  
communist	  infiltration	  had	  emerged	  anywhere	  in	  the	  hemisphere	  (CIA,	  November	  
1953).95	  The	  US’	  position	  in	  the	  UN	  required	  its	  actions	  to	  be	  justified	  to	  its	  allies.	  
The	  US	  sought	  to	  utilise	  the	  CIA’s	  new	  operational	  capabilities	  to	  “plausibly	  deny”	  
its	   involvement	   in	   Guatemala	   (Greenberg,	   2007,	   p.	   692).	   NSC	   144/1	   designated	  
Guatemala	  an	  enemy	  of	  US	  interests	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  in	  March	  1953.	  By	  September	  
1953	  Allen	  Dulles	  had	  composed	  a	  detailed	  plan	  to	  remove	  Árbenz,	  both	  cheaply	  
and	  quietly	  (CIA).	  The	  CIA	  (September	  1953)	  identified	  four	  components	  to	  the	  US	  
mission.	  Firstly,	  the	  US	  had	  to	  convince	  the	  world	  that	  Guatemala	  –	  and	  Árbenz	  –	  
was	  communist,	  and	  as	  such,	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  ‘free	  world’.	  Secondly,	  
the	  US	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  Árbenz’	  economic	  reforms	  were	  a	  failure	  and	  that	  
the	   people	   of	   Guatemala	   were	   ready	   to	   oust	   their	   government	   (CIA,	   September	  
1953).	  Thirdly,	  the	  US	  needed	  to	  prove	  that	  communism	  was	  a	  direct	  threat	  to	  the	  
entire	   hemisphere	   (CIA,	   September	   1953).	   Finally,	   the	  US	  needed	   to	   execute	   the	  
coup	   with	   minimal	   direct	   involvement	   or	   capital	   investment	   (CIA,	   September	  
1953).	  The	  CIA	  asserted	  that	  should	  these	  objectives	  be	  fulfilled,	  the	  US	  would	  be	  
viewed	  as	  an	   idle	  observer	   in	  a	   civil	   conflict	   that	   reinstalled	  a	  pro-­‐US	  dictator	   to	  
the	  region.	  	  Unfortunately,	  little	  of	  the	  CIA’s	  plan	  ran	  smoothly.	  
The	   US	   State	   Department	   successfully	   accused	   Árbenz	   of	   communist	  
sympathy	   during	   1953	   and	   1954.	   The	   CIA’s	   plan	   called	   for	   “the	   collection	   of	  
evidence,	   fabrication	   of	   same,	   [to]	   be	   attended	   to	   accordingly”	   (CIA,	   September	  
1953,	   p.	   7).	   This	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   CIA	   knew	   the	   Árbenz	   regime	   was	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Although	  it	  had	  been	  successfully	  falsified	  on	  several	  occasions,	  such	  as	  with	  the	  Colombian	  
Bogotázo.	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communist.	   Fortunately	   for	   its	   director,	   Allen	   Dulles,	   the	   UFCo	   had	   waged	   a	  
propaganda	   war	   against	   the	   Guatemalan	   Revolution	   since	   the	   late	   1940s	   (Tye,	  
1998,	   pp.	   156-­‐170).	   The	   UFCo’s	   public	   relations	   director,	   Edward	   Bernays,	   had	  
warned	  the	  US	  government	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  nationalist	  anti-­‐Americanism	  since	  the	  
rise	   of	   Mohammad	   Mossadegh	   in	   Iran	   (Tye,	   1998,	   p.	   167).96	  Bernays	   used	   his	  
connections	   with	   the	   US	   media97	  to	   pursue	   his	   agenda	   (Tye,	   1998,	   p.	   168).	   He	  
wrote	  dozens	  of	  articles	   for	   the	  major	  papers	   that	  he	  called	   “fillers”,	  which	  were	  
published,	   often	   unedited	   (Tye,	   1998,	   p.	   168).	   His	   propaganda	  war	   dramatically	  
increased	   after	   Arbenz’s	   election.	   Bernays	   paid	   the	   influential	   conservative	  
Republican	   John	   Clements	   US$35,000	   to	   produce	   and	   distribute	   the	   “report	   on	  
Guatemala”	   to	   800	   leading	   conservatives	   in	   1951	   (Chapman,	   2007,	   p.	   129).	   The	  
report	   claimed,	   “communism	   had	   already	   gained	   a	   foothold	   in	   Guatemala	   [and	  
that]	  the	  next	  objective	  of	  Árbenz	  and	  his	  regime	  was	  to	  seize	  the	  Panama	  Canal”	  
(Clements	  in	  Tye,	  1998,	  p.	  176).	  Bernays	  led	  a	  press	  tour	  to	  Guatemala	  in	  1952	  to	  
demonstrate	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  communism	  to	  US	  business	  (Tye,	  1998,	  p.	  170).	  
While	   the	   UFCo	   could	   not	   convince	   the	   Democrats	   to	   invade	   Guatemala,	   their	  
alliance	   with	   the	   Republicans	   was	   inevitable.	   In	   reality,	   however,	   it	   was	   a	  
relationship	  of	  convenience.	  The	  resultant	  alliance	  meant	  that	  the	  UFCo	  on	  behalf	  
of	   the	   US	   State	   Department	   and	   CIA	   waged	   the	   propaganda	   war.	   Regardless	   of	  
motivation,	  all	  of	  their	  interests	  were	  served	  by	  Bernays’	  actions.	  	  
The	  US	  waged	  economic	  warfare	  against	  Árbenz	  from	  the	  late	  1940s	  (Aybar	  
de	   Soto,	   1978,	   pp.	   79-­‐94).	   This	   process	  was	   accelerated	   under	   Eisenhower.	   The	  
first	   tenet	   of	   the	   economic	  warfare	   was	   the	   arms	   embargo,	   in	   place	   since	   1948	  
(Blum,	   2004,	   p.	   73).	   The	   Guatemalan	   government,	   unable	   to	   manufacture	   arms	  
internally,	  looked	  elsewhere.	  Initially,	  Arévalo	  bought	  large	  amounts	  of	  arms	  from	  
the	   Argentine	   Juan	   Perón	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   50).	   However,	   after	   the	   failed	  
Caribbean	   Legion	   invasion	   of	   Santo	   Domingo,	   Argentina	   ceased	   arms	   shipments	  
(Gleijes,	  1989,	  p.	  142).	  With	  the	  invasion	  clearly	  imminent,	  Árbenz	  reached	  out	  to	  
the	  Eastern	  Bloc	   (Immerman,	   1982,	   p.	   155).	  Árbenz	  had	  no	   concrete	   contacts	   in	  
the	   Bloc.	   In	   his	   one	   brief	   conversation	   with	   Joseph	   Stalin,	   Stalin	   requested	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Who	  the	  CIA	  also	  overthrew	  under	  false	  anti-­‐Communist	  accusation	  in	  1953.	  
97	  Specifically	  with	  the	  NY	  Times,	  whose	  director	  Arthur	  Hays	  Sulzberger	  was	  related	  to	  Bernays’	  
wife.	  CIA	  records	  also	  reveal	  a	  dialogue	  between	  Sulzberger	  and	  Allen	  Dulles	  from	  late	  1953.	  
Examples	  of	  the	  NY	  Times	  anti-­‐Árbenz	  agenda	  include:	  ‘Guatemala	  Exiles	  in	  anti-­‐Red	  fight;	  Group	  in	  
Mexico	  unites	  to	  undermine	  Árbenz	  and	  land	  reform’	  (June	  22,	  1952);	  and	  ‘Ideas	  of	  Red	  Held	  Ruling	  
Guatemala;	  Ideologies	  wear	  a	  nationalistic	  cloak	  but	  observers	  see	  a	  Kremlin	  program’	  (May	  21,	  
1952).	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shipment	   of	   bananas	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   goodwill.	   Árbenz	  was	   forced	   to	   reply	   that	   the	  
UFCo	   owned	   the	   bananas	   and	   he	   had	   no	   power	   to	   market	   them	   in	   Russia	  
(Chapman,	   2007,	   p.	   146).	   Nevertheless,	   he	   acquired	   out-­‐dated	   arms	   from	  
Czechoslovakia	   in	   May	   1954.	   The	   CIA	   was	   aware	   of	   the	   cargo	   of	   the	   Swedish	  
freighter	  Alfheim	  (Immerman,	  1982,	  p.	  155).	  This	  transaction	  further	  condemned	  
the	   Árbenz	   regime.	   The	   CIA	   (September,	   1953)	   also	   sought	   to	   sabotage	   foreign	  
exchange	  by	  discriminating	  against	  Guatemalan	  coffee.	  The	  irony	  was	  that	  the	  US	  
actions	  propelled	  Decree	  900	  to	  national	  importance.	  Without	  the	  ability	  to	  import	  
food,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  peasant	  in	  the	  economy	  increased	  significantly	  (Aybar	  de	  Soto,	  
1978,	  p.	  182).	  
Diplomatic	   warfare	   also	   reached	   its	   pinnacle	   under	   Eisenhower.	   The	   US	  
characterised	  events	  in	  Guatemala	  as	  requiring	  the	  multilateral	  action	  of	  the	  OAS.	  
The	   CIA	   had	   encouraged	   the	   State	   Department	   to	   fabricate	   evidence	   where	  
necessary	   to	   win	   overwhelming	   support	   (CIA,	   September	   1953).	   The	  May	   1954	  
meeting	   in	   Caracas	   eventuated	   in	   an	   idealistic	   debate	   between	   the	   Guatemalan	  
foreign	  minister	  Guillermo	  Toriello	  and	  John	  Foster	  Dulles.	  Toriello	  argued	  
The	   plan	   of	   national	   liberation	   being	   carried	   out	   with	   firmness	   by	   my	  
	   government	   has	   necessarily	   affected	   the	   privileges	   of	   the	   foreign	  
	   enterprises	   that	   are	   impeding	   the	  progress	   and	  economic	  development	  of	  
	   the	   country…They	   wanted	   to	   find	   a	   ready	   expedient	   to	   maintain	   the	  
	   economic	   dependence	   of	   the	   American	   Republics	   and	   suppress	   the	  
	   legitimate	  desires	  of	  their	  people,	  	   cataloguing	   as	   communism	   every	  
	   manifestation	   of	   nationalism	   or	   economic	   independence,	   any	   desire	   for	  
	   social	   progress,	   any	   intellectual	   curiosity,	   and	   any	   interest	   in	   progressive	  
	   and	  liberal	  reforms	  (as	  cited	  in	  Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  	   1982,	   pp.	   144-­‐
	   145).	  
Despite	  Toriello	  receiving	  a	  standing	  ovation	  at	  the	  OAS,	   .	  Dulles	  viewed	  these	  as	  
the	  words	  of	  a	  desperate	  communist.	  He	  argued,	  “anyone	  travelling	  in	  the	  interests	  
of	   communism	   is	   in	   fact	   part	   of	   the	   whole	   subversive	   program	   of	   international	  
communism”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  50;	  Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  145).	  
A	   combination	  of	   fear,	   ideological	   allegiances,	   and	  monetary	  promises	  ended	   the	  
debate	   in	   Caracas.	   The	   OAS	   decided	   Árbenz	   was	   a	   communist	   and	   that	   “the	  
domination	   or	   control	   of	   the	   political	   institutions	   of	   any	   American	   states	   by	   the	  
international	   communist	   movement…would	   constitute	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   entire	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hemisphere	   and	   would	   require	   appropriate	   action”	   (OAS,	   1954).	   The	   OAS	  
condemned	  Árbenz	  in	  May	  1954.98	  
The	   paramilitary	   campaign	   against	   Árbenz	  was	   not	   a	   ‘covert	   action’.	   The	  
CIA	  armed,	  planned,	  funded	  and	  executed	  the	  coup	  against	  Guatemala	  in	  1954.	  The	  
US	  chose	  Colonel	  Castillo	  Armas	  to	  lead	  the	  coup	  (Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  
92).99	  The	  NY	  Times	  described	  Armas	  as	  a	  “stupid	  man”	  (cited	  in,	  Schlesinger	  and	  
Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  70).	  He	  was	  a	  loyal	  subject	  of	  Francisco	  Arana,	  who	  had	  been	  killed	  
by	  Árbenz	   loyalists	   in	  1949	  for	  planning	  a	  coup	  against	  Arévalo	  (Schlesinger	  and	  
Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  70).	  Armas	  also	  attempted	  a	  coup	  in	  1950	  and	  evaded	  execution	  
by	  escaping	  a	  Guatemala	  City	  jail.	  The	  CIA	  had	  been	  working	  with	  Armas	  since	  the	  
thwarted	  PB	  Fortune	  of	  1952.	  PB	  Success	  began	  in	  June	  1954	  (Immerman,	  1982,	  p.	  
159).	  The	  invading	  force	  of	  a	  few	  hundred	  Armas	  loyalists	  were	  stopped	  just	  inside	  
the	   Southern	   border	   with	   Honduras	   was	   underprepared. 100 	  CIA	   propaganda	  
attempted	  to	  convince	  the	  nation	  of	  the	  coming	  invasion	  through	  radio	  and	  leaflets	  
(Grow,	  2008,	  p.	  1).	  However,	   the	  army	  remained	   loyal	   to	  Árbenz.	  By	   June	  15	   the	  
coup	   had	   failed.	   Realising	   the	   costs	   of	   defeat,	   Allen	   Dulles	   requested	   additional	  
military	  support.	  Under	  presidential	  orders,	  the	  US	  began	  bombing	  Guatemala	  City	  
on	  June	  20,	  1954	  (Immerman,	  1982,	  p.	  163).	  The	  city	  was	  defenceless	  since	  Árbenz	  
had	  mistakenly	  grounded	  his	  air	   force	  because	  of	   fears	  of	  espionage	  (Immerman,	  
1982,	   p.	   165).	   Árbenz’s	   last	   attempt	   to	   save	   his	   government	   was	   peaceful.	   He	  
requested	   UN	   observers	   to	   Guatemala	   to	   witness	   the	   US	   war	   against	   his	  
democratic	   government.	   Initially	   the	   UN	   was	   open	   to	   this.	   The	   delegations	   of	  
France,	   Britain,	   Lebanon,	   Denmark,	   New	   Zealand	   and	   the	   USSR	   supported	   the	  
action	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   55).	   Lodge	   was	   instructed	   to	   use	   the	   first	   ever	   US	   veto	  
should	  the	  resolution	  go	  through	  (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  55).	  If	  the	  UN	  had	  allowed	  the	  US	  
aggression	  against	  Guatemala,	   its	  moral	  global	  and	  regional	  positions	  would	   face	  
serious	  criticism.	  Fortunately,	  Britain	  and	  France	  were	  dependent	  upon	  US	  aid	  and	  
support	  to	  sustain	  their	  empires.	  Eisenhower	  threatened	  his	  two	  greatest	  allies	  to	  
stay	  out	  of	  Latin	  America.	  They	  did.	  With	  this	  last	  effort	  defeated,	  Árbenz,	  believing	  
that	   the	  war	  was	   against	   him	   and	  not	   his	   revolution,	   resigned	   on	   June	   27,	   1954	  
(Schlesinger	  and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  p.	  199).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  The	  Latin	  American	  vote	  was	  16-­‐3-­‐1.	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  abstained.	  Costa	  Rica	  refused	  to	  send	  
a	  delegation.	  Guatemala’s	  was	  the	  only	  negative	  vote.	  
99	  The	  CIA	  gave	  Armas	  the	  code	  name	  RUFUS.	  
100	  Taking	  refuge	  in	  a	  Catholic	  church.	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Guatemala’s	   tragic	   twentieth	   century	   history	   began	   on	   June	   27,	   1954.	  
Following	   Árbenz’s	   resignation,	   200,000	   peasants	   were	   murdered	   and	   over	  
1,000,000	  internal	  refugees	  were	  created	  between	  1954	  and	  1990	  (Grow,	  2008,	  p.	  
26).	  Árbenz	  left	  the	  presidency	  to	  his	  revolutionary	  colleague	  Carlos	  Enrique	  Díaz.	  
Díaz	  allowed	  Árbenz	  to	  address	   the	  nation	  before	   leaving.	   In	  his	  address,	  Árbenz	  
blamed	  the	   fruit	  company	   for	  his	  demise.	  However,	   “the	   fear	   that	   the	  example	  of	  
Guatemala	  would	  be	   followed	  by	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries”	  was	  greater	   in	  
Washington	  than	  in	  the	  UFCo	  headquarters	  in	  Boston	  (Árbenz	  cited	  in,	  Schlesinger	  
and	  Kinzer,	  1982,	  pp.	  199-­‐200).	  Castillo	  Armas	  was	  promoted	  to	  President	  by	  the	  
end	  of	  July.	  He	  revoked	  Decree	  900	  and	  returned	  all	  land	  to	  the	  UFCo	  (Immerman,	  
1982,	   p.	   177).	  He	   ended	  development	  programs	   and	   returned	  Guatemala	   to	   IMF	  
policy.	  Armas’	  1957	  assassination	  brought	  more	  corrupt	  military	  leaders	  to	  power	  
and	   the	   US	   continued	   to	   provide	   military	   aid	   to	   ensure	   that	   no	   renewed	  
revolutionary	   activity	   would	   be	   possible	   (Schlesinger	   and	   Kinzer,	   1982,	   p.	   232;	  
Brocket,	  1988,	  p.	  107).	  Guatemala	  effectively	  became	  a	  police	  state.	  In	  1963	  the	  US	  
President’s	   brother,	   Milton	   Eisenhower,	   remarked,	   “we	   breathed	   in	   relief	   when	  
forces	   favouring	   democracy	   restored	   Guatemala	   to	   its	   normal	   place	   in	   the	  
American	   family	   of	   nations”	   (in	   Cook,	   1981,	   p.	   218).	   By	   1963	   corruption	   had	  
decayed	  Guatemala.	  Attempts	  by	  Arévalo	  to	  return	  to	  the	  political	  fray	  in	  1962	  had	  
been	  vehemently	  opposed	  by	  the	  US.	  Guatemala	  did	  not	  elect	  another	  government	  
until	   1995	   (Kinzer,	   1995,	   p.	   129).	   The	   insanity	   of	   the	   age	   was	   now	   evident.	   US	  
policy	   supporting	   repression	   was	   called	   “democracy”;	   social	   democratic	  
governments	   were	   called	   “communist”	   and	   even	   “totalitarian”.	   Any	   lack	   of	   real	  
outrage	  over	  Guatemala	  from	  within	  the	  US	  or	  the	  region	  motivated	  Eisenhower	  to	  
go	  further,	  and	  successive	  administrations	  to	  continue	  this	  path.101	  Historians	  have	  
characterised	  Guatemala	   as	   a	   Cold	  War	   anomaly,	   in	  which	   the	   corruption	   of	   the	  
UFCo	   convinced	   the	   US	   to	   invade	   a	   democratic	   government.	   However,	   this	   Cold	  
War	  conspiracy	  did	  not	  end	  in	  Guatemala;	  it	  was	  just	  the	  beginning.	  	  
	  
The	  Implications	  of	  Caracas	  
The	  Caracas	  conference	  indicated	  the	  first	  serious	  departure	  from	  the	  1933	  
treaty	   of	  Montevideo.	   Any	   government	   following	   “the	   communist	   Line”	   required	  
“appropriate	   action”	   to	   reinstall	   pro-­‐US	   regimes	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   hemisphere	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  When	  protesters	  in	  Lima	  and	  Caracas	  ridiculed	  US	  action	  in	  Guatemala	  in	  1958,	  they	  too	  were	  
seen	  as	  communists.	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(Niblo,	  2006,	  p.	  284;	  OAS,	  1954).	  Interventionism	  was	  again	  an	  acceptable	  part	  of	  
US	  policy.	  The	  last	  bulwark	  of	  the	  social	  democratic	  revolutionary	  period	  was	  José	  
Figueres	  Ferrer.	  The	  Costa	  Rican	  President	  had	  witnessed	  the	  demise	  of	  his	  social	  
democratic	  allies	  throughout	  Latin	  America.	  The	  central	  tenet	  of	  Figueres’	  mission	  
was	  the	  eradication	  of	  regional	  dictatorships	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  64).	  By	  the	  time	  
of	   the	   Caracas	   conference	   of	   1954,	   12	   of	   the	   20	   Latin	   American	   Republics	  were	  
under	  authoritarian	  rule	   (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  53).	  After	   the	  coups	  against	  Árbenz	  and	  
Perón	  in	  1954	  and	  1955	  respectively,	  Costa	  Rica’s	  was	  one	  of	   just	  six	  democratic	  
governments	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Figueres	   represented	   the	   significant	   minority	   in	  
Latin	   America	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1950s.	   Washington’s	   decision	   to	   hold	   the	   May	   1954	  
meeting	   of	   the	   OAS	   in	   Caracas,	   Venezuela,	   was	   insulting	   to	   Figueres.	   The	  
Venezuelan	   leader,	   Pérez	   Jiménez,	   had	   ruthlessly	   dismantled	   the	   Democratic	  
Action	  party	   of	  Rómulo	  Betancourt,	  who	  was	   living	   in	   exile	   in	   Costa	  Rica	   (Szulc,	  
1959,	  p.	  250).	  US	  policy	  towards	  anti-­‐communist	  dictators	  under	  Eisenhower	  was	  
also	  alarming	  for	  Figueres.	  Jiménez	  and	  Peru’s	  Manuel	  Odría	  were	  awarded	  the	  US	  
Legion	   of	   Merit	   for	   their	   repression	   of	   internal	   democratic	   elements	   under	   the	  
auspices	   of	   anti-­‐communism.	  The	   contradictions	   of	  US	   regional	   policy	  motivated	  
Figueres	   to	   boycott	   the	   1954	   meeting	   of	   the	   OAS.	   The	   Mexican	   delegation	   also	  
questioned	  US	  hostility	  towards	  Guatemala.	  They	  argued	  that	  Guatemala’s	  actions	  
were	   significantly	   less	   radical	   than	   their	   revolutionary	   actions	   in	   the	  1930s,	   and	  
stated	  that	  social	  revolutions	  were	  necessary	  for	  the	  development	  of	  Latin	  America	  
(Padilla,	   as	   cited	   in	   Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   52).	   No	   other	   significant	   protestations	   were	  
heard	  at	  Caracas.	  	  
The	   first	   consequence	   of	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   was	   realised.	   Latin	  
America	  was	   now	   subject	   to	   imposed	   authoritarianism	   in	   order	   to	   “defend”	   the	  
region	   from	   the	   perceived	   threat	   of	   communism	   (OAS,	   1954).	   Although	   the	  
relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  dictatorship	  deviated	  during	  the	  final	  thirty-­‐
five	   years	   of	   the	   early	   Cold	   War,	   US	   policy	   favoured	   the	   dictatorial	   option	  
throughout.	  The	  increased	  significance	  of	  MAP	  and	  the	  standardisation	  of	  military	  
doctrine,	  training	  and	  equipment	  meant	  that	  many	  Latin	  American	  armies	  became	  
extensions	  of	  US	  regional	  policy	  during	   the	  Cold	  War	  (Gill,	  2004,	  pp.	  59-­‐73;	  NSC,	  
1953).	   This	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated	  how,	   and	  why,	   the	  next	   stage	   of	   the	   anti-­‐
democratic	  purge	  was	  realised.	  The	  demise	  of	  Árbenz,	  Vargas	  and	  Perón	  signalled	  
an	   end	   to	   regional	   popular	   sovereignty.	   It	   also	   revealed	   the	   lengths	   that	   the	   US	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would	   go	   to	   destroy	   anti-­‐American	  democratic	   governments.	  However,	   the	  most	  
revealing	  element	  of	  this	  first	  manifestation	  of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  was	  the	  
distance	   between	   rhetoric	   and	   reality.	   The	   enunciations	   of	   Milton	   Eisenhower,	  
celebrating	  the	  US’	  role	  in	  re-­‐establishing	  ‘democratic’	  rule	  under	  Castillo	  Armas	  in	  
1954,	   demonstrated	   the	  most	   dangerous	   aspect	   of	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext	   –	  
the	   complete	  denial	   of	   evidence	   in	   the	   enacting	  of	   foreign	  policy	   (Cook,	   1981,	   p.	  
218).	  Guatemala,	  unfortunately,	  was	  not	  an	  isolated	  event,	  but	  a	  powerful	  testing	  
ground	   for	   US	   policy	   in	   the	   Latin	   American	   Cold	   War.	   This	   first	   consequence,	  
forced	  authoritarianism	  in	  Latin	  America,	  was	  not	  an	  end	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  Rather,	  it	  
was	  a	  means	  to	  the	  greater	  goals	  of	  US	  imperial	  policy.	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‘People	   Cannot	   Spit	   on	   Foreign	   Policy’:	   The	   Radicalisation	   of	  
Social	  Democracy	  in	  Latin	  America	  
José	  Figueres	  Ferrer	  was	  invited	  to	  address	  the	  US	  Congress	  on	  June	  9,	  1958,	  and	  
asked	   to	   explain	   the	   motivation	   of	   protesters	   in	   Lima,	   Peru,	   and	   Caracas,	  
Venezuela,	  who	  had	  violently	  attacked,	  and	  ultimately	  spat	  upon,	  US	  Vice	  President	  
Richard	  Milhous	  Nixon	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   145).	  When	  Figueres	   addressed	   the	  
US	  Congress	   in	  1958,	   he	  was	   asked	   to	   explain	   the	  Latin	  American	  opinion	  of	  US	  
regional	   policy	   (in	   Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   145).	   He	   also	   identified	   the	   fatuity	   of	  
Washington’s	   anti-­‐communist	   posture	   that	   confronted	   every	   aspect	   of	   Latin	  
American	   politics.	   In	   1955,	   14	   of	   the	   original	   20	   OAS	  members	  were	   controlled	  
militarily.	   Figueres	   concluded	  his	   lengthy	   remarks	  by	   stating,	   “when	  one	  of	   your	  
lawmakers	   calls	   [US	   political-­‐economic	   policy	   in	   Latin	   America]	   collaboration	   to	  
fight	   communism,	  180	  million	  Latin	  Americans	   feel	   the	  need	   to	   spit”	   (as	   cited	   in	  
Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  146).	  This	  chapter	  will	  focus	  on	  two	  further	  consequences	  of	  
anti-­‐communism	  in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  alternate	  vision	  for	  economic	  
development	   known	   as	   Operation	   Pan	   America	   (OPA).	   The	   1955	   Rio	   economic	  
conference	   indicated	   that	   large-­‐scale	   development	   assistance	   would	   not	   be	  
forthcoming.	   Hence,	   the	   Brazilian	   President	   Juscelino	   Kubitschek	   developed	   the	  
outline	   for	   a	   regional	   economic	   alliance	   and	   development	   bank.	   The	   next	  
consequence	  was	   the	  movements	  against	   regional	  militarism.	  Between	  1956	  and	  
1961	  the	  military	  regimes	  of	  Peru,	  Venezuela,	  Argentina,	  Colombia	  and	  Cuba	   fell.	  
Additionally,	   the	   dictators	   of	   Nicaragua	   and	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	   were	  
assassinated	   in	   the	   same	   era.	   This	   provided	   the	   social	   democrats	   with	   the	  
opportunity	   to	   reclaim	   political	   leadership	   and	   to	   challenge	   the	   US	   position.	  
However,	   the	   cross-­‐class	   alliances	   involved	   in	   the	   removal	   of	   authoritarianism	  
included	  many	   different	   political	   groups.	   The	   radical	   elements	   of	   these	   alliances	  
were	  evident	  during	  Nixon’s	  1958	  trip	   to	  Latin	  America.	  Hence,	   the	  ageing	  social	  
democrats	  were	   forced	   to	  negotiate	  power	   in	  differing	  ways	   following	   the	   fall	   of	  
totalitarianism	  in	  their	  nations.	  
	  
No	  Marshall	  Plan	  for	  Latin	  America	  
This	  section	  will	  detail	  the	  moment	  when	  Latin	  Americans	  realised	  that	  US	  
economic	   support	   was	   not	   forthcoming.	   This	   is	   a	   significant	   moment	   in	   inter-­‐
American	   relations	   as	   it	   informs	   several	   key	   Cold	   War	   events,	   including:	   the	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popular	   response	   to	   imposed	   authoritarianism;	   the	   development	   of	   a	   radical	  
nationalist	   left,	   best	   evidenced	   in	   Cuba;	   anti-­‐American	   demonstrations	   towards	  
Vice	  President	  Nixon;	  and	  the	  attempts	  to	  create	  the	  OPA,	  which	  preceded	  and	  was	  
distinct	   from	   the	   Alliance	   for	   Progress.	   Eisenhower’s	   foreign	   economic	   policy	   is	  
usually	   viewed	   as	   short	   sighted.	   Zoumaras	   (1987)	   asserts,	   “Eisenhower’s	  
compunction	   to	  proceed	  cautiously	  on	   free-­‐trade	   legislation	  and	  his	   readiness	   to	  
cut	   economic	   assistance	   grants	   did	   not	   bode	   well	   for	   the	   United	   States-­‐Latin	  
American	   relations”	   (p.	   159).	   Rabe	   (1999)	   demonstrates	   Dulles’	   reluctance	   to	  
contribute	  to	  Latin	  American	  development	  (p.	  95).	  He	  also	  documents	  the	  critiques	  
of	  economists	  and	  politicians	  (pp.	  85-­‐91).	  This	  emphasis	  on	  free-­‐trade	  economics	  
compounded	   the	   dependency	   of	   Latin	   American	   nations.	   By	   1955	  many	   leading	  
economists,	   including	  Oswaldo	  Aranha	  and	  Raúl	  Prebisch,	  accepted	   this	   fact.	  The	  
Prebisch	   Singer	   Thesis	   (PST),	   developed	   at	   this	   time,	   argues	   “that	   there	   is	   a	  
tendency	   for	   the	   results	   of	   technical	   progress	   to	   be	   retained	   in	   the	   richer	  
countries”	  while	  the	  peripheral	  nations	  stagnate	  (Raffner	  and	  Singer,	  2001,	  p.	  18).	  
These	  ideas	  were	  prevalent	  amongst	  Latin	  American	  nationalists	  at	  this	  historical	  
moment.	  Economic	  conditions	  were	  worsening	  in	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  
due	  to	  declining	  values	  of	  agricultural	  exports.	  Hence	  the	  critique	  of	  US	  free-­‐trade	  
principals,	   and	   Latin	   American	   hesitance	   to	   commit	   foreign	   economic	   aid	   was	  
revealing.	  This	  section	  will	  detail	  the	  events	  of	  the	  1955	  Rio	  Economic	  Conference.	  
Later	  in	  the	  chapter,	  the	  outcome	  in	  Brazil	  and	  Argentina	  will	  be	  explained.	  	  
The	   1955	   OAS	   Rio	   Economic	   Conference	   was	   the	   first	   such	   meeting	   in	  
history.	  The	  Latin	  Americans	  had	  called	  for	  the	  meeting	  since	  their	  1945	  resolution	  
at	   Chapultepec	   (Smith,	   1994,	   p.	   44).	   Dulles	   committed	   to	   the	   conference	   in	  May	  
1954	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   secure	   support	   for	   the	   US	   condemnation	   of	   Guatemala	  
(Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   50).	   Despite	   regional	   optimisms,	   Dulles	   claimed	   “an	   economic	  
treaty	  [was]	  not	  necessary	  to	  further	  [US]	  objectives	  in	  Latin	  America”	  (as	  cited	  in	  
Rabe	  1988,	  p.	  95).	  NSC	  144/1	  stated	  US	  economic	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America	  as	  
Encouraging	   Latin	   American	   governments	   to	   recognise	   that	   the	   bulk	   of	  
capital	   required	   for	   development	   can	   best	   be	   supplied	   by	   private	  
enterprise…[and	   the]	   reduction	   of	   trade	   barriers	   under	   the	   Reciprocal	  
Trade	  Agreements	  program...	  (NSC,	  1953	  p.	  10-­‐11).	  
It	   also	   promoted	   the	   use	   of	   domestic	   capital	   to	   promote	   ‘development’	   (NSC,	  
1953).	  This	  relied	  upon	  private	  capitalist	  initiatives	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  capital	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drain	  of	  the	  hemisphere.	  Neither	  Eisenhower,	  nor	  Dulles,	  believed	  it	  necessary	  to	  
provide	   the	   scope	   of	   development	   assistance	   proposed	   by	   the	   Latin	   Americans.	  
This	   position	  was	   broadly	   unpopular	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   95).	  However,	   that	   did	   not	  
matter.	   Subservient	   dictators	   ruled	   the	   majority	   of	   Latin	   America.	   The	   US	  
economic	  agenda	  was	  passed	  without	  a	  thought	  for	  the	  approximately	  180	  million	  
inhabitants	  of	  the	  region.	  Nevertheless,	  Under-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Moors	  Cabot	  
“worried	   about	   the	   vast	   disparities	   of	   wealth	   in	   Latin	   America,	   with	   the	   upper	  
classes	  exercising	  an	  almost	  feudal	  control”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  78).	  As	  fiscal	  
conservatism	  dominated	   the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  Humphrey	  advised	   that	  
corporate	   lawyer	  Henry	  Holland	  replace	  Cabot	   in	  1955	   (Ambrose,	  1984,	  p.	  194).	  
From	  that	  year,	  Holland	  oversaw	  a	  rapid	  decline	  in	  EXIM	  loans	  to	  Latin	  American	  
leaders	  (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  69).	  
The	   1955	  Rio	   Economic	   Conference	   once	   again	  witnessed	   the	   collision	   of	  
two	  conflicting	  economic	  philosophies.	  While	  the	  US’	  position	  remained	  dominant,	  
the	   Argentine	   economist	   Raúl	   Prebisch	   posed	   a	   conflicting	   vision	   (Raffner	   and	  
Singer,	   2001,	   p.	   17).	   Prebisch,	   and	   the	   ECLA,	   identified	   three	   steps	   to	   prevent	  
economic	  calamity	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Firstly,	  Latin	  America	  needed	  to	  absorb	  US$1	  
billion	   annually	   to	   counter	   the	   effect	   of	   capital	   drain	   caused	   by	   excessive	   profit	  
remittance	   to	   foreign	   companies	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   75).	   Secondly,	   Latin	   America	  
required	  immediate	  economic	  diversification	  to	  limit	  consumer	  imports	  (Prebisch,	  
as	  cited	  in	  Dreir,	  1963,	  p.	  26).	  Finally,	  Latin	  America	  needed	  price	  stabilisation	  for	  
key	  export	  commodities	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  a	  secure	  price	  for	  its	  goods	  (Prebisch	  
cited	   in,	   Dreir,	   1963,	   p.	   26).	   These	   policies	   were	   broadly	   defined	   as	  
“developmentalism,”	  and	  were	  in	  conflict	  with	  US	  economic	  policy	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  
pp.	  32-­‐35).	  Dulles	  did	  not	  travel	  to	  Rio	  with	  congressional	  approval	  for	  increased	  
aid.	   Rather,	   he	   sought	   to	   institutionalise	   the	   economic	   policies	   of	   NSC	   144/1.	  
Rabe’s	  (1988)	  analysis	  of	  US	  regional	  aid	  under	  Eisenhower	  demonstrates	  this.	  In	  
1958	  Latin	  America	   received	  US$113.5	  million	   in	   economic	   assistance102:	   54	  per	  
cent	   of	   that	   was	   military	   assistance;	   35	   per	   cent	   was	   granted	   to	   US	   companies	  
operating	  in	  Latin	  America;	  and	  the	  final	  11	  per	  cent	  was	  economic	  aid	  afforded	  to	  
Guatemala,	  Bolivia	  and	  Haiti	   (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  79).	   In	  Guatemala	  and	  Haiti	   this	  aid	  
strengthened	   the	   position	   of	   allied	   dictators.	   In	   Bolivia	   the	   humanitarian	   aid	  
assisted	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   Bolivia’s	   export	   economy,	   especially	   in	   oil	   (Klein,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  5.4	  per	  cent	  of	  Washington’s	  global	  commitment.	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1992,	   p.	   239).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   US	   had	   the	   numbers	   to	   fulfil	   its	   self-­‐interested	  
economic	  policies.	  Dulles	  noted	  privately,	  “[it]	  was	  sometimes	  a	  bit	  embarrassing	  
to	  win	  votes	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  one,	  along	  with	  the	  despots	  of	  the	  region”	  (as	  cited	  in	  
Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   75).	   While	   Dulles	   and	   Humphrey	   considered	   Rio	   an	   astounding	  
success,	   the	   State	   Department’s	   Latin	   American	   specialist,	   Roy	   Rubottom,	  
considered	  it	  “one	  of	  the	  worst	  failures	  of	  any	  conference	  we’ve	  ever	  had”	  (in	  Rabe,	  
1988,	  p.	  79).	  	  
US	   economic	   policy	   in	   Latin	   America	   was	   self-­‐interested.	   While	   this	   was	  
both	  pragmatic	   and	   inevitable,	   the	  divergence	  between	  US	   rhetoric	   and	  policy	   is	  
the	  fundamental	  point.	  While	  the	  US	  outlined	  a	  development	  policy	  reliant	  on	  the	  
injection	   of	   private	   capital,	   its	   fiscal,	   tariff	   and	   development	   policies	   directly	  
contradicted	   the	   rhetoric.	   All	   three	   of	   Washington’s	   economic	   agendas	   in	   Rio	  
sought	  to	  further	  open	  Latin	  America	  to	  free-­‐trade	  economics.	  However,	  the	  Latin	  
Americans	  could	  not	  challenge	  US	  development	  policy	  individually	  or	  collectively.	  
Given	  that	  only	  six	  governments	  represented	  the	  Latin	  American	  people	  at	  Rio,	  US	  
economic	   philosophy	   became	  OAS	   economic	   policy	   (Schmitz,	   1999,	   p.	   196).	   The	  
Latin	   American	   governments	   who	   had	   expected	   more	   from	   Rio	   “were	   deeply	  
disappointed	  [as]	  they	  had	  been	  waiting	  ten	  years	  to	  discuss	  economic	  cooperation	  
with	  the	  United	  States”	  (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  88).	   	  The	  Brazilian	  delegation,	   led	  by	  João	  
Carlos	  Muniz	  explained	  
During	  World	  War	  II,	  Latin	  Americans	  had	  believed	  that	  the	  vast	  resources	  
of	   the	  United	   States	  were	   going	   to	   be	   brought	   to	   bear	   on	  wide	   and	   rapid	  
economic	  development	  in	  Latin	  America-­‐	  but	  since	  the	  war	  there	  has	  been	  
an	  intense	  process	  of	  disillusionment	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  (as	  cited	  in	  
Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  89).	  	  
After	  a	  decade,	   it	  became	  clear	   that	   several	  governments	   required	   independence	  
from	  US	  and	   IMF	  economic	  policy.	  This	  was	  highlighted	  by	   the	   contradictions	  of	  
free-­‐market	   economics	   within	   exporting	   nations.	   During	   the	   1950s,	   the	   Korean	  
commodity	  price	  boom	  ended	  and	  the	  index	  prices	  of	  key	  mineral	  and	  agricultural	  
exports,	   including	   coffee,	   wheat,	   corn,	   tin,	   cotton,	   sisal,	   zinc,	   nitrates	   and	   sugar,	  
decreased	  significantly	  (Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  73).	  This	  situation	  was	  further	  exacerbated	  
by	   the	   re-­‐inclusion	   of	   Africa	   and	   Asia	   within	   the	   US	   economic	   sphere.	   As	   more	  
nations	   became	   democratic	   between	   1955	   and	   1958,	   the	  US’	   free-­‐trade	   position	  
would	  be	  vocally	  critiqued.	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Decline	  in	  Dictators,	  1955-­‐1958	  
The	   struggle	   against	   authoritarianism	   in	   Latin	   America	   lasted	   between	  
three	  and	  ten	  years	  in	  those	  nations	  affected	  by	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  purges	  of	  the	  
late	  1940s.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Nicaragua,	  it	  had	  existed	  for	  over	  twenty	  years	  (Crawley,	  
1979,	  pp.	  15-­‐70).	  The	  nature	  of	  those	  struggles	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  cross-­‐class	  
alliances	   in	   several	   Latin	  American	   countries.	   These	   alliances	  were	   composed	   of	  
social	  democrats,	   liberal	  and	  conservative	  constitutionalists,	  and	   the	  Marxist	   left.	  
However,	  the	  most	  dramatic	  occurrence	  was	  the	  emergence	  of	  militant	  groups	  to	  
the	  left	  of	  the	  old	  social	  democratic	  leaders	  in	  Cuba,	  Venezuela,	  Peru,	  Colombia	  and	  
Bolivia	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1992,	   p.	   30).	   The	   power	   vacuum	   left	   by	   the	  
authoritarian	   regimes	   forced	   these	   ideologically	   distinct	   groups	   into	  what	   Ames	  
(1987)	   refers	   to	   as	   “survival	   coalitions”	   (p.	   7).	   Ames	   goes	   on	   to	   state	   that	  
“multiclass	  coalitions	  are	  common”	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Ames,	  1987,	  p.	  7).	  However,	  
“coalitions	   form	   more	   easily	   among	   political	   actors	   with	   shared	   interests,”	   and	  
defections	  from	  the	  coalition	  are	  common	  when	  “resources,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  control	  
over	   programs,	   are	   transferred	   to	   the	   new	   recruits”	   (Ames,	   1987,	   p.	   37).	   This	  
occurred	   in	   the	   case	   mentioned	   above.	   The	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   political	  
pressures	  exerted	  upon	  the	  social	  democratic	  and	  Liberal	  leaders	  moved	  them	  into	  
coalitions	  with	  Conservative	  and	  corporatist	  elements.	  In	  these	  cases,	  their	  former	  
allies	  defected	  from	  the	  coalition	  and	  become	  the	  most	  dangerous	  elements	  in	  the	  
political	   landscape,	   due	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   siphon	   off	   mass	   support	   within	   the	  
under-­‐represented	  public.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  democratic	  rule	  in	  Cuba,	  Peru	  
and	   Bolivia	   between	   1959	   and	   1964	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1992,	   pp.	   30-­‐37).	   In	  
Colombia,	  the	  new	  coalition	  between	  Liberals,	  Conservatives	  and	  foreign	  interests	  
withstood	  the	  leftist	  attack,	  while	  in	  Venezuela;	  the	  Betancourt	  regime	  allied	  itself	  
with	  rural	  democratic	  groups	  to	  combat	  the	  eventual	  “fidelista”	  threat	  (Alexander,	  
1982,	  p.	  489).	  This	  section	  will	  detail	  the	  decline	  of	  dictators	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  
multiclass	  alliances	  in	  several	  Latin	  American	  states.	  It	  will	  continue	  by	  examining	  
the	  response	  to	  Nixon’s	  1958	  trip	  to	  Latin	  America.	  
On	   September	   20	   1956	   Rigoberto	   López	   Pérez	   shot	   Anastasio	   Somoza	  
García	  in	  the	  Nicaraguan	  town	  of	  León	  (Crawley,	  1979,	  p.	  116).	  Somoza’s	  personal	  
guard	  killed	  Pérez	  instantly.	  In	  his	  last	  testimony	  to	  his	  mother,	  Pérez	  said	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I	   have	   always	   been	   involved	   in	   everything	   concerned	   with	   attacking	   the	  
dismal	  regime,	  which	  rules	  over	  our	  fatherland.	  In	  view	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  
attempts	   at	  making	  Nicaragua	  once	   again	   a	   free	   country,	  without	   stain	  or	  
dishonour,	   have	   failed…I	   have	   decided	   to	   try	   to	   be	   the	   person	   who	   will	  
begin	  the	  end	  of	  this	  tyranny…This	  is	  not	  a	  sacrifice	  but	  a	  duty	  I	  have	  been	  
able	  to	  fulfil	  (as	  cited	  in	  Crawley,	  1979,	  p.	  115).	  
Despite	   the	   efforts	   of	   Eisenhower’s	   personal	   physician,	   Somoza	   died	   nine	   days	  
later	  (Crawley,	  1979,	  p.	  116).	  The	  US	  ambassador,	  Thomas	  Whelan,	  called	  Pérez’s	  
actions	   a	   “communist	   conspiracy	   hatched	   in	   El	   Salvador”	   (in	   Crawley,	   1979,	   p.	  
116).	   Whelan	   sought	   to	   prevent	   further	   revolutionary	   and	   pro-­‐democratic	  
activities	   by	   gaining	   the	   approval	   of	   the	   Nicaraguan	   Congress	   to	   install	   Luis	  
Somoza	  as	  president	  the	  following	  day	  (Crawley,	  1979,	  p.	  117).	  Pérez’	  actions	  had	  
failed.	  The	  military	  received	  increased	  funding	  from	  the	  US.	  Anti-­‐communism	  saw	  
the	   persecution	   of	   moderate	   opponents	   of	   the	   government.	   Many	   liberals,	  
including	  the	  now	  elderly	  Emiliano	  Chamorro,	  were	  arrested	  as	  they	  attempted	  to	  
flee	   Nicaragua,	   despite	   there	   being	   “no	   visible	   connection	   with	   left-­‐wing	  
conspiratorial	   activity”	   (Crawley,	   1979,	   p.	   118).	   	   While	   efforts	   to	   remove	   the	  
military	   government	   of	   Nicaragua	   failed,	   they	   foreshadowed	   comparable	   events	  
throughout	  the	  region.	  
In	  1956	  Manuel	  Odría	   forfeited	  his	  military	   government	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   a	  
political	  crisis.	  The	  crisis	  began	  in	  late	  1954	  when	  Odría	  reduced	  his	  persecution	  of	  
the	   Apristas,	   allowing	   Haya	   to	   leave	   Peru	   (Klaren,	   1978,	   p.	   306).	   In	   1956	   the	  
military	   crushed	   an	   industrial	   strike	   over	   conditions	   in	   silver	  mining	   operations	  
(Arévalo,	   1963,	   p.	   46).	   Progressive	   military	   officers	   protested	   their	   role	   in	   this	  
event.	  The	  military	  moved	  against	  Odría	  “in	  protest	  of	  [its]	  oppressive	  role”	  upon	  
society	   (Bertrum,	   1995,	   p.	   439).	  While	  Odría	   survived	   these	   crises	   he	   sought	   an	  
exit	   from	   the	   presidency	   in	   late	   1956,	   giving	   APRA	   de-­‐facto	   recognition	   (Szulc,	  
1959,	  p.	  204).	  The	  deal	  made	  between	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre	  and	  Odría	  gave	  APRA	  full	  
legislative	  recognition	  from	  1961,	  in	  return	  for	  Aprista	  endorsement	  for	  the	  1956	  
Presidential	   candidate	   Hernando	   de	   Lavalle	   (Bertrum,	   1995,	   p.	   449).	   Many	   of	  
Haya’s	  supporters	   interpreted	  this	   ‘deal’	  as	  a	  betrayal.	  Accordingly,	  Haya	  and	  the	  
Apristas	   lost	   significant	   support	   within	   the	   organised	   labour	   movement.	   Haya	  
responded	   by	   shifting	   his	   support	   to	   the	   independent	   candidate	   Manuel	   Prado,	  
who	  won	  the	  election	  with	  45	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  popular	  vote	  (Bertrum,	  1995,	  p.	  447).	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Although	  APRA	  was	  legalised	  in	  1961,	  continuing	  military	  intervention	  in	  Peruvian	  
politics	  handicapped	  its	  direct	  role.	  	  
By	  1958,	  Colombia	  had	  suffered	  ten	  years	  of	  brutal	  civil	  war.	  The	  political	  
parties	  who	  had	  ceded	  control	  to	  the	  Colombian	  military	  sought	  to	  reclaim	  power	  
in	  that	  year.	  During	  this	  time	  the	  moderate	  left	  were	  targeted	  as	  communists	  and	  
persecuted	   accordingly.	   The	   nature	   of	   the	   paramilitary	   conflict	   led	   to	   the	  
radicalisation	   of	   the	   rural	   peasantry	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   12).	   This	   war,	   which	   was	  
theoretically	   between	   the	   two	   major	   parties,	   left	   the	   country	   debilitated	   for	   a	  
decade.	   Realising	   these	   consequences,	   the	   two	   parties	   sought	   to	   end	   the	   war	  
through	   the	   formation	   of	   a	  National	   Front	   government.	   Alfonzo	   López	   Pumarejo	  
suggested	   that	   the	   Liberal	   Party	   should	   endorse	   the	   Conservative	   presidential	  
candidate	   in	   order	   to	   end	  military	   control	   in	  Colombia	   (Hartlyn,	   1998,	   p.	   61).	   In	  
March	  1957	  the	  two	  political	  parties	  formed	  the	  “joint	  manifesto	  of	  the	  Liberal	  and	  
Conservative	  Parties”	   (Hartlyn,	  1998,	  p.	  57).	  On	  April	  8	  1958,	   the	  National	  Front	  
nominated	  the	  Conservative	  Guillermo	  León	  Valencia	  as	  the	  candidate	  for	  the	  May	  
elections	  (Hartlyn,	  1998,	  p.	  67).	  On	  May	  1	  1958,	  Rojas	  Pinilla	  detained	  Valencia	  to	  
prevent	   the	   elections	   taking	   place	   (Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	   239).	   On	  May	   2	   students	   and	  
workers	   began	   protesting	   in	   Bogotá	   (Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	   241).	   The	   military	   killed	  
approximately	  20	  rioters	  between	  the	  third	  and	  fifth	  of	  May	  (Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  241).	  
On	   May	   5	   the	   Church	   condemned	   Pinilla	   (Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	   242).	   On	   May	   7	   the	  
military	   bombarded	   rioters	   seeking	   refuge	   in	   a	   Bogotá	   church	   with	   teargas.	   On	  
May	   9	   the	   military	   moved	   against	   Pinilla,	   scheduling	   elections	   for	   August	   7	  
(Hartlyn,	  1998,	  p.	  70).	  Alberto	  Lleras	  was	  subsequently	  elected	  President	  (Randall,	  
1992,	   p.	   219).	   While	   the	   military	   were	   removed,	   the	   ruling	   oligarchy	   still	  
controlled	  Colombia	  politics.	  	  
Argentina	   also	   initiated	   a	   path	   towards	   democratisation	   during	   1958.	  
However,	   the	  military	  regimes	  of	  Eduardo	  Lonardi	  and	  Pedro	  Eugenio	  Arumburu	  
sought	   to	   do	   this	  without	   allowing	   Perónist	   influences	   into	   the	   process	   (Potash,	  
1980,	  pp.	  249-­‐265).	  This	  became	  an	  insurmountable	  task	  due	  to	  Perón’s	  enduring	  
significance	   which	   posed	   an	   increasingly	   militant	   Perónist	   opposition.	   In	   June	  
1957,	  José	  Valle	  launched	  a	  Perónist-­‐inspired	  attack	  on	  the	  La	  Plata	  army	  barracks	  
(Potash,	   1980,	   p.	   232).	   While	   unsuccessful,	   it	   indicated	   the	   lingering	   unrest	   in	  
Argentina.	  The	   July	  1957	  constituent	  elections	  also	  demonstrated	   the	  strength	  of	  
Perónism	  (Potash,	  1980,	  p.	  255).	  24.3	  per	  cent	  of	  votes	  cast	  were	  left	  blank	  upon	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the	   instructions	   of	   Perónist	   leaders	   (Potash,	   1980,	   p.	   255).	   This	   indicated	   that	  
Perónism	  commanded	  approximately	  one-­‐quarter	  of	  the	  Argentine	  electorate.	  The	  
Presidential	   nominees	   took	   the	   situation	   seriously.	   The	   Radical	   nominee,	   Arturo	  
Frondizi,	   sought	   Perónist	   endorsement	   in	   the	   process	   of	   democratisation	  
(Szusterman,	  1993,	  p.	  64).	  To	  achieve	  this	  endorsement	  he	  sent	  Rogelio	  Frigerio	  to	  
Caracas	  on	  January	  3,	  1958,	  to	  meet	  with	  Perón	  (Potash,	  1980,	  p.	  265).	  Perón	  made	  
several	  demands	   in	   return	   for	   support	   for	   the	  Presidential	   election	   (Szusterman,	  
1993,	   p.	   66).	   Perón	   demanded	   the	   return	   of	   Perónist	   economic	   policy	   and	  
democratic	   liberalization	   to	   allow	   his	   followers	   to	   peacefully	   participate	   in	   the	  
electoral	   system.	   On	   February	   10	   Perón	   encouraged	   his	   supporters	   to	   vote	   for	  
Frondizi	   (Szusterman,	   1993,	   p.	   70).	   Frondizi	   also	   won	   the	   support	   of	   the	   small	  
communist	  movement	  (Potash,	  1990,	  p.	  271).	  Frondizi	  won	  the	  1958	  election	  in	  a	  
landslide	   (Szusterman,	  1993,	  p.	  71).	  However,	   the	  military	  handicapped	  his	   rule.	  
Hence,	   many	   of	   Frondizi’s	   promises	   to	   Perón	   were	   vetoed	   by	   the	   military,	  
effectively	  undermining	  the	  coalition.	  
On	  January	  22	  1958	  the	  Venezuelan	  despot	  Pérez	  Jiménez	  was	  forced	  to	  flee	  
Caracas	   by	   a	   militant	   general	   strike	   (Alexander,	   1964,	   p.	   50).	   The	   movement	  
against	  Jiménez	  began	  in	  May	  1957,	  however	  the	  resistance	  had	  been	  building	  for	  
years	   (Alexander,	   1964,	   p.	   47).	   The	   human	   rights	   abuses	   carried	   out	   by	   Pedro	  
Estrada’s	   secret	   police	   and	   the	   continuing	   poverty	   of	   the	  Venezuelan	   population	  
motivated	  revolutionary	  resistance	  (Alexander,	  1982,	  p.	  326).	  Then,	  in	  May	  1957,	  
the	  Catholic	  Church	  withdrew	  their	  support	  for	  the	  military	  regime.	  In	  December	  
1957	   Jiménez	   ordered	   a	   plebiscite	   which	   asked	   the	   Venezuelan	   people:	   “should	  
General	  Marcos	   Pérez	   Jiménez	   continue	   as	   President	   of	   the	   Republic	   during	   the	  
next	  Presidential	  term?”	  (Alexander,	  1964,	  p.	  49).	  	  State	  employees	  were	  forced	  to	  
vote	   yes	   (Szulc,	   1959,	   p.	   319).	   The	   vote	   was	   not	   secret;	   it	   was	   enforced	   by	   the	  
military	   to	  ensure	   total	   compliance.	  According	   to	   the	  historian	  Robert	  Alexander	  
(1964),	   “from	   the	   day	   of	   the	   vote,	   the	   regime	   was	   harassed	   by	   street	  
demonstrations,	   plots	   and	   disturbances,	   ending,	   only	   a	   few	   weeks	   after	   the	  
plebiscite,	   in	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   dictatorship”	   (p.	   49).	   On	   January	   22,	   1958,	   a	  
Revolutionary	   Junta	   replaced	   Jiménez	   and	   committed	   to	   presidential	   elections	  
(Szulc,	  1959,	  p.	  327).	  While	  the	  military	  was	  purged	  of	  pro-­‐Jiménez	  elements,	  the	  
military	  still	  undermined	  the	  junta	  in	  July	  and	  September	  (Alexander,	  1964,	  p.	  52).	  
Several	   progressive	   elements	   supported	   the	   actions	   against	   Jiménez.	   The	   1958	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elections	   were	   extremely	   tightly	   contested.	   Acción	   Democrática	   and	   Rómulo	  
Betancourt	   resumed	   leadership	   of	   Venezuela	   in	   1959	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   p.	   466).	  
Betancourt	  narrowly	  defeated	  both	  the	  Christian	  Left	  Copei	  Party	  and	  the	  Socialist-­‐
dominated	  Democratic	  Republican	  Party.	  The	  “Betancourt	  Doctrine”	  survived,	  with	  
Venezuela	   remaining	   democratic	   throughout	   the	   remainder	   of	   Cold	   War	   (Rabe,	  
1988,	  p.	  105).	  
This	   period	   of	   democratisation	   offered	   mixed	   results.	   Venezuela	   can	   be	  
considered	   a	   success	   in	   implementing	   social	   democracy.	   The	   return	   of	   Rómulo	  
Betancourt	   brought	   with	   it	   a	   renewed	   emphasis	   on	   economic	   development,	   oil	  
nationalisation	  and	  social	   justice	   (Alexander,	  1982,	  pp449-­‐475).	  The	  reorganised	  
regimes	   of	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   also	   brought	   a	   focus	   on	   ‘developmentalism’	  
(Alexander,	   1991,	   p.	   279;	   Szusterman,	   1993,	   p.	   75).	   These	   policies	   sought	   to	  
rapidly	   develop	   economic	   output	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   society	   more	   widely.	   Both	  
nations	  were,	  however,	  significantly	  hampered	  by	  their	  militaries	  throughout	  this	  
process.	  While	  Colombia	  and	  Peru	  reinitiated	  representative	  governments	  during	  
this	  period,	   they	  remained	  bound	  by	  oligarchic	  rule	   (Hartlyn,	  1998,	  pp.	  113-­‐120;	  
Klaren,	   1978,	   pp.	   315-­‐318).	   Dictators	   were	   executed	   without	   the	   attainment	   of	  
democracy	   in	   Nicaragua	   in	   1956	   and	   in	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	   in	   1961103	  
(Crawley,	   1979,	   p.	   116;	   Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   39).	   Additionally,	   elections	   were	   held	   in	  
Haiti	  and	  Honduras	  during	  1957	  (Truillot,	  1990,	  p.	  148;	  MacCameron,	  1983,	  p.	  79).	  
In	   Haiti	   the	   corrupt	   regime	   of	   François	   ‘Papa	   Doc’	   Duvalier	   replaced	   the	  
dictatorship	  of	  Paul	  Magloire	   (Truillot,	  1990,	  p.	  148).	   In	  Honduras,	   the	  moderate	  
Ramón	  Villeda	  Morales	  was	   elected	   (MacCameron,	   1983,	   p.	   79).	   Finally,	   in	  Cuba,	  
the	  revolution	  of	  Fidel	  Castro	  sought	  instant	  and	  radical	  change.	  Moreover,	  the	  late	  
1950s	  witnessed	  a	  resounding	  surge	  towards	  ‘democratic	  ideals’	  against	  the	  right-­‐
wing	  dictatorships.	  Yet	   the	  regimes	  of	   the	   late	  1950s	  offered	   far	   less	  hope	   to	   the	  
people	  of	  Latin	  America	  than	  those	  of	  the	  1940s	  had	  done.	  Many	  social	  democratic	  
leaders	  lost	  their	  positions	  of	  dominance	  within	  the	  progressive	  movement.	  While	  
Betancourt’s	  success	  was	  resounding	  in	  regional	  areas,	   the	  margin	  was	  far	  closer	  
in	   Caracas.	   In	   many	   cases	   this	   new	   path	   would	   be	   more	   radical	   than	   social	  
democracy,	  as	  was	  evidenced	  in	  Cuba	  from	  1959.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103	  This	  incident	  was	  actually	  supported	  by	  the	  US.	  It	  will	  be	  detailed	  within	  Chapter	  9.	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Multi-­‐Class	  Alliances	  
The	   Mexican	   Revolution	   of	   1910-­‐1920	   served	   as	   the	   first	   example	   of	   a	  
multi-­‐class	  revolution,	  often	  regarded	  as	  “coalition”	  building.	  Multi-­‐class	  alliances	  
were	   developed	   throughout	   Latin	   America	   to	   defeat	   dictatorial	   enemies.	   These	  
alliances	  challenged	  the	  class	  relationships	  of	  several	  Latin	  American	  states.	  Since	  
the	  mid-­‐1930s	  a	  generation	  of	  revolutionaries	  had	  controlled	  widespread	  popular	  
support.	   The	   pinnacle	   of	   this	   revolutionary	  movement	  was	   the	   brief	   democratic	  
spring	  that	  followed	  WWII.	  However,	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  social	  democracy,	  and	  the	  
perceived	   failures	   of	   populism,	   the	   people	   turned	   to	   other	   organisations	   for	  
support.	   The	   middle-­‐class	   social	   democrats	   were	   accused	   of	   significant	  
mismanagement	   and	   corruption	   and	   this	   was	   considered	   the	   cause	   of	   their	  
downfall.	   The	   radical	   economic	   philosophies	   of	   the	   populists	   in	   Brazil	   and	  
Argentina	   were	   seen	   as	   the	   cause	   of	   economic	   turmoil	   in	   those	   republics.	  
Conservative	   military	   coalitions	   sought	   to	   dismantle	   those	   philosophies.	   The	  
political	  alliances	  sought	  by	  older	  revolutionary	  movements	  lacked	  central	  control.	  
Organised	  labour	  was	  both	  less	  disciplined	  and	  less	  committed	  to	  a	  single	  ideology	  
(Alexander,	   2009,	   pp.	   120-­‐135).	   Furthermore,	   the	   omission	   of	   workers	   and	  
peasants	   from	  political	  outlets	   led	   to	  radicalisation	   in	  several	  states.	  This	  section	  
will	   focus	   on	   these	   emerging	   cross-­‐class	   alliances	   formed	   throughout	   Latin	  
America	   from	   1955-­‐1958,	   the	   effect	   of	   which	   was	   the	   radicalisation	   of	   the	   old	  
social	  democratic	  states.	  	  
The	   allegiances	   of	   organised	   labour	   were	   significant	   in	   both	   Brazil	   and	  
Argentina.	  Anti-­‐communism	  witnessed	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  labour	  movement	  
during	  the	  1950s	  (Alexander,	  2009,	  pp.	  120-­‐126).	  The	  destruction	  of	  socialist-­‐	  and	  
communist-­‐affiliated	  organisations	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  left	  a	  void	  that	  was	  filled	  by	  
the	   Regional	   Organisation	   of	   Workers	   (ORIT)	   (Alexander,	   2009,	   p.	   120).	   While	  
ORIT	  encompassed	  several	  ideological	  and	  nationalist	  sentiments,	  it	  stood	  firm	  on	  
the	  issue	  of	  dictatorial	  regimes.	  Its	  leader	  Luis	  Alberto	  Monge	  affirmed	  that	  
The	   Latin	   American	   dictatorships…are	   the	   product	   of	   the	   action	   of	   the	  
oligarchic	  and	  plutocratic	  groups,	  sometimes	  in	  coalition	  with	  international	  
capitalism,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   maintaining	   their	   position	   of	   dominance	  
over	   the	   majority,	   necessary	   to	   maintain	   their	   position	   of	   economic	   and	  
social	   privileges…The	   struggle	   of	   the	   trade	   union	   movement	   against	   the	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dictators	   must	   continue	   until	   they	   are	   liquidated	   (as	   cited	   in	   Alexander,	  
2009,	  pp.	  122-­‐123).	  
Moreover,	   the	   unions	   of	   Latin	   America	   were	   central	   to	   dismantling	   the	  
dictatorships.	   The	   difficulty	   in	   defining	   these	   union	   groups	   is	   their	   diverse	  
ideological	   views.	  Organised	   labour	  was	  particularly	   influential	   in	  Argentina	   and	  
Brazil.	   In	   Brazil,	   Kubitschek	   drew	   upon	   popular	   enthusiasm	   for	   nationalist	  
economic	  development	  to	  benefit	  the	  nation’s	   largest	  unions	  (Alexander,	  1991,	  p.	  
251).	   In	   Argentina,	   Frondizi	   required	   the	   support	   of	   the	   Perónista-­‐led	   union	  
movement	   through	   popular	   appeals	   for	   anti-­‐imperialist	   national	   development	  
(Alexander,	   1979,	   p.	   171).	   Hence,	   Kubitschek	   and	   Frondizi	   came	   to	   power	   by	  
ensuring	   a	   continuation	   of	   their	   predecessors’	   policies	   and	   by	   resisting	  military	  
rule.	  This	  was	  a	  reflection	  of	  union	  values	  rather	  than	  personal	  leadership.	  
Radicals	  benefitted	  from	  greater	  freedom	  within	  these	  broad	  revolutionary	  
alliances.	   This	   included	   the	   revival	   of	   the	   dormant	   communist	   movement,	  
especially	   evident	   in	   Colombia,	   Cuba	   and	   Venezuela.	   Colombian	   politicians	  
excluded	   revolutionary	   forces,	   and	   the	   left-­‐liberals,	   from	   the	   political	   sphere	   in	  
1958.	   These	   revolutionaries	   had	   fought	   the	   government’s	   paramilitaries	  
throughout	   the	   La	   Violencia	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   8).	   With	   Gaitán’s	   death	   and	   the	  
moderation	   of	   the	   Liberal	   party,	   there	   was	   no	   political	   voice	   for	   the	   nation’s	  
peasants	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   8).	   In	   this	   climate,	   the	   Colombian	   Communist	   Party’s	  
prestige	   increased.	   In	   1959,	   the	   US	   estimated	   that	   the	   communists	   had	   trained	  
10,000	  peasant	  insurgents	  (Leech,	  2011,	  p.	  14).	  The	  exclusion	  of	  peasant	  interests	  
from	   the	   Colombian	   National	   Front,	   even	   after	   their	   significant	   role	   in	  
overthrowing	  the	  military	  regime,	  was	  the	  direct	  motivation	  for	  the	  establishment	  
of	   the	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	   of	   Colombia	   (FARC)	   in	   the	  1960s	   (Villar	   and	  
Cottle,	   2011,	   p.	   25).	   The	   failures	   of	   the	   PRC-­‐A	   to	   reclaim	   power	   from	   Batista’s	  
military	   regime	   emboldened	   Fidel	   Castro	   during	   the	   1950s.	   Castro’s	   26th	   of	   July	  
Movement	   gained	   momentum	   by	   drawing	   support	   away	   from	   the	   social	  
democratic	  leaders.	  A	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  agrarian	  affairs	  further	  enflamed	  the	  
situation.	  The	  Bolivian	  MNR	  also	  lost	  the	  support	  of	  its	  left	  wing	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  
(Prados	  Salmon,	  1987,	  p.	  12).	  Juan	  Lechín	  opposed	  the	  economic	  treaties	  between	  
Hernán	   Siles’	   regime	   and	   the	   US	   (Prados	   Salmon,	   1987,	   p.	   12).	   By	   1960	   the	   US	  
were	  actively	  involved	  in	  Bolivian	  politics.	  They	  labelled	  Lechín	  and	  the	  MNR	  left	  
as	   “internal	   subversives”	   and	   ostracized	   them	   from	   national	   politics	   (Prados	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Salmon,	   1987,	   p.	   12).	   The	   schism	  of	   the	  Venezuelan	  Acción	  Democrática	  Party	   in	  
1960	  also	  demonstrated	  the	  revolutionary	  potential	  of	  the	  region.	  The	  Movement	  
of	   the	   Revolutionary	   Left	   (MIR)	   opposed	   the	   government	   of	   Rómulo	   Betancourt	  
(Ewell,	   1984).	   Moreover,	   a	   new	   left	   was	   emerging	   outside	   of	   the	   control	   of	   the	  
social	   democrats.	   The	   periods	   of	   dictatorship	   made	   people	   of	   Latin	   American	  
republics	   desperate.	   Under	   these	   conditions	   radicals,	   including	  Marxists	   thrived.	  
The	   dictatorial	   periods	   were	   responsible	   for	   this	   increased	   radicalisation,	   the	  
extent	  of	  which	  became	  clear	  during	  1958.104	  
	  
The	  Nixon	  Trip	  
The	   US	   did	   not	   grasp	   the	   enormity	   of	   political	   change	   in	   Latin	   America	  
between	  1955	  and	  1958.	  They	  reasoned	  that	  economic	  interests	  could	  dictate	  their	  
policies	   in	   the	   region	   and	   that	   any	   emerging	   Latin	   American	   regime	   could	   be	  
controlled	  through	  political,	  economic	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  military	  means.	  However,	  
the	  situation	  was	  different	  for	  Latin	  Americans.	  The	  1958	  protest	  provided	  the	  US	  
State	   Department	   with	   insight	   into	   the	   position	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	  majority.	  
However,	   at	   this	  historical	  moment,	   the	  US	   remained	  blinded	  by	  anti-­‐communist	  
paranoia.	   When	   Eisenhower	   asked	   Nixon	   (1978)	   to	   lead	   a	   goodwill	   tour	  
throughout	   Latin	   America,	   following	   the	   Argentine	   presidential	   inauguration,	   he	  
expected	  it	  to	  be	  “the	  most	  boring	  trip	  [he]	  had	  ever	  taken”	  (p.	  186).	  According	  to	  
Nixon’s	  (1978)	  memoirs,	  “the	  CIA	  warned	  that	  although	  the	  Communist	  Party	  had	  
been	  officially	  suppressed	  in	  most	  South	  American	  countries,	  [the	  Vice	  President]	  
might	  have	  to	  face	  occasional	  demonstrations”	  (p.	  186).	  In	  Argentina,	  the	  military	  
effectively	   suppressed	   the	   Perónist	   opposition,	   allowing	   Nixon	   a	   relatively	   quiet	  
time	   in	  Buenos	  Aires	   (Potash,	  1980,	  p.	  230).	  The	  military	   that	   removed	  Perón	   in	  
1955	   labelled	   the	   Perónist	   opposition	   as	   communists	   in	   order	   to	   justify	   their	  
omission	  from	  the	  political	  process.	  Nixon	  viewed	  all	  critiques	  of	  US	  policy	  in	  Latin	  
America	   as	   communist	   propaganda.	   Latin	   American	   military	   leaders	   who	   were	  
indoctrinated	   to	   anti-­‐communism	   reinforced	   this	   view.	   In	   Lima	   and	   Caracas,	  
however,	  Nixon	  witnessed	  the	  full	  force	  of	  this	  opposition.	  
In	  Lima	  the	  demonstrations	  grew	  more	  vocal	  and	  violent.	  Peruvian	  officials	  
warned	  Nixon	  not	  to	  go	  to	  San	  Marcos	  University,	  fearing	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  at	  
the	   spiritual	   home	   of	  Aprismo	   (Stein,	   1980,	   pp.	   129-­‐136).	   Haya	   de	   la	   Torre	   had	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  The	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  these	  ‘insurgent’	  groups	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  Chapter	  10.	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organised	   the	   student	   union’s	   collaboration	   with	   the	   working	   class	   within	   the	  
University.	   During	   the	   1948-­‐1956	   persecution	   of	   adherence	   of	   Aprismo,	   San	  
Marcos	  had	  been	   targeted	  by	  Odría’s	  military,	  with	   several	   students	  detained	  on	  
suspicion	   of	   ‘communism’	   (Klaren,	   2000,	   p.	   239).	   The	   San	  Marcos	   student	   union	  
was	   hostile	   to	   militarism	   and	   the	   foreign	   policy	   of	   the	   US	   in	   Latin	   America.	   As	  
Nixon’s	   (1978)	  motorcade	   approached	   San	  Marcos	   on	  May	   8,	   1958,	   the	   crowds	  
could	   be	   heard	   across	   several	   blocks	   shouting	   “Fuera	   (go	   home)	   Nixon”	   and	  
“Muera	   (death	   to)	   Nixon”	   (Nixon,	   1978,	   p.	   287).	   Nixon	   (1978)	   approached	   the	  
crowds	  and	  declared,	   “I	  want	   to	   talk	   to	  you,	  why	  are	  you	  afraid	  of	   the	   truth”	   (p.	  
188).	  A	  barrage	  of	  projectiles,	  primarily	   stones,	  met	  Nixon	  as	  he	  approached	   the	  
crowd	  (Raymont,	  2005,	  p.	  104).	  One	  projectile	  injured	  a	  secret	  service	  officer,	  who	  
forced	  Nixon	  back	  to	  the	  motorcade	  (Nixon,	  1978,	  p.	  288).	  Nixon	  sought	  the	  refuge	  
of	  his	  Lima	  hotel,	  yet	  demonstrators	  blocked	  his	  entrance,	  with	  one	  spitting	  at	  the	  
Vice	   President	   (Nixon,	   1978,	   p.	   288).	   US	   media	   coverage	   of	   the	   Lima	   protests,	  
however,	   undermined	   Nixon’s	   characterisation	   of	   the	   protesters	   as	   communists.	  
According	   to	   the	   New	   York	   Times	   (May,	   1958),	   “the	   event	   cannot	   simply	   be	  
dismissed	  as	  communist	  inspired.	  This	  is	  a	  mistake	  that	  is	  too	  often	  made	  in	  Latin	  
American	  affairs.”	  However,	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  ignored	  such	  advice.	  	  
Nixon	   then	   travelled	   from	  Lima	   to	   Bogotá	   (Raymont,	   2005,	   p.	   104).	   After	  
ten	   years	   of	   civil	  war	   the	  military	  was	   able	   to	   repress	   any	   civilian	   opposition	   in	  
Colombia.	   However,	   the	   CIA	   began	   warning	   of	   protests	   organised	   for	   Caracas	  
(Nixon,	  1978,	  p.	  185).	  The	  CIA	  advised	  Nixon	  (1978)	  not	  to	  enter	  Venezuela.	  Nixon	  
(1978)	   defied	   their	   warning	   and	   flew	   to	   Caracas	   on	  May	   13,	   1958	   (p.	   186).	   An	  
estimated	  5,000	  demonstrators	  awaited	  him	  at	  Caracas	  airport	  (Alexander,	  1982,	  
p.	  406).	  As	  Nixon	  exited	  his	   aircraft,	  meeting	  with	   the	  provisional	  military	   junta,	  
the	   demonstrators	   began	   throwing	   projectiles	   and	   spitting	   at	   him	   (Alexander,	  
1982,	   p.	   407).	   The	   incident	   was	   overwhelming	   for	   all	   involved.	   The	   Americans	  
hurriedly	  entered	  a	  motorcade	  destined	  for	  the	  US	  embassy	  in	  central	  Caracas.	  En	  
route,	  the	  Venezuelan	  foreign	  minister	  explained	  to	  Nixon	  that,	  	  
The	  Venezuelan	  people	  have	  been	  without	   freedom	  so	   long	  that	   they	  tend	  
now	  to	  express	  themselves	  more	  vigorously…we	  do	  not	  want	  anything	  that	  
would	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   suppression	   of	   freedom…	   (as	   cited	   in	   Nixon,	  
1978,	  p.	  190).	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To	  which	  Nixon	  replied,	  “if	  your	  government	  does	  not	  have	  the	  guts	  [to	  suppress	  
mob	   activity]	   there	   will	   soon	   be	   no	   freedom	   for	   anyone	   in	   Venezuela”	   (Nixon,	  
1978,	  p.	  190).	  Nixon	  was	  suggesting	  that	  the	  protestors	  were	  communists,	  and	  that	  
the	   military	   must	   suppress	   them	   to	   avoid	   violent	   revolution.	   As	   the	   motorcade	  
travelled	  to	  the	  US	  embassy	  a	  large	  group	  of	  protesters	  blockaded	  the	  main	  route	  
(Alexander,	   1982,	   p.	   407;	   Nixon,	   1978,	   p.	   191).	   The	   motorcade	   drew	   to	   a	   halt.	  
While	  it	  was	  stopped,	  the	  cars	  were	  kicked,	  shaken,	  stoned	  and	  pummelled	  (Nixon,	  
1978,	  p.	  191).	  This	  was	  horrifying	  for	  both	  Nixon	  and	  his	  wife	  Nancy.	  After	  twelve	  
minutes	   the	   driver	   of	   the	   lead	   car	   took	   the	   desperate	   option	   of	   forcing	   his	  way	  
through	   the	   large	   crowd.	   The	   entire	   motorcade	   arrived	   at	   the	   embassy	   safe.	  
However,	  the	  ordeal	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  America’s	  relationship	  with	  South	  
America.	  	  	  	  
	   Nixon	  was	   irate	   at	   the	  US	   embassy.	  He	  met	  with	   the	   head	   of	   the	  military	  
junta,	  Wolfgang	  Larrazábal.	  As	  he	  chastised	   the	  Venezuelan	   leader,	  he	  demanded	  
that	   the	  car	  not	  be	  kept	   the	  embassy	  as	  physical	  evidence	  of	   the	  events	   that	  had	  
transpired.	  Nixon	  stated	  
	   It’s	   time	   that	   [Latin	   America]	   sees	   some	   graphic	   evidence	   of	   what	  
	   communism	   really	   is…	  The	  men	  and	  women	  who	  had	   led	   the	   riots	   could	  
	   not	  be	  loyal	  to	  their	  	   country	   because	   their	   first	   loyalty	   was	   to	   the	  
	   international	  communist	  	   conspiracy…	  Those	  mobs	  were	   communist	   led	  
	   communists,	  and	   they	  have	  no	  devotion	   to	   freedom	  at	  all	   (Nixon,	  1978,	  p.	  
	   191)	  
Upon	   learning	  of	   the	  events	   in	  Caracas,	  Eisenhower	  contemplated	  an	   invasion	   to	  
rescue	  the	  Vice	  President.	  He	  stationed	  four	  naval	  divisions	  in	  nearby	  Puerto	  Rico	  
to	   be	   prepared	   for	   military	   intervention	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   102).	   However,	   the	  
military	  junta	  controlled	  the	  situation.	  It	  declared	  martial	  law	  throughout	  Caracas.	  
In	  an	  act	  of	  symbolism,	  Nixon	  left	  Caracas	  via	  the	  same	  road	  he	  had	  been	  attacked	  
on	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   p.	   408).	   This	   time,	   however,	   the	   streets	   were	   empty.	   The	  
thick	   haze	   of	   tear	   gas	   indicated	  why	   (Alexander,	   1982,	   p.	   408).	   The	   Venezuelan	  
junta	  was	  attempting	  to	  prove	  its	  anti-­‐communist	  credentials	  to	  the	  US	  to	  ward	  off	  
any	  threat	  of	  US	  action	  in	  reprisal	  for	  the	  events	  in	  Caracas.	  In	  many	  ways	  it	  was	  
successful	  as	  the	  elections	  scheduled	  for	  late	  1958	  occurred	  as	  planned.	  However,	  
the	  gesture	  came	  at	  the	  population’s	  expense.	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   The	   US	   struggled	   to	   grasp	   the	   motivations	   of	   the	   residents	   of	   Lima	   and	  
Caracas.	  Nixon’s	  anti-­‐communist	  paranoia	  was	  compounded	  by	  his	  experiences	  in	  
May	  1958.	  For	  Nixon	  (1978),	  there	  was	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  incited	  
the	   protest	   against	   him.	   This	   predetermined	   view	   of	   events	   that	   overlooked	  
evidence	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	   administration.	  
However,	  the	  US	  Congress	  was	  concerned	  by	  the	  events	  of	  May	  1958.	  Democratic	  
Congressman	   Charles	   Porter	   invited	   Figueres	   to	   help	   understand	   why	   these	  
protests	   had	   occurred	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   146).	   Figueres	   testified	   before	   the	  
Inter-­‐American	   Affairs	   Sub-­‐Committee	   on	   June	   9,	   1958.	   In	   consultation	  with	   his	  
close	   ally	   and	   personal	   friend	   Betancourt,	   Figueres	   sought	   utilise	   the	   events	   in	  
Caracas	   to	   re-­‐determine	   the	   direction	   of	   US	   policy	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Figueres	  
stated	  
	   I	  deplore	  that	  the	  people	  of	  Latin	  America…have	  spit	  upon	  a	  worthy	  public	  
	   officer…[However,]	   I	  must	   speak	   frankly	   because…	   the	   situation	  demands	  
	   it:	  the	  	  people	   cannot	   spit	   at	   a	   foreign	   policy….	   But	   when	   they	   have	  
	   exhausted	  all	  other	  	   means	   of	   trying	   to	  make	   themselves	   understood,	   the	  
	   only	  thing	  left	  to	  do	  is	  spitting…	  (as	  cited	  in	  Ameringer,	  1978,	  pp.	  146-­‐147).	  
Figueres	  asserted	  that	  Latin	  Americans	  had	  been	  demanding	  a	  change	  to	  US	  policy	  
since	   WWII.	   The	   Latin	   American	   people	   had	   only	   met	   intransigence	   and	  
indifference	   in	   return.	   The	   people	   were	   tired	   and	   lacked	   options.	   Hence	   they	  
turned	  to	  anger,	  and	  the	  action	  of	  spitting	  upon	  US	  foreign	  policy.	  
	   Figueres	   continued	   with	   an	   indictment	   of	   the	   US’	   foreign	   policy	   towards	  
Latin	  America	  since	  WWII.	  His	  first	  critique	  was	  over	  US	  policy	  towards	  dictators,	  
stating	   “you	   have	   made	   certain	   investments	   in	   the	   American	   dictatorships”	   (in	  
Ameringer,	   1978,	   pp.	   147).	   Anti-­‐democratic	   US	   policies	   were	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
imperial	   system,	   rather	   than	   an	   aim	   in	   and	   of	   itself.	   Figueres	   also	   addressed	  US	  
policy	   regarding	  human	   rights	   and	  economics.	   In	   a	   critique	  of	  US	   indifference	   to	  
human	   rights	   in	   Latin	   America,	   Figueres	   said,	   “when	   American	   boys	   have	   been	  
dying,	  your	  mourning	  has	  been	  our	  mourning.	  When	  our	  people	  die	  you	  speak	  of	  
investments”	   (in	   Ameringer,	   1978	   pp.	   146).	   He	   questioned	   the	   dehumanised	  
pragmatism	   of	   US	   policy	   in	   Latin	   America.	   He	   continued	   by	   critiquing	   the	   US	  
economic	  policy	  that	  condemned	  much	  of	  the	  region,	  stating	  “we	  want	  to	  be	  paid	  a	  
fair	   price…when	  we	   provide	   a	   product	   needed	   by	   another	   country”	   (as	   cited	   in	  
Ameringer,	  1978,	  pp.	  147-­‐148).	  According	  to	  Figueres,	  that	  fair	  price	  was	  “enough	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to	   live,	   to	   raise	   our	   own	   capital	   and	   to	   carry	   on	  with	   our	   own	  development”	   (in	  
Ameringer,	  1978,	  pp.	  147).	  Figueres’	  testimony	  echoed	  the	  structure	  of	  Roosevelt’s	  
1941	  Four	  Freedoms	  Speech.	  This	  was	  done	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  purposeful	  denial	  
of	   any	   of	   those	   freedoms	   to	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   citizenry.	  
Figueres	   was	   offering	   Washington	   the	   opportunity	   to	   redevelop	   their	   Latin	  
American	   policy.	   However,	   to	   Eisenhower,	   no	   severe	   threat	   was	   posed	   by	   the	  
events	   of	   1958.	   Additional	   support	   for	   military	   regimes	   could	   continue	   to	  
safeguard	   US	   regional	   interests.	   Figueres’	   insightful	   testimony	   was	   lost	   as	   a	  
footnote	  in	  history	  due	  to	  Eisenhower’s	  failure	  to	  act	  on	  his	  suggestions.	  
	  
Kubitschek’s	  Operation	  Pan-­‐America	  
Operation	   Pan-­‐America	   was	   an	   attempt	   to	   pursue	   policies	   of	   economic	  
nationalism	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  life	  of	  individuals	  in	  Latin	  America.	  OPA	  was	  
not	   intended	   to	   be	   like	   a	   Marshall	   Plan	   directed	   by	   the	   US.	   It	   was	   a	   domestic	  
economic	  reform	  package	  reliant	  upon	  foreign	  capital	  investment.	  Its	  replacement	  
by	   the	   AFP	   accounts	   for	   its	   limited	   place	  within	   Latin	   American	   historiography.	  
However,	  the	  literature	  of	   ‘developmentalism’	  in	  Latin	  America	  offers	  insight	  into	  
the	  motivation	  of	  OPA.	  According	  to	  Szusterman	  (1993),	  the	  economic	  philosophy	  
of	   ‘developmentalism’	  was	   the	   creation	  of	   self-­‐sustaining	   growth	   in	  multilayered	  
industry	   not	   dependent	   on	   foreign	   exports	   (pp.	   75-­‐80).	   Argentines,	   including	  
Prebisch,	   Perón,	   and	   Frondizi,	   believed	   that	   significant	   capital	   investment	   was	  
required	  to	  establish	  this	  level	  of	  industrialisation	  (Szusterman,	  1993,	  pp.	  79-­‐90).	  
Without	  capital	  injections	  the	  state	  is	  dependent	  upon	  export	  for	  foreign	  exchange	  
and	   foreign	   energy	   reserves.	   Sikkink	   (1992)	   furthers	   this	   point	   by	   stating	   that	  
developmentalism	  was	   “based	   on	   the	   belief	   that	   industrialisation	  was	   necessary	  
for	  development”	  (p.	  32).	  She	  continues	  	  
The	  interrelated	  policy	  components	  …characterised	  developmentalism:	  (1)	  
intense	   vertical	   [ISI]…	   (2)	   Rapid	   capital	   accumulation	   [through]	   foreign,	  
private	  and	  public	  sources;	  (3)	  state	  involvement	  to	  channel	  initiative	  into	  
priority	  areas	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  33.)	  
Moreover,	  OPA	  was	  Kubitschek’s	  attempt	  to	  utilise	  growing	  Cold	  War	  tensions	  to	  
demand	   a	   complete	   overhaul	   of	   Washington’s	   economic	   strategy	   towards	   Latin	  
America.	  He	  sought	  US	  support	   for	  his	  vision	  of	  developmentalism,	  however,	   this	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was	   directly	   opposed	   to	   the	   US	   liberal	   philosophy	   of	   trade	   expansionism.	   This	  
section	  will	  detail	  the	  Brazilian	  attempt	  to	  create	  OPA.	  
Juscelino	   Kubitschek	   sought	   to	   evolve	   inter-­‐American	   relations	   in	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   the	   1958	   protests.	   He	   attempted	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   need	   for	  
immediate	   capitalist	   development.	   In	   a	   private	   letter	   to	   Eisenhower,	   Kubitschek	  
claimed	   that	   the	   Caracas	   protests	   were	   the	   “product	   of	   years	   of	   neglect”	  
(Alexander,	  1991,	  p.	  109).	  Kubitschek	  saw	  Caracas	  as	  pivotal	  as	  he	  exaggerated	  the	  
communist	  menace	  to	  place	  Brazilian	  development	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Cold	  
War.	  This	  was	  a	  calculated	  move	  where	  he	  claimed	  that	  the	  “continued	  economic	  
development	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  is	  vital	   to	  the	  winning	  of	  the	  Cold	  War”	  
and	   that	   no	  military	  would	   protect	   the	   region	   should	   “the	   great	  masses	   in	   Latin	  
America	   continue	   in	   poverty	   and	   disease”	   (Alexander,	   1991,	   p.	   280).	   In	   his	  
attempts	   to	   persuade	   Eisenhower	   into	   granting	   significant	   economic	   assistance,	  
Kubitschek	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  Argentine	  Frondizi,	  the	  Colombian	  Lleras	  and	  
the	  Peruvian	  Manuel	  Prado	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  140).	  A	  revolutionary	  left	  threatened	  
these	   four	  governments.	  However,	  each	   lacked	  the	  necessary	  capital	   to	  appeal	   to	  
the	   masses.	   Kubitschek	   acknowledged	   that	   social	   progress	   and	   economic	  
development	  require	  capital	  and	  that	  the	  US	  was	  the	  major	  creditor	  to	  the	  region.	  
They	  proposed	  Operation	  Pan-­‐America	  in	  1958	  (Alexander,	  1991,	  p.	  286).	  OPA	  was	  
an	   economic	   alliance	   that	   required	   significant	   economic	   assistance	   from	   the	   US.	  
The	  Latin	  Americans	  sought	  to	  acquire	  this	  assistance	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  threat	  
of	  poverty	  to	  hemispheric	  security.	  	  
OPA	   was	   an	   ambitious	   investment	   program	   proposed	   by	   Kubitschek.	  
However,	   the	   US	   had	   little	   intention	   of	   negotiating.	   Kubitschek’s	   vision	   for	   OPA	  
was	  	  
Obtaining	   a	   level	   of	   living	   per-­‐capita,	   which	   permits	   the	   beginning	   of	   a	  
process	  of	  a	  cumulative	  and	  autonomous	  growth	  with	  local	  resources,	  to	  a	  
satisfactory	   level,	  without	   brusque	   or	   institutional	   alterations	   (Alexander,	  
1991,	  p.	  288).	  
Kubitschek	   stated	   that	   Brazil	   alone	   required	   an	   investment	   of	   US$3.5	   billion	  
(Alexander,	   1991,	   p.	   289).	   Dulles	   disagreed.	   According	   to	   Kubitschek,	   “Foster	  
Dulles	   showed	   himself	   as	   a	   tenacious	   arguer,	   intransigent,	   almost	   incapable	   of	  
reaching	  agreement.	  He	  put	   forth	  his	  points	  of	  view,	  and	   from	  there	  was	  no	  way	  
out”	   (cited	   in,	   Alexander,	   1991,	   p.	   281).	   It	   was	   no	   coincidence	   that	   the	   US	   and	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Dulles	   opposed	   OPA.	   Kubitschek	   proposed	   a	   revolution	   in	   US-­‐Latin	   American	  
relations.	  He	  sought	  significant	  commodity	  price	  reform.	  If	  Brazil	  received	  a	  higher	  
price	   for	   coffee,	   US	   corporations	   would	   lose	   profit.	   Additionally,	   the	   Brazilians	  
would	   need	   to	   commit	   less	   labour	   to	   coffee	   production	   to	  meet	   the	   demands	   of	  
foreign	   exchange.	   Brazil	   also	   sought	   US	   aid	   to	   construct	   industries	   that	   would	  
compete	   with	   US	   exports.	   The	   creation	   of	   moderate	   to	   heavy	   industrialisation	  
would	   limit	  Brazil’s	  dependence	  on	  US	  capital	  goods.	  Finally,	   the	  production	  and	  
accumulation	  of	  Brazilian	  capital	  would	  give	  the	  nation	  economic	  autonomy.	  This	  
would	  allow	  Brazilian	  capital	   to	  replace	  US	   investment	   in	   the	  domestic	  economy.	  
Brazil’s	   economy	  would	   be	   free	   to	   operate	  without	   regard	   for	   US	   industrial	   and	  
military	   needs.	   Kubitschek	   asked	   the	   US	   to	   forfeit	   their	   economic	   dominance	   of	  
Brazil.	  Beyond	  this,	  he	  sought	  to	  extend	  this	  economic	  revolution	  to	  greater	  Latin	  
America.	  Kubitschek	  was	  correct	   in	  his	  claim	  that	  substantial	  US	   investment	  was	  
required	  to	  improve	  the	  lives	  of	  all	  Latin	  Americans.	  However,	  he	  was	  incorrect	  in	  
assuming	  that	  this	  improvement	  was	  vital	  to	  US	  interests.	  	  
Eisenhower’s	  intransigence	  led	  to	  a	  resurgence	  of	  economic	  nationalism	  in	  
Brazil	   and	  Argentina	   known	  as	   “developmentalism”	   (Sikkink,	   1992,	   pp.	   105-­‐121,	  
132-­‐14).	  Kubitschek	  promised	  “fifty	  years’	  progress	  in	  five”	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  134).	  
From	  1956	  he	  set	  about	  achieving	  a	   “targets	  program”	  emphasising	   “a	  monetary	  
and	   budget	   program,	   an	   exchange	   reform,	   and	   an	   investment	   plan.	   His	   plan	  
centred	  on	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  energy,	  transport	  and	  manufacturing	  industries	  in	  
both	  Rio	  de	  Janeiro	  and	  São	  Paulo	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  pp.	  132-­‐140).	  Kubitschek’s	  most	  
ambitious	  development	  plan	  was	  the	  new	  capital,	  Brasília.	  The	  construction	  of	  this	  
city	  meant	   significant	   investment	   in	   transport	   and	   communications	   to	   service	   it.	  
Kubitschek	  adopted	  an	  independent	  tariff	  and	  fiscal	  policy,	  and	  broke	  ties	  with	  the	  
IMF	   over	   currency	   policy	   (Sikkink,	   1992,	   p.	   142).	   The	   IMF	   encouraged	   austerity	  
and	  the	  end	  of	  developmentalism	  in	  order	  to	  curb	  inflation	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  142).	  
Decreasing	  coffee	  prices	  limited	  Brazil’s	  capital	  reserves.	  The	  Argentine	  economist	  
Raúl	  Prebisch	  also	  supported	  policies	  of	  developmentalism	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  252).	  
Developmentalism	  was	  also	  partially	  adopted	  by	  Frondizi,	  who	  declared	  after	  the	  
1958	  election:	  
Our	  triumph	  will	  be	  a	  great	  step	  forward	  in	  the	  struggle	  against	  colonialist	  
imperialism	   and	   native	   oligarchies	   who	   throughout	   the	   continent	   have	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always	  blocked	  national	  development	  and	  the	  fraternity	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  
Americas	  (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  85).	  
In	   his	   first	   year,	   Frondizi	   also	   established	   a	   “targets	   program”	   (Sikkink,	   1992,	   p.	  
111).	   He	   sought	   to	   rapidly	   expand	   the	   Argentine	   economy	   through	   private	  
capitalist	   investment	   in	   both	   resource	   extraction	   and	   industrial	   manufacturing.	  
Frondizi	   and	  Kubitschek	   sought	   to	   enlarge	   their	   economies	   rapidly.	   They	   did	   so	  
without	  direct	  support	  from	  the	  US.	  	  
Eisenhower’s	   intransigence	  towards	  Latin	  American	  affairs	  was	  motivated	  
by	  a	  doctrine	  of	  military	   supremacy.	  He	  began	  his	   second	   term	  by	  adopting	  NSC	  
directive	  5613/1,	  which	  stated	  
If	  a	  Latin	  American	  state	  should	  establish	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc	  close	  ties	  of	  
such	   a	   nature	   as	   seriously	   to	   prejudice	   our	   vital	   national	   interests,	   be	  
prepared	  to	  diminish	  government	  economic	  and	  financial	  cooperation	  with	  
that	   country	   and	   take	   any	   other	   political,	   economic,	   or	   military	   actions	  
deemed	  appropriate	  (as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  91).	  
Eisenhower’s	   administration	   refused	   to	   accept	   any	   change	   to	   its	   hegemonic	  
relationship	   with	   Latin	   America.	   This	   approach	   defied	   the	   realities	   of	   the	  
relationship.	   Ten	   anti-­‐communist	   dictatorships	   fell	   during	   Eisenhower’s	   second	  
term.	   J.	  F.	  Dulles	  commented,	  “if	  we	  carry	  out	  our	  theory	  too	  rigidly	  the	  practical	  
result	  would	  be	  that	  many	  friendly	  governments	  would	  collapse	  and	  communism	  
would	   take	   over”	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   107).	   The	   conservative	   Secretary	   of	   State	  
acknowledged	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  face	  of	  revolutionary	  anti-­‐
Americanism.	   In	   1959	   Christian	   Herter	   replaced	   him	   due	   to	   declining	   health	  
(Schoultz,	  2009,	  p.	  105).	  Between	  1955	  and	  1959	  regional	  military	  assistance	  was	  
increased	   from	   US$54	   million	   to	   US$160	   million	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   107).	   Dulles’	  
warning	   was	   not	   headed.	   Eisenhower	   continued	   to	   govern	   via	   his	   central	  
philosophy.	  His	  refusal	   to	  participate	   in	  OPA	  was	  fuelled	  by	  a	  belief	   that	  regional	  
security	  was	  best	  served	  through	  alliances	  with	  conservative,	  and	  often	  despotic,	  
regimes.	   In	   1959	   a	   small	   group	   of	   revolutionaries	   in	   Cuba	   permanently	   altered	  
Washington’s	   view	   of	   Latin	   America.	   Fidel	   Castro	   goaded	   Washington	   into	   an	  
aggressive	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  its	  policies	  towards	  a	  continent	  that	  it	  had	  dominated	  
just	  four	  years	  earlier.	  The	  prolonged	  radicalisation	  of	  Latin	  American	  politics	  from	  
1955-­‐1959,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  brought	  about	  this	  change.	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The	   Cuban	   Revolution:	   Castro,	   the	   New	   Left	   and	   the	  
Confirmation	  of	  Pretext	  
The	  Cuban	  Revolution	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘origin’	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
In	  many	  ways	  it	  was.	  Fidel	  Castro	  invited	  the	  USSR	  to	  participate	  in	  Cuban	  political,	  
economic	  and	  military	  affairs,	  bringing	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  to	  the	  precipice	  of	  
disaster	  in	  October	  1962.	  This	  was	  the	  first	  conflict	  between	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR	  
in	   Latin	   America.	   However,	   this	   thesis	   adopts	   a	   more	   critical	   approach	   to	   the	  
concept	   of	   the	   ‘Cold	   War’	   in	   Latin	   America.	   In	   this	   mould,	   it	   views	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	   of	   1956-­‐1959	   as	   the	   logical	   evolution	   of	   the	   intellectual	   tradition	   of	  
social	  democracy	  in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  revolution	  was	  not	  fought	  for	  the	  interests	  
of	   the	   USSR.	   It	   was	   fought	   for	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   Cuban	   people	   and	   the	  
revolutionary	   cadre,	   led	   by	   Fidel	   Castro.	   The	   26th	   of	   July	   movement	   (M26)	  
espoused	   the	   philosophy	   of	   José	   Martí,	   whose	   ideas	   had	   underpinned	   Cuban	  
political	   thought	   since	   its	   independence	   from	   Spain	   (Benjamin,	   1990,	   p.	   143).	  
Martí’s	   ideas	   had	   influenced	   the	   PRC-­‐A	   regimes	   of	   Grau	   and	   Prío,	   but	   more	  
significantly	   the	   Ortodoxo	   politician	   Eduardo	   Chibás	   (Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   45).	  
Chibás’	  philosophy,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle,	   influenced	  Castro’s	  
revolutionary	  ideas	  and	  shaped	  his	  political	  program.	  This	  chapter	  will	  explain	  the	  
political,	   economic	   and	   philosophical	   motivations	   of	   Castro	   and	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution.	   It	  will	   also	   examine	   the	  position	  of	  Castroism	  within	  Latin	  American	  
political	   thought	   to	   demonstrate	   Castro’s	   gradual	   divergence	   from	   the	   social	  
democratic	  tradition.	  Furthermore,	  it	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  revolution	  was	  radicalised	  
between	  1959	  and	  1963	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  both	  the	  US	  and	  the	  USSR.	  While	  the	  US	  
sought	  to	  remove	  Castro,	  his	  position	  became	  useful	  to	  its	  stance	  on	  Latin	  America.	  
Castro	   confirmed	   those	   accusations	   of	   communism	   that	   US	   officials	   had	   been	  
directing	  at	  Latin	  American	  leaders	  for	  thirty	  years.	  By	  establishing	  a	  nationalist-­‐
socialist	   regime,	   and	   eventually	   allying	  Cuba	   to	   Soviet	   interests,	   Castro	  provided	  
Washington	  with	  the	  justification	  to	  increase	  its	  political	  and	  economic	  grip	  upon	  
Latin	  America	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  revolution.	  	  
	  
Cuba	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  ‘Castroism’	  
Political	   theorists	   have	   debated	   the	   ideological	   orientation	   of	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	   since	   1959.	   However,	   no	   conclusive	   definition	   of	   Castroism	   has	  
emerged.	   Leading	   Cold	   War	   historians	   have	   viewed	   the	   distinction	   between	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Castroism	   and	   communism	   as	   trivial,	   given	   Castro’s	   eventual	   admission	   into	   the	  
Soviet	  camp.	  Attempting	  to	  fit	  the	  narrative	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War,	  the	  Preeminent	  
Cold	   War	   historian,	   John	   Lewis	   Gaddis	   (2007)	   called	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   “a	  
Marxist-­‐Leninist	  insurgency”	  (p.	  75).	  Citing	  Soviet	  sources,	  Gaddis’	  simplification	  is	  
typical	   of	   American	   Cold	   War	   historiography.	   However,	   Castroism	   was	   distinct	  
from	   Soviet	   inspired	   communist	   insurgencies	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   world.	   The	  
Communist	   Parties	   of	   Latin	   America	   were	   orientated	   towards	   Moscow	   and	  
pragmatically	   waited	   for	   revolutionary	   conditions	   to	   emerge	   in	   their	   individual	  
republics	   (Aguilar,	   1968,	   pp.	   42-­‐58).	   The	   Soviets	   doubted	   Castro’s	   allegiance	   to	  
Marxism	   (Fursenko	   and	   Naftali,	   2006,	   p.	   295).	   Meanwhile	   Castro,	   and	   those	  
regional	  insurgents	  who	  followed	  his	  doctrine,	  promoted	  a	  political	  and	  economic	  
philosophy	  in	  line	  with	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement,	  despite	  their	  more	  radical	  
tactics.	   However,	   they	   aggressively	   fought	   for	   those	   programs	   that	   previous	  
constitutional	  governments	  had	  failed	  to	  deliver.	  Aguilar	  (1988)	  presents	  the	  most	  
useful	   analysis:	   Cuban	   Marxism	   “is	   merely	   a	   repertoire	   of	   slogans	   serving	   to	  
organise	   various	   interests,	   most	   of	   them	   completely	   remote	   from	   those	   which	  
Marxism	   originally	   identified	   itself”	   (p.	   140).	  Moreover,	   Castroism	   pragmatically	  
utilised	  Marxist	  rhetoric	  in	  applying	  reforms	  that	  were	  not	  initially	  ‘revolutionary’,	  
but	  were	   demanded	   by	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   population.	   The	   rhetoric	   rather	   than	   the	  
policies,	   afforded	   his	   regime	   the	   support	   of	   the	   USSR,	   in	   light	   of	   the	   inevitable	  
aggression	   from	   the	   US.	   Sánchez	   (1967)	   offers	   the	   most	   detailed	   analysis	   of	  
Castroism.	   He	   summarised	   its	   characteristics	   as:	   “exceptional	   powers	   and	  
qualities”	   of	   the	   leader;	   economic	   dependence	   on	   an	   external	   source;	   and	   a	  
commitment	  to	  “revolutionary	  duties”	  in	  the	  hemisphere	  (pp.	  214-­‐215).	  He	  asserts	  
that	  Castroism	  was	  unique	  from	  communism.	  This	  section	  will	  trace	  the	  ideological	  
origins	  of	  Fidel	  Castro	  and	  Castroism.	  
Fidel	   Castro	   was	   born	   into	   considerable	   wealth.	   His	   family,	   of	   Spanish	  
heritage,	   owned	   significant	   property	   in	   the	   sugarcane	   region	   of	   Southern	   Cuba	  
(Skierka,	   2004,	   p.	   5).	   He	   was	   afforded	   the	   luxury	   of	   a	   private	   boarding	   school	  
education	  and	  progressed	  to	  Havana	  University	  in	  1945	  (Skierka,	  2004,	  p.	  11).	  The	  
administration	   of	   the	   Auténtico	   Grau	   lacked	   the	   willingness	   to	   enact	   radical,	   or	  
even	   nationalist,	   economic	   policies,	   leaving	   the	   Cuban	   electorate	   dissatisfied	  
(Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  41).	  Castro	  arrived	  at	  maturity	  during	  a	  unique	  time	  in	  Cuban	  
history.	   The	   political	   system	  was	   freer	   than	   at	   any	   time	   in	   the	   past	   (Ameringer,	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2000,	  p.	  66-­‐87).	  However,	  leftist	  fervour	  was	  growing	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  alleged	  
incompetence	  and	  corruption	  of	  the	  civilian	  government.	  During	  this	  time,	  Castro	  
entered	   student	   politics	  while	   studying	   Law.	  An	   average	   student,	   Castro	   became	  
more	  interested	  in	  politics	  than	  his	  education.	  In	  1946	  he	  delivered	  a	  speech	  that	  
condemned	  both	  US	  imperialism	  and	  the	  failures	  of	  the	  Grau	  government,	  raising	  
his	  national	  profile	  (Skierka,	  2004,	  p.	  24).	  Castro	  became	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  
regional	  democratic	  action.	  He	  joined	  the	  failed	  1947	  Caribbean	  Legion	  invasion	  of	  
the	   Dominican	   Republic	   (Tunzelman,	   2011,	   p.	   38).	   He	   also	   attended	   the	   1948	  
Bogotá	  conference	  of	  the	  OAS,	  which	  saw	  the	  death	  of	  Gaitán	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
Bogotázo	   (Tunzelman,	   2011,	   p.	   40).	   He	   was	   involved	   in	   the	   anti-­‐US	   protest	  
movement,	  but	   took	  refuge	  once	   the	  violence	   increased.	  The	  origins	  of	  Castroism	  
lie	  within	   the	   ideological	   progression	  of	   the	   young	  Fidel	   Castro.	  By	  1947	  he	  had	  
chosen	  his	  political	  and	  philosophical	  path,	  as	  a	  young	  Ortodoxo	  and	  a	  follower	  of	  
the	  politician	  Eduardo	  Chibás.	  
Chibás	   was	   a	   member	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Machado	   resistance	   and	   an	   active	  
advocate	   of	   the	   Auténtico	   program	   for	   Cuba	   (Benjamin,	   1990,	   p.	   141).	   He	   was	  
elected	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Congress	  in	  1940,	  where	  he	  remained	  until	  his	  death	  (Skierka,	  
2004,	  p.	  25).	  However,	  Chibás	  grew	  frustrated	  with	  the	   inability	  of	  Grau	  to	  enact	  
reform.	  On	  May	  11	  1947,	  Chibás	  declared	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Ortodoxos	  as	  “he	  
claimed	   that	   Grau	   had	   abandoned	   the	   ideas	   and	   programs	   of	   the	   PRC-­‐A”	  
(Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   41).	   Chibás	   unsuccessfully	   ran	   for	   the	   Cuban	  Presidency	   in	  
1948	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  84).	  He	  was	  prominent	  primarily	  as	  a	  radio	  host,	  and	  his	  
weekly	  broadcast	  had	  a	  loyal	  following	  throughout	  Cuba.	  During	  those	  broadcasts,	  
he	   routinely	   accused	   the	   government	   of	   both	   corruption	   and	   intransigence	  
(Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  37).	  Cuba	  moved	  quickly	  to	  the	  right	  under	  the	  presidency	  of	  
Carlos	   Prío.	   Chibás	   claimed	   that	   the	   Auténticos	   abandoned	   their	   ideological	  
commitment	  to	  the	  Cuban	  people.	  Benjamin	  (1990)	  notes	  “under	  the	  charismatic	  
leadership	  of	  Eduardo	  Chibás,	  the	  Ortodoxos	  held	  together	  in	  growing	  tension	  the	  
forces	  of	  moderate	  political	  reform	  and	  those	  of	  political	  purification”	  (p.	  141).	  In	  
fact,	   support	   for	   the	   Ortodoxos	   grew	   significantly	   between	   1947	   and	   1951	  
(Tunzelman,	  2011,	  pp.	  38-­‐44).	  Fidel	  Castro	  was	  an	  Ortodoxo.	  He	   later	   formed	  the	  
Ortodoxo	  Radical	  Action	  (ARO)	  group	  within	  Chibás’	  movement	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  
p.	   39).	   Castro	   considered	   himself	   the	   “intellectual	   descendent”	   of	   Chibás,	   and	  
prepared	   for	   the	   1952	   elections,	   in	   which	   he	   sought	   a	   Congressional	   seat	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(Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1992,	  p.	  38).	  However,	  Castro’s	  life	  took	  an	  unexpected	  turn	  in	  
August	   1951.	   Chibás	   had	   caught	  wind	   of	   a	   plan	   to	   overthrow	   the	   constitutional	  
government	   to	   prevent	   what	   he	   perceived	   as	   likely	   Ortodoxo	   victories	   in	   key	  
offices.	   To	   create	  maximum	  political	   impact,	   Chibás	   committed	   suicide	   on	   air	   on	  
August	   5,	   1951	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1992,	   p.	   38).	   This	  was	   followed	   by	   Batista’s	  
coup	   in	  early	  1952.	   In	  that	  year,	  all	  constitutional	  options	  were	  taken	  away	  from	  
Castro	  and	  the	  Ortodoxos.	  	  
A	  small	  group	  of	  revolutionaries	  set	  about	  returning	  Cuba	  to	  constitutional	  
government	  and	  fulfilling	  the	  Ortodoxo	  vision	  for	  Cuba.	  Following	  the	  failed	  attack	  
on	   the	  Moncada	  barracks	  Castro	   laid	  out	  his	   revolutionary	  philosophy.	  Benjamin	  
(1990)	   asserts	   that	   “the	   thesis	   of	   ‘history	   will	   absolve	   me’	   followed	   the	   moral	  
reformism	   of	   Eduardo	   Chibás	   and	   drew	   inspiration	   from	   the	   utopian	  
egalitarianism	  of	  José	  Martí”	  (p.	  143).	  Castro	  cited	  Chibás’	  forewarning	  of	  Batista’s	  
military	   despotism	  within	   his	   1953	   speech.	   He	   then	   laid	   out	   four	   revolutionary	  
‘laws’	  that	  “would	  have”	  come	  into	  effect	  if	  Moncada	  had	  succeeded	  (Castro,	  1953).	  
They	  included:	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  the	  1940	  constitution;	  extensive	  land	  reform;	  
fairer	   distribution	   of	   profits	   to	   industrial	   and	   agricultural	   workers,	   by	   way	   of	  
wages;	   and	   the	   expropriation	   of	   properties	   attained	   through	   government	   fraud	  
(Castro,	  1953).	  He	  continued	  to	  state	  that	  he	  possessed	  majority	  support	   in	  Cuba	  
and	   that	   “history	   will	   absolve”	   his	   actions	   (Castro,	   1953).	   The	   revolution,	   until	  
1959,	   was	   fought	   by	   the	   Cuban	   people	   for	   these	   revolutionary	   principals	   built	  
upon	   the	   Auténtico	   and	   Ortodoxo	   platforms	   of	   “nationalism,	   socialism	   and	   anti-­‐
Imperialism”	  (Grau,	  as	  cited	  in	  Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  44).	  It	  was	  extremely	  important	  
that	  Castro’s	  message	  was	  consistent	  and	  appealing	   to	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  Cuban	  
people.	  A	  communist	  revolution	  would	  have	  lacked	  that	  appeal.	  
Castro’s	  ideological	  relationship	  to	  ‘communism’	  has	  been	  scrutinised	  given	  
the	  outcome	  of	   the	   revolution.	  Castro	   committed	   to	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	   following	  
the	   revolution	   in	   December	   1961	   (Aguilar,	   1988,	   p.	   147).	   He	   did	   so	   to	   procure	  
Soviet	   economic	   and	   military	   assistance	   against	   the	   aggression	   of	   the	   US.	  
Nevertheless,	   this	   ideological	   orientation	   is	   the	   defining	   legacy	   of	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  that	  Castro	  was	  a	  communist	  prior	  to	  
1959.	   The	   Cuban	   Revolution	   did	   not	   follow	   ‘Leninist’	   strategy,	   as	   power	   was	  
handed	  back	   to	   conservatives	   for	  much	  of	  1959	   (Ratliff,	  1976,	  p.	  33).	  The	  Cuban	  
people	  were	  not	   indoctrinated	   towards	  socialism	  or	  Marxism	  until	  1961,	  nor	  did	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the	  Castro	   cadre	  make	  any	  public	  proclamation	  of	  Marxism	  until	   then.	  However,	  
given	  that	  Marxism	  is	  an	  ideology,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  prove	  that	  it	  did	  not	  influence	  
Castro’s	   thinking	   prior	   to	   the	   revolutionary	   victory.	   All	   that	   can	   conclusively	   be	  
said	   is	   that	   Castroism	   is	   unique,	   and	   a	   result	   of	   Fidel’s	   ideological	   progression	  
between	   1945	   and	   1961.	   The	   Cuban	   communists	   did	   not	   directly	   influence	   him	  
(Sánchez,	  1967,	  p.	  26).	  Castro	  opposed	  the	  sedentary	  nature	  of	  their	  organisation,	  
and	   the	   Ortodoxos	  competed	   and	  were	   successful	   in	   obtaining	  members	   (Pérez-­‐
Stable,	   2012,	   pp.	   72-­‐80).	   The	   small	   group	   of	   37,000	   predominately	  middle-­‐class	  
professionals	   collaborated	  with	   the	  Batista	   dictatorship	   and	  publicly	   condemned	  
both	  the	  Moncada	  assault	  and	  the	  Sierra	  Maestra	  campaign	  (Sánchez,	  1967,	  p.	  39).	  
They	  were	   the	   only	   progressives	   omitted	   from	   the	   pact	   of	   Caracas	   in	   1958	   and	  
Castro	   also	   tightly	   monitored	   their	   actions	   in	   the	   early	   revolutionary	   period	  
(Sánchez,	   1967,	   p.	   28).	   Moreover,	   Castroism	   and	   communism	   were	   distinct.	  
Castro’s	   Marxism	   “has	   been	   generally	   limited	   to	   vague	   declarations	   or	   sporadic	  
quotes	  often	  aimed	  at	   justifying	  pragmatic	  political	  decisions”	   (Aguilera,	  1988,	  p.	  
140).	   His	   version	   of	  Marxism	  was	   designed	   to	   procure	   the	   necessary	   amount	   of	  
domestic	   and	   foreign	   support	   for	   his	   revolution	   to	   ensure	   its	   longevity.	  While	   it	  
eventually	   evolved	   to	   a	   form	   of	   communism,	   it	  was	   due	   to	   political	   factors,	   and	  
does	   not	   demonstrate	   the	   ideological	   development	   of	   Fidel	   Castro	   or	   his	  
movement.	  	  
Castro’s	   political	   philosophy	   was	   influenced	   by	   Cuba’s	   political	   and	  
economic	   situation	   under	   Fulgencio	   Batista.	   He	   looked	   to	   the	   indentured	  
agricultural	  population	  as	  the	  key	  to	  his	  revolution.	  More	  so	  than	  any	  other	  Latin	  
American	   nation,	   Cuba	   was	   an	   economic	   satellite	   of	   the	   US.	   Under	   Batista,	  
“Americans	  owned	   forty	  per	  cent	  of	   the	  Cuban	  sugar	   industry,	  eighty	  per	  cent	  of	  
Cuban	  utilities	  [and]	  ninety	  per	  cent	  of	  Cuban	  mining”	  (Beschloss,	  1991,	  p.	  88).	  The	  
Cuban	  economy	  was	  completely	  dependent	  on	  sugar	  sales	  to	  the	  US,	  however,	  the	  
significant	   decrease	   in	   world	   sugar	   prices	   between	   1955	   and	   1958	   left	   Cubans	  
increasingly	   impoverished	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   226).	   This	   poverty	   was	   felt	  
disproportionately	  in	  rural	  areas.	  The	  top	  20	  per	  cent	  of	  Cubans,	  primarily	  urban	  
professionals,	   took	  62	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  national	   income	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  229).	  This	  
figure	  accounts	   for	  the	  average	  annual	  wage	  of	  US$374,	  which	  was	  second	  in	  the	  
region	  behind	  that	  of	  oil-­‐rich	  Venezuela	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  225).	  The	  importation	  of	  
US$777	   of	   US	   consumer	   goods	   affected	   the	   real	   purchasing	   power	   of	   the	   Cuban	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people	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   225).	  Meanwhile,	   “nearly	   60	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   labour	  
force	   languished	   permanently	   in	   conditions	   between	   unemployment	   and	  
underemployment,”	  due	  to	  the	  seasonal	  nature	  of	  the	  sugar	  economy	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  
p.	   227).	   Cubans	   wanted	   to	   replace	   Batista.	   However,	   the	   urban	   opposition	   was	  
unable,	  and	  unwilling,	  to	  wage	  a	  long-­‐term	  war	  against	  the	  well-­‐trained	  and	  armed	  
Cuban	   army.	   Hence,	   rural	   poverty	   became	   the	   greatest	   source	   of	   revolutionary	  
ferment	   in	   Cuba.	   Without	   government	   intervention,	   this	   poverty	   was	   set	   to	  
increase.	   Between	   1956	   and	   1958	   150,000	   Cubans	   reached	   working	   age,	   while	  
only	  8,000	  urban	  jobs	  were	  created	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  228).	  Accordingly,	  the	  children	  
of	  rural	  peasants	  would	  mature	  into	  rural	  peasants.	  The	  PRC-­‐A,	  while	  ideologically	  
committed,	  never	  enacted	  meaningful	   land	  reform	  in	  Cuba	  (Ameringer,	  2000,	  pp.	  
24-­‐56).	  These	  factors	  made	  revolution	  in	  rural	  Cuba	  inevitable.	  	  
	  
The	  Sierra	  Maestra	  
	   The	  Sierra	  Maestra	  was	  unique	   in	  Latin	  American	  history.	   It	  was	   the	   first	  
successful	  rural	  insurgency	  to	  overthrow	  a	  government.	  Under	  Castro’s	  leadership,	  
the	  M26	  abandoned	  the	  constitutional	  road	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  violent	  rural	  insurgency.	  
Wickham-­‐Crowley	   (1992)	   argues	   “Guerrilla	  movements	   do	   not	   begin	   among	   the	  
peasants	   in	   the	   countryside,	   but	   among	   urban-­‐based	   intellectuals”	   (30).	   Castro,	  
however,	  chose	  the	  rural	  community	  to	  stage	  his	  revolution.	  He	  saw	  the	  campesino	  
population	   to	   be	  most	   susceptible	   to	   his	   revolutionary	   ideals.	  Wickham-­‐Crowley	  
(1991)	   has	   attributed	   the	   rise	   of	   rural	   insurrections	   to	   “a	   breakdown	  
of...centralised	  state	  authority”	   in	   the	  Sierra	  Maestra	  and	  surrounding	  regions	  (p.	  
35).	  The	  peasantry	  were	  betrayed	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  army,	  often	  inadvertently,	  had	  
committed	  atrocities	  against	  the	  rural	  population,	  which	  allowed	  the	  revolutionary	  
cadre	   to	  establish	   informal	  rule	   in	   the	  Sierra	  Maestra.	  The	  support	   for	   the	  rebels	  
was	   based	   on	   “promises	   of	   land	   reform”	   and	   monetary	   rewards	   (Wickham-­‐
Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   35).	   This	   support	   was	   vital,	   as	   the	   revolutionary	   cadre	   was	  
extremely	   small	   making	   it	   dependent	   on	   peasant	   support.	   Moreover,	   while	   this	  
form	  of	  revolution	  does	  not	  begin	  in	  rural	  areas,	  peasants	  nurture	  it.	  That	  is,	  they	  
are	  convinced	  by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  leader	  –	  that	  their	  lives	  will	  improve	  after	  the	  
revolution.	  Cuba	  was	   the	   first	  Latin	  American	  example	  of	  such	  a	  movement.	  This	  
section	  will	  explain	  the	  military	  and	  political	  program	  of	  the	  Cuban	  M26	  through	  
its	  eventual	  victory	  in	  January	  1959.	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Latin	   America	   had	   a	   longstanding	   tradition	   of	   social	   democratic	   and	  
populist	   revolutions	   against	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   These	   primarily	   occurred	  
either	  within	  the	  military	  or	  amongst	  urban	  elites	  in	  capital	  cities.	  While	  the	  Cuban	  
Revolution	   represented	   a	   unique	   strategy,	   the	   class	   origins	   of	   the	   leading	   cadre	  
were	  consistent	  with	  other	  anti-­‐dictatorial	  movements	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  
twentieth	  century	  (Aguilar,	  1988,	  pp.	  140-­‐144).	  It	  is	  also	  consistent	  with	  the	  1933	  
anti-­‐Machado	   movement	   that	   was	   quickly	   stifled	   by	   the	   military.	   No	   civilian	  
movement	   can	  permanently	  protect	   itself	   from	   the	  military	  without	   the	  physical	  
support	   of	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   the	   people.	   Even	   with	   that	   support,	   the	  
revolutionary	   leaders	   must	   be	   willing	   to	   utilise	   that	   support	   by	   arming	   the	  
citizenry.	  Ernesto	  ‘Che’	  Guevara’s	  observations	  of	  Árbenz’s	  downfall	  in	  Guatemala	  
indicated	   the	   perils	   of	   the	   constitutional	   road	   (Ratliff,	   1976,	   p.	   27).	   Guevara’s	  
experience	   in	   Guatemala	   convinced	   him	   “that	   the	   struggle	   against	   the	   oligarchic	  
system	   and	   the	   main	   enemy,	   Yankee	   imperialism,	   must	   be	   an	   armed	   one,	  
supported	   by	   the	   people”	   (as	   cited	   in	   Blum,	   2004,	   p.	   82).	   Moreover,	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	   was	   a	   significant	   departure	   from	   the	   moderate	   social	   democratic	  
revolutions.	   It	   was	   also	   distinct	   from	   ‘communism,’	   which	   had	   taken	   the	  
constitutional	   road	   until	   this	   point	   (Aguilar,	   1988,	   p.	   140).	   The	   Cuban	   Popular	  
Socialist	  Party	   (PSP)	  criticised	   the	  Moncada	  assault	  as	  a	   “desperate	  action	  which	  
may	  be	  regarded	  as	  an	  adventure..,”	  asserting	  that	  such	  action	  could	  “lead	  only	  to	  
failure”	   (Harnecker,	   1987,	   p.	   16).	   Moreover,	   the	   Sierra	   Maestra	   strategy	   was	  
unique	   in	   Latin	   American	   history.	   Batista’s	   conventional	   army	   and	   police	   force	  
were	   ill-­‐equipped	   to	   counter	   this	   new	   form	   of	   ‘insurgency’	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  
1991,	  p.	  37).	  
Castro	  attempted	  to	  land	  a	  small	  revolutionary	  army	  in	  the	  Sierra	  Maestra	  
in	  Southern	  Cuba.	  His	  revolutionary	  cadre	  would	  procure	  additional	  rural	  support	  
through	   revolutionary	   propaganda,	   financial	   incentives,	   education	   and	  Guevara’s	  
ability	   as	   a	  medical	   doctor	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   41).	   The	   revolutionaries	  
had	  significant	   financial	  backing	   from	  sympathetic	  wealthy	  Cubans,	  urban	  Cuban	  
anti-­‐Batista	   politicians,	   Cuban	   expatriates	   throughout	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere	  
and	   members	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	   movement,	   including	   Betancourt	   and	  
Figueres	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   149).	   The	   Granma	   departed	   from	   Mexico	   in	  
November	   1956,	   taking	   82	   Cuban	   exiles	   to	   Playa	   Las	   Coloradas	   (Sweig,	   2002,	   p.	  
13).	  The	  landing	  was	  a	  disaster,	  as	  it	  missed	  the	  beach	  and	  the	  rebels	  were	  forced	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to	  make	  their	  way	  through	  mangrove	  swamps	  (Sweig,	  2002,	  p.	  14).	  Batista’s	  troops	  
were	   onsite	   to	   prevent	   the	  majority	   of	   rebels	   from	   reaching	   the	   Sierra	  Maestra.	  
Approximately	   20	   of	   the	   82	   participants	   survived	   to	   continue	   the	   revolution.	  
Significantly,	   the	   survivors	   included	   the	   Castro	   brothers,	   Guevara	   and	   Camilo	  
Cienfuegos.	   Once	   in	   the	   Sierra,	   the	   rebels	   had	   to	   regroup.	   They	   had	   lost	   the	  
majority	   of	   their	   equipment,	   supplies	   and	   Guevara’s	   asthma	  medication	   (Sweig,	  
2002,	  p.	  14).	  Over	  the	  following	  months	  the	  rebels	  integrated	  their	  movement	  into	  
rural	   communities	   and	   began	   the	   task	   of	   overthrowing	   the	   authoritarian	  Batista	  
regime.	  
The	  expansion	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  was	  dependent	  on	  popular	  support	  
in	   Cuba.	   The	   small	   revolutionary	   cadre	   was	   poorly	   armed	   and	   lacked	   basic	  
provisions.	   It	   needed	   to	   expand	   and	   strengthen	   for	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   to	  
succeed.	   However,	   by	   January	   1957	   most	   Cubans	   outside	   of	   the	   Sierra	   Maestra	  
believed	  that	  Castro	  was	  dead	  (Depalma,	  2006,	  p.	  33).	  Castro	  sought	  to	  expand	  his	  
revolution	   through	   propaganda.	   Given	   that	   his	   revolution	   was	   dependent	   on	  
national	   and	   international	   support,	   Castro	   reached	   out	   to	   the	   New	   York	   Times	  
journalist	   Herbert	   Matthews	   to	   propagandise	   the	   revolution	   (Depalma,	   2006,	   p.	  
67).	  Matthews	  travelled	  to	  Havana	  in	  February,	  completing	  significant	  background	  
work	   prior	   to	   his	   arranged	   meeting	   with	   Castro.	   Fidel	   Castro	   “controlled	   the	  
setting,	   the	   timing,	   and	   to	  a	   large	  extent	   the	   content	  of	   the	   interview”	   (Depalma,	  
2006,	  p.	   77).	  His	   supporters	   took	  Matthews	   into	   the	   Sierra	  Maestra.	   From	   there,	  
the	   interview	   was	   carefully	   staged.	   Light	   was	   limited,	   the	   aura	   of	   threat	   was	  
exaggerated,	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  cadre	  was	  overstated	  (Depalma,	  
2006,	   p.	   81).	   Castro	   confidently	   told	   Matthews	   that	   his	   movement	   had	   total	  
support	  in	  Cuba	  and	  that	  they	  were	  well-­‐equipped	  to	  defeat	  Batista	  and	  to	  create	  
an	  effective	  government.	  He	  also	  stated	  that	  his	  movement	  espoused	  “nationalism”	  
and	  “was	  angry	  with	  the	  United	  States	  for	  continuing	  to	  support	  Batista”	  (Castro,	  
as	   cited	   in	   Depalma,	   2006,	   p.	   86).	   The	   world	   knew	   Fidel	   Castro’s	   name	   from	  
February	   1957.	  While	   this	   was	   an	   exaggerated	   version	   of	   Castro,	   the	  myth	  was	  
more	  significant	   to	   the	  revolution	   than	  any	  realities	  on	   the	  ground	  as	  continuing	  
support	   was	   dependent	   on	   the	   viability	   of	   the	  M26	   as	   an	   opposition	   force.	   The	  
spectre	   of	   strength	   created	  more	   supporters	   in	   urban	   areas	   and	   procured	  more	  
foreign	  financial	  support.	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The	   Cuban	   Revolution	   gained	   momentum	   during	   1957.	   As	   the	  
revolutionaries’	  message	  of	  liberation	  began	  resonating	  with	  the	  poor,	  it	  expanded	  
to	  several	  thousand	  in	  late	  1957.	  However,	  this	  regional	  struggle	  could	  not	  succeed	  
in	  isolation.	  The	  M26	  were	  dependent	  upon	  support	  from	  urban	  revolutionaries,	  in	  
addition	   to	   foreign	  assistance.	  The	   rebels	   required	   resources	  and	  ammunition	   to	  
defeat	   Batista’s	   army.	   Guevara	   acknowledged	   the	   support	   of	   the	   urban	  
revolutionary	  “Ilano”	  group	  towards	  the	  rural	  guerrillas	  (Sweig,	  2002,	  p.	  4).	  One	  of	  
the	   leading	   theoreticians	   of	   the	   Ilano	   was	   Frank	   País,	   who	  was	   killed	   in	   August	  
1957	   by	   Batista’s	   troops	   (Benjamin,	   1990,	   p.	   147).	   País	   viewed	   the	   aim	   of	   the	  
revolution	  as	  
To	  remove,	  demolish	  and	  destroy	  the	  colonialist	  system	  that	  still	  reigns,	  to	  
do	   away	   with	   the	   bureaucracy,	   eliminate	   superfluous	   mechanisms,	  
extracting	   true	   values	   and…[to]	   introduce	   the	   values	   of	   modern	  
philosophical	  currents	  that	  currently	  prevail	  in	  the	  world	  (as	  cited	  in	  Sweig,	  
2002,	  p.	  12).	  
País	   and	   the	   Ilano	   had	   links	   within	   the	   PRC-­‐A	   and	   other	   moderate	   anti-­‐Batista	  
groups	  (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1992,	  p.	  38).	  They	  raised	  money	  inside	  Cuba	  to	  pay	  for	  
ammunition	   for	   the	   guerrillas.	   They	   also	   had	   foreign	   connections	   within	   Latin	  
America	   and	  within	   the	   US.	   Former	   President	   Prío	   committed	   US$50,000	   to	   the	  
revolution	   in	   1956	   (Tunzelman,	   2011,	   p.	   71).	   The	   former	   Costa	   Rican	   president	  
José	   Figueres	   personally	   raised	   US$70,000	   towards	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	  
(Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   147).	   Additional	   support	   was	   procured	   from	   Mexico,	  
Venezuela,	   Argentina	   and	   liberal	   organisations	   in	   the	   US	   (Goldenberg,	   1965,	   pp.	  
180-­‐199).	   Batista	   feared	   this	   expansion	   and	   launched	   Operation	   Verano	   in	   June	  
1958	  (Benjamin,	  1990,	  p.	  153).	  After	  two	  months,	  Castro’s	  forces	  prevailed	  (Pérez,	  
2011,	  p.	  234).	  By	  this	  time	  all	  progressives	  were	  allied	  under	  the	  July	  1958	  Pact	  of	  
Caracas	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   234).	   The	   PSP	   was	   not	   in	   this	   alliance	   until	   late	   1958.	  
Castro	  asserted	  his	  dominance	  over	  the	  revolutionary	  process	  in	  Cuba	  and	  would	  
control	  the	  peace.	  
By	  late	  1958,	  victory	  for	  the	  rebels	  was	  inevitable.	  Batista’s	  military	  claimed	  
that	   90	   per	   cent	   of	   Cubans	   supported	   Castro’s	   aims	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   236).	   By	  
October,	  the	  CIA	  (1959)	  and	  State	  Department	  acknowledged	  that	  Batista	  would	  be	  
overthrown.	  However,	  they	  feared	  a	  government	  led	  by	  Castro.	  They	  sought	  to	  co-­‐
opt	   the	   revolutionary	   process.	   State	   Department	   official	   William	   Pawley	   urged	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Batista	   “to	   capitulate	   to	   a	   caretaker	   government	   unfriendly	   to	   [Batista],	   but	  
satisfactory	  to	  [the	  US],	  whom	  [Washington]	  could	  immediately	  recognise	  and	  give	  
military	   assistance	   to	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   Fidel	   Castro	   does	   not	   come	   to	   power”	  
(Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  235).	  By	  instilling	  a	  conservative	  ‘democrat,’	  the	  US	  attempted	  to	  
avoid	  the	  force	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  government.	  While	  they	  acknowledged	  the	  need	  
for	   democracy,	   they	   hoped	   there	   would	   be	   no	   progressive	   reform	   in	   regard	   to	  
agriculture,	  economics	  or	  international	  relations	  (Benjamin,	  1990,	  p.	  152).	  Batista	  
refused	   to	   leave.	   The	   struggle	   continued.	   Conditions	   in	   Havana	   worsened.	   The	  
three	   revolutionary	   fronts	   of	   Fidel	   Castro,	   Raúl	   Castro	   and	   Ernesto	   Guevara	  
advanced	  quickly	  (Pérez-­‐Stable,	  2012,	  p.	  66).	  On	  January	  1	  1959	  Batista	  fled	  Cuba	  
via	   the	   Dominican	   Republic,	   taking	   US$424	  million	   from	   the	   national	   reserve	   to	  
impoverish	   the	   incoming	  government	   (Lamrani,	  2013,	  p.	  18).	  Guevara	  arrived	   in	  
Havana	  on	  January	  2,	  and	  Castro	  followed	  on	  January	  8	  (Pérez-­‐Stable,	  2012,	  p.	  67).	  
To	   avoid	   the	   condemnation	   of	   the	   US,	   Castro	   had	   appointed	   the	   “fiercely	   anti-­‐
communist”	  Manuel	  Urrutia	  as	  provisional	  President	  on	  January	  3	  (Lamrani,	  2013,	  
p.	   18).	   While	   Castro	   had	   defeated	   Batista,	   larger	   enemies	   would	   confront	   the	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  in	  its	  first	  months	  of	  power.	  
	  
The	  Radicalisation	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution 	  
American	   foreign	   policy	   towards	   Cuba	   has	   been	   characterised	   in	   several	  
ways.	   Schoultz	   (2009)	   defines	   America’s	   initial	   response	   to	   the	   revolution	   as	  
pragmatic	   and	   patient.	   He	   characterised	   this	   US	   response	   as	   “nudging”	   Castro	  
towards	   their	   interests.	  Morley	   (1987)	   argues	   that	   “United	   States	   policy	   toward	  
Cuba	   after	   1959”	   sought	   to	   “destabilise	   and	   overthrow	   the	   Castro	   government”	  
(p.72).	  In	  his	  economic	  analysis,	  Lamrani	  (2013)	  writes	  that	  US	  policy	  amounted	  to	  
“economic	  warfare”	  (p.	  1).	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  embargo	  was	  designed	  to	  destabilise	  
the	  domestic	  economy	  so	  as	  to	  undermine	  Castro’s	  revolutionary	  ambitions.	  While	  
interpretations	  of	  US	  policies	  vary,	  the	  consequences	  did	  not.	  Because	  of	  US	  action,	  
Cuba	   left	   the	   capitalist	   world	   and	   joined	   the	   Socialist	   camp	   between	   1960	   and	  
1963.	  The	  US	  journalist	  Walter	  Lipmann	  asserted	  that	  “the	  thing	  we	  should	  never	  
do	   in	  dealing	  with	   the	   revolutionary	  countries	   in	  which	   the	  world	  abounds,	   is	   to	  
push	  them	  behind	  an	  iron	  curtain	  raised	  by	  ourselves”	  (cited	  in,	  Schoultz,	  2009,	  p.	  
100).	  The	  Cuban	  Revolution	  was	  radicalised	  by	  American	  foreign	  policy	  as	  Castro	  
was	   forced	   to	   choose	   between	   forfeiting	   his	   revolution	   and	   entering	   the	   Soviet	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sphere.	   As	   his	   political	   power	   was	   dependent	   on	   fulfilling	   the	   aims	   of	   the	  
revolution,	   he	   was	   determined	   to	   avoid	   the	   mistakes	   of	   Árbenz.	   This	   required	  
adherence	   to	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   policy	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   This	   section	  
will	   explain	   how	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   Eisenhower	   and	   Kennedy	   administrations	  
pushed	  Castro	  away	  from	  US	  interests	  and	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  
The	   US	   was	   wary	   of	   Fidel	   Castro’s	   leadership	   of	   Cuba	   prior	   to	   the	   rebel	  
victory	  in	  January	  1959	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  235).	  While	  the	  US	  did	  not	  see	  Castro	  as	  a	  
communist,	   they	   were	   attentive	   to	   his	   anti-­‐US	   rhetoric	   and	   that	   of	   other,	   more	  
radical,	   members	   of	   the	   cadre.	   Despite	   the	   emerging	   conflict,	   key	   US	   officials	  
questioned	  Castro’s	   ‘communism.’	  Dulles	   informed	   the	  US	  Senate	   that	  he	  did	  not	  
believe	   Castro	   to	   be	   a	   communist	   (Schoultz,	   2009,	   p.	   84).	   Castro	   also	   sought	   to	  
normalise	  Cuban-­‐American	  relations.	  He	  appointed	  the	  Liberal	  democratic	  Urrutia	  
as	  the	  constitutional	  face	  of	  the	  revolution	  on	  January	  3,	  1959	  (Pérez-­‐Stable,	  2012	  
p.	   66).	   More	   significantly,	   he	   appointed	   Felipe	   Pazos	   and	   Regino	   Boti	   to	   the	  
treasury	  to	  create	  a	  moderate	  economic	  plan	  for	  Cuba	  (Pérez-­‐Stable,	  2012,	  p.	  68).	  
After	  recognising	  Urrutia’s	  Cuba,	  the	  US	  replaced	  the	  pro-­‐Batista	  ambassador,	  Earl	  
T.	   Smith,	  with	   the	   liberal	   Philip	   Bonsal	   (Morley,	   1987,	   p.	   74).	  While	   Bonsal	  was	  
outwardly	   intellectual,	   multicultural	   and	   progressive,	   he	   was	   also	   a	   fiscal	  
conservative.	  While	  in	  Bolivia	  “he	  had	  proved	  an	  effective	  instrument	  of	  [US]	  policy	  
to	  slow	  down	  the	  revolution”	  (Morley,	  1987,	  p.	  74).	  In	  May	  the	  Cubans	  began	  their	  
urban	   reform	   laws	   designed	   to	   lower	   rents,	   utility	   prices	   and	   basic	   consumer	  
goods	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   242).	   While	   these	   actions	   left	   US	   investment	   largely	  
unhindered,	  Castro’s	   anti-­‐US	  proclamations	  and	  his	   strategy	  of	   a	   “third	  position”	  
concerned	  Washington	  (Schoultz,	  2009,	  p.	  91).	  Similar	  to	  the	  Argentine	  Perónists	  
of	  the	  1940s,	  Castro	  sought	  to	  remove	  his	  government’s	  actions	  from	  the	  context	  of	  
the	   global	   Cold	   War	   by	   claiming	   neutrality	   between	   American	   capitalism	   and	  
Soviet	  communists.	  He	  extended	  this	  neutrality	  by	  promising	  an	   impartial	  stance	  
towards	   both	   at	   the	   UN,	   when	   addressing	   the	   General	   Assembly	   in	   1960	  
(Beschloss,	  1991,	  p.	  98).	  It	  was	  these	  actions,	  rather	  than	  the	  early	  economic	  ones,	  
that	   alerted	   US	   officials	   of	   the	   threat	   emerging	   in	   Cuba.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   NSC	  
began	  discussing	  how	  to	  remove	  the	  rebels	  from	  power	  as	  early	  as	  March	  1959.	  If	  
Castro	   could	   not	   be	   “nudged”	   towards	   US	   interests,	   they	   needed	   a	   pretext	   to	  
dislodge	  him	  (Schoultz,	  2009,	  p.	  89).	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Castro	   controlled	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution.	   His	   utilisation	   of	   liberals	   was	  
designed	   to	   procure	   a	   sympathetic	   American	   response.	   However,	   the	   revolution	  
was	  based	  on	  his	  populist	  measures	  granted	  to	  the	  people.	  The	  centrepiece	  of	  the	  
economic	  program	  was	   agrarian	   reform.	  The	  Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  of	  May	  1959	  
applied	   to	  all	   rural	  properties	   exceeding	  1,000	  acres,	   except	   for	   those	  producing	  
exportable	   crops,	  which	  were	  permitted	   to	  be	  3,333	  acres	   (Pérez,	   2011,	  p.	   243).	  
Expropriated	  land	  was	  compensated	  through	  government	  bonds	  payable	  after	  25	  
years	  at	  the	  taxable	  value	  as	  of	  October	  1958	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  243).	  The	  first	  round	  
of	   expropriations	   targeted	   Cuban	   landowners.	   However,	   by	   July	   Americans	   also	  
faced	  expropriations.	  The	   largest	  property	  owner	   in	  Cuba	  was	   the	  Kleberg	  cattle	  
ranch	   (Morley,	   1987,	   p.	   83).	   Richard	   Kleberg	   reacted	   strongly	   to	   this	   action.	   He	  
lobbied	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  even	  had	  a	  private	  appointment	  with	  President	  
Eisenhower,	   claiming,	   “Cuba	   is	   being	  dominated	   and	   run	  by	   the	   agents	   of	   Soviet	  
communism”	  (Schoultz,	  2009,	  p.	  707).	  The	  sugar	  industry	  made	  similar	  appeals	  to	  
the	   US	   government.	   In	   a	   meeting	   with	   the	   sugar	   baron	   Thomas	   Mass	   and	  	  
Lawrence	   Crosby	   of	   the	   Cuban-­‐American	   Sugar	   Council,	   it	   was	   indicated	   that	  
Castro’s	  actions	  threatened	  to	  destroy	  the	  industry	  (Schoultz,	  2009,	  p.	  96).	  Castro	  
was	   caught	   in	   a	   difficult	   position.	   It	   was	   evident	   that	   the	   US	   was	   opposed	   to	  
moderate	  economic	  reform	  in	  Cuba,	  as	  it	  directly	  impacted	  its	  private	  investments.	  
Yet,	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  hinged	  on	  the	  high	  expectations	  of	  the	  people.	  If	  he	  lost	  
popular	   support,	   he	  would	   lose	   control	   of	   the	   revolution.	   Fidel	   asserted	   that	   his	  
agrarian	  reform	  was	  based	  on	  the	  US-­‐led	  program	  in	  post-­‐war	  Japan	  (Jones,	  2008,	  
p.	   82).	  Nevertheless,	   the	  modest	   reforms	   proposed	   by	   the	  Agrarian	  Reform	  Law	  
were	  enough	  to	  convince	  the	  US	  that	  Castro	  was	  opposed	  to	  US	  interests.	  
The	  interests	  of	  Cuba	  and	  the	  US	  continued	  to	  diverge	  in	  the	  year	  following	  
October	  1959.	  The	  US	  still	  hoped	  that	  conservative	  democrats	  would	  remain	  at	  the	  
top	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  leadership.	  However,	  from	  October	  the	  M26	  took	  control	  
of	   the	   Cuban	   government:	   on	   October	   17,	   Raúl	   Castro	   became	   Minister	   of	   the	  
Revolutionary	   Armed	   Forces;	   Fidel	   Castro	   declared	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   popular	  
militia	   to	   defend	   the	   revolution;	   and	   on	   November	   25,	   Guevara	   was	   appointed	  
head	   of	   the	   National	   Bank	   (Franklin,	   1992,	   p.	   28).	   To	   prevent	   US	   confiscation,	  
Guevara	   hurriedly	   transferred	   Cuba’s	   foreign	   exchange	   to	   Canadian	   and	   Swiss	  
banks.	  Castro	  began	  ruling	  by	  decree	  as	  the	  Cuban	  Premier,	  superseding	  the	  power	  
of	   the	   weak	   Presidency	   of	   Osvaldo	   Torrado	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   251).	   These	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governmental	   changes	   solidified	   the	   US	   view	   of	   Cuba	   as	   anti-­‐American	   and	  
potentially	   communist.	  According	   to	  Morley	   (1987),	   “sometime	  during	   the	   fall	  of	  
1959,	   officials	   of	   the	   State	   Department	   and	   the	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency	  
initiated	  discussion	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  President’s	  approval	  in	  March	  1960	  of	  a	  
covert	  action	  and	  economic	  sabotage	  memorandum”	  (p.	  85).	  The	  political	  tension	  
grew	  as	  Eisenhower’s	  government	  ceased	  its	  attempts	  to	  work	  collaboratively	  with	  
the	   Cuban	   regime,	   which	   in	   turn,	   led	   to	   further	   conflict.	   In	   January	   1960,	  
Eisenhower	   began	   the	   process	   of	   reducing,	   and	   eventually	   eliminating,	   Cuba’s	  
sugar	  quota.	  This	  led	  Castro	  to	  initiate	  trade	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (Franklin,	  1992,	  
p.	  31).105	  In	  June,	  US	  oil	  properties	  were	  expropriated	  for	  their	  refusal	  to	  process	  
Soviet	   crude	   oil	   (Morley,	   1987,	   p.	   87).	   Eisenhower	   responded	   by	   cancelling	   the	  
Cuban	  sugar	  quota,	  driving	  Castro	  into	  further	  dependence	  upon	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  
America’s	   regional	   stance	   at	   the	   OAS	   meeting	   in	   San	   José,	   Costa	   Rica,	   further	  
indicated	   its	   hostility	   towards	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   (Alexander,	   1964,	   p.	   146).	  
Castro	  (1959)	  vociferously	  responded	  through	  his	  famed	  Declaration	  of	  Havana	  on	  
September	  2,	  1959.	  This	  anti-­‐American	  tirade	  was	  directed	  at	  the	  “free	  people”	  of	  
the	  Americas,	   in	  response	  to	  the	  North	  American	  Declaration	  of	  San	  José	  (Castro,	  
1959).	  Castro	  moved	  further	  to	  the	  left	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  1960.	  In	  October	  1960,	  
the	  Cuban	  government	  completed	  the	  expropriation	  of	  all	  US	  property,	  ending	  all	  
hopes	  of	  rapprochement	  (García-­‐Luis,	  2007,	  pp.	  39-­‐44).	  
The	   plan	   to	   remove	   Castro	   was	   multifaceted	   under	   the	   Eisenhower	  
administration.	   It	   sought	   to	   demoralise	   the	   Cuban	   people	   through	   propaganda,	  
economic	  sabotage,	  and	  ultimately	  the	  assassination	  of	  the	  leading	  cadre	  (Morley,	  
1987,	  p.	  85).	  During	  1960,	  Cuba	  was	  bombarded	  with	  aerial	  assaults	  and	  domestic	  
acts	  of	  terrorism.	  It	  also	  faced	  propaganda	  efforts	  through	  radio	  and	  leaflet	  drops	  
(Jones,	   2008,	   p.	   43).	  However,	   Eisenhower’s	   initial	   strategy	  did	  not	   generate	   the	  
required	  results	   leading	   to	  his	  approval	  of	  a	  plan	   to	  aggressively	   invade	  Cuba	  on	  
November	   9,	   1960	   (Jones,	   2008,	   p.	   34).	   His	   administration	   approved	   the	   Bay	   of	  
Pigs	  as	  the	  landing	  site	  and	  broke	  off	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Cuba.	  This	  plan	  to	  
‘liberate’	   Cuba	   through	   the	   use	   of	   exiles	   was	   passed	   from	   Eisenhower	   to	   the	  
incumbent	   Kennedy	   administration.	   Kennedy	  was	   elected	   on	   a	   platform	   of	   anti-­‐
communism.	   According	   to	   Robert	  McNamara,	   “Kennedy	   insisted	   that	   the	   United	  
States	  cannot	  allow	  the	  Castro	  government	   to	  exist	   in	  Cuba”	  (Jones,	  2008,	  p.	  31).	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Kennedy	   approved	   the	   CIA	   plan	   to	   invade	   Cuba	  with	   1500	   Cuban	   exiles	   (Jones,	  
2008,	  p.	  42).	  The	  troops	  were	  trained	  in	  Guatemala	  during	  1960.	  Nicaragua	  was	  an	  
ally	  in	  the	  invasion,	  providing	  airstrips	  for	  aerial	  bombing.	  The	  US	  also	  planned	  to	  
provide	  aerial	  support	  by	  dropping	  500-­‐pound	  demolition	  bombs	  and	  750-­‐pound	  
napalm	   bombs	   on	   strategic	   targets	   (Jones,	   2008,	   p.	   35).	   However,	   little	   went	   to	  
plan.	   In	  the	  months	   leading	  up	  to	  the	  April	   invasion,	  Guatemalans	  discovered	  the	  
poorly	  disguised	  training	  facility.	  Latin	  American	  expert	  Tad	  Szulc	  reported	  this	  in	  
the	  New	  York	  Times	   (Jones,	   2008,	   p.	   65).106	  The	   Soviets	   also	   discovered	   the	   plan	  
and	  warned	  Castro	  (Fursenko	  and	  Naftali,	  2006,	  p.	  343).	  By	  this	  time,	  Castro	  was	  
well	   armed	   with	   Soviet	   ammunition	   (Beschloss,	   1991,	   pp.	   112-­‐119).	   The	   initial	  
plan	   to	   ‘liberate’	   Cuba	   covertly	   had	   been	   bungled	   even	   before	   the	   April	   17	  
invasion.	   Kennedy	   was	   caught	   between	   calling	   off	   the	   invasion	   and	   the	   JCS’s	  
suggestion	  of	  full-­‐scale	  US	  involvement.	  Ultimately,	  he	  chose	  the	  middle-­‐ground	  by	  
approving	  the	  attack	  with	  only	  minimal	  visible	  US	  support,	  which	  left	  the	  invading	  
force	  too	  weak	  to	  pose	  a	  credible	  challenge	  to	  Castro’s	  Cuba.	  The	  US	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  
invading	   Cuba	   and	   faced	   protests	   at	   its	   embassies	   in	   Moscow,	   Warsaw,	   Cairo,	  
Tokyo,	  New	  Delhi,	  Mexico	  City	  and	  Brasília	  (Beschloss,	  1991,	  p.	  118).	  Yet	  its	  efforts	  
failed	  to	  have	  any	  impact	  on	  Castro’s	  control	  over	  Cuba.	  
American	   foreign	  policy	  radicalised	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution.	  During	  the	   first	  
four	   years	   of	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   the	   United	   States	   had	   isolated	   Cuba	   from	  
international	   diplomacy,	   removed	   its	   traditional	   avenues	   of	   trade,	   sabotaged	   its	  
attempts	  to	  initiate	  moderate	  reform	  and	  pushed	  Cuba	  closer	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  
While	  these	  actions	  were	  designed	  to	  remove	  the	  Cuban	  leadership,	  they	  actually	  
pushed	   the	   Cuban	   people	   further	   to	   the	   left	   as	   Castro’s	   accusations	   of	   anti-­‐
Americanism	  were	  continually	  confirmed	  by	  US	  actions.	  The	  Cuban	  Revolution	  was	  
not	   fought	   for	   communism.	   However,	   by	   1961	   the	   Cubans	   were	   completely	  
dependent	   upon	   the	   USSR	   for	   trade	   and	   defence.107 	  This	   led	   the	   Castros	   to	  
prioritise	   “national	   sovereignty	   against	   the	   United	   States	   and	   pursuing	   social	  
justice	  for	  the	  classes	  populare”	  over	  “democracy,	  civil	  liberties	  and	  free	  elections”	  
(Pérez-­‐Stable,	   2012,	   p.	   82).	   This	   allowed	   Castro	   to	   come	   under	   the	   security	  
umbrella	   of	   the	   USSR.	   On	   December	   1,	   1961,	   he	   confirmed	   his	   ideological	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commitment	   to	   ‘communism’.	   Castro	   stated	   that,	   “I	   am	   a	   Marxist-­‐Leninist	   and	   I	  
shall	  be	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  to	  the	  end	  of	  my	  life”	  (Castro,	  as	  cited	  in	  Aguilar,	  1988,	  
p.	   147).	   Within	   this	   speech	   Castro	   made	   a	   candid	   recognition	   that	   Cuba	   was	  
“making	  a	  Socialist	  revolution	  without	  Socialists”	  (Castro,	  as	  cited	  in	  Aguilar,	  1988,	  
p.	  144).	  Following	  this,	  Cuba	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  capitalist	  Western	  Hemisphere	  
(Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  46).	  Despite	  Castro’s	  declarations	  of	  communism,	  it	  was	  a	  deviation	  
of	   the	   PSP	   interpretation	   (Pérez-­‐Stable,	   2012,	   p.	   82).	   The	   revolutionary	  
government	   centralised	  power	  within	   the	  M26,	   as	   it	   received	   the	   support	   of	   the	  
people.	  Moreover,	  Castro	  appealed	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  through	  his	  declarations	  of	  
communism.	  He	  did	  so	  because	   the	  US	  was	  attempting	   to	  undermine	  his	   regime.	  
Nevertheless,	  his	   form	  of	  socialism	  was	  unique	  from	  Soviet	  communism.	  It	  was	  a	  
radical	   approach	   to	   the	   nationalist	   desires	   of	   the	   hemisphere.	   “Nationalism,	  
Socialism,	  and	  Anti-­‐Imperialism”	  were	  achieved	   through	   the	  armed	  struggle,	   and	  
the	  creation	  of	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  USSR	  (Grau,	  as	  cited	  in	  Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  44).	  
The	   revolutionary	   government	  went	   to	   these	   lengths	   because	   the	   US	  would	   not	  
allow	  the	  social	  democratic	  goal	  to	  be	  manifested	  in	  the	  hemisphere.	  
	  
Castro	  and	  the	  Soviets	  
Cuba	  left	  the	  capitalist	  world,	  entering	  the	  Soviet	  sphere	  between	  1960	  and	  
1963.	   The	   Cuban	   government	   embraced	   the	   Soviet	   system	   in	   order	   to	   receive	  
economic	  and	  military	  assistance	  from	  the	  USSR,	  defending	  it	   from	  aggressive	  US	  
actions.	  Tunzelman’s	  critique	  of	  Cold	  War	  historiography	  states	  that	  “the	  story	  of	  
the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  as	  it	  is	  usually	  told,	  is	  not	  a	  story	  about	  Cuba.	  The	  real	  object	  
at	  stake…	  was	  Berlin.	  All	  the	  important	  events	  are	  presumed	  to	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  
Washington	   or	   Moscow.	   What	   went	   on	   in	   Moscow	   is	   widely	   considered	   to	   be	  
irrelevant”	  (p.	  4).	  In	  fact,	  Castro’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  USSR	  was	  pragmatic.	  It	  was	  
caused	  by	  US	  aggression.	  According	  to	  Shearman	  (1987),	  “it	  was	  not	  a	  question	  of	  
[Castro]	  suddenly	  becoming	  sympathetic	  to	  Marxism-­‐Leninism,	  but	  one	  of	  national	  
pride	  and	  survival	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  increasing	  threat	  from	  the	  United	  States”(p.	  10).	  
Beschloss	   (1991)	   suggests	   “[Nikita]	   Khrushchev	   had	   gained	   an	   ally	   not	   by	  
subversion	  by	  mainly	  by	  sheer	   luck”	   (p.	  129).	  This	  undermines	   the	  US’	  assertion	  
that	   Castro’s	   Revolution	  was	   fought	   for	   communism,	   and	   that	   Soviet	   subversion	  
posed	   a	   significant	   threat	   to	   Latin	   American	   sovereignty.	   Regardless	   of	   the	  
ideological	   connection	   between	   Castro	   and	   Khrushchev,	   the	   two	   states	   became	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interconnected	  militarily	  and	  economically	  between	  1960	  and	  1963.	  This	  section	  
will	  explain	  how	  and	  why	  that	  occurred.	  
The	  battlelines	  between	  Castro	  and	  the	  US	  were	  clearly	  drawn	  by	  1960.	  To	  
combat	   Cuba’s	   dependence	   on	   sugar	   exports	   to	   the	   US.,	   Castro	   turned	   to	   the	  
Eastern	   Bloc	   in	   February	   1960.	   He	   invited	   a	   Soviet	   trade	   mission	   led	   by	   Prime	  
Minister	  Anastas	  Mikoyan	   (Pérez,	   2011,	   p.	   247).	   The	   Soviets	   agreed	   to	   purchase	  
five	  million	  tons	  of	  sugar	  over	  five	  years	  and	  to	  provide	  Cuba	  with	  US$100	  million	  
credit	   to	   combat	   its	   foreign	   exchange	   crisis	   (Morley,	   1987,	   p.	   87).	   The	   Soviets	  
planned	   to	   hand	   over	  manufactured	   goods	   and	  minimal	   US	   currency	   to	   Cuba	   in	  
exchange	   for	   sugar	   (Morley,	   1987,	   p.	   87).	   Castro	   also	   signed	   trading	   agreements	  
with	  Eastern	  European	   states	   and	  with	   communist	   China.	   This	   infuriated	   the	  US	  
and	   led	   to	   further	   economic	   embargos	   and	   the	   eventual	   reduction	   of	   the	   Cuban	  
sugar	  quota	  to	  zero	  (Pérez,	  2011,	  p.	  247).	  The	  Soviets	  also	  began	  sending	  crude	  oil	  
to	   Cuba.	   This	   both	   ensured	   Cuba’s	   energy	   supplies	   and	   further	   alienated	   Castro	  
from	   the	   oil	   companies.	   By	   the	   time	   of	   the	   1960	   expropriations,	   Castro	   was	  
completely	  dependent	  on	   the	  Soviets	   for	   trade.	  The	  US,	  which	  had	  accounted	   for	  
the	  majority	  of	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  Cuba’s	  trade,	  launched	  an	  embargo	  on	  it	  (Lamari,	  
2013,	  pp.	  23-­‐28).	  While	  other	  hemispheric	  states,	   including	  Canada,	  continued	  to	  
trade	  with	  Cuba	  until	  the	  crisis	  of	  October	  1962,	  most	  of	  the	  industrial	  equipment	  
required	  by	   the	  Cubans	  was	  produced	   in	   the	  US	   (Lamari,	   2013,	   p.	   25).	   By	  1963,	  
Cuba	  was	  cut	  off	   from	   the	  capitalist	  world.	   In	   the	   space	  of	   four	  years,	   the	  Cuban	  
economy	  went	   from	  being	  a	  dependent	  appendage	  of	   the	  American-­‐led	  capitalist	  
economy,	   to	   being	   a	   dependent	   appendage	   of	   the	   Soviet-­‐led	   socialist	   economy.	  
Castro’s	   professed	   desire	   for	   ‘nationalism’	   and	   an	   independent	   line	   between	  
capitalism	   and	   communism	   was	   impossible	   given	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   two	  
superpowers.	  While	  Cuba	  was	  economically	  advantaged	  through	   its	  alliance	  with	  
the	  Soviets,	  it	  was	  highly	  dependent	  on	  an	  alien	  ideology	  and	  interests	  beyond	  that	  
of	  Cuba.	  
Following	  the	  1961	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  fiasco,	  Khrushchev	  committed	  to	  defending	  
the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   from	   American	   aggression.	   However,	   Khrushchev	   always	  
viewed	   the	   Cuban	   situation	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   global	   Cold	   War	  
(Fursenko	  and	  Naftali,	  2006,	  pp.	  209-­‐302,	  344-­‐348).	  Support	  for	  Cuba	  also	  helped	  
with	   domestic	   policies	   as	   the	   euphoria	   over	   Castro’s	   victory	  within	   the	   socialist	  
world	  eased	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  Kremlin	  to	  directly	  confront	  the	  US.	  Khrushchev	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took	  the	  opportunity	  to	  defend	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution.	  It	  was	  a	  calculated	  risk	  that	  
brought	   the	   world	   to	   the	   precipice	   of	   destruction.	   After	   Cuba	   declared	   its	  
communist	   credentials	   in	   April	   and	   December	   1961	   the	   USSR	   channelled	   its	  
resources	   into	   Cuba	   (Beschloss,	   1991,	   pp.	   122-­‐125).	   The	   Soviets	   began	   offering	  
large	   amounts	   of	   ammunition,	   including	   MIG	   jets,	   tanks	   and	   transport	   vehicles	  
(Jones,	  2008,	  p.	  75).	  In	  September	  1962,	  Castro	  and	  Khrushchev	  signed	  the	  Cuban-­‐
Soviet	  Military	  Agreement,	   assuring	   the	  mutual	   defence	  of	   the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  
(Franklin,	  1992,	  p.	  55).	  To	  this	  end,	  42,000	  Soviet	  troops	  were	  stationed	  in	  Cuba	  by	  
October	   1962	   (Beschloss,	   1991,	   p.	   116).	   The	   Soviets	   also	   began	   constructing	  
nuclear	  missile	  sites	  in	  Cuba	  to	  deter	  the	  predicted	  US	  invasion.	  This	  inspired	  more	  
direct	  military	  responses	  from	  Washington.	  In	  August	  1962,	  the	  CIA	  conceded	  that	  
the	   removal	   of	   Castro	   would	   necessitate	   a	   full-­‐scale	   invasion	   and	   a	   long-­‐term	  
occupation	   (Stern,	   2003,	   p.	   23).	   At	   this	   stage,	   the	   US	  was	  willing	   to	   go	   to	   these	  
lengths	  to	  remove	  Castro.	  However,	  American	  U2	  reconnaissance	  planes	  identified	  
the	  missile	  sites	  in	  Cuba	  on	  October	  26,	  1962	  (Franklin,1992,	  p.	  58).	  Cuba	  played	  
no	   role	   in	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   Cuban	  Missile	   Crisis.	   Khrushchev	   negotiated	   the	  
removal	   of	   the	  missiles	  with	   Kennedy.	   Kennedy	   assured	   the	   Soviets	   that	   the	   US	  
would	   not	   invade	   Cuba,	   in	   addition	   to	   other	   Cold	   War	   concessions	   in	   Europe	  
(Stern,	  2003,	  p.	  23).	  Castro	  was	  furious	  that	  the	  missiles	  were	  removed	  without	  his	  
consultation.	   Cuba	   remained	   economically	   dependent	   upon	   the	   Soviets	   and	   the	  
Missile	  Crisis	  demonstrated	  the	  divergent	  interests	  of	  the	  Cubans	  and	  Soviets.	  	  
	  
Diverging	  from	  Social	  Democracy	  
The	  Cuban	  Revolution	  was	  widely	   supported	   in	  Latin	  America.	  Many	  pro-­‐
democratic	   individuals	   and	   governments	   contributed	   finances	   to	   the	   revolution.	  
They	   had	   also	   provided	   refuge	   for	   Cuban	   exiles	   in	   Mexico	   and	   Venezuela.	   The	  
revolutionary	  Pact	  of	  Caracas	  was	  possible	  due	   to	  active	  Venezuelan	   support	   for	  
Cuba’s	   revolution.	   This	   enthusiasm	   for	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   led	   to	   public	  
celebrations	   in	   Brazil,	   Mexico,	   Argentina	   and	   Chile	   (Goldenberg,	   1965,	   p.	   311).	  
Celebrations	  went	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   political	   sphere	   as	   Castro’s	  movement	  
represented	   the	   desires	   of	   large	   populations.	   These	   celebrations	   were	   not	   pro-­‐
communist	  as	  most	  Latin	  Americans	  viewed	  the	  revolution	  as	  an	  “autochthonous	  
product	  of	  the	  continent	  [that	  had	  been]	  aroused	  in	  [the	  Cuban]	  people”	  and	  held	  
the	  potential	  to	  “spread	  to	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries”	  (Goldenberg,	  1965,	  p.	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311).	  This	  revolutionary	  potential	  motivated	  the	  euphoria	  surrounding	  the	  Cuban	  
Revolution.	  Castro’s	   radical	  political	   and	  economic	  policies	   fulfilled	   the	  historical	  
desires	   of	   this	   impoverished	   global	   region.	   The	   tenets	   of	   Castroism	   were	  
integrated	  into	  other	  standing	  populist	  political	  movements.	  Upon	  visiting	  Havana	  
in	   1959,	   Lázaro	   Cárdenas	   criticised	   his	   successors	   in	   Mexico,	   asking	   “did	   they	  
believe	   in	   revolutions	   or	   didn’t	   they?”	   (Goldenberg,	   1965,	   p.	   311).	   The	  Mexican	  
President	   López	   Mateos	   responded	   by	   expropriating	   and	   redistributing	   16.8	  
million	   acres	   of	   agricultural	   land,	   the	   largest	   amount	   since	  Cárdenas’	   presidency	  
(Goldenberg,	   1965,	   p.	   313).	   The	   Brazilian	   President	   Jânio	   da	   Silva	   Quadros	  
bestowed	  the	  highest	  military	  award	  upon	  Guevara	  (Goldenberg,	  1965,	  p.	  314).	  His	  
successor	   João	  Goulart	  was	   also	   criticised	  by	   the	  US	   for	   his	   pro-­‐Castro	   domestic	  
and	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  regional	  popularity	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  posed	  a	  critical	  
threat	  to	  all	  other	  revolutionaries	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
The	   ideological	   divergence	   between	   social	   democracy	   and	   Castroism	  
occurred	   soon	   after	   the	   revolution.	   Guevara	   had	   personally	   thanked	   both	  
Betancourt	   and	   Figueres	   for	   their	   financial	   commitment	   to	   the	   revolution	   in	  
January	   1959.	   Guevara	   also	   invited	   Figueres	   to	   tour	   Cuba.	   On	   March	   22,	   1959,	  
Figueres	   addressed	   the	   ‘worker’s	   palace’	   alongside	   Castro	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	  
154).	  Figueres	  congratulated	  the	  revolutionaries,	  but	  urged	  them	  to	  adhere	  to	  two	  
central	  tenets.	  Firstly,	  Figueres	  promoted	  democracy,	  which	  was	  “the	  only	  source	  
of	   permanent	   sovereignty	   for	   the	   people”	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   154).	   Secondly,	  
Figueres	  endorsed	  support	  for	  the	  West	  in	  the	  global	  Cold	  War	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  
p.	   154).	   As	   he	   spoke,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   Cuban	   trade	   unions,	   David	   Salvador	  
interjected	  with,	  “we	  cannot	  be	  with	  the	  Americans	  who	  today	  are	  oppressing	  us”	  
(Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  154).	  This	  issue	  divided	  the	  movement.	  The	  social	  democrats	  
idealistically	   identified	  with	   the	  US	  global	  mission,	  while	   the	  Cubans	   focussed	  on	  
direct	   US	   actions.	   Castro	   addressed	   the	   crowd	   with	   a	   rebuffal	   of	   Figueres’	  
suggestions.	  He	  spoke	  directly	  of	  the	  need	  to	  oppose	  US	  influence	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
He	  then	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  Costa	  Rica.	  Castro	  suggested	  that	  no	  revolution	  had	  
taken	  place	   in	   Costa	  Rica.	  Democracy,	   he	   asserted,	   had	   not	   liberated	   the	   people.	  
Castro	  personally	  attacked	  Figueres,	  calling	  him	  “a	  bad	  friend,	  a	  bad	  democrat	  and	  
a	  bad	  revolutionary”	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  156).	  In	  March	  1959	  “the	  break	  between	  
the	   democratic	   left	   and	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   occurred	   on	   a	   public	   stage”	  
(Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  155).	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The	  social	  democratic	   leaders	  of	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  Venezuela	  became	  hostile	  
to	  Castro	  during	  1959.	  They	  sought	  to	  undermine	  Cuba’s	  regional	  influence.	  They	  
feared	   that	   the	   liberation	   of	   the	  Dominican	  Republic	   and	  Nicaragua	   by	   Castroist	  
forces	   would	   give	   Castro	   de-­‐facto	   leadership	   over	   the	   Latin	   American	   anti-­‐
dictatorial	   movement	   (Alexander,	   1964,	   p.	   146).	   In	   the	   face	   of	   these	   problems,	  
Figueres	   embarked	   on	   a	   US	   lecture	   tour	   in	   April	   1959	   where	   he	   met	   with	  
significant	  diplomats	  such	  as	  Adlai	  Stevenson,	  Richard	  Nixon,	  Milton	  Eisenhower,	  
Nelson	  Rockefeller	  and	  Roy	  Rubottom	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  158).	   In	  meetings	  he	  
suggested	   that	   “the	   resistance	   to	   my	   suggestions	   for	   understanding	   with	   the	  
United	   States	   seems	   in	   a	   large	   part	   from	   communist	   infiltration,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   a	  
logical	   reaction	   to	   the	   sufferings	   endured	   under	   the	   dictatorship”	   (Ameringer,	  
1978,	   p.	   156).	   Figueres	   was	   well-­‐received	   by	   both	   major	   parties.	   He	   wrote	   to	  
Betancourt,	  “a	  prophesy	  of	  yours	  is	  going	  to	  be	  fulfilled,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  have	  
to	  reach	  an	  understanding	  with	  us,	  the	  Latin	  American	  liberals,	   instead	  of	  blindly	  
persecuting	  us”	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  158).	  While	  in	  the	  US	  he	  also	  addressed	  the	  
Institute	   for	   International	  Labour	  Research	   (IILR),	   speaking	  at	   length	  with	  Sacha	  
Volman	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  164).	  Figueres	  would	  later	  discover	  that	  Volman	  was	  
a	   CIA	   agent.	   IILR	   gave	  US$100,000	   to	   Figueres	   to	   start	   the	   Institute	   for	   Political	  
Education	   in	   November	   1959.	   The	   CIA	   began	   funding	   the	   expansion	   of	   social	  
democratic	   principles	   to	   combat	   the	   appeal	   of	   Castroism.	   Figueres	  was	   largely	   a	  
pawn	   in	   this	   process.	   The	   Institute	   sought	   to	   mould	   future	   leaders	   and	   to	  
“determine	   their	   ideology	   in	   light	   of	   their	   principles,	   lessons,	   experiences	   and	  
achievements	   of	   democracy	   in	   service	   of	   the	   people”	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   162).	  
Figueres	  also	  worked	  with	   the	  CIA	  agent	  Cord	  Meyer	   in	   July	  1960	   to	  established	  
the	   Inter-­‐American	   Democratic	   Social	   Movement	   (IADSM)	   as	   an	   “effort	   to	   help	  
integrate	  the	  popular	  political	  parties,	  and	  the	  labour	  and	  student	  groups	  that	  are	  
fighting	  the	  democratic	  battle	  in	  Latin	  America”	  (Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  169).	  	  
The	  rift	  between	  social	  democracy	  and	  Castroism	  deepened	  in	  1960	  when	  
Guevara	   addressed	   a	   group	   of	   Venezuelan	   students,	   suggesting	   that	   they	   should	  
organise	   a	   Sierra	   Maestra-­‐type	   revolution	   against	   the	   Betancourt	   government	  
(Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   146).	   Alexander	   (1964)	   referred	   to	   this	   as	   “the	   final	   ideological	  
break	  between	   the	  Venezuelan	  Democratic	   revolution	  and	   the	  Castro	  revolution”	  
(p.	   146).	   Betancourt	   was	   shocked	   and	   denounced	   the	   “Fidelista	   interference	   in	  
Venezuelan	  politics”	  (Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  146).	  He	  further	  suggested	  the	  establishment	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of	  an	  Andean	  Sierra	  Maestra	  against	  several	  South	  American	  governments.	  These	  
proclamations	   were	   influential	   in	   the	   South	   American	   decision	   to	   remove	   Cuba	  
from	   the	   inter-­‐American	   community.	   Support	   for	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   reduced	  
gradually.	  The	  open	  rift	  with	  the	  social	  democrats	  gave	  the	  US	  majority	  support	  in	  
its	   dealings	   with	   Cuba.	   However	   Mexico,	   Argentina,	   Brazil,	   Chile,	   Bolivia	   and	  
Ecuador	   protected	   the	   Cubans	   from	   US-­‐led	   resolutions	   in	   the	   OAS	   (Goldenberg,	  
1965,	   p.	   321).	   Fearing	   domestic	   reprisals,	   even	   conservative	   regimes,	   such	   as	  
Chile’s,	   refused	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   influential	   in	   the	   overthrow	   of	   Cuba,	   (Goldenberg,	  
1965,	  pp.	  238-­‐245).	  Support	  for	  Cuba	  increased	  following	  the	  Bay	  of	  Pigs	  incident	  
but	  fell	   following	  Castro’s	  December	  adherence	  to	  Marxism-­‐Leninism.	  On	  January	  
21,	  1962,	  Cuba	  was	  voted	  out	  of	   the	  OAS	  with	   the	   six	   states	   choosing	   to	   abstain	  
rather	  than	  to	  continue	  defending	  Cuba	  and	  risking	  their	  places	  in	  the	  Alliance	  for	  
Progress	   (Stern,	   2003,	   p.	   17).	   Cuba’s	   aggressive	   actions	   in	   South	   America	  
accelerated	   the	  American	   program	   to	   eliminate	   the	   Cubans	   from	   inter-­‐American	  
discourse.	  They	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  their	  previous	  allies,	  seeing	  their	  vision	  
of	  revolution	  as	  the	  only	  acceptable	  course	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  	  
	  
The	  New	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America	  
Castroism	  posed	  a	  unique	   challenge	   to	  US	   foreign	  policy	   in	  Latin	  America	  
between	   1959	   and	   1963.	   The	   Cuban	   government	   under	   Castro	   was	   the	   first	  
regional	   state	   to	  utilise	   the	  global	  Cold	  War	   to	   further	   its	  political	   and	  economic	  
interests.	   However,	   Castro’s	   embrace	   of	   ‘communism’	   was	   reluctant	   and	  
pragmatic.	   He	  was	   not	   aligned	   to	   the	   Cuban	   communists	   and	   continually	   stifled	  
their	  attempts	  to	  participate	  in	  his	  revolution	  (Pérez-­‐Stable,	  2012,	  pp.	  76-­‐88).	  The	  
threat	   posed	   by	   Castroism	   was	   temporary	   and	   isolated.	   By	   1963	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	  had	  been	  contained.	  The	  remainder	  of	   this	  thesis	  will	  explain	  the	  two	  
US	  policy	  responses	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution:	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  programs	  of	  
the	   Alliance	   for	   Progress;	   and	   the	   military	   response	   of	   counter-­‐insurgency,	  
increased	  military	  assistance	  and	  support	  of	  authoritarian	  regimes	  in	  the	  Western	  
Hemisphere.	   While	   these	   responses	   had	   significant	   consequences	   for	   individual	  
Latin	   American	   states,	   the	   threat	   that	   provoked	   them	   was	   exaggerated.	   When	  
Castro	   sided	   with	   the	   Soviets,	   Latin	   American	   social	   democratic	   and	   populist	  
movements	   distanced	   themselves	   from	   the	   Cubans.	   Latin	   Americans	   are	  
historically	   opposed	   to	   foreign	   intervention.	   While	   this	   thesis	   has	   focussed	   on	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literature	   that	  demonstrates	   this	   in	  regard	   to	  US	   intervention,	   it	  was	  also	   true	  of	  
Soviet	  leadership	  in	  Cuba.	  While	  Castro’s	  revolution	  provided	  an	  effective	  strategy	  
to	   remove	   authoritarian	   rule,	   few	   followed	   his	   example	   towards	   Soviet-­‐directed	  
communism.	   The	   revolutionary	   cadres,	   which	   emerged	   in	   virtually	   every	  
hemispheric	   republic,	   were	   small,	   unorganised	   and	   lacked	   the	   urban	   support	  
afforded	  to	  Castro.	  Above	  all,	   they	  were	  national	  responses	  to	  national	  problems.	  
By	  1965	  the	  threat	  of	  Castroist	  insurgency	  had	  passed	  and	  the	  ‘olive	  branches’	  of	  
economic	  aid	  were	  replaced	  by	  realpolitik	  realignment	  within	  the	  global	  capitalist	  
economy.	  	  
As	   the	   threat	   of	   Castroism	   receded,	   opportunities	   for	   a	   greater,	   and	  
confirmed	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  emerged.	  The	  US	  had	  claimed	  that	  the	  USSR	  had	  
threatened	  hemispheric	  security	  since	  the	  conclusion	  of	  WWII.	  However,	  without	  
evidence	  to	  support	  this	  claim,	  many	  nations	  began	  deviating	  from	  US	  political	  and	  
economic	  philosophy,	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  This	  was	  most	  evident	  in	  Argentina	  and	  
Brazil.	  The	  nationalist	  development	  strategies,	  proposed	  by	  elected	  governments,	  
were	   just	   as	   dangerous	   as	   those	   posed	   by	   rural	   insurgents.	   That	   threat	   was	  
significantly	   larger	   in	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   given	   the	   size	   and	   scope	   of	   their	  
national	  economies,	  when	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  Castro’s	  Cuba.	  The	  anti-­‐communist	  
pretext	   changed	   following	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution.	   The	   relatively	   benign	   threat	  
posed	   by	   disciplined	   communist	   parties	   was	   replaced	   with	   an	   indigenous	  
insurgency	   strategy	   to	   remove	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   This	   new	   form	   of	  
‘communism’	  was	  less	  aligned	  to	  globalist	  communist	  goals	  than	  the	  small	  parties	  
that	  preceded	  them.	  However,	  it	  posed	  a	  far	  greater	  physical	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  
of	  oligarchic	  and	  foreign	  investment	  in	  those	  states.	  To	  address	  these	  threats,	  far-­‐
reaching	  military	  campaigns	  were	  required.	  The	  example	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  
served	   to	  make	   the	   entire	  hemisphere	  more	   conservative.	  The	   social	   democratic	  
movement	  was	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  CIA	  and	  by	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  AFP.	  As	  it	  moved	  to	  
the	   right,	   a	   young	   generation	   of	   indigenous	   insurgents	   took	   up	   the	   challenge	   of	  
revolutionary	   change.	   The	   origins	   of	   the	   late	   Cold	   War	   period	   lie	   within	   the	  
strategy	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  US	  policy	  against	  it.	  It	  is,	  however,	  important	  
to	   define	   between	   indigenous	   insurgent	   groups	   and	   Moscow-­‐orientated	  
communists.	   It	  was	   that	   lack	  of	   definition	   that	  made	   the	   anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  
increasingly	  dangerous	  in	  the	  fallout	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  and	  throughout	  the	  
following	  three	  decades.	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Designed	  to	  Fail:	  Anti-­‐communism	  and	  the	  Rhetorical	  Alliance	  
for	  Progress	  
Events	  in	  Cuba	  institutionalised	  anti-­‐communism	  in	  Latin	  America.	  However,	  they	  
also	   revealed	   several	   weaknesses	   in	   US	   policy	   towards	   the	   hemisphere.	   The	  
regional	   euphoria	   surrounding	   Castro’s	   revolution,	   combined	   with	   the	   violent	  
displays	   of	   anti-­‐Americanism	   in	   1958,	   demonstrated	   to	   the	   incoming	   Kennedy	  
administration	  that	  Washington	  had	   lost	   its	   former	  hold	  over	  Latin	  America.	  The	  
career	   diplomat	   Adolph	   Berle	   warned	   in	   January	   1961	   that	   without	   the	   correct	  
policy	   response,	   “eight	   governments	   may	   go	   the	   way	   of	   Cuba	   in	   the	   next	   six	  
months”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  24).	  	  Kennedy	  attempted	  to	  alter	  Washington’s	  
image	   in	   Latin	   America	   through	   the	  Alliance	   for	   Progress	   (AFP).	   The	  AFP	  was	   a	  
broad-­‐scale	  aid	  program,	  which	  sought	  to	  foster	  pro-­‐US	  sentiments	  throughout	  the	  
region.	  It	  addressed	  many	  of	  the	  grievances	  that	  arose	  during	  the	  late	  Eisenhower	  
administration,	   including:	  US	   support	   for	   right-­‐wing	  dictatorships;	   the	   actions	  of	  
certain	  US	  corporations	  in	  Latin	  America;	  the	  urgent	  need	  for	  commodity	  price	  for	  
reform;	  the	  need	  for	  agrarian	  reform	  to	  limit	  poverty;	  the	  need	  for	  social	  reform	  in	  
education,	  health	  care	  and	  social	  security;	  the	  need	  for	  mass	  industrialisation;	  and	  
capital	  for	  currency	  stabilisation	  (Taffet,	  2007,	  p.	  37).	  As	  far	  as	  rhetoric,	  Kennedy	  
and	  the	  AFP	  committed	  to	  all	  of	  these.	  By	  1970,	  however,	  Latin	  Americans	  had	  not	  
experienced	  any	  significant	  improvement	  to	  their	  quality	  of	  life	  (McPherson,	  2003,	  
p.	  91).	  This	  thesis	  asserts	  that	  for	  Latin	  America,	  the	  AFP	  was	  designed	  to	  fail.	  Yet	  
for	  the	  US	  it	  was	  an	  astounding	  success.	  This	  thesis	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  AFP	  was	  a	  
propaganda	   mission	   designed	   to	   position	   the	   US	   alongside	   social	   democratic	  
theory	  through	  the	  Charter	  of	  Punta	  del	  Este.	  While	  the	  AFP	  failed	  to	  reach	  Latin	  
American	  development	   goals,	   it	  was	   the	   single	   greatest	   foreign	  policy	   success	   of	  
any	   US	   administration	   during	   the	   Latin	   American	   Cold	  War,	   as	   it	   built	   alliances	  
with	  moderate	  reformers	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  radical	  elements.	  The	  implementation	  
of	   the	   economic	   AFP,	   and	   the	   simultaneous	   military	   developments,108	  built	   the	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108	  Which	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  final	  thesis	  chapter.	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An	  Alliance	  for	  ‘Progress’	  
The	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  failed	  to	  meet	   its	  economic	  and	  social	  objectives	  
(McPherson,	  2003,	  p.	  91).	  However,	  many	  scholars	  attribute	  this	  to	  the	  enormity	  of	  
the	  task.	  Latham	  (2000)	  suggests	  that	  Kennedy	  employed	  leading	  theorists	  in	  the	  
field	   of	   “Development	   theory”	   (p.	   70).	   He	   argues,	   “very	   few	   questioned	   the	  
fundamental	   assumption	   that	   a	   projection	   of	   modern	   values,	   resources	   and	  
tutelage	  could	  engineer	  the	  dramatic	  transformation	  of	  an	  underdeveloped	  region”	  
(Latham,	  2000,	  p.	  71).	  That	   is,	   the	  Kennedy	  administration	  believed	   that	   it	   could	  
drastically	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   life	   for	   the	   Latin	   American	   people.	   This	   is	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  personnel	  changes	  in	  the	  US	  State	  Department.	  Scheman’s	  (1988)	  
edited	  collection	  reasserts	  that	  the	  “Alliance	  [as]	  an	  aberration	  in	  the	  long	  history	  
of	  US	  indifference	  and	  neglect	  of	  its	  neighbours”	  (Scheman,	  1988,	  p.	  3).	  By	  utilising	  
the	   views	   of	  many	   surviving	   Kennedy	   officials,	   Scheman	   (1988)	   argues	   that	   the	  
AFP	   indeed	   had	   a	   positive	   impact	   on	   Latin	   America’s	   future.	   Kennedy’s	  
biographers	   and	  mainstream	   historical	   studies	   conform	   to	   this	   view	   of	   the	   AFP.	  
Parmet	  (1983)	  asserts,	   “the	  Alliance	  held	  out	  a	  middle	  way	   in	  Latin	  America,	   the	  
promotion	  of	  democracies”	  (p.	  98).	  This	  section	  will	  explain	  the	  political	  functions	  
of	   the	  Alliance	   for	  Progress.	  This	  will	   include	   several	   structural	  weaknesses	   that	  
undermined	  the	  AFP	  from	  the	  beginning.	  The	  subsequent	  sections	  will	  argue	  that	  
the	   failure	   to	   enact	   a	   social	   and	   political	   revolution	   in	   Latin	   America	   was	   not	  
actually	  a	  failure,	  but	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  program	  for	  the	  US.	  
Kennedy	   adopted	   a	   new	   approach	   towards	   Latin	   America	   attempting	   to	  
work	   with	   those	   democratic	   leaders	   who	   opposed	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   (Rabe,	  
1999,	  p.	  23).	  Kennedy	  believed	  that	  this	  would	  procure	  maximum	  support	  for	  the	  
American	   position	   in	   the	   Cold	   War.	   One	   of	   the	   central	   grievances	   of	   American	  
foreign	   policy	   was	   the	   personal	   attitude	   of	   conservative	   diplomats	   towards	  
pragmatic	  reform.	  The	  anti-­‐communist	  paranoia	   that	  proliferated	   throughout	   the	  
Eisenhower	   administration	   led	   to	   irrational	   hostility	   towards	   moderate	  
democratic	  elements.	  For	  Figueres,	  especially,	  this	  needed	  to	  change.	  Figueres	  and	  
Betancourt	  viewed	  US	  policy	  as	  discriminatory	  against	  democracy.	  Figueres	  stated,	  
“there	  was	  little	  chance	  for	  a	  peaceful	  revolution	  in	  Latin	  America	  without	  a	  clear	  
and	  forthright	  policy	  change	  by	  the	  United	  States”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Ameringer,	  1978,	  p.	  
169).	  Accordingly,	  Kennedy	  built	  upon	  his	  “best	  and	  brightest”	  team	  of	  Dean	  Rusk,	  
Robert	  McNamara,	  McGeorge	  Bundy	  and	  C.	  Douglas	  Dillon	  with	  a	  team	  of	  leading	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Liberals	  to	  reformulate	  US	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Parmet,	  1983,	  pp.	  65-­‐
72;).	   He	   relied	   upon	   the	   presidential	   aides	   Arthur	   Schlesinger	   Jr.,	   Adolph	   Berle,	  
Chester	  Bowles	  and	  Richard	  Goodwin	  (Latham,	  2000,	  p.	  81).	  These	  “New	  Dealers”	  
advised	  the	  young	  President	  on	  Latin	  American	  grievances.	  Kennedy	  indicated	  his	  
intentions	  through	  his	  appointments.	  For	  instance,	  he	  and	  Rusk	  appointed	  Robert	  
Woodward	  as	  Under-­‐Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  (Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  
15).	  The	  former	  Costa	  Rican	  ambassador	  was	  a	  trusted	  confidant	  of	  Figueres	  and	  
Betancourt	   (Ameringer,	   1978,	   p.	   162).	   He	   was	   pro-­‐democracy	   and	   pro-­‐reform,	  
indicating	  an	  evolved	  approach	  in	  Washington.	  Teodoro	  Moscoso,	  a	  native	  Puerto	  
Rican,	  was	  appointed	  head	  of	  AFP	  coordination	  (Taffet,	  2007,	  p.	  38).	  This	  gave	  the	  
AFP	   a	   seemingly	   ‘Latin’	   voice.	   Additionally,	   Adlai	   Stevenson	   was	   appointed	   as	  
Ambassador	   to	   the	   United	   Nations.	   The	   career	   liberal	   was	   less	   hostile	   to	  
evolutionary	  change	  in	  Latin	  America	  than	  his	  predecessors	  (Parmet,	  1983,	  p.	  68).	  
The	  Kennedy	   administration	   utilised	   leading	   proponents	   of	   “development	  
theory”	   in	   formulating	   the	   AFP	   (Latham,	   2000,	   pp.	   69-­‐75).	   It	   brought	   in	   leaders	  
from	  the	  fields	  of	  economics,	  sociology	  and	  politics	  to	  develop	  the	  AFP	  philosophy.	  
Walt	   Rostow	   was	   the	   central	   figure	   in	   this	   movement	   (Milne,	   2008,	   p.	   9).	   His	  
scholarship	  motivated	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  AFP.	  Rostow	  advocated	  a	  “new	  look”	  
in	   foreign	   aid,	   “a	   coordinated	   free	   world	   effort	   with	   enough	   resources	   for	  
development	  purposes”	   (Latham,	  2000,	  p.	  69).	  He	  personally	  convinced	  Kennedy	  
to	   approve	   Schlesinger’s	   vision	   for	   the	   AFP.	   Rostow,	   Schlesinger	   and	   Gordon	  
sought	  to	  demonstrate	  “in	  the	  hemisphere	  that	  economic	  growth,	  social	  equity,	  and	  
the	   democratic	   development	   of	   societies	   can	   proceed	   hand	   in	   hand”	   (Latham,	  
2000,	   p.	   81).	   Moscoso’s	   appointment	   to	   AFP	   coordinator	   was	   also	   a	   significant	  
move.	   He	   had	   overseen	   Operation	   Bootstrap	   in	   his	   native	   Puerto	   Rico	   (Bailey,	  
1976,	  p.	  87).	  Operation	  Bootstrap	  was	  a	  development	  project	   in	   the	  US	   territory	  
that	  utilised	  federal	  funds	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  “self-­‐help”	  (Gordon,	  1963,	  p.	  46).	  Its	  
goal	  was	  to	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  Puerto	  Rican	  exports	  from	  primarily	  agricultural	  
to	  primarily	  industrial.	  The	  self-­‐help	  concept	  gave	  financial	  motivation	  to	  investors	  
within	  Puerto	  Rico,	  who	  established	  industrial	  factories	  (Bailey,	  1976,	  p.	  87).	  This	  
transitioned	   the	   landed	   oligarchy	   to	   an	   urban	   capitalist	   class.	   However,	   little	  
capital	  was	  made	   available	   for	   programs	   of	   class	  mobility.	   Bailey	   (1976)	   asserts	  
that	  Operation	  Bootstrap	  “was	  a	  failure	  with	  the	  economic	  development	  achieved	  
at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  working	  classes”	  (p.	  87).	  The	  idea	  of	  transitioning	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the	  rural	  oligarchy	  into	  an	  urban	  capitalist	  class	  was	  central	   to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  
the	  AFP.	  However,	   it	  was	   at	   odds	  with	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   social	   and	   democratic	  
revolution	  espoused	  by	  the	  AFP.	  
Latin	  America	  required	  a	  comprehensive	  social	  and	  democratic	  revolution	  
to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  lofty	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  AFP.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  region’s	  citizens	  lived	  
in	  abject	  poverty	  (ECLA,	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  1988,	  p.	  74).	  Despite	  the	  mass	  urbanisation	  
of	  the	  1950s,	  the	  majority	  of	  Latin	  Americans	  still	  worked	  as	  agricultural	  labourers	  
in	   1961	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   74).	   These	   labourers	   had	   no	   access	   to	   healthcare,	  
education,	   social	   security,	   affordable	   consumer	   goods,	   or	   the	  widespread	   labour	  
protection	   of	   unions	   or	   the	   government	   (Rabe,	   1988,	   p.	   74).	   There	  was	   no	   class	  
mobility	   in	   Latin	  America	   in	   1961.	   The	   oligarchic	   class	   held	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	  
land	   (Alba,	   1965,	   p.	   75).	   The	   situation	   of	   Cuba	   resembled	   that	   of	  much	   of	   Latin	  
America.109	  The	   oligarchic	   class	   needed	   to	   forfeit	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   its	   political	   and	  
economic	  power	   to	  enact	   this	   revolution.	  The	   rhetoric	  of	   the	  AFP	  suggested	   that	  
the	  US	  sought	  to	  support	  the	  popular	  revolution	  against	  the	  oligarchic	  class	  (OAS,	  
1961).	  Democratic	   action	  was	   central	   to	   this	   revolution	  but	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   the	  
desires	   of	   the	   impoverished	   majority	   against	   the	   privileged	   few	   was	   a	   radical	  
concept	   in	   Latin	   America.	  When	   in	   practice,	   democracy	   had	   begun	   to	   alleviated	  
poverty,	   increase	   class	   mobility	   and	   led	   to	   rapid	   economic	   growth	   in	   post-­‐war	  
America	   and	  Europe,	   and	   had	   the	   potential	   to	   do	   so	   in	   Latin	  America	   (Halperin,	  
Siegel	   and	   Weinstein,	   2005,	   p.	   2).	   US	   rhetoric	   promoted	   democracy	   under	   the	  
auspices	   of	   the	   AFP.	   By	   promoting	   the	   policies	   of	   land	   reform,	   commodity	   price	  
reform,	   economic	  development	   and	  humanitarian	   reform,	   the	  US	  was	   seen	   to	  be	  
siding	  with	  masses	  (OAS,	  1961;	  Cull,	  2008,	  p.	  194).	  The	  AFP	  sought	  to	  emulate	  the	  
results	   of	   the	   Mexican	   and	   Cuban	   Revolutions	   without	   compromising	   its	   aims.	  
Hence	  the	  AFP	  ‘revolution’	  was	  fundamentally	  flawed	  from	  its	  inception.	  	  
	  
Propaganda	  
The	  AFP	  was	  a	  propaganda	  program	  designed	  to	  counter	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
Cuban	  Revolution.	  Those	  scholars	  critical	  of	   the	  AFP	  have	  claimed	  continuing	  US	  
indifference	   towards	   Latin	   America.	   Alba	   (1965)	   asserts	   that	   the	   AFP	   failed	  
because	  it	  did	  not	  unseat	  the	  oligarchy	  that	  was	  “the	  great	  force	  for	  immobility	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Urban	  development	  had	  alleviated	  some	  aspects	  of	  this	  poverty	  in	  parts	  of	  Argentina,	  Chile,	  
Uruguay	  and	  Brazil.	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Latin	   America”	   (p.	   76).	   Frank	   (1967;	   1970)	   argues	   that	   the	   AFP	   unfairly	  
advantaged	   US	   capitalists	   that	   drained	   capital	   from	   the	   hemisphere.	   McPherson	  
(2003)	   argues	   that	   “the	   US	   misled	   themselves	   trying	   to	   apply	   dubious	   social	  
science	   theories”	   and	   failed	   “to	   reach	   any	   of	   its	   ninety-­‐four	   numerical	   goals	   in	  
health,	  education	  and	  welfare”	  (p.	  91).	  The	  AFP	  failed	  Latin	  America	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  
reasons,	  however;	   the	  AFP	  was	  not	  born	  of	  American	   indifference	   towards	  Latin	  
America	  either.	  It	  was	  created	  to	  alter	  the	  discourse	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  designed	  
to	   convince	   the	   Latin	   Americans	   that	   the	   US	   was	   a	   force	   for	   good	   in	   the	  
hemisphere.	   Cull	   (2008)	   identified	   the	   propaganda	   arm	   of	   the	   AFP	   through	   the	  
United	  States	  Information	  Agency	  (USIA)	  (p.	  191).	  He	  examined	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  
USIA	   in	   Latin	   America	   under	   Kennedy	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   “new	   posts	   and	  
specialist	  staff”	  (Cull,	  2008.	  p.	  191).	  Kunz	  (1997)	  argues	  that	  propaganda	  was	  the	  
central	   aim	   of	   the	   AFP	   (p.	   131).	   He	   suggests	   that	   Kennedy	   sought	   to	   change	  
America’s	   image	   in	   Latin	   America,	   without	   fundamentally	   altering	   American	  
policies	  (Kunz,	  1997,	  p.	  128).	  Bailey	  (1976)	  reasons	  that	  “the	  greatest	  single	  task	  of	  
American	   diplomacy	   in	   Latin	   America	   [was]	   to	   divorce	   the	   inevitable	   and	  
necessary	  Latin	  American	  social	  transformation	  from	  connection	  with	  and	  prevent	  
its	  capture	  by	  overseas	  communist	  powers”	  (p.	  85).	  That	  is,	  to	  place	  the	  US	  on	  the	  
side	  of	  reform	  and	  remove	  the	  revolutionary	  emphasis	  emanating	  from	  Cuba.	  This	  
section	   argues	   that	   the	   AFP	   was	   a	   successful	   operation	   in	   propaganda.	   The	  
subsequent	  section	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	   ‘Latinised’	  
the	  AFP	  through	  additional	  propaganda.	  Put	  together,	  this	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate	  
that	   the	   US	   achieved	   its	   objectives	   in	   Latin	   America	   between	   1961	   and	   1963	  
without	  a	  substantial	  change	  in	  policy.	  
The	   AFP	   was	   a	   propaganda	   program	   designed	   to	   isolate	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution.	  Kennedy	  proclaimed	  
To	  our	   sister	   republics	   south	  of	   the	  border,	  we	  offer	  a	   special	  pledge	  –	   to	  
convert	  our	  good	  words	  into	  good	  deeds	  –	  in	  a	  new	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  –	  
to	  assist	  free	  men	  and	  free	  governments	  in	  casting	  off	  the	  chains	  of	  poverty	  
(Kennedy,	  March	  1961).	  
Kennedy	  attempted	  to	  reverse	  Washington’s	  image	  in	  Latin	  America	  by	  advocating	  
a	   democratic	   and	   social	   revolution	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Washington’s	   dominant	  
position	  within	  the	  OAS	  had	  allowed	  it	  to	  enact	  such	  a	  revolution	  at	  any	  stage	  from	  
1948.	  However,	  it	  had	  not.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  threat	  to	  US	  strategic	  interests	  prior	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to	   1959.	   The	   Cuban	   Revolution	   required	   this	   dramatic	   alteration	   in	   American	  
foreign	   policy,	   at	   least	   in	   rhetoric.	   The	   Mexican	   agricultural	   expert,	   Edmundo	  
Flores	  argued	  
Without	   Castro,	   few	   outside	   Latin	   America	  would	   care	   about	   the	   region’s	  
economic	   stagnation,	   its	   political	   instability,	   or	   its	   undeniable	   ability	   to	  
upset	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  in	  Cold	  War	  (Flores,	  1963,	  p.	  6).	  
The	  AFP	  was	  much	  more	   effective	   than	   the	  US	   initially	   believed.	  Not	   only	   did	   it	  
“sterilise	   the	   example	   of	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution,”	   it	   also	   convinced	   the	   Latin	  
Americans	   that	   the	  US	  was	  committed	   to	   fundamental	   change	   (Guevara,	  2006,	  p.	  
24).	  The	  US	  ambassador	   to	   the	  UN,	  Adlai	   Stevenson,	   collated	   the	  Latin	  American	  
response	   to	   Kennedy’s	   speech	   in	   a	   March	   memorandum	   to	   the	   President.	   He	  
informed	  Kennedy	  that	  his	  speech	  had	  “a	  profound	  impression	  in	  Latin	  America	  –	  
the	  most	  favourable	  since	  Roosevelt’s	  Good	  Neighbour	  policy”	  (SD,	  June	  1961b,	  p.	  
1).	  USIA	   confirmed	   this	   view,	   identifying	   one	  Colombian	  who	   called	   it	   “the	  most	  
significant	   contribution	   to	   pan-­‐Americanism	   in	   one	   hundred	   years”	   (as	   cited	   in	  
Cull,	  2008,	  p.	  195).	  Moreover,	  the	  chief	  objective	  of	  the	  AFP	  was	  achieved	  in	  March	  
1961	  without	  a	  single	  dollar	  of	  aid.	  The	  US	  commitment	  to	  democracy	  and	  social	  
change	  was	  rhetorically	  emphasised	  in	  the	  Charter	  of	  Punta	  del	  Este	  (OAS,	  1961).	  
This	  section	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  this	  US	  rhetoric	  co-­‐opted	  the	  social	  democratic	  
movement.	  
Kennedy	   declared	   the	   AFP	   a	   democratic	   and	   social	   revolution	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   However,	   the	   US	   had	   no	   evidence	   to	   support	   this	   claim.	   The	   social	  
democrats	  required	  proof	  of	  the	  US’	  commitment	  to	  democracy.	  The	  longstanding	  
mission	   of	   the	   social	   democrats,	   dating	   back	   to	   Arévalo’s	   Caribbean	   Legion,	   had	  
been	  to	  eradicate	  the	  Caribbean	  of	  the	  insidious	  dictatorships	  of	  Nicaragua	  and	  the	  
Dominican	  Republic	   (Gleijes,	  1989,	  p.	  135).	  The	  US	  had	  created	   these	   regimes	   in	  
the	   1930s	   and	   continued	   to	   flood	   them	   with	   military	   assistance	   to	   establish	  
regional	   strategic	   alliances,	   nominally	   against	   those	   social	   democratic	  
governments	   (Roorda,	   1998,	   pp.	   44-­‐54;	   Crawley,	   2007,	   pp.	   33-­‐72).	   Trujillo	   was	  
considered	   additionally	   dangerous	   as	   he	   brazenly	   organised	   the	   failed	  
assassination	  attempt	  of	  Betancourt	   in	  Caracas	   in	   June	  1960	   (Patterson,	  1989,	  p.	  
9).	  From	  this	  moment	  the	  CIA	  began	  working	  with	  Dominican	  opposition	  groups.	  
On	  May	  30,	  1961,	  Trujillo	  was	  ambushed	  and	  assassinated	  (Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  39).	  The	  
US	   supported	   the	   anti-­‐Trujillo	   opposition	   and	   advocated	   their	   actions,	   but	   was	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concerned	   about	   the	   consequences	   of	   Trujillo’s	   death.	   The	   Dominican	   incident	  
offered	  insight	  into	  Kennedy’s	  thinking	  on	  Latin	  American	  democracy:	  
There	   [were]	   three	   possibilities	   on	   descending	   order	   of	   preference:	   a	  
descent	   democratic	   regime,	   a	   continuation	   of	   the	   Trujillo	   regime,	   or	   a	  
Castro	  regime.	  We	  ought	   to	  aim	   for	   the	   first,	  but	  we	  really	  can’t	   renounce	  
the	  second	  until	  we	  are	  sure	  that	  we	  can	  avoid	  the	  third	  (as	  cited	  in	  Rabe,	  
1999,	  p.	  41).	  
As	   the	   communist	   movement	   was	   extremely	   weak,	   the	   US	   allowed	   elections	   in	  
1962,	   bringing	   the	   social	   democrat	   Juan	   Bosch	   to	   power	   (Rabe.	   1999,p.	   45).	   In	  
order	   to	   avoid	  a	  Castro-­‐type	   regime,	  however,	   the	  CIA	  established	  a	  new	  pro-­‐US	  
police	   force	   equipped	   with	   advanced	   counter-­‐insurgency	   training	   (Gill,	   2004,	   p.	  
65).	   This	   ‘Dominican	   arithmetic’	   defines	   Kennedy’s	   handling	   of	   Latin	   American	  
politics	  generally.	  The	  instability	  of	  the	  Dominican	  situation	  left	  the	  US	  unwilling	  to	  
attempt	   similar	   actions	   against	   the	   authoritarians	   of	   Nicaragua	   or	   Haiti.	  
Nevertheless,	  Kennedy	  backed	  up	  his	  pro-­‐democratic	  rhetoric	  with	  action.	  
	   Agrarian	  reform	  was	  the	  central	  aim	  of	  social	  democratic	  revolutionaries	  in	  
the	   tropical	   regions	   during	   the	   post-­‐war	   era	   (Carrol,	   1970,	   pp.	   103-­‐107).	   It	  was	  
used	   to	   procure	   the	   support	   of	   agrarian	   peasants,	   making	   a	   key	   tenet	   of	   the	  
"multiclass”	   revolutions	   (Ames,	   1987,	   p.	   60).	   As	   demonstrated,	   the	   US	   actively	  
opposed	   land	   reform	   in	  Mexico,	   Venezuela	   and	  Guatemala	   during	   the	   early	   Cold	  
War.	   In	  order	  to	  reposition	   its	  standing,	   the	  US	  committed	  to	  the	  process	  of	   land	  
reform	  in	  1961.	  The	  charter	  claimed	  
	   To	   encourage,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   characteristics	   of	   each	   country,	  
	   programs	   of	   comprehensive	   agrarian	   reform	   leading	   to	   the	   effective	  
	   transformation,	  where	   required,	   of	   unjust	   structures	   and	   systems	   of	   land	  
	   tenure	  and	  use,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  replacing	  latifundia	  and	  dwarf	  holdings	  by	  an	  
	   equitable	  system	  of	  land	  tenure	  so	  	  that…that	   land	  will	  become	  for	   the	  man	  
	   who	  works	  it	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  economic	  	  stability	  (OAS,	  1961).	  
This	   declaration	   was	   a	   policy	   reversal	   that	   required	   domestic	   and	   foreign	  
landowners	   to	   forfeit	   property	   to	   peasants	   voluntarily.	   In	   effect,	   the	   US	   was	  
echoing	   the	   revolutionary	   position	   of	   Castro.	   Alba	   (1965)	   asserted	   “The	  
landowning	   oligarchy	   wants	   no	   change”	   (p.81).	   This	   led	   to	   programmatic	  
stagnation	  with	  only	  minimal	  land	  redistributed	  to	  peasant	  farmers	  during	  the	  AFP	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period.110	  According	  to	  Flores	  (1963),	  the	  US’	  position	  on	  land	  reform	  “is	  tragic	  and	  
perhaps	  absurd:	  it	  wishes	  to	  entrust	  what	  is	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  revolution	  to	  the	  
very	  group...which	  in	  its	  own	  interest	  must	  block	  it”	  (p.	  7).	  Moreover,	  the	  US	  asked	  
the	  ruling	  class	  to	  give	  their	   land	  to	  peasants.	  The	  ruling	  class	   inevitably	  took	  no	  
action.	  
	   Latin	  America’s	  dependency	  upon	  export	  economies	  made	  it	  susceptible	  to	  
the	   global	   fluctuations	   of	   commodity	   prices.	   The	   vulnerability	   of,	   specifically,	  
coffee	  and	  sugar	  prices	  to	  global	  fluctuations	  prioritised	  the	  concept	  of	  commodity	  
price	   stabilisation.	   The	   entrance	   of	   decolonised	   Africa	   and	   Asia	   into	   the	   global	  
capitalist	  economy	  led	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  production	  in	  key	  commodities	  such	  as	  
sugar,	  coffee,	  meats,	  iron	  ore,	  copper,	  tin	  and	  nitrates.	  Adolph	  Berle	  (1962)	  claimed	  
that	   the	   US	   no	   longer	   needed	   Latin	   American	   markets	   and	   resources,	   as	   it	   had	  
during	  the	  1940s	  (p.	  8).	  The	  increased	  global	  supply	  led	  to	  a	  global	  price	  recession	  
that	   favoured	   developed	   nations	   and	   crippled	   those	   of	   the	   third	   world.	   The	  
comparative	  advantage	  of	  developed	  goods	  over	  raw	  materials	  led	  to	  a	  divergence	  
in	   wealth	   that	   followed	   the	   division	   of	   labour.	   Latin	   American	   leaders,	   such	   as	  
Kubitschek,	   attempted	   to	   create	   cartels	   to	   control	   the	   distribution	   and	   sale	   of	  
specific	   raw	  materials	   in	   Latin	  America	   (Prebisch,	   as	   cited	   in	  Overbeek,	   1999,	   p.	  
576).	   The	   AFP	   granted	   the	   Latin	   Americans’	   demands	   for	   comprehensive	  
commodity	  price	  reform	  through	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  common	  market	  
	   4.11.	   To	   strengthen	   existing	   agreement	   on	   economic	   integration,	   with	   a	  
	   view	  to	  the	  ultimate	  fulfilment	  of	  aspirations	  for	  a	  Latin	  American	  common	  
	   market	   that	   will	   expand	   and	   diversify	   trade	   among	   the	   Latin	   American	  
	   countries	  and	   thus	  contribute	   to	   the	  economic	  growth	  of	   the	  region	  (OAS,	  
	   1961).	  
A	  Latin	  American	  common	  market	  was	  detrimental	  to	  US	  trade	  and	  investment,	  as	  
it	  would	  increase	  the	  price	  of	  primary	  commodities	  (Prebisch,	  as	  cited	  in	  Overbeek,	  
1999,	   p.	   571).	  No	  plan	  was	  provided	   to	   transition	  Latin	  America	   into	   a	   common	  
market	  until	  the	  early	  1990s,	  as	  it	  was	  directly	  counter	  to	  US	  objectives.	  In	  1968,	  
Covey	  Oliver,	  the	  AFP	  coordinator	  of	  the	  time,	  quipped,	  “to	  speak	  of	  fair	  prices	  is	  a	  
medieval	  concept,	  for	  we	  are	  in	  the	  era	  of	  free	  trade”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Galliano,	  1973,	  p.	  
1).	  Hence,	  the	  AFP	  had	  no	  interest	  in	  paying	  ‘fair’	  prices	  for	  coffee,	  or	  any	  other	  raw	  
material.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  Most	  of	  which	  occurred	  in	  Mexico	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  (Goldenberg,	  1965,	  p.	  
312).	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   The	   social	   democratic	   revolutionaries	   also	   advocated	   sweeping	   social	  
reforms	   in	   order	   to	   alleviate	   poverty	   and	   to	   increase	   class	   mobility.	   This	   social	  
program	   advocated	   education,	   healthcare,	   social	   security,	   women’s	   rights,	  
unionization	   and	   income	   redistribution.	   The	   US	   had	   labelled	   these	   social	  
democratic	   reforms	   as	   “impractical”	   during	   the	   1940s	   and	   1950s.	   However,	   in	  
1961	   the	   AFP	   began	   advocating	   the	   following	   aspects	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	  
Revolution:	  
	   1.7.	   To	   eliminate	   adult	   illiteracy	   by	   1970....2.1.	   Comprehensive…national	  
programs	   of	   economic	   and	   social	   development…in	   accordance	   with	  
democratic	  principles....2.3…women	  should	  be	  placed	  on	  equal	  footing....2.5	  
Institutions	  in	  both	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors….including	  labour	  unions	  
[should]	   be	   strengthened…[so]	   that	   social	   reforms	   necessary	   to	   fair	  
distribution	  of	  the	  fruit	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  progress	  [can]	  be	  carried	  out	  
(OAS,	  1961).	  
In	  essence,	  the	  US	  promised	  to	  create	  more	  education	  institutions	  as	  education	  and	  
healthcare	  are	  considered	  as	  human	  rights.	  However,	  in	  the	  developing	  world,	  this	  
substantial	  capital	  investment	  in	  the	  population	  requires	  increased	  taxation	  upon	  
domestic	  and	  foreign	  enterprise	  to	  fund	  it	  (Ameringer,	  2009,	  p.	  34).	  Also,	  the	  OAS	  
committed	   to	   strengthen	   unionism	  with	   the	   eventual	   aim	   of	  widespread	   income	  
distribution.	  This	  placed	  the	  onus	  on	  governments	  to	  arbitrate	  industrial	  disputes	  
regarding	   wages,	   to	   the	   advantage	   of	   the	   poor.	   As	   was	   the	   case	   with	   agrarian	  
reform,	  the	  social	  reforms	  placed	  contradictory	  duties	  on	  oligarchic	  governments	  
(Alba,	   1965,	   81).	   As	   it	   was	   against	   their	   interests,	   there	   was	   no	   motivation	   to	  
conform.	  
	   The	  social	  democratic	  movement	  ended	  in	  1961.	  Its	  proponents	  had	  failed	  
to	  bring	  their	  philosophy	  of	  “nationalism,	  socialism	  and	  anti-­‐Imperialism”	  to	  Latin	  
America	  (Grau,	  as	  cited	  in	  Ameringer,	  2000,	  p.	  44).	  Those	  who	  had	  tried	  had	  been	  
overthrown,	  killed,	  or	  moderated.	  The	  revolutionary	  impetus	  in	  Latin	  America	  had	  
passed	  to	  the	  young	  insurgents.	  The	  remaining	  social	  democratic	  leaders,	  including	  
Betancourt	  and	  Figueres,	  aligned	  their	  interests	  with	  this	  US	  rhetoric	  (Ameringer,	  
1978,	   pp.	   163-­‐175).	   The	   breakdown	   of	   relations	   between	   elements	   of	   the	  
revolutionary	   left	  was	   responsible	   for	   this.	   Figueres’	  willingness	   to	  host	   the	   first	  
meeting	  of	  the	  OAS	  to	  condemn	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  in	  1960	  was	  highly	  symbolic,	  
as	   was	   the	   1961	   commitment	   to	   the	   AFP	   in	   Caracas	   (Dallek,	   2004,	   p.	   468).	   US	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propaganda	  played	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  creating	  that	  breakdown	  of	  relations	  between	  
Cuba	   and	   the	   democratic	   revolutionaries.	   The	   US	   had	   indicated	   that	   the	  
intransigent	  policies	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  were	  over.	  It	  filled	  the	  Latin	  
American	  bureau	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  with	  liberals	  who	  espoused	  democracy	  
and	  social	  reform	  (Dallek,	  2004,	  pp.	  340-­‐345).	  It	  authored	  the	  Charter	  of	  Punta	  del	  
Este,	  which	  was	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  longstanding	  desires	  of	  the	  social	  democrats	  
and	   their	   supporters.	   AFP	   propaganda	   drove	   a	   bridge	   between	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	  and	  many	  Latin	  American	  governments.	  Whether	  the	  US	  committed	  to	  
that	  propaganda	  was	  irrelevant.	  It	  intended	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  brief	  threat	  posed	  by	  
revolutionary	  Cuba.	  By	  1963	  that	  threat	  had	  subsided,	  as	  Cuba	  had	  been	  painted	  as	  
the	   aggressor	   in	   the	  missile	   crisis	   and	  many	   of	   the	   small	   insurgencies	   had	   been	  
defeated.	   By	   that	   time	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   AFP	   rhetoric	   had	   been	   formulated	   for	  
political	   purposes.	   It	   was	   also	   evident	   that	   the	   US	   had	   fulfilled	   its	   objectives	   of	  
isolating	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  aligning	  itself	  to	  the	  moderate	  democracies	  of	  
Latin	  America.	  	  
	  
Latinising	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Progress	  
AFP	  propaganda	  relied	  on	  Kennedy’s	  ability	  to	  win	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  
Latin	  American	  leaders.	  Prior	  to	  his	  inauguration,	  Kennedy	  commissioned	  a	  Latin	  
American	  taskforce	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  to	  win	  over	  Latin	  Americans.	  According	  
to	   this	   taskforce,	  many	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   continent	   saw	   the	   US	   as	   an	   enemy	   of	  
human	  freedom	  (Kunz,	  1997,p.	  129).	  This	  taskforce	  encouraged	  Kennedy	  to	  assert	  
his	  keen	  interest	  in	  Latin	  American	  affairs.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  US	  sought	  to	  reclaim	  the	  
moral	   position	   it	   had	   taken	   during	  WWII,	   regarding	   human	   freedom,	   social	   and	  
economic	   well-­‐being,	   representative	   governance	   and	   national	   sovereignty.	   This	  
position	   had	   been	   forfeited	   in	   the	   regional	   euphoria	   surrounding	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   central	   aim	   of	   the	   AFP	  was	   to	   secure	   additional	  
regional	  support	  to	  prevent	  further	  leftist	  deviations	  throughout	  Latin	  America.	  To	  
this	   end,	   Kennedy	   visited	   the	   region	   several	   times	   (Dallek,	   2004,	   p.	   468).	   In	  
December	  1961	  he	  travelled	  to	  Venezuela	  where	  in	  joint	  declarations	  with	  Rómulo	  
Betancourt,	  Kennedy	   reaffirmed	   the	  US	   commitment	   to	  both	   the	   ‘Alianza	  para	   el	  
Progreso’	   and	   the	   achievements	   of	   the	   Betancourt	   government	   (Kennedy,	  
December	  1961a).	  He	  visited	  the	  La	  Morita	  resettlement	  that	  provided	  3.8	  million	  
acres	  of	  redistributed	  land	  to	  peasant	  communities.	  He	  stated,	  “this	  program	  is	  at	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the	  heart	  of	  the	  Alianza	  para	  el	  Progreso,	  for	  no	  real	  progress	  is	  possible	  unless	  the	  
benefits	  of	   increased	  prosperity	  are	  shared	  by	   the	  people	   themselves”	   (Kennedy,	  
December	  1961a).	  It	  was	  important	  to	  link	  the	  AFP	  propaganda	  with	  the	  desires	  of	  
the	  hemisphere.	  However,	  some	  saw	  these	  declarations	  as	  contradictory.	  
The	  Cuban	  delegation	   led	  by	  Ernesto	   ‘Che’	  Guevara	  resisted	  this	  US	  vision	  
for	  the	  Americas.	  Guevara	  directly	  opposed	  the	  Charter	  of	  Punta	  del	  Este.	  He	  was	  
forced	   to	   ask	   the	   delegations	   of	   Latin	   America:	   is	   this	   “our	   America	   or	   theirs”?	  
(Guevara,	  2006,	  p.	  20).	  The	  Argentines	  were	  against	  Washington’s	  initiative	  to	  take	  
over	   the	  Latin	  American	   social	   revolution.	  The	  Cuban	  delegation	  was	   specifically	  
opposed	   to	   the	   American	   utilisation	   of	   José	   Martí’s	   nineteenth-­‐century	   political	  
analysis.	  Accordingly,	  Guevara	  cited	  Martí’s	  famous	  “whose	  America”:	  
Whoever	   speaks	  of	   economic	  union	   speaks	  of	   political	   union.	  The	  nations	  
that	   buys	   commands;	   the	   nation	   that	   sells	   serves….Let	   there	   be	   neither	  
unions	  of	  the	  Americas	  against	  Europe,	  nor	  with	  Europe	  against	  a	  nation	  of	  
the	  Americas….If	  the	  republics	  of	  the	  Americas	  have	  any	  function	  at	  all	  it	  is	  
certainly	   not	   to	   be	   herded	   by	   one	   of	   them	   against	   the	   future	   republics	  	  
(Martí,	  as	  cited	  in	  Guevara,	  2006,	  p.	  20).	  
Martí	  had	  warned	  against	   the	  collective	  economic	  assault	  on	   individual	  republics	  
seventy	   years	   earlier,	  which	  Guevara	   sought	   to	   remind	   them.	  He	   also	   took	   issue	  
with	  the	  US	  State	  Department	  White	  Paper	  that	  claimed,	  “the	  revolutionary	  regime	  
betrayed	  their	  own	  revolution”	  and	  “The	  Castro	  regime	  offers	  a	  clear	  and	  present	  
danger	   to	   the	   authentic	   revolutions	   of	   the	   Americas”	   (Guevara,	   2006,	   p.	   25).	  
Guevara	   (2006)	   questioned	  Washington’s	   ability	   to	   assess	   authentic	   revolutions.	  
He	  also	  identified	  Washington’s	  crimes	  against	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  its	  role	  in	  
the	   assassination	   of	   Rafael	   Trujillo	   	   (Guevara,	   2006,	   p.	   31).	   Guevara	   correctly	  
identified	  that	  the	  AFP	  was	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  Revolution	  and	  would	  not	  exist	  
without	  his	  revolutionary	  regime.	  The	  US	  was	  using	  the	  AFP	  politically	  rather	  than	  
economically.	  Nevertheless,	  following	  Punta	  del	  Este,	  the	  Latin	  American	  republics	  
committed	  to	  the	  US’	  position	  in	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.	  Moreover,	  Cuba	  had	  lost	  its	  
position	  within	  the	  Latin	  American	  revolutionary	  movement.	  	  
Many	   Latin	   Americans	   were	   enthused	   by	   the	   prospect	   of	   American	  
economic	   assistance	   (Cull,	   2008,	   p.	   195).	   The	   Charter	   of	   Punta	   del	   Este	   was	  
accepted	  unanimously	  is	  1961.	  Many	  Latin	  Americans	  believed	  that	  the	  US	  would	  
commit	  large	  amounts	  of	  capital	  and	  deliver	  a	  social	  and	  democratic	  revolution	  to	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the	   region.	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Treasury	  C.	  Douglas	  Dillon	  was	   pragmatic	   about	   the	  
AFP	  (SD,	  August	  1961).	  He	  realised	  the	   impediments	  and	  limitations	  of	  US	  policy	  
commitments.	   However,	   Latin	   American	   expectations	   were	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  
propaganda	  program.	  Dillon	  advocated	  a	  modest	  growth	  rate	  of	  2.5	  per	  cent	  per	  
annum	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  (SD,	  August	  1961).	  While	  the	  US	  provided	  significant	  
capital	   investment,	   the	   majority	   was	   to	   be	   accumulated	   domestically;	   Latin	  
Americans	   would	   need	   to	   rely	   upon	   “self-­‐help”	   to	   achieve	   significant	   economic	  
development	  (SD,	  August	  1961).	  As	  this	  was	  a	  program	  of	  propaganda,	  rather	  than	  
a	   long-­‐term	   solution,	   immediate	   effects	   were	   required.	   Dillon	   envisaged	  
Washington’s	   role	   in	   funding	   small	   ‘visual’	   projects	   in	   ‘communist’	   threatened	  
regions,	   as	   “these	  measures	  will	   have	   greater	  political	   ramifications”	   (as	   cited	   in	  
SD,	  August,	  1961).	  These	  visual	  programs	  would	  reaffirm	  the	  US’	  commitment	   to	  
its	  rhetoric.	  Kennedy’s	  December	  tour	  of	  democratic	  Venezuela	  was	  quite	  effective.	  
However,	   some	   regions	   were	   much	   more	   impoverished	   and	   vulnerable	   to	  
Castroism	   than	   oil-­‐rich	   Venezuela.	   Areas	   such	   as	   Northeast	   Brazil	   received	   the	  
majority	  of	  the	  initial	  aid,	  to	  quell	  Castroist	  critiques	  of	  Washington’s	  foreign	  policy	  
(Robock,	   1963,	   p.	   141).	   While	   some	   positive	   effects	   were	   reaped	   from	   the	  
construction	  of	  roads,	  schools	  and	  hospitals,	  the	  political	  economic	  inequality	  was	  
not	  addressed.	  	  
Despite	   the	  weaknesses	  of	  Kennedy’s	  AFP,	  his	  personal	   charisma	  ensured	  
Latin	  Americans	  of	  his	  intentions.	  Kennedy’s	  tours	  and	  proclamations	  throughout	  
Latin	  America	  were	  effective.	  His	  1961	  tour	  of	  Latin	  America	  was	  crucial	  to	  selling	  
the	  AFP.	   Following	   the	   Caracas	   visit,	   he	  moved	   on	   to	  Bogotá	  where	   he	   asserted,	  
“The	  Alianza	   para	   el	   Progreso	   is	   a	   phrase…all	   of	   the	   people	   of	   this	   country…are	  
going	   to	   see	   filling	   this	   field	   in	   the	  next	  months	   and	  years”	   (Kennedy,	  December	  
1961b).	   President	   Alberto	   Camargo	   asked	   Kennedy,	   “do	   you	   know	   why	   these	  
people	  are	  cheering	  for	  you?”	  to	  which	  he	  explained,	  “it’s	  because	  they	  think	  that	  
you	  are	  on	  their	  side	  against	  the	  oligarchs”	  (as	  cited	  in	  Skidmore,	  1988,	  p.	  48).	  The	  
peasants	   were	   wrong.	   In	   Mexico	   Kennedy	   recognised	   that	   the	   AFP	   was	  
ideologically	   aligned	   to	   the	  Mexican	  Revolution	   as	   both	   strove	   for	   “social	   justice	  
and	  economic	  progress	  within	  the	   framework	  of	   individual	   freedom	  and	  political	  
liberty”	   (Kennedy,	   June	  1962).	  Moreover,	  Kennedy	  was	   intentionally	  aligning	   the	  
rhetoric	  of	   the	  AFP	   to	   the	  standing	  revolutionary	  missions	   in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  
utilisation	   of	   his	   wife	   Jackie’s	   Spanish	   skills	   in	   Caracas	   and	   Mexico	   City	   was	   a	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particular	  highlight	  (Leaming,	  2001,	  p.	  237).	  It	  was	  a	  sign	  of	  respect	  to	  the	  region.	  
For	  two	  centuries	  the	  US	  had	  looked	  down	  on	  Latin	  America.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  
US	  had	  elected	  a	  President	  who	  would	  visit	  Latin	  America,	  speak	  to	  its	  leaders	  as	  
equals	   and	   appoint	   a	   First	   Lady	   fluent	   in	   Spanish.	   Kennedy’s	   personal	   charisma	  
ensured	   regional	   optimism	   about	   the	   AFP	   in	   its	   early	   stage.	   His	   appointment	   of	  
new	  dealers	  and	  liberals	  also	  provided	  assurances.	  
Kennedy	  was	  assassinated	  in	  Dallas,	  Texas,	  on	  November	  22,	  1963	  (Dallek,	  
2004,	  p.	  694).	  This	  brought	  Lyndon	  Baines	  Johnson	  to	  the	  Presidency.	  Johnson	  was	  
less	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  AFP	  than	  Kennedy	  (Colman,	  2010,	  p.	  164).	  The	  greatest	  
foreign	   policy	   threat	   to	   the	   US	   was	   emerging	   in	   South	   East	   Asia.	   The	   Cuban	  
Revolution	  was	  contained	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1963,	  hence,	  the	  original	  objective	  of	  AFP	  
had	  been	  achieved.	  Despite	   Johnson’s	   claims	   that	  Latin	  America	  was	   “among	   the	  
highest	   concerns	   of	   [his]	   government”	   and	   that	   the	  AFP	   sought	   to	   “improve	   and	  
strengthen	   the	   role	   of	   the	   US”	   in	   Latin	   America,	   the	   region	  was	   downgraded	   to	  
secondary	  importance	  (Colman,	  2010,	  p.	  164).	  Johnson	  purged	  the	  department	  of	  
liberals	   and	   idealists	   (Colman,	   2010,	   p.	   164).	   He	   installed	   Thomas	   C.	   Mann	   as	  
Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs	  and	  US	  AID	  director	  for	  Latin	  
America	   (Colman,	   2010,	   p.	   164).	   From	   1961,	   he	   began	   a	   regression	   back	   to	  
Eisenhower-­‐era	   foreign	  policy	   in	  Latin	  America.	  The	  unashamed	  anti-­‐communist	  
installed	   the	   1964	   Mann	   Doctrine	   (Kunz,	   1997,	   p.	   145).	   The	   Mann	   Doctrine	  
highlighted	  four	  key	  points:	  
(1)	   To	   foster	   economic	   growth	   and	   be	   neutral	   on	   social	   reform;	   (2)	   to	  
protect	   US	   private	   investment	   in	   the	   hemisphere;	   (3)	   to	   show	   no	  
preference,	   through	   aid	   or	   otherwise,	   for	   representative	   democratic	  
institutions;	  and	  (4)	  to	  oppose	  communism	  (Kunz,	  1997,	  p.	  145-­‐6).	  
Mann	  advocated	  the	  political	  role	  of	  economic	  aid	  over	  the	  humanitarian	  one.	  He	  
believed	  that	  all	  US	  loans	  should	  advantage	  US	  hemispheric	  interests.	  This	  justified	  
the	  large	  loans	  given	  to	  authoritarian	  governments.	  
	  
The	  Economic	  Alliance	  
There	   is	   a	   large	   divergence	   in	   economic	   analyses	   of	   the	   application	   and	  
legacy	   of	   the	   Alliance	   for	   Progress.	   This	   divergence	   is	   largely	   centred	   upon	  
interpretations	   of	   economic	   theory.	   The	   Alliance	   for	   Progress	   espoused	  
“Modernisation	   Theory,”	   which	   promoted	   foreign	   investment	   to	   improve	   the	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efficiency	  of	  the	  export	  economy	  (Latham,	  2000,	  p.	  69).	  Latham	  (2000)	  documents	  
the	   theoretical	  approach	  adopted	  by	   the	  Kennedy	  administration	  (pp.	  69-­‐85).	  He	  
argues	   that	  Walt	   Rostow’s	   economic	   team	   “insisted	   that	   the	   United	   States	   could	  
demonstrate	   in	   the	   Hemisphere	   that	   economic	   growth,	   social	   equity,	   and	   the	  
democratic	  development	  of	  societies	  can	  proceed	  hand	  in	  hand”	  (Latham,	  2000,	  p.	  
81).	   While	   acknowledging	   many	   of	   the	   failures,	   Latham	   (2000)	   describes	   the	  
genuine	  attempts	  by	  the	  Rostow	  team	  to	  make	  “Modernisation…a	  battle	  of	   image	  
and	   identity”	   Latin	   America.	   While	   this	   may	   have	   been	   the	   case,	   Bailey	   (1976)	  
argues	   that	   these	   idealistic	   goals	   “were	   swallowed	   up	   by	   the	   pragmatism	   of	   the	  
President	   and	   his	   advisors”	   (p.	   84).	   The	   forerunner	   to	   the	   AFP,	   OPA,	   espoused	  
developmentalism.	   Those	   who	   have	   been	   critical	   of	   the	   AFP	   come	   from	   the	  
background	   of	   dependency	   theory,	   which	   supports	   the	   position	   of	  
developmentalism.	   Developmentalism	   relied	   upon	   the	   economic	   theories	   of	  
Prebisch,	  Singer,	  Frank	  and	  others	  regarding	  the	  unequal	  relationship	  between	  the	  
US	  and	  Latin	  America	   (Prebisch,	   as	   cited	   in	  Dreir,	  1963,	  pp.	  25-­‐51;	  Singer,	  1999,	  
pp.	  913-­‐915;	  Frank,	  1967,	  1970).	  This	  thesis	  will	  demonstrate	  those	  programs	  that	  
sought	   to	   benefit	   Latin	   American	   economies.	   It	   will	   also	   emphasise	   obstacles	   to	  
development	  under	  the	  philosophies	  of	  free-­‐trade	  economics.	  	  
The	   AFP	   was	   an	   economic	   alliance.	   While	   it	   did	   not	   seek	   to	   alter	   the	  
economic	   relationship	  between	   the	  US	   and	  Latin	  America,	   it	   did	  provide	   a	   lot	   of	  
capital.	   Moreover,	   the	   promises	   of	   Dillon	   were	   kept.	   The	   US	   lent	   Latin	   America	  
US$20	  billion	  over	  ten	  years	  (Taffet,	  2007,	  p.	  9).	  Special	  emphasis	  was	  applied	  to	  
Colombia.	  Its	  conservative	  government	  opposed	  communism	  and	  remained	  pro-­‐US	  
in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution.	  Colombia	  was	  provided	  with	  US$761.9	  million	  
between	   1962	   and	   1969	   (Taffet,	   2007,	   p.	   149).	   However,	   Colombia’s	   embattled	  
economy	  limited	  the	  role	  of	  capital	  in	  economic	  development.	  The	  decline	  in	  coffee	  
prices	  meant	  that	  much	  of	  the	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development	  (AID)’s	  loans	  
were	   spent	   on	   Colombia’s	   balance	   of	   payments	   and	   servicing	   its	   standing	   debt	  
accrued	   during	   La	   Violencia	   (Taffet,	   2007,	   p.	   159).	   Moreover,	   no	   development	  
could	   occur.	   The	   US	   used	   the	   funds	   lent	   to	   leverage	   the	   Colombian	   economy.	   It	  
argued	  that	  “greater	  openness	  in	  the	  economy	  would	  improve	  the	  prospects	  for	  US	  
companies	   hoping	   to	   invest”	   and	   promote	   two-­‐way	   trade	   (Taffet,	   2007,	   p.	   159).	  
Colombia	   is	   an	   ideal	   case	   study	   for	   the	   AFP	   period	   as	   its	   government	   was	   not	  
revolutionary.	   Therefore,	   its	   programs	   of	   self-­‐help	   revolved	   around	   returning	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liquidity	   to	   the	   struggling	   economy.	   While	   Kennedy	   celebrated	   the	   social	  
achievements	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Venezuela,	  his	  government	  would	  not	  promote	  them	  
elsewhere.	  The	  AID	  loans	  became	  increasingly	  dependent	  on	  neoliberal	  conditions,	  
including	   “liberalised	   trade	   policy	   and	   noninflationary	   fiscal	   and	   monetary	  
policies”	   (Taffet,	   2007,	   p.	   166).	   While	   these	   demands	   ensured	   stability	   for	  
investors,	  they	  did	  not	  address	  the	  factors	  that	  caused	  the	  AFP,	  making	  the	  rhetoric	  
redundant.	  
In	   many	   respects,	   the	   AFP	   solidified	   the	   economic	   philosophy	   of	   the	  
Eisenhower	   administration.	   The	   AFP	   Charter	   required	   Latin	   American	   states	   to	  
pursue	   free-­‐trade	  economics.	   Free	   trade	  was	  antithetical,	   however,	   to	  one	  of	   the	  
key	  issues	  for	  Latin	  America	  –	  commodity	  price	  reform.	  The	  US	  viewed	  the	  paying	  
of	   a	   fair	   price	   for	   Latin	  American	   resources	   as	   “a	  medieval	   concept”	   (as	   cited	   in	  
Galliano,	  1973,	  p.	  1).	  The	  AFP’s	  support	  of	  modernisation	  theory	  sought	  to	  increase	  
the	  export	  capacities	  of	  dependent	  states	   (Sikkink,	  1992,	  p.	  13).	  While	   this	  could	  
temporarily	   support	   employment,	   and	   produce	   government	   revenues	   for	   social	  
services,	   it	   did	   not	   address	   the	   fundamental	   problem	   of	   development	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   In	   fact,	   in	   many	   aspects	   the	   economic	   problems	   got	   worse.	   Latin	  
American	   economies	   were	   forced	   to	   further	   deregulate	   their	   control	   over	  
commodities	   in	   exchange	   for	   AFP	   funding	   (Taffet,	   2007,	   p.	   159).	   This	   further	  
opened	  their	  economies,	  making	  ISI	  more	  difficult.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  AFP	  funds	  
were	  used	  for	  immediate	  visual	  ‘humanitarian	  aid’	  and	  grants	  to	  ‘friendly	  regimes,’	  
with	  loans	  for	  long-­‐term	  development	  coming	  a	  distant	  third	  (Kunz,	  1997,	  p.	  131).	  
Perhaps	  the	  biggest	  flaw	  of	  the	  AFP	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  planning.	  Many	  states	  did	  not	  
produce	   effective	   estimates	   for	   development	   projects	   (Latham,	   2000,	   p.	   71).	  
Accordingly,	  the	  US	  gave	  several	  contracts	  to	  US	  firms	  to	  construct	  visual	  projects	  
such	  as	  ports,	  rail,	  road,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  schools	  and	  hospitals	  in	  the	  region	  
(Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   159).	   These	   visual	   projects	   further	   enmeshed	   the	   dependent	  
economies	  into	  the	  world	  system.	  The	  AFP	  also	  failed	  to	  address	  issues	  of	  capital	  
flight	   and	   Latin	   American	   debt,	   and	   actively	   opposed	   programs	   of	   economic	  
nationalism.	  Far	  from	  revising	  their	  place	  in	  the	  international	  capitalist	  system,	  the	  
AFP	  merely	  reasserted	  it.	  	  
Economic	  nationalism	  was	  advocated	  as	  a	  means	  of	  development	  by	  several	  
economists,	  most	  notably	  Raúl	  Prebisch.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  AFP	  was	  handicapped	  
by	  the	  “failure	  to	  strengthen	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  economy	  so	  as	  to	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withstand	   external	   fluctuations	   and	   events”	   (Prebisch,	   as	   cited	   in	  Dreir,	   1963,	   p.	  
33).	   The	   issue	   of	   nationalism	   was	   sensitive	   for	   the	   US	   as	   nationalism	   requires	  
regional	  leaders	  to	  exert	  sovereignty	  over	  trade	  and	  investment.	  The	  US	  Congress	  
seized	  upon	   the	   issues	  of	  nationalisation,	   regulation	  and	   taxation	  (Kunz,	  1997,	  p.	  
133).	   They	   opposed	   any	   leftist	   deviation	   from	   the	   AFP	   outcomes.	   In	   1962	   the	  
Governor	   of	   Rio	   de	   Sul	   sought	   to	   nationalise	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   American	   ITT	  
Company	   (Kunz,	   1997,	   p.	   136).	   Those	   actions	   were	   questioned	   by	   the	   US	   State	  
Department.	  In	  fact,	  the	  US	  Congress	  threatened	  to	  withdraw	  AFP	  funding	  to	  all	  of	  
Brazil	  if	  the	  Governor	  did	  not	  stand	  down	  (Kunz,	  1997,	  p.	  136).	  US	  contradictions	  
had	  crippled	  the	  AFP.	  In	  June	  1963,	  Kubitschek	  and	  Camargo	  emphasised	  “that	  the	  
alliance	   had	   not	   been	   granted	   sufficient	   resources	   and	   that	   it	   had	   lost	   the	  
confidence	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  peoples”	  (Kunz,	  1997,	  p.	  144).	  Camargo	  asserted	  
that	  “one	  cannot	  see	  anywhere	  in	  Latin	  America	  the	  spirit	  of	  enthusiasm”	  required	  
to	   achieve	   the	  AFP	   (cited	   in,	   Kunz,	   1997,	   p.	   144).	   Kubitschek	   blamed	   the	  US	   for	  
deviating	  from	  the	  statist	  philosophies	  of	  OPA.	  The	  basic	  contradiction	  was	  simple:	  
the	   US	   sought	   to	   promote	   Latin	   American	   development	  without	   jeopardising	   its	  
own	   dominance	   in	   trade	   and	   development.	   What	   it	   did	   not	   recognise	   was	   that	  
American	   trade	   and	   investment	   was	   somewhat	   responsible	   for	   the	  
underdevelopment	  of	   the	  hemisphere.	  Without	   recognition	  of	   this	  point,	   the	  AFP	  
could	  not	  end	  the	  economic	  stagnation	  of	  the	  hemisphere.	  
The	  greatest	  obstacle	  to	  Latin	  American	  development	  during	  the	  1960s,	  and	  
beyond,	   was	   capital	   flight.	   The	   ECLA	   studied	   this	   problem	   in	   detail.	   It	  
demonstrated	   that	   in	   1962	   a	   disproportionate	   61	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   total	   export	  
earnings	   of	   Latin	   America	   were	   absorbed	   by	   what	   it	   called	   ‘invisible	   services’	  
(Frank,	   1970,	   p.	   184).	   These	   ‘invisible	   services’	   included:	   profit	   remittance	   by	  
foreign	   corporations;	   the	   service	   of	   foreign	   debt;	   foreign	   funds	   transfers;	   and	  
freight,	   travel	   and	   insurance	   (Frank,	   1970,	   p.	   184).	   If	   one	   then	   considered	   the	  
remainder	   of	   its	   foreign	   capital,	   6	   per	   cent	   was	   spent	   on	   fuel;	   13	   per	   cent	   on	  
consumer	  goods	  and	  26	  per	  cent	  on	  raw	  materials	  including	  food	  (Frank,	  1970,	  p.	  
184).	   Moreover,	   without	   spending	   a	   single	   dollar	   on	   development,	   the	   Latin	  
Americans	  together	  had	  spent	  106	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  foreign	  exchange	  (Frank,	  1970,	  
p.	  185).	  Andre	  Frank	  (1970)	  called	  this	  transfer	  of	  capital	  to	  developed	  nations	  a	  
“cycle	   of	   underdevelopment”	   (p.	   186).	   If	   one	   considers	   the	   total	   import-­‐export	  
exchange	   of	   Latin	   America	   in	   1962,	   we	   see	   a	   balance	   of	   payments	   surplus	   of	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US$1.215	   billion	   (Frank,	   1970,	   p.	   186).	   However,	   in	   actual	   terms	   the	   Latin	  
Americans	  spent	  135	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  foreign	  exchange	  (Frank,	  1970,	  p.	  186).	  This	  
meant	  that	  the	  35	  per	  cent	  would	  have	  to	  be	  repaid	  at	  some	  stage.	  Accordingly,	  in	  
future	  years	   ’invisible	  services’	  would	  be	  considerably	  higher.	  While	  much	  of	   the	  
AFP	  funds	  were	  spent	  balancing	  the	  accounts	  of	  defunct	  Latin	  American	  regimes,	  
specifically	  Colombia,	  no	  development	  was	  achieved	   (McPherson,	  2003,	  p.	  91).	  A	  
loan	  program	   could	  not	  work	   for	   Latin	  America.	   The	  money	  had	   to	   be	   repaid	   at	  
some	  stage.	  Latin	  America	  required	  a	  social	  revolution.	  Only	  then	  could	  it	  alter	  its	  
place	   in	   the	   global	   capitalist	   economy.	   Kennedy’s	   short-­‐sighted	   approach	   to	  
economics	   condemned	   Latin	   America	   to	   a	   problematic	   future	   of	   debt-­‐driven	  
economic	  crises,	  which	  defined	  the	  late	  Cold	  War	  period	  for	  many	  states	  (Roddick,	  
1988,	  pp.	  4-­‐19).	  	  	  
The	   US	   committed	   to	   lend	   Latin	   America	   US$20	   billion	   from	   1961	   until	  
1970	   (Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   153).	   	   While	   this	   capital	   was	   spent	   on	   food	   aid,	   military	  
equipment	  and	  small-­‐scale	  public	  works,	   that	  money	  needed	   to	  be	   repaid	   (Kunz,	  
1997,	  p.	  134).	  Roddick	  (1988)	  suggests	  that	  by	  1987,	  the	  Latin	  Americans	  had	  paid	  
US$30.1	  billion	   in	   interest	   to	   the	  US	  and	  private	   institutions	  throughout	   the	  debt	  
crisis	  that	  was	  in	  part	  caused	  by	  the	  AFP	  (p.	  7).	  Any	  good	  that	  could	  be	  achieved	  
from	  the	  loans	  was	  directly	  undermined	  by	  the	  interest	  paid.	  The	  worst	  examples	  
of	   debt	   accumulation	   occurred	   in	  Mexico	   and	   Brazil.	   During	   the	   1960s	  Mexico’s	  
debt	  position	  steadily	  worsened	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  AFP.	   It	  culminated	   in	  a	  debt	  of	  
US$105.6	   billion	   in	   1987	   (Roddick,	   1988,	   p.	   7).	   The	   injection	   of	   capital	   into	   the	  
economy	   did	   not	   alleviate	   public	   poverty.	   Higher	   capital	   injections	   were	   made	  
throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  during	  a	  period	  of	  increased	  poverty	  in	  Mexico.	  
While	  Brazil’s	  debt	  position	  was	  onerous	  prior	  to	  the	  AFP,	  it	  worsened	  during	  the	  
1960s	  (Roddick,	  1988,	  p.	  11).	  Many	  of	  these	  loans	  directly	  increased	  the	  capacity	  
of	   the	   military,	   both	   through	   grants	   and	   ‘civic	   action’	   (Gaillard,	   1992,	   p.	   64).111	  
Brazil	  reached	  a	  crippling	  debt	  position	  of	  US$116.9	  billion,	   leading	  into	  the	  debt	  
crisis	  of	  1987	  (Roddick,	  1988,	  p.	  7).	  Given	  that	  the	  AFP	  did	  not	  achieve	  its	  stated	  
goals,	   the	   regional	   debt	   accumulated	   throughout	   the	   AFP	   era	   was	   especially	  
damaging.	   Moreover,	   the	   contradiction	   of	   the	   AFP	   was	   its	   failure	   to	   “convert	  
[Kennedy’s]	  good	  words	  into	  good	  deeds”	  (Kennedy,	  March	  1961).	  The	  US	  had	  no	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  This	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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obligation	  to	  loosen	  its	  economic	  grip	  on	  Latin	  America	  and,	  unsurprisingly,	  it	  did	  
not.	  	  
	  
Designed	  to	  Fail	  
This	  thesis	  asserts	  that	   the	  AFP	  was	  designed	  to	   fail	  Latin	  America.	   It	  was	  
antithetical	  to	  US	  interests	  to	  conduct	  a	  social	  and	  democratic	  revolution	  in	  Latin	  
America.	  The	  AFP	  charter	  was	  highly	  contradictory	  and	   in	  some	  ways	   illogical.	   It	  
advocated	   extensive	   land	   reform	   without	   creating	   incentives	   for	   landowners	   to	  
transfer	   their	   land	   to	   peasants.	   It	   advocated	   commodity	   price	   reform	   without	  
creating	  the	  mechanisms	  to	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  raw	  materials.	  It	  advocated	  social	  
policies,	   including	   education,	   healthcare,	   gender	   equality	   and	   income	  
redistribution,	  without	  creating	   the	  economic	   incentives	   to	  make	   the	  ruling	  class	  
enact	  these	  reforms.	  Most	  significantly,	  the	  AFP	  advocated	  democracy	  without	  US	  
support	   for	   constitutional	   regimes	   against	  military	   coups.	   The	   full	   extent	   of	   this	  
will	   be	   explained	   in	   the	   final	   chapter.	   However,	   it	   highlights	   the	   contradictions	  
inherent	  in	  the	  AFP.	  Many	  historians	  have	  asserted	  that	  the	  AFP	  was	  a	  liberal	  aid	  
program	  that	  intended	  to	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	   living	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Latham,	  
2000;	   Scheman,	  1988;	  Taffet,	   2007).	  However,	   there	   is	   little	   evidence	   to	   support	  
this.	   Economic	   growth	  was	   stagnant	  during	   the	  AFP.	  The	  AFP	  did	  not	   follow	   the	  
recommendations	   of	   the	   ECLA	   to	   achieve	   long-­‐term	   development,	   in	   fact,	   it	  
actively	  opposed	  policies	  of	  economic	  nationalism	  and	  did	  not	  confront	  the	  issue	  of	  
capital	  flight.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  AFP	  period	  left	  Latin	  America	  with	  a	  substantial	  debt	  
position	   that	   crippled	   the	   region	   throughout	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  The	  AFP	  was	  
designed	   to	   fail	   in	  Latin	  America	  because	   the	   success	  of	   the	  AFP	  would	   severely	  
handicap	   the	   position	   of	   US	   trade	   and	   investment	   in	   the	   region.	   Its	   success	  
required	  the	  US	  government	  to	  act	  against	  its	  own	  interests.	  	  The	  swift	  isolation	  of	  
the	   Castroist	   threat	   de-­‐emphasised	   the	   AFP,	   allowing	   the	   US	   to	   return	   to	  
Eisenhower	  era	  economic	  policies	  under	  the	  Mann	  Doctrine.	  
The	   AFP,	   however,	   was	   a	   success	   for	   the	   US.	   Within	   two	   months	   of	  
committing	   to	   the	  Charter	  of	  Punta	  del	  Este,	   the	  Cubans	  were	  banished	   from	  the	  
OAS.	   The	   Latin	   American	   people	  were	   enthusiastic	   about	   the	  AFP.	   Kennedy	  was	  
greeted	  by	  cheering	  crowds	  in	  Caracas,	  Bogotá	  and	  Mexico	  City	  between	  1961	  and	  
1963.	  He	  was	  the	  most	  celebrated	  American	  leader	  in	  Latin	  America,	  with	  regional	  
enthusiasm	  for	  his	  polices,	  exceeding	  that	  for	  Roosevelt’s	  Good	  Neighbour	  Policy.	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The	   utilisation	   of	   progressive	   advisors,	   strong	   allegiances	   to	   social	   and	   liberal	  
democratic	   leaders,	   and	  his	  wife’s	  Spanish	   language	  skills,	   along	  with	   the	   largest	  
foreign	   economic	   commitment	   to	   Latin	   America	   in	   history,	   earned	   Kennedy	  
astounding	   prestige	   in	   Latin	   America.	   This	   notoriety	   was	   achieved	   without	   any	  
concrete	  signs	  of	   the	  social	  and	  democratic	  revolution	  proposed	  by	  AFP	  rhetoric.	  
In	  fact,	  the	  enthusiasm	  reached	  its	  pinnacle	  prior	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  AFP.	  UN	  
Ambassador	   Stevenson	   and	   the	   USIA	   division	   in	   Latin	   America	   informed	   the	  
President	   in	   March	   1961	   that	   he	   had	   made	   a	   profound	   impression	   on	   Latin	  
America.	   By	   1963	   that	   impression	   had	   changed.	   However,	   the	   Kennedy	  
administration	   was	   unfazed.	   By	   1963:	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	   was	   isolated;	   the	  
majority	   of	   the	   Castroist	   insurgencies	   had	   occurred	   and	   failed;	   the	   hemisphere	  
began	   its	   progression	   from	   democratic	   to	   military	   states;	   the	   US	   increased	   its	  
military	   influence	   in	   Latin	   America;	   the	   philosophical	   policies	   of	   the	   AFP	   were	  
institutionalised;	  leftist	  and	  nationalist	  development	  policies	  were	  eradicated;	  and	  
the	  US	  had	  created	  its	  own	  version	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  stability	  that	  allowed	  
US	  investment	  to	  thrive	  regionally.	  While	  it	  had	  not	  met	  the	  stated	  objectives	  of	  the	  
AFP,	   it	  was	  a	   successful	  policy	   for	   the	  US.	  The	   following	   chapter	  will	   explain	   the	  
parallel	  political	  and	  military	  events.	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‘In	   the	   Grip	   of	   a	   Psychosis’:	   Anti-­‐communism,	  
Counterinsurgency	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  a	  New	  Militarism	  
Shortly	  after	  the	  military	  coup	  against	  the	  Dominican	  Republic’s	  short	  experiment	  
with	  democracy,	   its	  deposed	  President,	   Juan	  Bosch,	  explained	  to	  historian	  Robert	  
Alexander	  (1995)	  that,	  “all	  of	  America,	  with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  Canada,	  is	  in	  
the	  grip	  of	  a	  psychosis.	  It’s	  not	  merely	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fear	  of	  communism,	  but	  there	  
is	   a	   fear	   of	   anything	   different”	   (p.	   230).	   This	   chapter	   explains	   the	   volatile	  
relationship	  between	  ‘insurgents’,	  Latin	  American	  society,	  the	  military	  and	  the	  US	  
that	  emerged	  between	  1961	  and	  1965,	  creating	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  remaining	  
25	  years	  of	  Cold	  War	   in	  Latin	  America.	  By	  1962	  the	  Kennedy	  administration	  had	  
effectively	   isolated	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution,	   gained	   allies	   through	   the	   AFP,	   caused	  
schisms	   within	   the	   social	   democratic	   movement	   and	   legitimised	   the	   anti-­‐
communist	   pretext.	   One	   final	   obstacle	   to	   regional	   hegemony	   came	   from	   small	  
insurgent	   groups,	   in	   several	   Latin	   American	   republics,	   who	   sought	   to	   emulate	  
Castro’s	   Sierra	  Maestra	   victory	   of	   1959.	   These	   insurgent	   groups	  were	   primarily	  
composed	  of	  middle-­‐class	   intellectuals	  who	  had	  broken	  away	  from	  their	  national	  
reform	   parties,	   attempting	   to	   create	   regional	   alliances	   with	   peasant	   groups	  
disgruntled	   with	   national	   and	   regional	   politicians	   and	   military	   generals.	   This	  
threat	   of	   ‘another	   Cuba’	   led	   the	   Kennedy	   administration	   to	   accelerate	   counter-­‐
insurgency	   funding	   and	   training	   in	   Latin	   America.	   This	   ‘threat’,	   however,	   also	  
created	   an	   ‘opportunity’	   to	   increase	   US	   influence,	   as	   it	   was	   integrated	   with	   the	  
philosophy	  of	  civic	  action	  that	  attempted	  to	  dislodge	  the	  insurgent	  groups	  in	  rural	  
areas.	  The	   considerable	   expansion	  of	   the	  Latin	  American	  armed	   forces	   created	  a	  
new	  militarism	   that	   directly	   impacted	   thirteen	   of	   the	   twenty	   regional	   republics.	  
This	  final	  regression	  to	  militarism	  in	  the	  Latin	  American	  Cold	  War	  was	  predicated	  




Every	  Latin	  American	  country	  experienced	  some	  form	  of	  insurgency	  in	  the	  
years	  after	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  (Goldenberg,	  1965,	  p.	  311).	  In	  most	  cases,	  these	  
insurgent	   groups	   were	   easily	   defeated	   by	   national	   militaries.	   However,	   in	  
Colombia,	   Venezuela,	   Guatemala	   and	  parts	   of	   Peru,	   large-­‐scale	   insurgencies	   took	  
hold	  within	   rural	   communities	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   39).	   This	   thesis	  will	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demonstrate	  the	  origins,	  cause	  and	  immediate	  effects	  of	  these	  insurgencies	  of	  the	  
early	  1960s.	  Thomas	  Whickham-­‐Crowley	   (1991,	  1992)	  argues	   that	   the	   insurgent	  
movements	  were	  formed	  within	  the	  hemisphere.	  That	  is,	  they	  were	  not	  imported	  
from	   the	   Soviet	   Union.	   Through	   substantial	   research,	   Wickham-­‐Crowley	   (1992)	  
concludes	   “guerrilla	   movements	   do	   not	   begin	   among	   the	   peasants	   in	   the	  
countryside	  but	  among	  urban-­‐based	  intellectuals,	  especially	  in	  the	  twin	  milieus	  of	  
universities	   and	   political	   parties”	   (p.	   30).	   He	   goes	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   the	   Cuban	  
example	   was	   utilised	   by	   other	   leftist	   groups	   that	   existed	   within	   the	   standing	  
political	   system.	   This	   demonstrates	   the	   class	   origins	   of	   the	   region’s	   leading	  
insurgents.	   They	   were	   not	   peasants	   or	   communist	   agents,	   but	   disenfranchised	  
reformers	   from	   the	   now	   redundant	   social	   democratic	   movement.	   Radu	   (1988)	  
confirms	  this	  view,	  although	  from	  a	  different	  perspective	  (pp.	  1-­‐15).	  He	  argues	  that	  
guerrilla	   movements	   were	   an	   “elite	   phenomenon”	   made	   by	   those	   “unwilling	   to	  
accept…the	  prevailing	  social	  conventions	  of	  his	  class	  or	  group”	  (Radu,	  1988,	  p.	  3).	  
This	   thesis	   adheres	   to	   the	   view	   that	   university-­‐educated	   politicians	   alienated	   by	  
the	   perceived	   failure	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	   parties	   created	   the	   guerrilla	  
movements	  of	  1961-­‐1965.	  This	   section	  will	   examine	   the	  physical	  and	   ideological	  
origins	  of	  the	  insurgent	  movements	  that	  sought	  to	  emulate	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution.	  
Following	   the	   failed	   Bay	   of	   Pigs	   invasion,	   the	   Kennedy	   administration	  
became	   obsessed	   with	   avoiding	   “another	   Cuba”	   (Grow,	   2008,	   p.	   80).	   Kennedy	  
argued	  that	  
The	   free	  world’s	   security	   can	  be	   endangered	  not	   only	  by	   a	  nuclear	   attack	  
but	  also	  by	  being	   slowly	  nibbled	  away	  at	   the	  periphery,	   regardless	  of	  our	  
strategic	  power,	  by	   forces	  of	  subversion,	   infiltration,	   intimidation,	   indirect	  
or	   non-­‐overt	   aggression,	   internal	   revolution,	   lunatic	   blackmail,	   guerrilla	  
warfare	  or	  a	  series	  of	  limited	  wars	  (as	  cited	  in	  Barber	  and	  Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  
31).	  
Kennedy’s	  prophecy	  was	  not	   solely	  directed	  at	  Latin	  America.	  However,	  many	  of	  
these	   ‘peripheral’	   forces	   were	   evident	   in	   the	   region.	   ‘Internal	   revolutions’	   were	  
common	  to	  the	  Latin	  American	  political	  experience	  but	  were	  usually	  conducted	  by	  
democratic	   elements	   and	   were	   often	   followed	   by	   elections.	   Accusations	   of	  
‘subversion’	   and	   ‘infiltration’	   were	   directed	   at	   the	   USSR.	   While	   the	   Cuban	  
Revolution	  had	  reinvigorated	  the	  communist	  parties,	  no	  Moscow-­‐orientated	  party	  
was	  on	  the	  front	  line	  of	  a	  national	  revolution	  (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1992,	  pp.	  30-­‐33).	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The	  small	  communist	  movement	  often	  directed	  its	  influence	  of	  ‘Socialism’	  on	  many	  
democratic	  political	  parties,	  most	  ominously	   in	  Chile	  with	  Salvador	  Allende.	  This	  
section	   will	   argue	   that,	   like	   Castro’s	   revolution,	   the	   insurgent	   movements	   were	  
both	   local	   to	   the	   region	   and	   an	   ideological	   extension	   of	   the	   national	   political	  
discourse.	   It	   will	   also	   demonstrate	   how	   insurgent	  movements	   formed	   coalitions	  
with	  peasants	   in	   rural	   areas	   of	   Latin	  America.	   Furthermore,	   it	  will	   explain	   some	  
significant	  examples	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare	  in	  this	  period.	  
Insurgencies	  began	   in	  urban	  settings	  as	   the	  class	  origins	  of	   the	   insurgents	  
who	  waged	  war	   in	   Latin	   America	   between	   1956	   and	   1965	  were	   predominately	  
middle-­‐class.	   Wickham-­‐Crowley	   (1992)	   identifies	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   rural	  
insurgencies	  within	  the	  urban	  political	  discourse	  (p.	  30).	  The	  example	  of	  Castro’s	  
revolution	   encouraged	   the	   younger,	   radical	   reformers	   to	  wage	   revolution	   in	   the	  
countryside.	   In	   his	   anthropological	   analysis,	   Radu	   (1988)	   identified	   a	  
“disproportionate	   amount	   of	   upper	   and	   middle	   class	   elements	   among	   the	  
revolutionaries”	  (p.	  3).	  These	  revolutionaries	  began	  to	  identify	  their	  interests	  with	  
that	   of	   peripheral	   members	   of	   society,	   including	   the	   peasantry.	   Fidel	   Castro	  
successfully	  utilised	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  peasantry	  to	  realign	  the	  national	  discourse.	  
However,	   even	   Castro	   had	   taken	   lessons	   in	   rural	   insurgency	   from	  Marti,	   Zapata	  
and	   Sandino.	   He	   utilised	   a	   nationalist	   collective	   identity	   to	   motivate	   revolution.	  
This	   form	  of	   revolution	   is	   remote	   from	   traditional	   notions	   of	  Marxist	   revolution	  
among	   the	   proletarians	   of	   Eastern	   Europe.	   In	   fact,	   “becoming	   a	   nationalist	   is	   so	  
incompatible	  with	  being	  a	  Leninist	  as	  to	  be	  impossible”	  (Radu,	  1988,	  p.	  6).	  That	  is	  
why	   Mexican	   Revolutionaries,	   Sandino’s	   guerrillas	   and	   the	   social	   democratic	  
movement	   systematically	   rejected	   doctrinal	   Marxism	   (Radu,	   1988,	   p.	   6).	   They	  
could	   not	   serve	   the	   national	   interest	   by	   conforming	   to	   the	   foreign	   political	   and	  
economic	  policy	  of	   the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  revolutionaries	  of	  Latin	  America	   fought	  
for	  independence	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  develop	  a	  vanguard	  serving	  their	  version	  of	  the	  
national	   interest	   (Aguilar,	   1988,	   p.	   147).	   While	   many	   were	   sympathetic	   to	  
components	   of	   Marxism,	   including	   a	   socialised	   welfare	   state,	   they	   were	   not	  
fighting	  for	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.	  The	  insurgents	  
motivated	   the	   populace	   through	   this	   nationalist	   rhetoric,	   far	   removed	   from	   the	  
sentiments	  of	  collectivism	  of	  authoritarian	  rule.	  Such	  a	  message	  could	  only	  lead	  to	  
alienation	   and	   defeat,	   as	   was	   the	   case	   with	   each	   of	   the	   doctrinaire	   Communist	  
Parties	  in	  the	  region.	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Virtually	   every	   guerrilla	   movement	   in	   Latin	   America	   emerged	   within	   the	  
reformist	   parties.	   The	   Venezuelan	   Movement	   of	   the	   Revolutionary	   Left	   (MIR)	  
evolved	   out	   of	   the	  Acción	  Democrática	   political	   party	   (Ratliff,	   1976,	   p.	   100).	   The	  
MIR	   opposed	   Betancourt’s	   platform	   in	   the	   1958	   elections	   and	  while	   Betancourt	  
received	  49	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  vote,	  his	  popularity	  in	  Caracas	  was	  significantly	  lower,	  
at	  12	  per	  cent	  (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1992,	  p.	  44).	  This	  demonstrated	  discontent	  with	  
moderate	   reform	   and	   reflected	   the	   radicalism	   of	   AD	   youth	   who	   “forged	   their	  
political	   thought	   in	   the	   battle	   against	   the	   increasingly	   bloody	   Pérez	   Jiménez	  
regime”	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1992,	   p.	   44).	   In	   Peru,	   a	   similar	   demographic	   was	  
drawn	  away	  from	  the	  Apristas.	  The	  Peruvian	  MIR	  charged	  that	  Haya	  had	  become	  
“pro-­‐yanqui	  and	  [was]	  in	  collusion	  with	  the	  oligarchy”	  (Goldenberg,	  1965,	  p.	  315).	  
Luis	   de	   la	   Puenta,	   a	   chief	   Aprista	   defector,	   claimed	   his	   support	   for	   Marxism-­‐
Leninism	   as	   the	   only	   road	   that	   “can	   lead	   the	   liberation	  process”	   in	   Peru	   (Ratliff,	  
1976,	  p.	   100).	   In	  Bolivia,	   the	   schism	  occurred	   in	   the	  months	   leading	   to	   the	   coup	  
against	   Estenssoro’s	   MNR.	   The	   National	   Liberation	   Army	   (ELN)	   was	   founded	   in	  
1964	   (Ratliff,	   1976,	   p.	   123).	   Its	   leader,	  Victor	  Medina,	   targeted	   the	   “political	   and	  
military	  domination	  of	   the	  United	  States”	  while	  distancing	  himself	   from	  Marxism	  
and	   Cuba	   (Ratliff,	   1976,	   p.	   119).	   The	   Revolutionary	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   Colombia	  
(FARC)	  emerged	  out	  of	  the	  fallout	  of	  La	  Violencia	  and	  coalition	  rule	  (Leech,	  2011,	  p.	  
14).	   The	   FARC	   leadership	   was	   ideologically	   connected	   to	   the	   Colombian	  
Communist	   Party	   (PCC),	   more	   so	   than	   other	   insurgent	   group	   in	   Latin	   America	  
(Leech,	   2011,	   pp.	   14-­‐17).	   The	   PCC	   had	   utilised	   the	   demise	   of	   Gaitán	   to	   gain	  
influence	   over	   all	   actors	   outside	   of	   the	   oligarchy.	   The	   FARC	   has	   led	   the	   longest	  
insurgency	  in	  Latin	  American	  history,	  beginning	  in	  1964	  (Leech,	  2011,	  pp.	  12-­‐35).	  
The	   urban	   FARC	   leadership	   cadre	   attempted	   “to	   secure	   power	   through	   the	  
unorthodox	   means	   of	   military	   alliance	   with	   the	   peasantry”	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  
1991,	  p.	  44).	  This	  followed	  the	  example	  of	  Castro’s	  Cuba.	  
The	   Cubans	   attempted	   to	   support	   revolution	   in	   Latin	   America	   as	   they	  
sought	  to	  extend	  their	  Sierra	  Maestra	  experience	  to	  greater	  Latin	  American.	  They	  
utilised	   widespread	   enthusiasm	   for	   the	   revolutionary	   ideology	   of	   Castroism	   to	  
increase	   their	   regional	   significance.	  Castro	  also	  provided	  material	   support	   to	   the	  
pro-­‐Castro	   revolutionaries	   of	   Nicaragua	   and	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	   (Crawley,	  
1979,	  p.	  127).	  Castro’s	   ideology	  emerged	  alongside	  his	   insurgent	   tactics.	  Castro’s	  
tactics	   were	   enmeshed	   within	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   Sierra	   Maestra.	   It	   was	   not	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dependent	  on	   the	  declarations	  of	   Socialism	  and	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	   that	   followed	  
the	  revolution.	  Castroism	  was	  distinct	  from	  doctrinal	  communism	  for	  a	  number	  of	  
reasons.	  Firstly,	   it	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  USSR	  or	  the	  Cominform	  for	  direction.	  Quite	  
simply,	  Latin	  America	  “had	  never	  been	  one	  of	  Moscow’s	  priorities”	  (Aguilar,	  1988,	  
p.	   145).	   The	   experience	   of	   Cuba	   did	   not	   overtly	   change	   this	   stance.	   Secondly,	  
Castroism	  did	  not	  emphasise	  the	  appointment	  of	  leading	  communists	  to	  head	  the	  
revolution.	  As	  Castro	  declared	  in	  1962,	  Cuba	  made	  “a	  socialist	  revolution	  without	  
Socialists”	  (Aguilar,	  1988,	  p.	  144).	  Those	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  had	  emerged	  from	  
the	  social	  democratic	  reform	  parties	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  Castro’s	  violent	  struggle.	  
Finally,	   they	   saw	   themselves	   as	   the	   revolutionary	   vanguard	   of	   their	   nations.	  
According	  to	  Aguilar	  (1988),	  that	  “vanguard”	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  “a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  
party”	   and	   could	   remain	   independent	   of	   “those	   parties”	   (p.	   147).	   Hence	   Cuba’s	  
support	   of	   the	   Latin	   American	   revolution	   was	   not	   solely	   dependent	   on	   its	  
professed	   communism.	   Rather,	   its	   support	   was	   a	   show	   of	   support	   for	   other	  
“autochthonous	  product[s]	  of	  the	  continent”	  (Goldenberg,	  1965,	  p.	  311).	  The	  urban	  
revolutionaries	   that	   enacted	   many	   of	   these	   insurgencies	   were	   not	   therefore	  
committed	   to	   enacting	   a	   communist	   state.	   However,	   they	   were	   committed	   to	  
reform,	  especially	  when	  it	  could	  procure	  the	  support	  of	  the	  peasantry.	  
Insurgent	   groups	   did	   not	   emerge	   in	   rural	   areas.	   However,	   the	   small	  
revolutionary	   cadres	   were	   completely	   dependent	   upon	   an	   organised	   peasantry.	  
With	   a	   few	   exceptions,	   Latin	   American	   national	   government	   authority	   did	   not	  
reach	   into	   the	   rural	   areas.	   Local	   landowners	   and	   regional	   police	   possessed	  
authority	  in	  these	  areas.	  However,	  the	  contract	  between	  peasants	  and	  landowners	  
was	   fragile.	   In	  cases	  where	  discriminate	  violence	  was	  used	  to	  either	  take	   land	  or	  
assert	   further	  authority,	   the	  urban	  guerrillas	   took	  advantage	  of	   the	  peasant	  need	  
for	   retribution	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   37).	   The	   revolutionary	   cadres	   could	  
develop	  an	  alliance	  with	  rural	  peasants	  in	  several	  ways.	  The	  simplest	  was	  material	  
reward	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  exchange	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  for	  assistance	  and	  shelter.	  The	  
second	   was	   to	   promise	   meaningful	   change,	   including	   land	   reform	   and	   fair	  
governance	   for	  practical	   assistance	   in	   their	   struggle	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1991,	  p.	  
37).	  Those	  promises	  of	  land	  reform	  attracted	  additional	  troops	  to	  the	  small	  cadres.	  
Literacy	   drives	   and	   routine	   health	   checks	   also	   improved	   the	   prestige	   of	   the	  
guerrillas.	  However,	  the	  most	  effective	  method	  was	  reprisal.	  When	  the	  government	  
or	   rural	   authorities	   directed	   an	   attack	   on	   the	   rebels,	   unintentionally	   killing	   the	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peasant	  population,	  the	  rebels	  could	  offer	  the	  surviving	  peasants	  the	  opportunity	  
for	   retribution	   (Radu,	   1988,	   p.).	   This	   was	   most	   effective	   in	   Colombia,	   where	  
indiscriminate	  government	  killing	  of	  peasants	  was	  common	  (Leech,	  2011,	  p.	  14).	  
Once	   in	   control	   of	   a	   rural	   area,	   the	   rebels	  would	   create	   an	   informal	   government	  
with	  laws	  and	  responsibilities.	  The	  revolutionaries	  then	  defended	  these	  “guerrilla	  
zones”	  while	   targeting	   further	   territory	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   65).	   It	   was	  
their	  responsibility	  to	  defend	  the	  peasants	  from	  state-­‐directed	  violence.	  However,	  
when	   the	   peasants	   betrayed	   their	  movement,	   the	   guerrillas	   carried	   out	   punitive	  
action	  (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1991,	  p.	  70).	  This	  was	  more	  isolated	  than	  government	  
terror	   as	   it	  was	  directed	   at	   an	   individual	   for	   their	   actions.	   Insurgent	   groups	  had	  
varying	   success	   in	   establishing	   guerrilla	   fronts	   in	   rural	   areas	   primarily	   in	   this	  
manner.	  
Insurgent	  groups	  emerged	  in	  several	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  The	  clearest	  
examples	   were	   in	   Cuba,	   Venezuela,	   Colombia	   and	   Guatemala.	   Colombia’s	  
insurgency	   predates	   its	   primary	   organisation,	   the	   FARC.	   The	   eradication	   of	  
Gaitainism	   propelled	   the	   communists,	   the	   PCC,	   to	   leadership	   among	   the	   leftist	  
community	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   13).	   In	   1961,	   they	   took	   a	   Castroist	   line,	   advocating	  
armed	   struggle	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   13).	   This	   armed	   struggle,	   as	   elsewhere	   in	   Latin	  
America,	  was	  small	  and	   focussed	  on	   the	  peasantry.	  The	  communists	   formed	  self-­‐
defence	   groups	   in	   rural	   Colombia	   that	   the	  US	   and	   the	  Colombian	  National	   Front	  
viewed	  as	   ‘insurgencies’	   (Leech,	  2011,	  p.	  14).	  The	  counter-­‐insurgency	  operations	  
of	  1962,	  discussed	  below,	  were	  the	  catalyst	   for	   the	  expanded	   insurgency	  and	  the	  
1964	   establishment	   of	   the	   FARC	   (Leech,	   2011,	   p.	   17).	   Continuing	   militarism	   in	  
Guatemala	   led	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Revolutionary	   Movement	   13th	   November	  
(MR13)	  during	  1961	  (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1991,	  p.	  35).	  The	  group	  was	  composed	  of	  
Árbenz-­‐era	  politicians	   and	  military	  officers,	   and	   received	   the	  political	   backing	  of	  
the	   Cuban	   government	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   35).	   The	   MR13	   engaged	   in	  
ambush	   attacks	   in	   rural	   areas.	   By	   1962	   “Guatemala	  was	   descending	   into	   exactly	  
the	   kind	   of	   violent	   Third	  World	   revolution	   that	   the	  Kennedy	   administration	   had	  
feared	  (Streeter,	  2006,	  p.	  59).	  Following	  Guevara’s	  suggestion,	  the	  Venezuelan	  MIR	  
engaged	   in	   a	   Sierra	   Maestra-­‐type	   insurgency	   in	   Southern	   Venezuela	   from	   1960	  
(Alexander,	   1964,	   p.	   146).	   The	  MIR	   received	   greater	   support	   in	   Caracas	   than	   in	  
rural	  areas.	  Due	  to	  its	  unique	  social	  structure,	  then,	  the	  revolutionary	  model	  was	  ill	  
defined	   for	   Venezuela	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1992,	   p.	   41).	   The	   long-­‐term	   MIR	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struggle	   was	   not	   met	   with	   the	   level	   of	   force	   witnessed	   in	   Colombia.	   Wickham-­‐
Crowley’s	  (1991)	  suggestion	  of	  the	  indiscriminate	  use	  of	  force	  appears	  correct;	  the	  
Colombian	  and	  Guatemalan	  insurgencies	  grew	  due	  to	  government	  action,	  while	  the	  
Venezuelan	  group	  stagnated	  (p.	  70).	  
	  
Counter-­‐Insurgency	  
The	  US	  was	  responsible	  for	  initiating	  counter-­‐insurgency	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
These	   operations	   were	   multifaceted.	   They	   required	   military	   training,	   large	  
amounts	  of	  military	  aid,	  the	  implementation	  of	  civic	  action	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  
the	  education	  of	  soldiers	  as	  to	  the	  communist	  menace	  they	  were	  confronted	  with.	  
By	  indoctrinating	  domestic	  police	  forces	  through	  US	  perceptions	  of	  the	  communist	  
and	   insurgent	   threat	   to	   Latin	  American	   security,	   the	  US	   increased	   its	   role	   in	   the	  
‘defence’	  of	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere.	  As	  Federico	  Gil	  (1988)	  explains,	  “the	  goal	  of	  
military	  aid	  to	  Latin	  America	  evolved	  from	  the	  prevention	  of	  outside	  aggression	  to	  
the	   suppression	   of	   internal	   subversion”	   (p.	   19).	   That	   is,	   the	   US	   asserted	   an	  
increased	   presence	   within	   the	   internal	   security	   of	   individual	   Latin	   American	  
countries.	  While	   this	  was	  perceived	  as	  necessary	   to	  prevent	   the	  Castroist	   threat,	  
the	  effects	  were	  far	  reaching.	  Coatsworth	  (1994)	  explains	  the	  US	  military	  build-­‐up	  
in	  Latin	  America	  from	  1.6	  per	  cent	  of	  foreign	  ‘aid’	  and	  loans	  under	  Eisenhower	  to	  
5.3	   per	   cent	   under	   Kennedy	   (p106).	   He	   states	   “the	   Kennedy	   administration	  
enthusiastically	  supported	  programs	  to	  improve	  the	  image	  of	  the	  local	  military	  and	  
increase	  their	  capabilities	  for	  counterinsurgency	  operations”	  (Coatsworth,	  1994,	  p.	  
106).	  The	  increased	  capacity	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  militaries,	  combined	  with	  their	  
training	  by	  US	  officials,	  increased	  their	  place	  in	  civilian	  politics	  (Gill,	  2004,	  pp.	  59-­‐
65).	   Furthermore,	   the	   Latin	   American	   militaries	   could,	   on	   the	   advice	   of	   US	  
intelligence,	  police	  remote	  areas	  of	  the	  continent	  to	  ensure	  stability	  and	  economic	  
growth	  (Fishel	  and	  Cohen,	  1992,	  p.	  51).	  The	  anti-­‐communist	  psychosis	  convinced	  
many	  responsible	  democrats	  to	   initiate	  a	   level	  of	  militarisation	  unprecedented	  in	  
the	  region’s	  history,	  and	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  lead	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  democracy	  in	  
many	  of	  those	  states.	  
The	  Kennedy	  administration	  oversaw	   the	  most	   significant	  evolution	  of	  US	  
military	  relations	  towards	  Latin	  America	   in	   its	  diplomatic	  history.	  The	  policies	  of	  
counterinsurgency	  and	  civic	  action	  broke	  down	  traditional	  notions	  of	  military	  aid,	  
military	   training	  and	  national	   sovereignty.	  Gill	   (2004)	  claims	   “counterinsurgency	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warfare	  fascinated	  President	  Kennedy”	  (p.	  77).	  Eisenhower’s	  military	  support	  for	  
the	   Batista	   regime	   had	   failed	   dramatically	   in	   1958	   as	   the	   regime	   had	   been	  
ineffective	   and	   received	   criticism	   from	  both	   sides	   of	   the	   political	   spectrum.	  As	   a	  
result,	   Kennedy	   envisaged	   a	   new	   response	   to	   the	   Castroist	   insurgencies	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   According	   to	   Gaillard	   (1992),	   “President	   Kennedy	   was	   responsible	   for	  
organising	   US	   foreign	   affairs	   and	   national	   security	   agencies	   to	   guide	   and	   assist	  
governments	  he	  considered	  threatened…to	  resist	  the	  threat	  of	  communist	  inspired	  
insurgency”	   (p.	   63).	   As	   was	   the	   case	   for	   the	   AFP,	   propaganda	   was	   key	   to	   the	  
success	  of	  counter-­‐insurgency	  operations.	  If	  the	  US	  and	  its	  allies	  were	  portrayed	  as	  
the	   aggressors,	   then	   their	   strategy	   would	   fail.	   It	   was	   important	   that	   the	   Latin	  
American	  militaries	  win	  the	  admiration	  of	  their	  population.	  To	  do	  this,	  the	  US	  had	  
to	  coordinate	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  mission.	  These	  included	  direct	  action,	  training,	  civic	  
action	  and	  allocating	  resources	  based	  on	  threats.	  To	  this	  end,	  Kennedy	  established	  
a	   “special	   group”	   to	   coordinate	   counter-­‐insurgency	   and	   civic	   action	   policies	  
throughout	   Latin	   America	   (Gaillard,	   1992,	   p.	   63).	   This	   group	   was	   composed	   of	  
Allen	  Dulles,	  Robert	  Kennedy,	  Admiral	  Arleigh	  Burke	  and	  General	  Maxwell	  Taylor	  
(Barber	   and	   Ronning,	   1966,	   p.	   95).	   The	   special	   group	   coordinated	   between	  
government	  agencies	  to	  ensure	  that	  US	  funds	  were	  directed	  towards	  the	  insurgent	  
threat	   to	   US	   interests.	   Kennedy’s	   counter-­‐insurgency	   policies	   were	   far	   more	  
advanced	  than	  is	  traditionally	  recognised.	  Within	  three	  years,	  national	  sovereignty	  
had	   broken	   down	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   the	   US	   was	   coordinating	   the	   struggle	  
against	  Castroist	  insurgencies	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
Counter-­‐insurgency	  training	  began	  at	  Fort	  Gulick,	  Panama,	  on	  July	  31,	  1961	  
(Gill,	   2004,	   p.	   74).	   The	   Kennedy	   administration	   oversaw	   the	   greatest	   peacetime	  
expansion	  of	   the	  US	  Special	  Forces	   in	   its	  history	  (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  75).	  These	  Special	  
Forces	   became	   instrumental	   to	   Kennedy’s	   regional	   foreign	   policy	   agenda.	   In	   the	  
year	  preceding	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  counter-­‐insurgency	  training	  course,	  a	  battalion	  
of	  the	  Seventh	  Special	  Forces	  Group	  visited	  Panama	  (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  75).	  Forty	  Latin	  
American	   students	   attended	   the	   first	   counter-­‐insurgency	   program	   at	   the	   LAGS	  
(Gill,	   2004,	   p.	   76).	   They	   represented	   twelve	   Latin	   American	   countries	   and	   their	  
ranks	   ranged	   from	  Second	  Lieutenant	   to	  Major	   (Gill,	  2004,	  p.	  78).	  The	  LAGS	  was	  
rebranded	   as	   the	   School	   of	   the	   Americas	   (SOA)	   in	   1963,	   with	   an	   increased	  
enrolment	  of	  leading	  military	  officials	  representing	  the	  greater	  role	  of	  the	  military	  
in	   politics.	   This	   phenomenon	   fed	   itself	   indefinitely.	   While	   military	   governments	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expanded	   their	   participation	   within	   the	   SOA,	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   SOA	   expanded	  
military	  governments.	  In	  addition	  to	  military	  tactics,	  the	  students	  at	  the	  SOA	  were	  
also	  about	  their	  Soviet,	  communist	  and	  miscellaneous	  enemies.	  Through	  this	  anti-­‐
communist	  pretext	   it	   indoctrinated	  generations	  of	  military	   leaders	  who	  attended	  
the	   SOA	   (Gill,	   2004,	   p.	   79).	   It	   was	   explained	   to	   the	   officers	   that	   the	   enemy	  was	  
directed	   from	   Moscow	   and	   posed	   a	   permanent	   threat.	   The	   SOA	   purposely	  
dehumanised	   insurgents	   and	   peasants.	   For	   SOA-­‐trained	   officers,	   the	   insurgents	  
were	  soldiers	  loyal	  to	  Moscow	  who	  manipulated	  the	  people	  to	  support	  communist	  
doctrine.	   The	   role	   of	   the	   military	   was	   to	   destroy	   the	   insurgency	   by	   all	   means	  
necessary.	  The	  US	   trainers	  convinced	   the	  Latin	  American	  officers	  who	  studied	  at	  
the	  SOA	   that	   it	  was	   their	  duty	   to	  prevent	   communist	  upheaval.	  By	  distorting	   the	  
definition	  of	  communism	  to	  include	  all	  progressive	  movements,	  the	  US	  effectively	  
turned	   the	   Latin	   American	   militaries	   against	   their	   governments,	   and	   eventually	  
their	  own	  people,	  to	  ensure	  compliant	  leaders.	  
Under	   this	   philosophy,	   the	   definition	   of	   national	   interest	   and	   US	   interest	  
became	   blurred.	   Insurgents,	   unionists,	   peasants	   and	   populist	   governments	  were	  
seen	  to	  represent	  a	  ‘foreign’	  interest,	  while	  the	  army	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  patriotic	  (Gill,	  
2004,	  p.	  79).	  This	  situation	  was	  most	  evident	  following	  the	  US-­‐backed	  coup	  in	  Chile	  
in	  1973.	  According	  to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  democratic	  Allende	  administration,	  Carlos	  
Prats,	  
Many	   of	   these	   [soldiers]	   have	   responded	   to	   the	   stereotypes	   and	   thoughts	  
	   were	  	  inculcated	  into	  them	  during	  these	  courses	  [at	  the	  SOA]	  and,	  believing	  
	   they	   were	   liberating	   the	   country	   from	   the	   internal	   enemy,	   have	  
	   committed	  a	   crime	  which	   	   can	  only	  be	  explained	  by	   their	   ingenious,	   their	  
	   ignorance	  and	  their	  political	  short-­‐	  sightedness	   (cited	   in	   Gill,	   2004,	   pp.	   79-­‐
	   80).	  
Given	   that	   the	   students	   of	   the	   SOA	   were	   high-­‐ranking	   military	   officials,	   the	  
indoctrination	  strategies	  were	  widely	  successful.	  Those	  men	  responsible	  for	  foiling	  
democracy	  held	  close	  connections	  to	  the	  US	  through	  such	  training	  programs	  (Gill,	  
2004,	  p.	  80).	  However,	  the	  infiltration	  of	  the	  military	  elite	  meant	  very	  little	  without	  
the	   support	   of	   the	   soldiers	   directly	   involved	   in	   counter-­‐insurgency	   operations.	  
Accordingly,	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   LAGS	   into	   the	   SOA	   was	   accompanied	   by	   a	  
training	   surge	   by	   the	   US	   Special	   Forces	   in	   Latin	   America	   (Gill,	   2004,	   p.	   78).	  
Between	  1962	  and	  1967,	  more	   than	   six	  hundred	  Special	  Forces	  officers	   aided	   in	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the	  expansion	  of	  counter-­‐insurgency	  capabilities	  within	  Latin	  America	  (Gill,	  200,	  p.	  
78).	  The	  Special	  Forces	  were	  divided	  into	  Mobile	  Training	  Teams	  consisting	  of	  two	  
Special	   Forces	   officers	   and	   ten	  military	   personnel	  who	  were	   sent	   “to	  work	  with	  
conventional	  armies,	   intelligence	  groups,	  and	  paramilitary	   irregulars”	  (Gill,	  2004,	  
86).	  
Civic	  action	  was	  introduced	  by	  the	  US	  to	  alter	  the	  role	  of	  the	  military	  within	  
Latin	  American	  politics.	  US	  military	  leaders	  viewed	  Latin	  America’s	  militaries	  as:	  
…the	  guardians	  of	   the	  national	   interest	  by	   replacing	   a	   government	   that	   is	  
confronted	  by	  growing	  strikes,	  riots,	  and	  terrorism	  or	  one	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  
in	   danger	   of	   being	   taken	   over	   by	   a	   resurgence	   of	   labour	   leftists	   (Robert	  
Wood,	  as	  cited	  in	  Barber	  and	  Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  38).	  
However,	   the	   Latin	   American	   peasantry	   viewed	   that	   same	   military	   as	   brutally	  
repressive.	   Given	  Washington’s	   vision	   for	   a	  militarised	   Latin	   America	   under	   the	  
Mann	   Doctrine	   of	   1964,	   public	   image	   became	   increasingly	   important	   (Colman,	  
2010,	  p.	  164).	  Civic	  action,	  introduced	  in	  1961,	  sought	  to	  utilise	  military	  personnel	  
and	   equipment	   to	   build	   public	   infrastructure	   and	   utilities	   that	   benefited	   the	  
impoverished	  masses	  of	  Latin	  America	  (Gaillard,	  1992,	  p.	  63).	  The	  military	  took	  an	  
active	  role	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  ports,	  roads,	  wells,	  schools,	  hospitals	  and	  housing.	  
These	   projects	   brought	   economic	   and	   social	   benefits	   to	   many	   people	   (Gaillard,	  
1992,	  p.	  64).	  While	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  military’s	  image	  was	  significant,	  it	  was	  
not	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  civic	  action.	  The	  US	  sought	  to	  drastically	  increase	  the	  size	  
and	   capabilities	   of	   Latin	   American	   militaries	   (Gaillard,	   1992,	   p.	   63).	   They	   also	  
sought	   to	   disperse	   those	   personnel	   to	   regional	   areas	   threatened	   by	   potential	  
‘insurgencies’.	  By	  utilising	  mass	  amounts	  of	  US	  AFP	  AID	  resources,	  the	  resources	  of	  
many	  Latin	  American	  militaries	  significantly	  increased	  (Gil,	  1988,	  p.	  19).	  Therefore	  
AID,	   not	   MAP,	   was	   funding	   the	   salaries,	   training,	   transport	   and	   ammunition	   of	  
many	  Latin	  American	  militaries	  (Barber	  and	  Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  17).	  This	  led	  to	  an	  
unregulated	  expansion	  of	  those	  military	  forces	  during	  the	  1960s,	  primarily	  aimed	  
at	  preventing	  a	  ‘new’	  Sierra	  Maestra	  in	  other	  regional	  areas	  of	  Latin	  America.	  
Both	   AID	   and	   the	   MAP	   funded	   counterinsurgency.	   The	   MAP’s	   director,	  
Robert	  Wood,	  explained	  that	  
The	  primary	  purpose	  of	   the	  proposed	   fiscal	  year	  1965	  Military	  Assistance	  
Program	   for	   Latin	   America	   is	   to	   counter	   the	   threat	   to	   the	   entire	   area	   by	  
providing	   equipment	   and	   training	  which	  will	   bolster	   the	   internal	   security	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capabilities	   of	   the	   recipient	   countries	   (Wood,	   as	   cited	   in	   Barber	   and	  
Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  35).	  
In	   fact,	   the	  official	   records	  show	  a	  steep	  decline	   in	  MAP	  funding.	  There	  was	  a	  71	  
per	  cent	  decline	  in	  MAP	  funding	  from	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  averages	  to	  
the	  1965	  fiscal	  year	  (Barber	  and	  Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  36).	  MAP	  funding	  to	  democratic	  
Venezuela,	   Costa	   Rica	   and	   Uruguay	   was	   essentially	   eliminated	   (Barber	   and	  
Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  36).	  This	  was	  due	  to	  the	  overlapping	  of	  MAP	  and	  AID	  resources	  
through	  the	  programs	  of	  civic	  action	  and	  counter-­‐insurgency.	  Federico	  Gil	  (1988)	  
states,	   “through	   AID	   a	   public	   safety	   program	   was	   launched	   under	   which	   Latin	  
American	  internal	  security	  and	  police	  forces	  were	  provided	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  arms	  
and	   special	   equipment”	   (p.	   19).	  US	  AID	   resources	  were	  heavily	   intertwined	  with	  
civil	  military	  operations	  (Fishel	  and	  Cowen,	  1992,	  p.	  49).	  Given	  that	  the	  AFP	  was	  a	  
propaganda	   program,	   this	  was	   an	   inevitable	   result.	   The	   Latin	   American	  military	  
provided	   the	   region	   with	   stability.	   However,	   improperly	   applied,	   military	  
involvement	  could	  also	  lead	  to	  instability	  by	  “alienating	  the	  populace”	  or	  failing	  to	  
“deliver	   basic	   services”	   (Fishel	   and	   Cowen,	   1992,	   p.	   50).	   Moreover,	   US	   AID	  
provisions	  were	  spent	  on	  coalition	  building	  between	  the	  Latin	  American	  militaries	  
and	   the	   civilians.	  This	   alienated	   the	   insurgency	  movements	  and	  was	  effective,	   as	  
most	  of	  the	  guerrilla	  movements	  were	  removed	  by	  1967	  (Gil,	  1988,	  p.	  20).	  
Counter-­‐insurgency	  operations	  began	  in	  Latin	  America	  following	  Kennedy’s	  
inauguration	   in	   1961.	   After	   the	   demise	   of	   Trujillo,	   “Kennedy	   personally	   ordered	  
aids”	  to	  teach	  the	  Dominican	  police	  force	  “riot	  control	  techniques”	  (Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  
44).	  The	  Dominican	   situation	  was	  a	  priority	   for	   the	  US,	   as	   it	  was	   concerned	   that	  
Castroist	   forces	  would	   infiltrate	   the	   Bosch	   government	   and	   so	   sought	   to	   bolster	  
Dominican	  military	   security	   (Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   44).	   The	   largest	   counter-­‐insurgency	  
force	   emerged	   in	   Colombia	   in	   1964.	   “Plan	   Laso”	   was	   a	   sophisticated	   counter-­‐
insurgency	   operation	   that	   targeted	   the	   communist-­‐controlled	   areas	   of	   rural	  
Colombia	   (Leech,	   2011,	  p.	   14).	  An	   estimated	  7000	  US-­‐trained	   soldiers	  destroyed	  
the	   “independent	   republic	  of	  Marquetalia”	   in	  1964	   (Leech,	  2011,	  p.	   14).	  The	  CIA	  
also	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  counter-­‐insurgency	  effort,	  providing	  anti-­‐communist	  
propaganda	   to	   the	   affected	   areas	   (Cockcroft,	   1996,	   p.	   419).	   The	   Colombian	  
counter-­‐insurgency	   effort	   also	   emphasised	   civic	   action.	   However,	   this	   was	  
ineffective	  as	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  the	  Colombian	  army	  killed	  ten	  peasants	  for	  every	  
insurgent	  (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	  1991,	  p.	  70).	  This	   type	  of	   force	  was	  detrimental	   to	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government	   control	   over	   rural	   areas	   in	   Colombia.	   In	   Venezuela,	   guerrilla	   zones	  
were	   regularly	   bombed	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   65).	   However,	   civilian	  
casualties	  were	  much	  lower	  than	  in	  Colombia,	  as	  the	  Venezuelan	  military	  initiated	  
“voluntary	   evacuations”	   of	   civilian	   populations	   (Wickham-­‐Crowley,	   1991,	   p.	   65).	  
The	   Betancourt	   government	   attempted	   to	   win	   the	   loyalty	   of	   the	   Venezuelan	  
peasantry,	   eroding	   the	   base	   for	   the	   insurgent	   movement.	   The	   early	   stages	   of	  
counter-­‐insurgency	   in	  Latin	  America	  varied	   in	   individual	  countries.	  However,	   the	  
rise	   of	   small	   insurgent	   movements	   in	   virtually	   every	   nation	   of	   Latin	   America	  
necessitated	  an	   increased	  military	  presence	   in	  Latin	  America.	  This	  was	  provided	  
by	  the	  US	  through	  MAP	  and	  AID	  funding,	  as	  well	  as	  training	  and	  leadership	  in	  the	  
tactics	  of	  counter-­‐insurgency	  and	  civic	  action.	  This	  integration	  of	  the	  military	  and	  
civilian	   administrations	   led	   to	   the	   eventual	   regional	   regression	   to	   authoritarian	  
rule.	  
	  
Yet	  Another	  Regression	  
	   The	  military	  policies	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Mann	  Doctrine	  significantly	  influenced	  
US	   diplomacy	   towards	   Latin	   America	   and	   the	   OAS	   (McPherson,	   2003,	   p.	   101).	  
Between	   1961	   and	   1965,	   the	   US	   oversaw	   anti-­‐democratic	   coups	   in	   Argentina,	  
Brazil,	   Honduras,	   the	  Dominican	  Republic,	   Peru	   and	   Bolivia.	   This	  military	   policy	  
culminated	  in	  the	  US	  invasion	  of	  Santo	  Domingo	  in	  1965.	  Through	  this	  act,	  the	  US	  
clearly	  set	  its	  priorities	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Any	  government	  that	  did	  not	  conform	  to	  
the	  central	  themes	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  and	  free	  trade	  economics	  could	  not	  exist	  in	  
Latin	  America.	  There	  could	  be	  no	   ‘second’	  Castro.	  The	  US	  also	  actively	  repressed	  
new	   left-­‐wing	   governments	   that	   emerged.	   It	   stifled	   progressives	   in	   elections	   in	  
both	  Chile	  and	  Guatemala	  as	  the	  US	  also	  fought	  against	  the	  election	  of	  the	  Socialist	  
Salvador	  Allende	  in	  the	  elections	  of	  1960	  and	  1964.	  The	  most	  blatant	  support	  was	  
given	   to	   Eduardo	   Frei	   in	   1964;	   the	   CIA	   donated	   US$20	   million	   to	   his	   electoral	  
campaign.	  James	  Petras	  (1969)	  asserts	  that:	  “US	  government	  intervention	  in	  Chile	  
in	   1964	  was	   blatant	   and	   almost	   obscene”	   and	   “an	   unusual	   influx	   of	   US	  military	  
personnel	   into	   Chile”	  was	   also	   evident	   prior	   to	   the	   election	   (p.	   19).	   The	  US	  was	  
motivated	  by	  two	  criteria.	  Firstly,	  Allende	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  leftist	  threat.	  Secondly,	  
Frei	   was	   an	   adherent	   to	   US	   fiscal	   policy.	   This	   led	   to	   vast	   private	   investments	  
through	   the	   AFP	   infrastructure.	   Chile	   was	   an	   ideal	   ally	   and	   the	   US	   sought	   to	  
maintain	   the	   status	   quo	   by	   utilising	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   pretext.	   The	   US	   had	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demanded	  free	  elections	  in	  Guatemala	  in	  1963;	  however,	  when	  Arévalo	  ascended	  
as	  a	  returning	  presidential	  hopeful,	  the	  US’	  position	  changed	  (Coatsworth,	  1994,	  p.	  
104).	  Arévalo’s	  candidacy	  brought	  renewed	  hope	  to	  Guatemalans.	  He	  promised	  to	  
reverse	   the	  counter-­‐revolution.	  On	  March	  31	  1963	   the	  head	  of	   the	  armed	   forces,	  
General	   Enrique	   Peralta	   Azurdia,	   seized	   power	   from	   Ydígoras	   Fuentes,	   claiming	  
that	  Arévalo	  was	  heading	  a	  communist	  conspiracy	  in	  Central	  America	  (Coatsworth,	  
1994,	  p.	  104).	  The	  US	  would	  not,	  under	  any	  circumstances,	  let	  another	  ally	  fall	  into	  
hostile	  hands.	  	  
Arturo	   Frondizi’s	   four-­‐year	   showdown	  with	   the	  Argentine	  military	   finally	  
ended	  with	  his	  ousting	  in	  1962	  (Szusterman,	  1993,	  p.	  219).	  	  The	  ‘deal’	  made	  with	  
Perón	  in	  1958	  allowed	  for	  the	  eventual	  transition	  of	  Perónists	  back	  into	  Argentine	  
politics	   (James,	   1988,	   p.	   141).	   Frondizi	   confidently	   asserted	   that	   his	   economic	  
achievements	  would	  undermine	   the	  populist	  policies	  of	  Perónism.	  Potash	  (1980)	  
demonstrates,	   “Frondizi	   failed	   to	   break	   Perón’s	   hold	   over	   the	  working	   class”	   (p.	  
377).	  This	   failure	  turned	  the	  military	  against	  his	  administration	  (Potash,	  1980,	  p.	  
377).	  The	  March	  1962	  municipal	  elections	  reversed	  his	   fortunes.	   In	   line	  with	  his	  
1958	  commitment,	  he	  allowed	  Perónists,	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  Unión	  Popular,	  to	  
participate	  in	  municipal	  elections	  (Szusterman,	  1993,	  p.	  212).	  Perónists	  won	  ten	  of	  
the	  fourteen	  provincial	  elections,	  including	  Buenos	  Aires	  (James,	  1988,	  p.	  152).	  In	  
response,	   he	   attempted	   to	   overturn	   seven	   of	   the	   elections,	   launch	   a	   proactive	  
attack	   on	   all	   communists	   and	   permanently	   ban	   all	   signs	   and	   symbols	   of	   Perón	  
under	   decree	   2542	   (James,	   1988,	   p.	   152).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   armed	   forces	  
overthrew	  Frondizi	  (Potash,	  1980,	  p.	  230).	  The	  US	  State	  Department	  accepted	  the	  
outcome	   of	   the	   coup	   as	   the	   military	   condemned	   Castro’s	   revolution,	   yet	   it	   also	  
requested	   immediate	   elections	   (Bailey,	   1976,	   p.	   83).	   The	   results	   of	   the	   1963	  
presidential	   elections	   were	   telling.	   The	   blank	   vote,	   representing	   the	   Perónists,	  
received	   19	   per	   cent,	  while	   the	   victor	   only	   achieved	   25.8	   per	   cent	   (Szusterman,	  
1993,	  p.	  210).	  When	  Perónists	   re-­‐joined	   the	   system	   in	  1965,	   their	   success	   led	   to	  
the	   overthrow	   of	   another	   democratic	   regime	   the	   following	   year	   (Rock,	   1986,	   p.	  
250).	   As	   Szusterman	   (1993)	   identifies,	   “democracy	   in	   Argentina	   was	   liable	   to	  
produce	  the	  ‘wrong’	  result”	  (p.	  219).	  The	  military	  attempted	  to	  run	  a	  ‘democratic’	  
system	  in	  which	  an	  estimated	  20-­‐30	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  population	  were	  excluded.	  By	  
outlawing	   the	  political	  manifestations	  of	  Perónism,	  Argentina	  was	  condemned	   to	  
cyclical	  military	  interventions	  until	  that	  appeal	  was	  decreased.	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Military	  coups	  also	  disrupted	  democratic	  rule	  in	  Peru	  and	  Bolivia	  during	  the	  
first	   years	   of	   the	   AFP.	   In	   Peru,	   President	   Manuel	   Prado	   legalised	   Aprista	  
participation	  in	  the	  1962	  presidential	  elections	  (Klaren,	  2000,	  p.	  320).	  However,	  by	  
1962	   APRA	   had	   split	   along	   ideological	   grounds	   (Ratliff,	   1976,	   p.	   100).	   The	  
moderate	  wing	  remained	  under	  the	  control	  of	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre,	  while	  the	  radical	  
Movement	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Left	  (MIR)	  was	  led	  by	  ex-­‐Aprista	  Luis	  de	  la	  Puente	  
(Goldenberg,	   1965,	   p.	   315).	   The	   conservatives	   promoted	   the	   candidacy	   of	  
Fernando	  Belaúnde.	  Despite	  the	  forthcoming	  democratic	  elections,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  
the	  military	  would	  not	  accept	  an	  APRA	  or	  MIR	  victory.	  One	  key	  general	  warned	  the	  
US	  ambassador	  that	  those	  “which	  originally	  drank	  at	  the	  communist	  fountains	  had	  
changed	   their	   political	   programs	   in	   a	   cynical	   play	   for	   power”	   (Klaren,	   2000,	   p.	  
320).	  On	  July	  18,	  1962	  the	  military	  removed	  Prado,	  along	  with	  the	  perceived	  threat	  
of	  Aprismo	   (Klaren,	  2000,	  p.	  320).	  The	  Bolivian	  MNR	   faced	  opposition	   from	  both	  
the	   left	  and	  the	  right	  during	  the	  1960s.	  On	  November	  4,	  1964,	   the	  Bolivian	  army	  
staged	  a	   coup	  against	   the	  President	  Víctor	  Paz	  Estenssoro	   (Malloy	   and	  Gamarra,	  
1988,	   p.	   1).	   This	   was	   a	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   coup	   against	   a	   constitutional	  
revolutionary	  regime	   that	  held	  power	   for	  over	  a	  decade	  (Malloy	  and	  Gamarra,	  p.	  
3).	  By	  1964,	  Paz	  faced	  opposition	  from	  both	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right.	  The	  left	  opposed	  
the	  moderation	  of	   the	  MNR	  through	   its	  economic	   interaction	  with	  US	  oil	  and	  gas	  
companies	  (Klein,	  1992,	  p.	  249);	  the	  right	  blamed	  Paz	  for	  the	  economic	  stagnation	  
that	  burdened	  the	  economy	  (Klein,	  1992,	  p.	  248).	  By	  the	  time	  the	  military	  moved	  
against	  Paz,	  it	  had	  support	  from	  conservative	  MNR	  members.	  However,	  soon	  after	  
the	   military	   assumed	   power	   a	   guerrilla	   struggle	   began,	   with	   the	   assistance	   of	  
Cuban	  forces.	  It	  was	  in	  Bolivia,	  in	  1967,	  that	  the	  CIA	  finally	  killed	  Guevara	  (Prados	  
Salmon,	  1987,	  pp.	  99-­‐120).	  
Democracy	  was	   also	   eradicated	   in	  Honduras	   and	   the	  Dominican	  Republic	  
during	   this	   period.	   The	   Honduran	   example	   highlights	   the	   hypocrisy	   of	   the	   AFP	  
period.	  Ramón	  Villeda	  was	  an	  exception	  within	   the	  AFP.	  He	  naively	  believed	   the	  
AFP	   charter	   (MacCameron,	   1983,	   p.	   178).	   He	   followed	   the	   recommendations	   on	  
agrarian	   reform	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   discriminated	   against	   most	   Honduran	  
politicians,	  who	  were	  landholders	  (MacCameron,	  1983,	  p.	  178).	  He	  enacted	  a	  land	  
reform	  policy	  that	  was	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  Árbenz’s	  1951	  Decree	  900.	  The	  military	  
and	  the	  oligarchy	  deposed	  Villeda	  on	  October	  3,	  1963	  (Coatsworth,	  1994,	  p.	  102).	  
While	  the	  US,	  under	  the	  AFP,	  promoted	  ‘democracy,’	  no	  condemnation	  eventuated.	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On	  December	  14	  the	  US	  recognised	  the	  military	  regime	  (Coatsworth,	  1994,	  p.	  102).	  
The	   Dominican	   example	   highlighted	   US	   uncertainty	   over	   Latin	   American	  
democracy.	   Kennedy’s	   Dominican	   arithmetic	   left	   Juan	   Bosch	   in	   a	   precarious	  
position.	   Bosch	   was	   an	   idealistic	   social	   democrat.	   He	   was	   not	   a	   communist.	   He	  
believed	  in	  political	  freedoms.	  He	  asserted	  in	  1962	  that	  the	  Partido	  Revolucionario	  
Dominicano	   (PRD)	   would	   allow	   the	   communists	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   political	  
sphere,	  despite	  his	  negative	  views	  on	  communism	  and	  Castroism	  (Bosch,	  as	  cited	  
in	  Alexander,	  1995,	  p.	  224).	  Bosch	  indicated	  that	  there	  was	  a	  disconnect	  between	  
State	   Department	   rhetoric	   and	   the	   American	   military.	   He	   argued	   that	   the	  
Ambassador	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  his	  regime,	  while	  the	  Pentagon	  colluded	  with	  the	  
Dominican	  military	  (Bosch,	  as	  cited	  in	  Alexander,	  1995,	  p.	  227).	  The	  Pentagon	  won.	  
In	   January	   1963	  Bosch	  was	   removed	   through	   a	   coup	   (Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   47).	   Bosch	  
believed	   that	   “the	  only	   group	   in	   the	   [DR]	   that	  had	  not	  been	   corrupted	   [was]	   the	  
masses	  of	  the	  people,”	  but	  he	  refused	  to	  have	  the	  people	  fight	  the	  military	  to	  return	  
him	   to	   power	   (as	   cited	   in	   Alexander,	   1995,	   p.	   232).	   In	   his	   view,	   the	   Dominican	  
Republic	  had	  missed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  as	  the	  military	  returned	  power	  to	  
the	  Trujillo	  family.	  	  
Brazil	   remained	   at	   the	   centre	   of	  Washington’s	   thinking	   on	   Latin	  America.	  
The	   removal	   of	   João	   Goulart	   was	   inevitable	   in	   the	   Cold	   War	   context.	   The	   US	  
opposed	   the	  governments	  of	  Quadros	  and	  Goulart	  due	   to	   their	   sympathy	   for	   the	  
Cuban	  Revolution	  (Dallek,	  2003,	  p.	  521).	  The	  State	  Department	  foresaw	  a	  “foreign	  
policy	   orientated	   increasingly	   toward	   the	   Soviet	   bloc	   in	  world	   affairs…”	   (Dallek,	  
2003,	  p.	  521).	  Ambassador	  Gordon	  asserted	  that	  the	  1964	  coup,	  
Can	   indeed	  be	   included	   along	  with	   the	  Marshall	   Plan	  proposal,	   the	  Berlin	  
Blockade,	  the	  defeat	  of	  communist	  aggression	  in	  Korea,	  and	  the	  resolution	  
of	   the	  missile	   crisis	   in	   Cuba	   as	   one	   of	   the	  major	   turning	   points	   in	   world	  
history	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (Skidmore,	  1988,	  p.	  28).	  
Due	  to	  their	  interpretation	  of	  Latin	  American	  politics,	  the	  US	  viewed	  the	  overthrow	  
of	  democratic	  Latin	  American	  governments,	  such	  as	  Goulart’s,	  as	  pivotal	  victories	  
in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Despite	  the	  good	  relations	  between	  Kennedy	  and	  Kubitschek,	  the	  
Brazilians	  had	  continually	  frustrated	  the	  Kennedy	  administration.	  Brazil’s	  was	  one	  
of	   the	   few	   governments	   who	   refused	   to	   condemn	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution	  
(Goldenberg,	   1965,	   p.	   314).	   It	   was	   also	   the	   greatest	   critic	   of	   US	   AID	   allocations,	  
despite	  being	  the	  greatest	  recipient	  (Alexander,	  1991,	  p.	  149).	  Kubitschek,	  Quadros	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and	   Goulart	   were	   nationalists.	   They	   opposed	   foreign	   monopolisation	   of	  
commodities,	  capital	  and	  trade	  (Alexander,	  1991,	  p.	  296).	  Moreover,	  they	  opposed	  
the	   economic	   philosophy	   of	   the	   US.	   Although	   the	   US	   disapproved	   of	   Quadros,	   it	  
was	  alarmed	  when	  he	  resigned	  in	  1962,	  leaving	  Goulart	  as	  President	  (Goldenberg,	  
1965,	  p.	  314).	  It	  demanded	  a	  reduced	  capacity	  for	  the	  leftist	  president,	  which	  the	  
military	   and	   Congress	   adhered	   to.	  When	  Goulart	   attempted	   to	   rule	   by	   decree	   in	  
1964,	   the	  military	  overthrew	  his	   government	   (Skidmore,	  1988,	  p.	  26).	  While	   the	  
US	   saw	   this	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Cold	   War,	   Goulart	   had	   sought	   to	   promote	  
economic	  policies	  that	  benefited	  Brazilians.	  He	  was	  not	  a	  communist.	  However,	  the	  
psychosis	  of	  the	  time	  made	  this	  fact	  irrelevant.	  
	   A	   consistent	   theme	   in	   this	   regional	   regression	   is	   clear.	  The	  American	  AFP	  
rhetoric	   had	   been	   accepted	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Accordingly,	   the	   regions	   leaders	  
opened	   their	   systems	   to	   more	   democratic	   elections.	   The	   problem	   existed	   in	  
American	  commitment	  to	  this	  rhetoric.	  While	  they	  spoke	  of	  democracy	  they	  chose	  
military	   coups	  over	   a	   return	  of	   Peron	   and	  Haya,	   or	   any	  new	   form	  of	   democratic	  
action	   emerging	   in	   Honduran	   and	   the	   Dominican	   Republic.	   Anti-­‐communism	  
motivated	  this	  new	  regression,	  but	  it	  Communism	  was	  clearly	  not	  the	  only	  enemy.	  
Conflicted	  US	  rhetoric	  was	  responsible	   for	  the	  overthrow	  of:	   	  Arturo	  Frondizi	   for	  
his	   links	   to	  Perónism;	  Manuel	  Prado	   for	   the	  support	  granted	  by	   the	  Apristas;	   the	  
moderate	  reformist	  Paz	  Estensarro;	  the	  naïve	  reformer	  Manuel	  Vidella;	  Juan	  Bosch	  
for	   refusing	   to	   ban	   communism;	   and	   the	   left	   labour	   leader	   João	   Goulart.	   Anti-­‐
communism	   also	   prevented	   the	   democratic	   revolution	   of	   the	   socialist	   Salvador	  
Allende	   and	   social	   democrat	   Juan	   José	  Arévalo.	  According	   to	  Coatsworth	   (1994),	  
the	  Kennedy	  and	  Johnson	  administrations	  “viewed	  many	  of	  the	  political	  and	  social	  
organisations	  most	  committed	  to	  addressing	  the	  region’s	  social	  problems	  as	  pro-­‐
Cuban”	  (p.	  111).	  However,	  the	  removal	  of	  these	  civilian	  governments	  dramatically	  
increased	   the	   impetus	   of	   insurgent	   organisations.	   The	   only	   governments	   who	  
survived	   the	   first	   four	   years	   of	   the	  AFP	   as	   entirely	   constitutional	  were	  Uruguay,	  
Costa	   Rica	   Venezuela,	   Colombia,	   Chile,	   Mexico	   and	   Panama.	   The	   other	   thirteen	  
Latin	   American	   nations	   suffered	   some	   form	   of	   military	   government	   during	   the	  
early	  AFP	  period.	  Given	  that	   the	  AFP	  was	  sold	  as	  regional	  democratic	  revolution,	  
this	   seems	   problematic.	   However,	   the	   AFP	   was	   not	   pro-­‐democracy;	   it	   was	   anti-­‐
Cuban.	  The	  clearest	  enunciation	  of	  US	  policy	  towards	  Latin	  American	  democracy,	  
again,	   comes	   from	  Kennedy	  himself.	  His	  stated	  preference	   for	  government	   in	   the	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Dominican	   Republic	   was	   democratic	   (Kennedy,	   as	   cited	   in	   Rabe,	   1999,	   p.	   41).	  
However,	  if	  a	  democracy	  risked	  the	  possible	  emergence	  of	  a	  Castroist	  regime,	  then	  
the	   preference	   became	   a	   right-­‐wing	   military	   dictatorship	   (Kennedy,	   as	   cited	   in	  
Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  41).	  This	  is	  where	  the	  pervasiveness	  of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  
emerges.	  The	  US	  had	  long	  viewed	  any	  deviation	  in	  political	  and	  economic	  policy	  as	  
communism,	   or	   the	   ‘communist	   line.’	   Given	   this	   misinterpretation	   of	   social	  
democracy,	  populism,	   labour	  democracy,	   left-­‐liberalism,	   and	  even	   some	   forms	  of	  
nationalism,	   Kennedy’s	   preferred	   rule	   in	   Latin	   America	   became	   right-­‐wing	  
dictatorships.	   Since	   right-­‐wing	   dictatorships	   provoke	   the	   greatest	   levels	   of	  
insurgent	   resistance,	   this	   position	   seems	   self-­‐serving,	   as	   leftist	   resistance	   to	  
authoritarian	   rule	   is	   the	   greatest	   long-­‐term	   justification	   for	   authoritarian	   rule	  
throughout	  Latin	  America	  –	  a	  situation	  that	  continued	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	  
	  
In	  the	  Grip	  of	  a	  Psychosis?	  
The	   Cold	   War	   dominated	   regional	   politics	   throughout	   the	   1960s.	   The	  
tragedy	   of	   the	   Cold	   War	   in	   Latin	   America	   was	   that	   the	   insurgents	   of	   that	   time	  
would	   have	   followed	   the	   constitutional	   road	   had	   it	   been	   provided	   to	   them.	   If	  
democracy	   had	   prevailed	   in	   Latin	   America	   during	   the	   1940s	   and	   1950s,	   the	  
insurgency	  of	  the	  1960s	  would	  not	  have	  eventuated.	  Fidel	  Castro	  exemplifies	  this	  
point.	   Without	   Chibás’	   1951	   death	   and	   the	   1952	   Batista	   coup,	   there	   would	   not	  
have	  been	  a	  Sierra	  Maestra	  movement	  in	  Cuban	  history.	  And	  without	  Castro	  many	  
other	  groups	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  social	  democrats	  would	  have	  continued	  to	  follow	  the	  
electoral	  road.	  Despite	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America,	  it	  
had	   certainly	   arrived	   by	   1965.	   The	   Soviet	   Union	   supported	   the	   Cuban	   economy	  
and	   political	   system,	   which	   posed	   a	   credible	   threat	   to	   several	   Latin	   American	  
governments.	  The	  support	  and	  training	  afforded	  to	  insurgent	  groups	  necessitated	  
a	   military	   response.	   When	   domestic	   militaries	   were	   not	   capable	   of	   imposing	  
coercive	   rule,	   the	   US	  military	   became	   involved.	   20,000	   US	  marines	   invaded	   the	  
Dominican	  Republic	   on	  April	   28,	   1965	   (Crandle,	   2006,	   p.	   22).	   President	   Johnson	  
asserted	   that	   “for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   [OAS],	   it	   has	   created	   and	  
sent…an	   international	   peace	   keeping	   military	   force”	   (as	   cited	   in	   Barber	   and	  
Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  210).	  He	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  OAS	  should	  maintain	  a	  constant	  
force	  for	  such	  purposes.	  Despite	  Johnson’s	  claim	  that	  this	  was	  a	  multilateral	  effort,	  
it	  was	  unilateral;	  this	  was	  the	  first	  US	  invasion	  in	  the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  for	  over	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three	  decades	  (Crandle,	  2006,	  p.	  66).	  Some	  allied	  OAS	  troops	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  
occupation,	   however	   the	   US	   executed	   the	   invasion	   alone.	   The	   irony	   of	   the	  
Dominican	  invasion	  was	   its	  cause.	  The	   insignificant	  14th	  of	   June	  Revolution	  Party	  
was	   completely	   subordinate	   to	   Bosch’s	   PRD,	   who	   the	   bulk	   of	   the	   citizenry	   had	  
deposed	  the	  military	  to	  elect	  (Rabe,	  1999,	  p.	  192).	  The	  US	  invaded	  the	  Dominican	  
Republic	   because	   of	   its	   geographic	   proximity	   to	   Cuba,	   rather	   than	   any	   shared	  
ideological	  conviction	  between	  Castro	  and	  Bosch.	  Few	  within	  the	  OAS	  condemned	  
this	  action.	  	  
The	   Cold	   War	   changed	   the	   notion	   of	   warfare	   in	   Latin	   America.	   The	  
psychosis	   that	   dominated	   Latin	   America	   exacerbated	   social	   divisions.	   The	   anti-­‐
communist	  pretext	   created	  enemies	  within	  Latin	  American	  societies	  and	  politics.	  
The	   key	   actors	  within	   this	   struggle	   included:	   the	   landed	   oligarchy,	   an	   emerging	  
capitalist	   class,	   the	   military,	   middle-­‐class	   workers,	   the	   union	   movement,	  
democratic	   political	  movements,	   radical	   insurgent	   groups	   and,	   on	   the	  periphery,	  
the	   communists.	  This	   is	   an	  extremely	   complicated	   social	   structure	   that	   varied	   in	  
individual	   nations.	   To	   understand	   the	   interests	   of	   each	   competing	   class	   and	  
organisation	  would	   require	   a	   separate	   thesis	   in	   and	   of	   itself.	   However,	   the	   anti-­‐
communist	  psychosis	   is	   the	   focus	  of	   this	   thesis,	  and	  chapter.	  This	   is	  of	  particular	  
importance	  as	  certain	  classes	  were	  grouped	  together	  and	  defined	  as	  enemies	  of	  the	  
state.	   The	   military	   forces	   became	   hegemonic	   during	   this	   period.	   They	   were	  
supported,	   and	   funded,	   by	   the	   landed	   oligarchy,	   the	   capitalist	   class	   and	   the	   US	  
(Barber	  and	  Ronning,	  1966,	  p.	  38).	  In	  every	  nation	  the	  composition	  of	  support	  was	  
different.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   military	   had	   an	   evolved	   purpose	   in	   Latin	   America.	  
Those	   who	   challenged	   the	   position	   of	   their	   funders	   and	   supporters	   were	  
characterised	  as	  communist	  and,	  in	  turn,	  enemies.	  Democrats,	  unionists,	  peasants	  
or	  reformers	  of	  any	  creed	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  standing	  order.	  The	  roots	  
of	  Operation	  Condor	  lie	  within	  this	  context.	  The	  militaries	  of	  the	  Southern	  Cone	  did	  
not	  make	  an	  isolated	  decision	  to	  target	   leftists.	   It	  was	  part	  of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  
pretext,	  and	  psychosis,	  that	  proliferated	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  from	  the	  1960s	  
onward.	  Under	  this	  pretext,	  a	  war	  was	  waged	  against	  the	  Latin	  American	  people.	  
Any	   dissident	   activity	   was	   closely	   monitored	   and	   eventually	   persecuted.	   The	  
expansion	  of	  military	  capabilities	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  US	  policy	  during	  the	  1960s.	  
While	   the	  US	   could	   not	   foresee,	   and	   often	   condemned,	   the	   human	   rights	   abuses	  
that	   followed,	   it	  was	  directly	  responsible	   for	   the	  conditions	   that	  motivated	  them.	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The	   political-­‐economic	  machinations	   of	   the	   empire	   demanded	   subservience,	   and	  
this	  was	  the	  cost.	  
By	   1965,	   the	   Cold	   War	   had	   been	   institutionalised	   in	   Latin	   America.	   The	  
sides	   were	   established	   for	   the	   bloodiest	   conflict	   in	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere’s	  
twentieth	   century	   history.	   This	   chapter	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   doctrine	   of	  
counter-­‐insurgency,	   under	   the	   pretext	   of	   anti-­‐communism,	   set	   the	   stage	   for	   this	  
conflict.	   This	   conflict	   took	   place	   in	   three	   Cold	   War	   theatres	   during	   the	   1960s:	  
geopolitical,	   political-­‐economic	   and	   militaristic.	   The	   primary	   struggle	   against	  
Castrosim	  required	  a	  submissive	  response.	  Castro’s	  alliance	  with	  the	  USSR	  allowed	  
the	  Cubans	  to	  exist	  peacefully.	  Cuba	  was,	  hence,	  isolated	  from	  its	  geopolitical	  place	  
in	   the	   OAS. 112 	  Second	   were	   the	   domestic	   theatres	   that	   served	   the	   political-­‐
economic	   interests	  of	   the	  US.	  This	   ‘new	  regression’	  allowed	  for	  a	  rapid	  economic	  
integration	  of	  Latin	  America	  into	  the	  world	  economic	  system.	  The	  extermination	  of	  
economic	   nationalism	   was	   largely	   caused	   by	   military	   coups.	   These	   coups	   were	  
predicated	  by	  loans	  and	  grants	  made	  possible	  through	  the	  AFP.	  The	  final	  form	  was	  
direct	  military	   intervention.	   In	   1933	  Cordell	  Hull	   forfeited	  Washington’s	   right	   to	  
invade	  sovereign	  states.	  Thirty-­‐two	  years	  later,	  the	  US	  reclaimed	  their	  militaristic	  
imperial	  presence	   in	  Latin	  America.	  Hence,	   the	  US	  had	  come	   full	   circle.	  While	  US	  
actions	   responded	   to	   individual	   circumstances,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   overlook	   its	  
achievements.	  In	  that	  thirty-­‐two	  years:	  the	  US	  became	  the	  dominant	  trading	  nation	  
in	   the	   Western	   Hemisphere;	   it	   monopolised	   the	   finances	   of	   Latin	   America;	   it	  
monopolised	   weapons	   sales	   and	   military	   training;	   its	   businesses	   flourished;	   it	  
developed	   a	   continually	   improved	   terms	   of	   trade;	   and,	  most	   significantly,	   it	   had	  
demonised	   all	   the	   opponents	   to	   US	   rule	   who	   had	   forced	   Hull	   into	   his	   1933	  
commitment.	  The	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America	  gave	  Washington	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
reclaim	   its	  dominant	  position	   in	  Latin	  America.	   It	  possessed	  subservient	  satellite	  
regimes	   indoctrinated	   to	   the	   psychosis	   of	   anti-­‐communism.	   This	   accounts	   for	   a	  
more	  pervasive	  form	  of	  Imperialism	  to	  that	  merely	  defined	  by	  military	  invasions.	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  An	  isolation	  that	  continued	  until	  June	  3	  2009.	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Conclusion:	  The	  Ghosts	  of	  Soviet	  Communism	  
By	  1965	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  ‘Cold’	  War	  in	  Latin	  America	  had	  effectively	  ended.	  The	  anti-­‐
communist	  paranoia	  of	  the	  early	  Cold	  War	  increased	  during	  the	  ensuing	  decades,	  
as	   many	   of	   the	   conflicts	   turned	   into	   open	   warfare.	   Latin	   American	   oligarchs	  
became	   increasingly	   indoctrinated	   by	   anti-­‐communism.	   By	   the	   late	   1970s,	   the	  
prolonged	  war	  against	   ‘communists,’	   ‘insurgents,’	  political	  opponents,	   academics,	  
journalists,	   unions	  and	  peasants	  had	  gained	  momentum.	  The	  US	   could	  no	   longer	  
control	   the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	   that	   it	  had	  effectively	  unleashed.	  The	  Central	  
American	  states	  of	  Guatemala,	  Nicaragua,	  Panama	  and	  El	  Salvador	  suffered	  under	  
military	  rule	  that	  led	  to	  violent	  civil	  wars	  (LaFeber,	  1984,	  pp.	  240-­‐255).	  Those	  civil	  
wars	  cost	  an	  estimated	  350,000	  lives	  between	  1965	  and	  1990	  (LaFeber,	  1984,	  pp.	  
240-­‐255).	  The	  Sandinista	  victory	   in	  1979	  goaded	   the	  Reagan	  administration	   into	  
launching	  a	  covert	  ‘Contra’	  war	  against	  the	  government	  of	  Daniel	  Ortega	  during	  the	  
1980s,	   without	   congressional	   or	   public	   approval	   (Kinzer,	   1991,	   pp.	   65-­‐75).	   The	  
Caribbean	   region	   saw	   the	   occupation	   of	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
invasion	  of	  Grenada	  in	  October	  1983,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  
Cuban	   Revolution	   (Crandle,	   2006,	   p.	   66;	   Grow,	   2008,	   pp.	   140-­‐143).	   However,	   it	  
was	   in	   South	   America	   that	   the	   full	   toll	   of	   anti-­‐communist	   paranoia	   was	   most	  
visible.	   The	   militarisation	   of	   South	   America	   following	   several	   domestic	   military	  
coups	   and	   the	   US	   intervention	   in	   Chile,	   1973,	   laid	   the	   way	   for	   the	   regional	  
‘Operation	   Condor’	   (Dinges,	   2006,	   pp.	   1-­‐21).	   The	   military	   regimes	   of	   Chile,	  
Argentina	  and	  Uruguay	  waged	  a	  war	  against	  their	  populations	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  
anti-­‐communism	  (Klaiber,	  1998,	  pp.	  71-­‐125);	   this	  was	  a	   transnational	   ‘dirty-­‐war’	  
against	   intellectuals,	   progressives,	   unions,	   peasants	   and	   anyone	   who	   could	   be	  
characterised	  as	  a	   ‘communist’	  (Dinges,	  2006,	  p.	  6).	  This	  thesis	  has	  explained	  the	  
origins	  of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  between	  1933	  and	  1965.	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  
pretext	  were	   the	  hot	  wars	  of	  Latin	  America	   that	  were	  waged	  between	  1965	  and	  
1990.	  	  
	  
Social	  Democracy:	  The	  Myth	  of	  Soviet	  Communism	  
The	  social	  democratic	  movement	  that	  emerged	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  
1930s	  was	  a	  definable	  phenomenon	  with	  transnational	  significance.	  The	  leaders	  of	  
this	  movement	  have	  often	  been	  relegated	  within	  national	  histories.	  However,	  it	  is	  
evident	  that	  there	  is	  an	  ideological	  correlation	  between	  the	  movements	  for	  social	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democracy	  in	  Latin	  America	  between	  1933	  and	  1965.	  Their	  leaders	  –	  Ramón	  Grau	  
and	  Eduardo	  Chibás	  in	  Cuba,	  Rómulo	  Betancourt	  in	  Venezuela,	  Víctor	  Raúl	  Haya	  de	  
la	  Torre	  in	  Peru,	  Jorge	  Eliécer	  Gaitán	  in	  Colombia,	  Lázaro	  Cárdenas	  in	  Mexico,	  José	  
Figueres	  Ferrer	  in	  Costa	  Rica,	  Juan	  José	  Arévalo	  and	  Jacobo	  Árbenz	  in	  Guatemala,	  
and	   Juan	   Bosch	   in	   the	   Dominican	   Republic	   and	   the	   movements	   that	   they	  
represented	   –	   all	   shared	   a	   common	   ideology.	   This	   ideology	   was	   defined	   by	  
“nationalism,	  socialism	  and	  anti-­‐Imperialism”	  (Chibás,	  as	  cited	  in	  Ameringer,	  2000,	  
p.	   34).	   It	   expressed	   itself	   in	   policies	   including	   economic	   nationalism,	   education,	  
healthcare,	   labour	   reform,	   land	   reform	   and	   social	   security.	   These	   policies	   are	  
defined	  within	   the	  European	  political	   tradition	   of	   social	   democracy,	   but	   are	   also	  
present	  within	  the	  American	  New	  Deal.	  Social	  democracy	  is	  evident	  throughout	  the	  
developed	  world.	   It	   is	   the	   standing	   ideology	   of	   all	   parties	   of	   the	   democratic	   left,	  
including	   Labour	   parties.	   Social	   democrats	   seek	   to	   bring	   a	   moderate	   form	   of	  
socialism	   to	   their	   societies	   through	   government	   regulation	   and	   income	  
redistribution	  through	  high	  taxation,	  big	  government	  and	  social	  services.	  This	  was	  
evident	   in	   Latin	   America	   between	   1933	   and	   1965.	   Others	   have	   suggested	   that	  
these	   politicians	   were	   ‘populists’.	   That	   is,	   that	   their	   policies	   were	   designed	   to	  
procure	   maximum	   support	   from	   the	   urban	   and	   rural	   poor.	   Yet	   this	   stance	  
overlooks	   the	   participation	   of	   sectors	   of	   the	   ‘under-­‐classes’	   within	   the	   social	  
democratic	   program.	   It	   also	   overlooks	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   leaders	   clung	   to	   their	  
vision	  through	  times	  of	  intense	  hardship,	  including	  persecution	  and	  exile.	  Populist	  
leaders	  routinely	  alter	  their	  ideological	  stance	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  events.	  This	  
makes	   the	   sacrifice	   of	   the	   generation	   of	   social	   democratic	   leaders	   that	   emerged	  
during	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s	  distinct.	  They	  developed	  an	  Latin	  American	  variation	  
of	   a	   common	  European	   ideology	  designed	   to	  deliver	   incremental	   social	   progress	  
without	  the	  violence	  associated	  with	  communist	  revolutions.	  
A	   brief	   biography	   of	   the	   social	   democratic	   leaders	   and	   their	   associated	  
movements	   has	   also	   been	   provided	   through	   constant	   comparison,	   and	   has	  
demonstrated	   the	   correlations,	   both	   ideological	   and	   chronological,	   between	   the	  
social	  democratic	   leaders.	  Several	   factors	  bind	  this	  group	  together.	  The	  class	  and	  
educational	   origins	   of	   these	   leaders	   were	   a	   significant	   contributor	   to	   their	  
adoption	   of	   social	   democratic	   theory.	   Most	   of	   these	   leaders	   were	   middle-­‐upper	  
class:	   Betancourt’s	   family	   owned	   cattle	   ranches	   in	   Southern	   Venezuela;	   Ramón	  
Grau	   descended	   from	   an	   aristocratic	   tobacco	   growing	   family;	   Arévalo	   studied	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abroad,	  becoming	  a	  professor	  of	  philosophy	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  prior	  to	  his	  return	  to	  
Guatemala;	  while	  Haya	  de	  la	  Torre,	  Figueres,	  Bosch	  and	  Gaitán	  all	  received	  family	  
support	   to	   go	   to	   university.	   This	   set	   them	   apart	   from	   the	   class	   of	   people	  whose	  
interests	   they	   represented.	   Moreover,	   the	   social	   democrats	   were	   middle-­‐class	  
revolutionaries	  who	  sought	  to	  evolve	  the	  political	  system	  for	   ideological	  reasons.	  
Their	   ideology	   was	   developed	   while	   studying	   European	   ideas	   in	   American	   and	  
European	   universities.	  While	   these	   ideas	  would	   have	   likely	   included	   the	   remote	  
theory	  of	  Marxism,	  social	  democracy	  was	  also	  seen	  as	  an	  adaptation	  of	  liberalism.	  
Their	   ideas	   of	   liberalism	   and	   socialism	   were	   fostered	   by	   the	   oppressive	  
dictatorships	  they	  lived	  under.	  Each	  of	  these	  leaders	  reached	  physical	  and	  political	  
maturity	  during	  times	  of	  oppression.	  These	  circumstances	  shaped	  the	  central	  tenet	  
of	   their	   movement,	   the	   anti-­‐dictatorial	   struggle.	   This	   thesis	   has	   explained	   that	  
these	   leaders	  were	  similar	   in	   their	  upbringing,	   their	  education	  and	  their	  political	  
situation.	   This	   shaped	   the	   views	   of	   those	  who	   created	   the	   Latin	  American	   social	  
democratic	  movement.	  
This	   thesis	  has	  explained	   the	  policies	  of	  economic	  nationalism	  and	  how	   it	  
was	   characterised	  within	   the	   ‘communist	   line’	   by	   the	   US.	   Economic	   nationalism	  
emerged	  within	   the	   social	   democratic	   philosophy	   of	   “nationalism,	   socialism	   and	  
anti-­‐imperialism”	   (Chibás,	   as	   cited	   in	   Ameringer,	   2000,	   p.	   34).	   Moreover,	   the	  
emphasis	  on	  serving	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  nation	  over	  that	  of	  foreign	  empires,	  both	  
formal	  and	  informal,	  was	  the	  economic	  foundation	  of	  social	  democracy.	  It	  required	  
the	   strict	   regulation	   of	   the	  market	   economies	   in	   order	   to	   gradually	   increase	   the	  
quality	   of	   life	   of	   the	   citizenry.	   The	   Latin	   American	   version	   of	   this	   philosophy	  
emerged	  during	  the	  1930s	  in	  Mexico.	  The	  presidency	  of	  Lázaro	  Cárdenas	  saw	  the	  
expropriation	   of	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   foreign-­‐owned	   agricultural	   property	   and,	  
more	   significantly,	   the	   foreign-­‐owned	   oil	   reserves.	   Mexico	   also	   created	   the	  
platforms	  for	  agrarian	  reform,	  market	  reform	  and	  labour	  reform.	  These	  actions	  set	  
the	   precedent	   for	   those	   emerging	   social	   democratic	   regimes	   of	   the	   1940s.	  
Expropriation	   of	   land	   and	   resources	  was	   emulated	   in	   Venezuela	   and	  Guatemala.	  
Market	   reform	  was	   emulated	   in	   Peru.	   Meanwhile,	   labour	   reforms	   were	   enacted	  
throughout	   the	  social	  democratic	   regimes.	  The	  social	  democratic	  governments	  of	  
the	  1940s	  were	  engaged	  in	  a	  moderate	  revolution	  that	  swung	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
from	   the	   ruling	  oligarchic	   class	   towards	   the	  urban	  and	  rural	  poor.	  Unfortunately	  
for	  those	  leaders	  embracing	  this	  moderate	  form	  of	  socialism,	  the	  global	  Cold	  War	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emerged	   in	   the	   1940s.	   This	   effectively	   meant	   that	   their	   reforms	   were	   viewed	  
within	   the	   context	   of	   that	   Cold	  War.	   Hence,	   they	  were	   required	   to	   abandon	   the	  
reforms	   that	   the	   US	   characterised	   as	   ‘the	   communist	   line.’	   In	   its	   dealing	   with	  
Mexico	   in	   1949,	   the	   communist	   line	   was	   defined	   as	   “any	   radical	   ideas	   they	  
disapproved	   of”	   (as	   cited	   in	   Niblo,	   2006,	   p.	   236).	   This	   demonised	   the	  moderate	  
actions	   of	   economic	   nationalists,	   relegating	   their	   potential	   to	   historical	   and	  
economic	  irrelevancy.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  social	  democracy	  posed	  a	  challenge	  to	  US	  
global	   interests	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	   WWII,	   from	   which	   the	   it	   emerged	   as	   the	  
undisputed	  victor.	  It	  had	  reshaped	  the	  international	  system,	  including	  its	  economy.	  
The	  European	  empires	  had	  been	  dismantled	  and	  the	  US	  stood	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  
capitalist	   world.	   This	   reality	   was	   pervasive	   in	   Latin	   America.	   Prior	   to	   the	   Great	  
Depression,	   the	  US	  had	  not	  held	  a	  dominant	  economic	  position	   in	  Latin	  America.	  
British	   and	   German	   trade	   and	   investment	   was	   significant	   throughout	   South	  
America,	   while	   the	   US	   focussed	   on	   the	   small	   Caribbean	   plantation	   states.	   The	  
political	   effects	   of	   WWII	   brought	   Latin	   America	   into	   Washington’s	   sphere	   of	  
influence	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  However,	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  Charter	  and	  Four	  
Freedoms	   masked	   its	   political	   and	   economic	   intentions.	   With	   the	   closure	   of	  
markets	   in	   Eastern	   Europe	   in	   1945	   and	   China	   in	   1949,	   the	   US	   placed	   increased	  
emphasis	   on	   its	   economic	   interaction	  with	   Latin	   America.	   Unfortunately	   for	   the	  
burgeoning	   social	   democratic	   movement,	   and	   those	   populists	   in	   Argentina	   and	  
Brazil,	  the	  US	  philosophy	  of	  free	  trade	  liberalism	  was	  a	  direct	  contradiction	  to	  the	  
policies	   of	   economic	   nationalism	   in	   Latin	   America.	   While	   the	   Guatemalan	   case	  
provided	  the	  most	  glaring	  example	  of	  the	  US	  interfering	  in	  the	  domestic	  economy	  
of	  a	  sovereign	  democratic	  state,	   it	  was	  not	  unique.	  During	   the	   late	  1940s,	   the	  US	  
waged	  economic	  warfare	  against	  the	  populist	  revolution	  of	  Perón	  in	  Argentina.	  It	  
ensured	  that	  Argentina	  would	  remain	  a	  poor	  appendage	  of	  the	  capitalist	  system	  by	  
blocking	   finance	   and	  markets	   to	   Europe	   and	   isolating	   Argentinean	   goods	  within	  
inter-­‐American	  trade.	  The	  US	  was	  threatened	  by	  economic	  nationalism	  because	  its	  
own	  national	  interest	  focussed	  on	  increasing	  domestic	  output	  of	  industrial	  goods,	  
which	   required	   cheap	   raw	   materials.	   While	   Latin	   America	   decreased	   in	  
significance	   throughout	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   due	   to	   decolonisation,	   it	   provided	  
the	   economic	   platform	   for	   the	  US	   to	   become	   the	   global	   hegemon	   between	   1933	  
and	  1950.	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These	   social	   democrats	   were	   not	   communists.	   The	   thesis	   has	   provided	  
extensive	   research	   into	   the	   Latin	   American	   communist	   movement	   that	  
demonstrates	   the	   peripheral	   nature	   of	   Marxism.	   Communism	   is	   a	   revolutionary	  
philosophy	  that	  involves	  the	  violent	  overthrow	  of	  a	  society	  to	  create	  class	  equality.	  
This	  requires	  the	  dismantling	  of	  all	  sectors	  of	  government	  and	  the	  capitalist	  class.	  
The	  Moscow-­‐orientated	  parties	  of	  Latin	  America	  were	  never	  able	  to	  gain	  support	  
for	   this	   vision.	   Even	   those	   quasi-­‐communist	   revolutions	   in	   Cuba	   and	   Nicaragua	  
preached	   an	   evolutionary	   economic	   program	   and	   emerged	   outside	   of	   the	  
communist	  movement.	  The	  social	  democrats	  advocated	  an	  evolutionary	  response	  
to	   economic	   challenges.	   Similar	   to	   their	   European	   counterparts,	   they	   sought	   to	  
bring	  about	  socialism	  through	  slow	  pragmatic	  changes	  that	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  
majority	   of	   the	   population.	   These	   changes	   improved	   the	   lives	   of	   the	   rural	   and	  
urban	  poor	   enough	   to	   gain	   support	   for	   renewed	   changes.	  The	   fatal	   flaw	   in	  Latin	  
America,	   when	   compared	   to	   post-­‐war	   Western	   Europe,	   was	   the	   reactionary	  
response	  to	  these	  evolutionary	  changes	  by	  the	  oligarchic	  classes	  and	  their	  military	  
backers.	  The	  distinction	  between	  communism	  and	  democratic	  socialism	  is	  key	  to	  
this	   thesis.	   Yes,	   some	   of	   the	   outcomes	   were	   similar.	   Both	   advocated	   large-­‐scale	  
social	  changes	  that	  would	  re-­‐shape	  their	  national	  political	  discourse.	  However,	  the	  
threat	  that	  the	  US	  suggested	  and	  propagated	  through	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  
did	   not	   exist.	   The	   assertion	   that	   the	   Moscow-­‐orientated	   parties	   dominated	   the	  
social	   democratic	   movement	   was	   false.	   The	   social	   democrats	   were	   nationalists	  
who	  had	  no	  allegiance	  to	  Moscow.	  In	  fact,	  their	  philosophy	  was	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  
American	  New	  Deal,	  and	  they	  constantly	  reiterated	  their	  support	  for	  the	  US	  in	  their	  
Cold	  War	  with	  Russia.	  	  
	   	  
The	  Anti-­‐communist	  Pretext:	  The	  Convenient	  Enemy	  
This	   thesis	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   use	   of	   anti-­‐communist	   propaganda	  
was	   an	   intentional	   mechanism	   to	   destabilise	   governments	   that	   confronted	   US	  
regional	  interests.	  This	  preceded	  any	  notion	  of	  a	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America.	  In	  fact,	  
it	   significantly	   preceded	   the	   global	   Cold	  War.	   America’s	   disdain	   for	   progressive	  
politics	   had	   created	   a	   prolonged	   paranoia	   around	   the	   term	   ‘communism.’	   Anti-­‐
communist	  characterisation	  was	  levied	  at:	  Mexico	  and	  Nicaragua	  in	  1927	  by	  Frank	  
Kellogg;	  Peruvian	  Apristas	  in	  1931	  by	  Fred	  Dearing;	  Cuban	  Auténticos	  in	  1933-­‐4	  by	  
Sumner	  Welles;	  Colombian	  Gaitánistas	  in	  1948	  by	  George	  C	  Marshall;	  Guatemala’s	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democracy	  in	  1954	  by	  John	  F.	  Dulles;	  Peruvian	  and	  Venezuelan	  protesters	  in	  1958	  
by	   Richard	  M.	   Nixon;	   and	   the	   Dominican	   Democrats	   led	   by	   Juan	   Bosch	   in	   1965,	  
leading	   to	  Lyndon	  B.	   Johnson’s	   invasion.	  Moreover,	   anti-­‐communism	  was	  a	   long-­‐
standing	   philosophy	   of	   American	   diplomats	   in	   Latin	   America.	   As	   has	   been	  
demonstrated,	  accusations	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  were	  not	  only	  levied	  at	  communist	  
parties	  and	  associated	  organisations	  but	  also	  came	  to	  include	  the	  social	  democratic	  
movement.	   This	  was	   an	   effective	   pretext	   as	   ‘communism’	  was	   seen	   as	   a	   foreign	  
ideology	  that	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  Latin	  American	  sovereignty.	   Ironically,	   those	  who	  
were	   characterised	   as	   part	   of	   the	   ‘communist	   line’	   were	   the	   same	   leaders	   who	  
were	   attempting	   to	   protect	   national	   sovereignty	   from	   the	   invasion	   of	   free-­‐trade	  
capitalism.	  
The	   US	   brought	   the	   Cold	   War	   to	   Latin	   America	   from	   April	   9,	   1948.	   The	  
period	   preceding	   the	   Colombian	  Bogotázo	   witnessed	   a	   democratic	   revolution	   in	  
Latin	  America.	  Ten	  dictatorial	  governments	  fell	   to	  democratic	  advocates	  between	  
1941	  and	  1948.	  This	  left	  only	  five	  military	  regimes	  administering	  the	  twenty	  Latin	  
American	  republics	  that	  existed	  in	  early	  1948.	  While	  social	  gains	  were	  limited	  and	  
short-­‐lived	   in	   Haiti,	   El	   Salvador	   and	   Honduras,	   social	   democratic	   governments	  
were	  established	  in	  Guatemala,	  Cuba,	  Venezuela,	  Peru	  and	  Costa	  Rica	  (Ameringer,	  
2009,	   pp.	   130-­‐170).	   Additionally,	   elections	   in	   Brazil	   and	   Argentina	   consolidated	  
the	  gains	  of	  those	  military	  populist	  leaders	  (Rapoport,	  1992,	  p.	  117;	  Bethal,	  1992,	  
p.	  45).	  Moreover,	  a	  democratic	  revolution	  swept	  through	  Latin	  America	  during	  this	  
period.	  This	  democratic	  revolution	  posed	  a	  unique	  threat	  to	  American	  interests	  in	  
the	  hemisphere,	  as	  explained	  above.	  Hence,	  when	  the	  Colombian	  Bogotázo	  erupted	  
in	   response	   to	  Gaitán’s	   assassination	  on	  April	   9,	   1948,	   the	  US	  Secretary	  of	   State,	  
George	  C.	  Marshall,	  created	  a	  calculated	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
While	   in	  Bogotá	   for	   the	   first	  meeting	  of	   the	  OAS	  during	  the	  Bogotázo,	  He	  posited	  
that	  the	  domestic	  unrest	  was	  intertwined	  with	  the	  global	  Cold	  War	  that	  the	  US	  was	  
waging	   in	   Eurasia.	   Despite	   Marshall’s	   department	   keeping	   extensive	   records	   on	  
Gaitán’s	   movement,	   and	   acknowledging	   that	   neither	   he,	   nor	   his	   followers,	   were	  
communists,	  Marshall	  concluded	  that	  events	  in	  Colombia	  must	  be	  seen	  within	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.	  This	  calculated	  falsification	  led	  the	  OAS	  delegations	  
to	  commit	  to	  condemn	  regional	  communism.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  explained	  how	  this	  anti-­‐communist	  pretext	  worked	  after	  its	  
emergence	  between	  1948	  and	  1950.	  Following	  the	  establishment	  of	  this	  pretext	  in	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April	   1948,	   the	   gains	   made	   by	   democrats	   were	   reversed.	   Conservative	   military	  
coups	  occurred	  in	  Peru,	  Venezuela,	  Cuba,	  Colombia,	  Haiti,	  Paraguay	  and	  Argentina	  
between	   1948	   and	   1955.	   Additionally,	   the	   US	   overthrew	   the	   Guatemalan	  
government	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  President,	  Getúlio	  Vargas,	  committed	  suicide	  while	  
enduring	  constant	  military	  pressure.	  This	  regional	  regression	  was	  motivated	  by	  an	  
altered	   stance	   on	   democracy	   within	   the	   US	   State	   Department.	   Cold	   War	  
pragmatists	   overtook	   the	   Latin	   American	   Bureau	   of	   the	   US	   State	   Department	  
during	  the	  McCarthyist	  crusade	  of	  the	  second	  Truman	  administration.	  This	  caused	  
an	   abandonment	   of	   the	   pro-­‐democratic	   vision	   of	   Latin	   America	   held	   by	   the	  
moderate	  Spruille	  Braden.	  Cold	  War	  realpolitik	  replaced	   this	  view.	  Following	   the	  
extensive	   reports	   into	   Latin	   American	   democracy	   and	   the	   communist	   threat	  
authored	   by	   George	   Kennan,	   Louis	   Halle	   and	   Francis	   Truslow,	   the	   US	  
Undersecretary	  of	  State	  for	  Inter-­‐American	  Affairs,	  George	  Miller,	  enacted	  an	  anti-­‐
communist	  doctrine,	  which	  favoured	  Latin	  American	  military	  regimes	  as	  a	  regional	  
bulwark	   against	   an	   advancing	   ‘communist’	   threat.	  While	   the	   ‘communist’	   threat	  
included	   progressive	   thinkers,	   such	   as	   social	   democrats,	   the	   Latin	   American	  
militaries	  quickly	  seized	  upon	  the	  promise	  of	  international	  recognition	  granted	  by	  
Washington’s	   anti-­‐democratic	   stance.	   These	   military	   governments	   opened	   their	  
intelligence	  files	  to	  the	  CIA	  on	  democrats	  and	  communists	  alike.	  They	  also	  actively	  
persecuted	   individuals	   posing	   threats	   to	   their	   longevity	   and	   US	   interests	   in	   the	  
region.	   While	   the	   US	   was	   only	   actively	   involved	   in	   Guatemala,	   it	   was	   implicitly	  
involved	   in	   all	   of	   the	  military	   coups	   as	   it	   began	   the	   regional	   regression	   against	  
democracy	  through	  the	  pretext	  of	  anti-­‐communism.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  altered	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  
‘Cold	   War’	   in	   Latin	   America	   between	   1959	   and	   1965.	   The	   Sierra	   Maestra	  
movement	  was	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  a	  regional	  backlash	  against	  dictatorial	  governance	  
in	   Latin	   America.	   Once	   again,	   between	   1956	   and	   1961	   ten	   dictatorial	   leaders	  
succumbed	  to	  more	  progressive	  forces.	  Cuba	  however	  was	  unique.	  It	  had	  an	  armed	  
revolution	  that	  allied	  the	  interests	  of	  middle-­‐class	  urban	  revolutionaries	  with	  the	  
rural	   peasantry	   through	   guerrilla	   warfare.	   Castro’s	   intellectual	   evolution	   took	  
place	  within	  the	  social	  democratic	  tradition,	  but	  he	  became	  increasingly	  frustrated	  
with	  its	  leaders’	  inability	  to	  enact	  meaningful	  reform	  or	  assert	  independence	  from	  
the	   US.	   Hence,	   he	   followed	   Eddy	   Chibás	   into	   the	   breakaway	   organisation	   of	   the	  
Ortodoxos,	  which	  was	  further	  radicalised	  by	  Chibás’	  death	  in	  1951	  and	  the	  Batista	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coup	  of	  1952.	  This	  radicalisation	  process	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  
cadre	   which,	   after	   the	   failed	   assault	   in	   1953,	   sought	   to	   overthrow	   the	   Batista	  
regime.	   The	   Castro	   movement	   was	   underestimated	   by	   every	   sector.	   Social	  
democrats,	  both	  in	  Cuba	  and	  in	  greater	  Latin	  America,	  supported	  it,	  believing	  that	  
Castro	  would	  restore	  democracy	  and	  pragmatic	  reform.	  The	  US	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  
a	  domestic	  revolution	  could	  challenge	  its	  position	  in	  Latin	  America	  until	  its	  victory	  
was	  assured	  in	  late	  1958.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  thought	  little	  of	  Castro’s	  attempts	  as	  it	  
had	  avoided	  acting	  in	  America’s	  sphere	  of	  influence	  prior	  to	  1960.	  However,	  during	  
1959	   and	  1960	  Castro	   changed	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   revolutionary	   struggle	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   He	   distanced	   himself	   from	   the	   social	   democrats	   and	   drew	   closer	   to	  
Marxism,	  despite	  his	  loathing	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Moscow-­‐orientated	  party.	  The	  regional	  
euphoria	   over	   Castro’s	   revolution	   led	   young	   discontents	   in	   Latin	   America	   to	  
attempt	   to	   emulate	   his	   efforts.	   Throughout	   the	   region	   the	   social	   democratic	  
movement	   splintered	  as	   radical	  wings	   turned	   to	  armed	  struggle,	   in	   certain	   cases	  
against	   their	   former	   leaders.	  While	   Castro	   did	   not	   begin	   as	   a	   communist,	   he	   did	  
change	   the	   approach	   to	   socialism	   in	   Latin	   America.	   The	   constitutional	   road	  was	  
replaced	   by	   a	   group	   of	   violent	   insurgencies	   that	   shook	   Latin	   America	   between	  
1961	  and	  1965.	  Ironically,	  these	  insurgencies	  were	  still	  not	  led	  by	  communists,	  but	  
by	  urban	  discontents	  of	  the	  social	  democratic	  movement.	  
Finally,	  this	  thesis	  has	  laid	  the	  platform	  for	  a	  thorough	  revision	  of	  Cold	  War	  
historiography.	  It	  does	  not	  claim	  to	  be	  a	  holistic	  revision	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  
America.	  Instead,	  it	  has	  used	  selected	  case	  studies	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  emergence	  
of	   a	   social	   democratic	   movement	   and	   a	   sustained	   campaign	   against	   it.	   It	   has	  
however	   challenged	  many	   assumptions,	   including	   that:	   the	   Latin	   American	   Cold	  
War	   was	   a	   proxy	   theatre	   of	   the	   global	   struggle;	   communists	   were	   the	   primary	  
target	   of	   anti-­‐communism;	   the	   US	   believed	   there	   was	   a	   genuine	   communist	  
menace	   in	   the	  Bogotázo;	  Guatemala	  was	  an	   isolated	  Cold	  War	  error	  made	  by	   the	  
Eisenhower	   administration;	   Latin	   America,	   as	   a	   region,	   was	   ever	   in	   danger	   of	  
turning	  ‘communist;’	  the	  Cold	  War	  began	  in	  1959,	  with	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution;	  the	  
insurgent	  movements	   were	   led	   by	  Moscow;	   and	   that	   the	   US	   wanted	   to	   support	  
change	   through	   its	   Alliance	   for	   Progress.	   This	   thesis	   has	   brought	   together	  many	  
narratives	  to	  support	  its	  central	  arguments.	  Yet	  it	  has	  also	  left	  several	  areas	  open	  
to	   reinterpretation.	   This	   reinterpretation	   is	   necessary	   to	   a	   full	   understanding	   of	  
the	  Cold	  War	   in	   Latin	  America.	   There	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   revisionist	   history	   in	   this	   area	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beyond	  the	  central	  case	  studies	  of	  Guatemala,	  Cuba,	  Chile	  and	  Nicaragua.	  The	  Latin	  
American	   Cold	  War	   cost	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	   lives	   and	   created	  millions	   of	  
internal	   refugees.	   A	   revision	   of	   its	   causes	   is	   significant	   to	   understanding	   this	  
generational	  conflict	  and	  to	  preventing	  a	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  reoccurrence.	  	  
	  
Contribution	  to	  the	  field	  
This	  thesis	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  field	  of	  study	  a	  political	  definition	  of	  the	  
Latin	   American	   social	   democratic	   movement.	   Relatively	   little	   work	   has	   been	  
conducted	   into	   the	   transnational	   nature	   of	   this	   political	   movement	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   The	  work	   that	   has	   been	   completed	   has	   focussed	   disproportionately	   on	  
Castroism	  and	  populism	  within	  the	  discourse.	  This	  thesis	  has	  applied	  the	  political	  
scaffold	  of	  social	  democracy	  onto	  a	  generation	  of	  political	  leaders	  in	  Latin	  America.	  
In	   doing	   so,	   it	   has	   offered	   the	  political	   definition	  of	   that	   generation.	  While	   these	  
leaders’	   policies	   fit	   within	   the	   concept	   of	   social	   democracy,	   however,	   they	  were	  
developed	  independently	  to	  the	  Socialist	   International,	  which	  emerged	  in	  Europe	  
after	   WWII.	   Hence,	   the	   Latin	   Americans	   responded	   to	   their	   individual	   political	  
crises	  by	  creating	  a	  more	   ‘Latin’	  version	  of	  social	  democracy.	  America’s	  apparent	  
endorsement	  of	  democratic	  rule	  was	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite.	  The	  failure	  to	  apply	  
the	  more	  radical	  doctrine	  of	  communism	  to	   the	  Latin	  American	  condition	  was	   in	  
fact	   the	   failure	   to	   apply	   the	   theoretical	   doctrine	   to	   the	   actual	   political	  
circumstances.	  The	  ability	  to	  alter	  their	  political	  platform	  within	  their	   ideological	  
convictions	  allowed	   the	  social	  democrats	   to	  be	  adaptable.	  The	  political	  economic	  
circumstances	  were	  different	   from	  Mexico	   to	  Cuba,	   from	  Guatemala	   to	  Colombia	  
and	  from	  Peru	  to	  Costa	  Rica.	  Hence,	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  social	  democrats	  had	  to	  be	  
applicable	  to	  the	  circumstances.	  Nevertheless,	  their	  constant	  ideological	  conviction	  
to	   adhere	   to	   this	   democratic	   form	   of	   socialism	   remained,	   even	   as	   the	   policies	  
changed.	  Social	  democracy	  was	  a	  unique	  political	  view	  in	  Latin	  American	  history.	  
This	  thesis	  has	  demonstrated	  how	  it	  emerged	  and	  adapted	  to	  the	  Latin	  American	  
condition.	  
The	   thesis	   has	   also	   provided	   a	   reinterpretation	   of	   the	   political	   economic	  
influence	  upon	  regional	  historic	  events.	  It	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  
each	   social	   democratic	   party	  were	   dictated	   by	   their	   economic	   circumstances.	   In	  
Venezuela,	   the	   emphasis	   was	   on	   the	   utilisation	   of	   increased	   oil	   revenues	   to	  
redistribute	   income	   and	   social	   services	   to	   a	   greater	   number	   of	   individuals.	   In	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Guatemala,	   however,	   the	   only	   discernible	   commodity	  was	   land.	  Hence	   the	   social	  
democratic	  movement	  there	  focussed	  on	  land	  reform	  and	  the	  modernisation	  of	  the	  
agrarian	  economy.	  The	  ideological	  purpose	  was	  the	  same	  –	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  
of	   life	   for	   the	   greatest	   amount	   of	   people.	   However	   the	   resources,	   and	   thus	   the	  
polices,	  were	  very	  different.	  Political	  economy	  also	  defined	  the	  class	  conflicts	  that	  
followed	   evolutionary	   social	   democratic	   policies	   such	   as	   land	   and	   commodity	  
reform.	  In	  agrarian	  economies	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Guatemala,	  the	  dominant	  
class	  was	   the	   rural	  oligarchy.	  Hence,	   they	   responded	  by	   supporting	   conservative	  
military	   coups.	   In	   Argentina,	   the	   class	   structure	   was	   far	   more	   complex,	   with	  
industrial	   and	   foreign	   influences	   being	   negotiated	   against	   the	   Perónist	   union	  
movement	   and	   military	   influences.	   The	   political	   economy	   shaped	   the	   political	  
condition.	   It	   also	   defined	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   US	   would	   go	   to	   prevent	  
evolutionary	   change.	   There	   can	   be	   no	   generalisation	   within	   Latin	   American	  
politics;	   there	   is	   far	   too	  much	   diversity.	   This	   thesis	   has	   attempted	   to	   define	   the	  
ideology	  over	  the	  political	  party.	  Each	  political	  party	  was	  unique	  and	  their	  policies	  
reflected	   national	   conditions.	   This	   complex	   situation	   has	   prevented	   a	   thorough	  
political,	  or	  political	  economic,	  analysis	  of	  the	  social	  democrats	  until	  this	  stage.	  
	   This	  thesis	  has	  also	  offered	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  events	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  
Cold	   War	   in	   Latin	   America,	   the	   most	   violent	   period	   in	   the	   region’s	   twentieth	  
century	  history.	  It	  has	  paid	  especial	  attention	  to	  rhetoric	  and	  propaganda.	  In	  many	  
ways,	  the	  Latin	  American	  Cold	  War	  emerged	  through	  anti-­‐communist	  propaganda.	  
The	   mischaracterisation	   of	   social	   democratic	   and	   populist	   leaders	   led	   to	   two	  
widespread	   conservative	   regressions	   in	   Latin	   America	   between	   1948	   and	   1965.	  
The	   US	   was	   pivotal	   in	   extending	   the	   anti-­‐communist	   paranoia	   that	   created	   and	  
reasserted	   the	   pretext.	   Latin	   American	   history	   contains	   several	   dictatorial-­‐
democratic	   cycles.	   It	   would	   not	   therefore	   be	   wise	   to	   say	   that	   every	   coup	   was	  
directly	   motivated	   by	   the	   US	   or	   anti-­‐communism.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   distinct	  
pattern	   in	   the	   causes	   and	   timing	   of	   dozens	   of	  military	   coups.	   And	   certainly,	   the	  
domestic	   militaries	   used	   anti-­‐communism	   as	   a	   pretext	   for	   coups	   that	   they	   may	  
have	   undertaken	   anyway.	   However,	   this	   supports	   the	   thesis’	   position.	   The	   US	  
created	   a	   climate	   in	   which	   the	   Latin	   American	   conservative	   militaries	   could	  
remove	  progressive	  democratic	   governments	   and,	   in	   turn,	   receive	  US	  diplomatic	  
and	  financial	  support	  for	  doing	  so.	  This	  thesis	  is	  not	  suggesting	  that	  none	  of	  these	  
coups	  would	  have	  occurred	  without	  anti-­‐communism.	  However,	  the	  US	  did	  swing	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the	  pendulum	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  conservative	  militaries	  against	  the	  social	  democrats	  
under	  the	  pretext	  of	  anti-­‐communism.	  This	  was	  the	  principal	  battleground	  of	   the	  
Latin	   American	   Cold	  War.	   The	   struggle	   encompassed	   far	   more	   than	   Guatemala,	  
Cuba,	  Chile	  and	  Nicaragua.	   It	  was	  a	   continental	   struggle	  between	  distinct	  visions	  
for	   the	   region’s	   participation	   within	   the	   global	   capitalist	   economy.	   The	   US	  
propagated	  one	  vision.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  condoned	  and	  supported	  several	  military	  
regimes	  that	  oppressed	  their	  populations.	  
Finally,	  this	  thesis	  has	  provided	  a	  historical	  lens	  through	  which	  to	  view	  the	  
political	  movements	  of	  modern	  Latin	  America	  that	  will	  be	  applicable	  to	  studies	  on	  
‘twenty-­‐first	   century	   socialism’.	   This	   thesis	   has	   demonstrated	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
struggle	  between	  two	  ideological	  visions.	  This	  struggle	  re-­‐emerged	  after	  the	  Cold	  
War.	   Once	   again,	   propaganda	   was	   used	   to	   discredit	   the	   reform	   regimes	   of	  
Venezuela,	   Bolivia,	   Ecuador,	   Nicaragua,	   Honduras,	   Argentina	   and	   Paraguay.	   This	  
propaganda	   highlighted	   the	   use	   of	   socialism	   that	   unfairly	   targeted	   the	  wealthier	  
elements	   of	   Latin	   American	   society.	   The	   US	   and	   conservative	   media	   sources	  
characterised	  these	  leaders	  as	  a	  violent	  minority	  that	  were	  harming	  their	  societies.	  
Given	   that	   each	   of	   these	   leaders	  was	   elected,	   this	   accusation	  was	   a	   falsification.	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   propaganda	   seriously	   damaged	   each	   of	   those	   reform	   regimes,	  
with	   the	   downfall	   of	   leaders	   in	   Honduras	   and	   Paraguay	   and	   the	   significant	  
weakening	  of	   the	  others.	  This	  demonstrates	  a	  historical	  correlation	   to	   the	   thesis’	  
focus	  area.	  Propaganda	  is	  an	  effective	  foreign	  policy	  mechanism.	  It	  allowed	  the	  US	  
to	  reshape	  Latin	  America	  in	  its	  service	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  This	  pattern	  of	  foreign	  
policy	  by	  propaganda	  has	  re-­‐emerged	   in	  recent	  years.	  Hence,	   the	  position	  of	   this	  
thesis	   is	   still	   relevant	   to	   modern	   Latin	   American	   politics.	   As	   George	   Santayana	  
(1998)	   famously	   uttered,	   “those	  who	   cannot	   remember	   the	   past	   are	   condemned	  
repeat	   it”	   (p.	   46).	   Thus,	   the	   thesis	   has	   attempted	   to	   expose	   the	   propaganda	  
strategy	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  is	  being	  emulated	  in	  modern	  Latin	  America.	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